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Social Science Text-Books

EDITED BY RICHARD T. ELY, PH.D., LL.D.

Director of the Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public Utilities and Research Professor of Economics, in Northwestern University

OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY

SOCIAL SCIENCE TEXT-BOOKS

EDITED BY RICHARD T. ELY, PH.D., LL.D.

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OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS (Fifth Edition)
By RICHARD T. ELY, PH.D., LL.D. Revised and enlarged by the AUTHOR and THOMAS S. ADAMS, PH.D., MAX O. LORENZ, PH.D., ALLYN A. YOUNG, PH.D.

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OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY

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THIRD EDITION

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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

So widespread has been the insistence on the part of teachers of sociology throughout the United States that this book be not allowed to die that the authors have once more undertaken its revision. Such has been the development of sociology in this country during the last few years that a revision has meant a somewhat thorough rewriting. However, in doing this those characteristics which have made it a widely used text have been conserved. It has no hobbies to ride, no one system to promote. It attempts as from its first appearance to present in terms understandable by the student and teachable by the instructor a clear analysis of society, how society has developed, the processes by which society functions, and some of the maladjustments which result from the social process.

Many of the chapters have had to be rewritten, others have had to be somewhat changed to bring them up to date with the growth of the subject. Part VI has been entirely eliminated, and several new chapters have been added. It is unnecessary to detail these changes as everyone familiar with the previous editions will discover them for himself.

The authors wish to express their grateful appreciation to the teachers of sociology throughout the United States and Europe for the kindly reception the book has had in the sixteen years of its life, and also for the many friendly suggestions they have received for its improvement.

J. L. Gillin
F. W. Blackmar

April, 1930.

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

With the growing interest in sociology both on the part of students in the colleges and universities and on the part of an increasing number of other people organized into study clubs there is need of a comprehensive outline of the subject. Moreover, the rapid growth of the subject makes a new book imperative every few years in order that students may keep up with the development. This book is intended to meet the requirements of teachers of the subject in the colleges and universities and also to provide a comprehensive survey of the field for the general reader as well as for the large number of clubs interested in the study of social questions of vital interest.

The writers have kept constantly in mind the teacher. The book is divided into parts, each of which deals with a particular aspect of the subject, thus assisting the instructor in the sometimes difficult task of making clear the main divisions of the subject. Thus, Part I defines the subject and points out the practical purpose of its study; Part II outlines the way in which some of the more important social ideas and institutions have come to be what they are; Part III and Part IV attempt to present an analysis of society from the genetic point of view, the former from the standpoint of the working of unconscious forces, the latter with reference to the part played by social ideals in social development; Part V deals with social pathology, a phase of social life which cannot well be omitted if the student is to be given an adequate conception of the nature of society; Part VI is an attempt to vitalize the study of sociology by giving the student an opportunity to make a first-hand study of society and to supply a few simple principles to guide him in the making of such a study; Part VII rounds out the beginner's conception of the subject by briefly setting forth the essential differences between social philosophy and social science in the endeavor to give the student a clear conception of the nature of social science

and an acquaintance with the names of those who have had a part in its creation. The division of the book into parts has the added advantage that certain parts, for example, the last two Parts, may be omitted in a course where time will not permit covering the whole book.

It is hoped that the questions and exercises at the end of each chapter will serve to quicken the student's interest in the subject, as well as serve as a convenient means whereby the instructor may stimulate fruitful discussions in class. The questions are framed with the purpose of calling forth independent thinking. In many cases some additional reading, as well as independent thought, will be required. The references at the end of each chapter are not offered as a complete bibliography on the subject, but are intended to indicate supplementary reading for both the teacher and the interested student.

The authors are under special obligations to Professor Ely, the editor of the Series, and to Professor Ross, both of whom have read the book in manuscript and have given unstintedly of their time and thought in making many valuable criticisms and suggestions.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The widespread use of this book as a text among colleges and universities has led to a demand that it be revised and brought up to date. In the seven years since it was originally published, numerous contributions have been made to sociological literature and much new statistical material on certain parts of it has been published. During these years since its first publication it has been possible to put to the acid test of trial the methods of presentation and the treatment of subjects in this book. As a result of the kindly suggestions of teachers throughout the United States, certain chapters have been rewritten and some rearrangement of material has been made in the interest of greater clearness of presentation and teachability. It is adapted to the introductory course in colleges and universities and also provides an outline of the entire field in those institutions which can offer but one course in Sociology.

In the revision, in addition to thorough-going changes in each of the chapters to bring the matter up to date and to improve the method of presentation, the following radical changes have been made: The chapters on the "Social Phases of Production and Consumption of Wealth" and on "Exchange as a Social Function" have been entirely discarded and two new chapters inserted in their place, the first on the "Origin and Development of Property" and the second on the "Social Results of Economic Activities."

The chapter on "The Development of Religion" has been entirely rewritten. In Part Three, the arrangement has been somewhat changed. The first two chapters (Chapters XVII and XVIII) remain in the order in which they originally stood. Chapter XIX retains its original title of "Psychical Activities," but has been entirely rewritten. Chapter XX is on "Collective Behavior" and Chapter XXI is on "Social Laws," — changes in the interest of a more logical development of the subject treated in this part, and of greater concreteness.

In Part Four, Chapter XXIX on "The Estimation of Progress" has been entirely rewritten.

The revised book now ends with Part Six. Part Seven revised has been made an appendix to the volume, thus giving greater unity to the treatment and making the volume more serviceable to teachers of the subject in college classrooms.

F. W. Blackmar
J. L. Gillin

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PART ONE

THE NATURE AND IMPORT OF SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL LIFE

Dependence of the Individual. — How dependent is the individual upon others, in spite of the fact that he often assumes that he can do as he pleases. He feels that his will is free to choose his course. So strong is this feeling of self-sufficiency that in moments when it most completely masters him he acts with a total disregard of the facts of his material environment and of the thoughts and feelings of his fellows. If physical material is in his way, he has but to remove it, his success being measured by his power to do so. If his fellows attempt to thwart his plans, he has but to thrust them aside and his purpose is accomplished. This ever present, persistent, self-assertive ego of man is constantly reminding him that he alone is to be consulted about his course of action. He considers, "Shall I do this or shall I do that?" or "I will do this," or "This is the most profitable for me," just as if he had the final settlement of the affairs of life which concern him. Yet the fact is that in the complex social life of our day his actions, — indeed, even his thoughts and feelings, — are influenced in large measure by a social life which surrounds him like an atmosphere. This conquering bent of man's nature, developed through long-continued race habits of conquest over the material world, the world of savage beasts and of more savage men, deceives man by making him believe at times what is only partly true. It is true to a degree that man can bend things to his will. Human achievement is marked by his ability to do so to a more remarkable degree than any other animal. However, the converse is also true, that no man really acts independently of the influences of his

fellow men.[1] Everywhere there is a social life setting limitations and predominatingly influencing individual action. In government, in religion, in industry, in education, in family association — in everything that builds up modern life, men are coöperating. They work together, combine, and organize for specific purposes, so that no man lives to himself. It is this unity of effort that makes society.

Forms of Social Coöperation. — If an individual considers that he is managing his own business, regardless of others, let him pause to think of the people upon whom he is immediately dependent for the conduct of his business. If he claims to be an independent farmer, still he depends upon the miner, the manufacturer, the merchant, and the transporter for his implements. He depends upon the coöperation of his fellow citizens for the protection of home and property, for the education of his children, for the building of roads, and the establishment of social order. His household furnishings and his clothing largely come from the toil of others. His whole surplus wealth is dependent upon the consumption of his products by others.

If a man assume that religion, the most sacred of all motives, is his individual affair, still we find him associating with his fellows to build a church for worship and employing a teacher paid by the membership. More than this, he meets with his fellows to worship and subscribes to a creed and ritual not established by himself but by thousands of his predecessors, directly or indirectly, and over which he has little individual control.

If he says, "I will educate myself," he begins by reading books written by others, containing the accumulated knowledge of centuries, or he enters a school supported by the contributions of thousands of his fellow men. The determination, the will, the ego, in this counts for much, but it is hedged in on all sides by the social life.

If a western farmer owes a man in Chicago for goods, he does not take a back-load of corn or beef, the products of his toil,

[1] Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chaps. I and II.
Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 4, 11.
Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, Chaps. I and II. For a contrary view see Fite, *Individualism*, pp. 3–6, 156–158, 233–235.

and walk to Chicago, but he sells his corn and his cattle to others and accepts money made by the combined action of thousands. If he wishes to pay a bill in Chicago, he might board a train made and operated by others, and carry the gold to Chicago, but he accepts the alternative and goes to a bank conducted by the coöperative work of others, buys exchange, and sends his money by an express company or by the postal service, two evidences of social coöperation. So that, turn whichever way he will, the ego finds another superior ego over which he has little personal control. Assuming that he is independent, he goes about doing as others do, thinking what others think, coöperating with them consciously and unconsciously in the work of life, frequently yielding to the will, or obeying the command of a great psychic organization called society. He cannot escape it, except by searching in ships made by others for an uninhabited island of the sea, there to spend the remainder of his threescore years and ten, alone, until he perish and his works with him.

Forms of Society. — In considering any material body we recognize it by its physical properties and, if living, by its activities. For example, so familiar are we with the form and life of the tree or the horse that we require no description to separate it from other organisms. Recognition of the social body is more difficult; for while we realize that there is something called "society," it is not easy to determine its characteristic marks or to define its activities. But this is essential before we can have any scientific notion of society. How then shall we recognize society when we see it? Will it be by its form or its function, or both, or is society merely an abstract generic term used to give collective expression to a large number of diverse things which men do in common?

(*a*) *The Political Life.* — We shall find on examination that the most prominent characteristics of an organized group of people are present in the politically organized body. The institutions of the State afford a typical example of all social institutions. Executive, legislative, and judicial bodies, fulfilling the chief functions of political control, and each representing a large number of individuals, bring together all people within a given territory, uniting them into an interdependent membership for the purposes

of protection, justice, and progress. From township trustee, policeman, and police judge, to senate, chief executive, and chief justice of the supreme bench we find a group of men with well-defined relations, representing and carrying out the will of the people, not the will of any single person. There is a regularity in which they act and a universality of organization which is conclusive evidence that the whole community is united by definite bonds and that its parts are interdependent.

(*b*) *The Economic Life.* — From the foundation of human society man has coöperated with his fellows in obtaining food, shelter, and material comfort. These activities are called the economic life. Perhaps there is no clearer evidence of the coöperative activities of society than in the organized efforts of man to satisfy his material wants. Here are groups of men engaged in agriculture supporting other groups, and in turn being supported by them. Here are giant corporations for the manufacture of material goods; here are great organizations for the transport of goods and men, and other great organizations for trade, commerce, and banking. Attendant upon these and growing out of them, are the labor organizations for the conservation and promotion of the common interests of the groups of wage earners. How helpless is the individual who strives alone, and how increasingly helpless as industrial organization continues to improve! The man out of bread and out of work quickly realizes how important is the organization of industrial life and the dependence of group on group as well as of the individual on the whole.

(*c*) *Voluntary Associations.* — If we take another view of the collective operations of men, we shall see large numbers forming themselves into *voluntary* associations for specific purposes. These organizations contribute to the general scheme of society and add particular lines of activity. Such are church societies, fraternal orders, benevolent and charitable associations, and social clubs. They bear less distinct relations to the whole mass than do the political and economic groups, and unite only a part of the whole general group. Yet they have special services to perform and represent a large body of people working, thinking, and toiling in concert.

(*d*) *Educational Association.* — There are educational activities which have much to do with the well-being and progress of humanity. Our public school system from the primary grade to the university represents another phase of the organized activities of society. This system aims to educate the child, not as a separate, independent individual, but as a member of society. It is supported by all propertied citizens, and in most instances by all who are not paupers. There are private schools of large foundations managed by voluntary associations, whose influences are less universal than the public schools but are essential to the organized community, and these schools bear well-sustained relations to the whole. There are scientific societies whose ultimate purpose is the extension of knowledge, which are as well important factors in social control making for social unity. These, and all educational institutions, give form and solidarity to society, help it to consider present needs, and to think and plan for future development.

(*e*) *Methods of Communication.* — Closely allied to education, political, religious, economic, and the purely social institutions, supporting and strengthening them all, are our various methods of communication: the postal service, the telephone, the press, and the telegraph. These draw individuals closer together and give them convincing proof of their daily and hourly interdependence. No other phases of modern life have so quickened the activities of society and contributed to the oneness of purpose and to the common thinking, feeling, and willing together as these.

(*f*) *The Family.*[2] — Nor must there be omitted from this list the family life, the center from which flow many important social impulses. Here is the primary institution for the propagation and perpetuation of the race. Genetically it is the whole social world in epitome evincing some of the elements of control, of industry, of education, of religion, and of benevolence. It has had its historical growth and is bound together by the most exact and rigid rules of social order. It is the most universally organized group, the hearth at which are forged the strongest sympathies

[2] See Chap. IX.

and the most finely tempered impulses of life. It is the center of the larger brotherhood of humanity.

The Nature of Society. — All these groups are forms or manifestations of society, but are they society itself? They are various organizations showing us somewhat of the morphology of society, but they are only the body in which social life incarnates itself. As biology studies life in all its forms, so sociology in order to understand society, studies the associated life of man manifesting itself in political, economic, religious, educational, cultural, and domestic organization; in public and private corporations, in customs and costumes, in imitations and oppositions, — briefly, in all the multitudinous ways in which men and women organize their social relations.[3] Society therefore may be said to be humanity, or any certain part of it, bound together in definite social relationships. If men have certain definite economic relations with each other, we call them an industrial or economic society. If their relations are political in nature, we call the group a political society. If the motives of their relations are religious, we call the group a religious society. Or, if we think of the extension of relationship to all men, we call it a world society. *Society then may be defined as any group of sentient beings who are more or less alike, who recognize more or less clearly that fact, and who have recognized common interests in their social relationships.*[4]

So there is society and there are societies. The two terms belong to different categories. The one is a general term, the other a special. The one denotes the most general aspects of all kinds of societies, the necessary attributes of any society, while the other suggests that there are various organizations belonging to this genus society which differ from each other in certain par-

[3] Cf. Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 7–9. For a more complete discussion see the same author, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 9–15. Professor Ellwood has well emphasized the *mental interrelation* which produces a society, but he seems to be uncertain in both these books as to whether society is "association" or a group of individuals associating for certain reasons of mutual interdependence. It seems clear to the present writer that it is impossible to substitute the term "association" for "society," as against both Professor Small and Professor Ellwood. The term "association" describes the action of a society, but a society is certainly a group of beings — who are associating. Two things are necessary, — sentient beings and association.

[4] Cf. Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, p. 9.

ticulars. Thus, the term "society" denotes all kinds of groups which are based on any kind of social interests; the other term, "societies," at once implies that an adjective is needed to convey to the mind a definite idea of what is meant.

Types of Societies. — Societies may be classified in various ways. Classification in any science is a method of simplifying a mass of phenomena. Classes are formed each on the basis of similarity between the individuals composing that class. The similarities concern one or more characteristics. Considering their most significant characteristics, the psycho-social, Giddings has suggested eight different kinds of human societies. The following is an epitome of these eight types, with an indication of the social bonds which create them, and with concrete examples of each type:

1. Broadest groupings — animal and human.
2. Human societies.
   (*a*) Ethnic — based on *kinship*.
   (*b*) Civil — based on *propinquity*.
3. Groupings more instructive for the sociologist.
   (*a*) Spontaneous.
   (*b*) Rational.

These two general types combined in varying degrees give us the following classification:

Spontaneous or Natural	1. *Sympathetic* — blood relatives, *e.g.*, the clan of an ethnic tribe. 2. *Congenial* — like spirits, *e.g.*, Pilgrim Fathers, Latter-Day Saints, Amana Society. 3. *Approbational* — lawless elements drawn together by economic opportunity, *e.g.*, frontier mining camps. A general approbation of qualities and conduct practically the only social bond.
More or Less Artificial Result of Thought about Social Order	4. *Despotic* — combination of elements of unequal strength. *Social bonds*, despotic power and servile, fear-inspired obedience, *e.g.*, Norman England immediately following Conquest, or the South in early Reconstruction days. 5. *Authoritative* — despotic power long enough established to be identified with tradition and religion. *Social bond*, reverence for authority. *Examples:* England of the Tudor and Early Stuart periods; France of Louis XIV; Russia from days of Peter the Great up to a recent period.

More or Less Artificial Result of Thought about Social Order

6. *Conspirital* — results of the disintegration of a preëxisting social order. Adventurers become the leaders by means of bribery, patronage, and special privileges. *Social bond,* intrigue and conspiracy. *Examples:* Italy of the time of Dante; France of the Reign of Terror (to a less degree).
7. *Contractual* — result of perception of the utility of association, leading to the conscious betterment of the general welfare. *Social bond,* a covenant or contract. *Examples:* Mayflower Compact, League of the Iroquois; Achæan League of Greece; American Confederation; Federal Union; Confederate States of America; Australian Commonwealth; Dominion of Canada.
8. *Idealistic* — result of a population collectively responding to great ideals and thus forming a society. *Social bonds,* mutual understanding, confidence, fidelity, and unselfish spirit of social service. *Examples:* U. S. of America (to a degree); some of our states; the Sylvania Association; the Theosophical Society at Point Loma, California; communistic societies like New Icaria.

Complexity of the Social Order. — Is it possible in this complexity of the social order to discover any constant social processes producing the social structure? Can we formulate general laws which operate for the control of society? It is the study of this apparently complex social order that constitutes the science of society. There are social phenomena more or less frequently recurring, and movements more or less regular which admit of study and classification. There is order in this process of society building.

There seem to be trends in its development. Perhaps the complexity is only apparent; at least certain classifications of social phenomena may be made. Possibly careful study may reveal certain uniformities in the origin and development of social organization and culture. Perhaps on examination what at first glance seems so chaotic may be found to fall into order as readily as the formerly apparent complex phenomena of the physical world. At least the study of society is worth while.

Simplicity of Primitive Social Life. — The student should early realize that sociology is a study of people in group action in which he has a part. He is proximately and vitally connected with the subject studied. It is a diagnosis of ourselves in our life of com-

munity action. This will relieve him of a too common error of supposing that sociology is a classification of abstract principles or philosophizing about social action or interpreting social theories however worthy these may be of consideration. It is the study of social life as it is wherever found, in the great city or the rural village located in Asia, Africa, or America.

However there are general functions which apply to every society great or small such as opposition and accommodation, action and reaction, association and coöperation, brought into action in the attempt of mankind to live together justly and harmoniously in the process of mutual aid. While these universal characters and functions are to be found in all societies and general principles of human association observed in all types of society, primitive society exhibits a simple form of expression with a limited number of actual group activities.

Character of the Undeveloped Society. — In the undeveloped society the number of life occupations are few and the group activities limited. Relatively more depended upon individual effort under such conditions than in a complex order. To seek food directly as provided by nature, to find a home under the trees, under the shadow of a rock or in the cave, to provide clothing as fancy or necessity demanded, or to seek methods of defense against wild beasts or hostile groups, brought into action initiative and gradually increasing social action. As the group increased in size there arose differentiated individual and group activities resulting in what is known as the division of labor. But the division of labor or service and the unity of effort were both crude. First the division of labor between men and women became marked. The rearing of children led naturally to the concentration of woman's activities to the preparing of the food and clothing and building the shelter, while the hunting, fighting of wild animals, tribal warfare, and later political leadership, fell to the men. At first this division was not definitely marked but subsequently changed in relative degree. Division of labor as the mastery of nature gradually grew, increased industries and occupations. Some devoted themselves to making stone implements, some to clothing, some to hunting and fishing and some to care of stock,

others to agriculture. Thus occupations followed by individuals to satisfy their individual wants became social functions so that some groups were working in particular occupations primarily for their own welfare in fashioning products for the general social good. The old farm life of America, when much of the machinery of the farm, the clothing of the family, the furniture of the household, was made at home, represents another phase of primitive social life as compared with the modern factory system when nearly all of the utensils, tools, and articles of use are made outside of the home in exchange for agricultural products. It represents the change of society from the simple to the complex with accompanying division of labor. Thus society naturally falls into industrial groups which in a measure determine group activity. Along the line of social order too, the family and the tribe exist as independent organized groups, dominated by tribal custom and mores.

Need of Scientific Study. — Common as are the facts of society which we observe about us, the knowledge of their real natures and their reduction to system and order are difficult tasks. If there are forces at work, the laws controlling and limiting their action are not readily discovered. But there are many reasons why it is essential to human welfare that a systematic study of society be encouraged. First, because the social life of man has been less carefully studied than other natural phenomena. It represents the class of phenomena last to be considered. Again, there is nothing which concerns human welfare more than the study of man in his social relations. The scientific and practical mastery of the lower forms of nature is in comparison far more advanced. We know much concerning the external world and its adaptation to our service. We have learned to adjust ourselves to the conditions of our physical environment whenever it is impossible to change the environment. But scientific knowledge of how men have learned to live together in harmony, each seeking his own interest, is very difficult to acquire. The art of social life is the most difficult of all arts to master and to comprehend. Witness the long lists of wars of tribes, nations, and races, caused by not knowing how to settle their social differences properly and justly! Consider the long struggle of man with his fellows for

survival, a struggle continued in the competitive business world, where it is a struggle, not so much for existence as for wealth. Observe the other numerous attempts that have been made in the world for a better system of justice. All these examples testify to the difficulties of social adjustment.

Formulation of a Science of Society. — Yet when we attempt to bring system into our knowledge of human society, we find that it is difficult to collect sufficient data to furnish the groundwork of science. There is not a sufficient number of generalizations proven to be universally true upon which might be established readily a well-defined body of principles of sociology. The laws that control society and the forces that operate it are not sufficiently understood to make the science of sociology easily determined or quickly mastered. Yet it is the task of sociology to compass within well-defined bounds a mass of social knowledge, to classify it, showing its order and logical sequence, to discover the forces that generate and move society and to determine and define the laws that control it. Its duty as a science is not done if it fails to point out the extent and manner in which society can be forced into certain lines of development or progress by the combined choice and action of mankind.

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Hankins, F. H. *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Chaps. VI–IX.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Make a list of all the organized social groups in your own community.
2. What were the individual desires and the social influences which caused you to get a college education?

3. Name all of the characteristics which the following groups have in common: The state in which you live; a bank; a college; a sewing society; a reading club; a political party; a lodge; a church; a railway company.

4. Compare the general idea of society (great society) to a society as to structure and function.

5. Compare the chief characteristics of the following, noting differences and resemblances: a tribe of American Indians; a Chinese village; the early Greeks; primitive German society, and the community in which you live.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociology Defined. — Definitions of sociology are many. While it would be hardly correct to say that there are as many as there are sociologists, it is safe to say that they are as numerous as the various points of view of the respective groups of sociologists.

Generally, sociologists, instead of giving a formal definition of sociology, have entered into an extended discussion of its nature. Some, however, have used a colorless definition like "Sociology is the science of society," [1] or "the scientific study of society," [2] or "the science of social phenomena." [3] Others, using more words, add but little, as for example, "Sociology is the name applied to a somewhat inchoate mass of materials which embodies our knowledge about society." [4] Other definitions somewhat more definite, yet unsatisfactory in many ways, are, "the science of social process" [5] and "the science of social relation." [6] Better than these are, "Sociology is the study of men considered as affecting and as affected by association," [7] or, "the study of human association, including whatever conduces to it or modifies it." [8] Of the formal definitions that have been given by scientific men, none is more comprehensive than that of Professor Giddings, which follows: "Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical causes working together in a process of evolution." [9] While it is difficult to give a brief comprehensive

[1] Ward, *Popular Science Monthly*, June, 1902, p. 113.
[2] Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 9.
[3] Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 6.
[4] Fairbanks, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 1.
[5] Small, *General Sociology*, p. 35.
[6] Wright, *Practical Sociology*, p. 1.
[7] Small, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[8] Dealey and Ward, *Text Book of Sociology*, p. 2.
[9] *Principles of Sociology*, p. 8.

definition of sociology that will prove entirely satisfactory through all of the changes of a developing science, Professor Giddings's definition is of great service to one who wishes a clear understanding and a precise view of the nature and purposes of the science. An adequate knowledge of the true nature and import of sociology, however, may be better obtained by a careful consideration of the underlying principles of the science, than by an attempt to follow any carefully formulated definition. *Sociology treats of the phenomena of society arising from the association of mankind.* It includes a body of classified knowledge relating to society and a number of principles and laws. It investigates causes and effects, discovers social forces, and formulates laws of control, or rules of action.

Definition of Society. — Certain terms are used in sociology, some of which are in common use, and others are not so familiar to us. Those which are taken from our common language stock must be defined as they are used in sociology. One of these somewhat ambiguous terms is "society." Others are adjectives, adverbs, and verbs derived from the same root.

What is meant by the word "society"? We speak of a society of women in a given community, or the humane society, or "going into society." Graham Wallas has written a book called *The Great Society.* Or we may say that society governs men's actions. Evidently we have some more or less vague idea in mind in each of these usages. Can we distill out of these various meanings the element common to them all? *Do we mean by "society" any group of people united together more or less closely by sentiments, ideals, traditions, customs, folkways, and mores which define the interests and purposes of the people belonging to that group?* The women belonging to a sewing society answer that definition. Does it not describe a humane or a philanthropic society? Is there anything not covered by that definition in a church society, a lodge, a bank, an industrial corporation, an Indian tribe, a state, a nation, or a League of Nations?

The number of ties which bind people together into a society, however, varies indefinitely. In some the important ties may be chiefly customs and traditions which have risen almost accidentally

in response to a crisis bringing in its train pleasure or pain. These Sumner has called *folkways*. Others are held together by what he calls *mores*. By this term he means those beliefs and patterns of action which are supposed to contribute to group welfare.[10] In still other societies ideals and sentiments predominate, as in certain lodges, philanthropic organizations, art associations, etc., and in political parties and governments.

What Is a Community? — Another term much used by sociologists is "community." How does it differ in meaning from that of "society"? Perhaps the best general definition is that of Queen. He defines a community as, "It is a local grouping of people who share a number of important interests and activities, who are more concerned about those things which they have in common than about those things wherein they differ."[11] From this definition it is apparent that a community is limited somewhat by geographic nearness of its members. However, propinquity in space does not make of the people living in that area a community. What else is needed? Those people must also have in common certain interests and activities. Thus, *a community is a group of people living within such an area that they may share common interests and activities to such a degree that they feel that they are partners in the enterprise or enterprises they undertake together.* In contrast with a "society" a "community" is more or less locally limited. It may be a part of society. Also within it may be many subordinate societies, taking in a part of the people of the community, and devoted to certain common interests or purposes.

Perhaps we shall do well to add certain adjectives in using the term "community," such as urban, rural, immigrant, industrial, racial, religious, or educational. By such designations we indicate more definitely what we have in mind.[12]

What Is a Neighborhood? — Another term which should be clearly defined is "neighborhood." This term emphasizes location within a given area. It implies that the people in this area are less united in common enterprises than in a "community."

[10] Sumner, *Folkways*, Boston, 1907, Chap. I.
[11] "What Is a Community?" *Journal of Social Forces*, May, 1923, p. 381.
[12] See Steiner, *Community Organization*, New York, 1925, pp. 15–18.

They are neighbors in the original etymological sense of "dwelling near." Propinquity rather than community of interest makes people neighbors.

The use of this term by sociologists, however, is wider than the meaning of the original term. It is often used to indicate as neighborhoods those areas in a city which are much too large for face-to-face primary contacts, yet which have certain common characteristics which differentiate them from other parts. It would seem best to confine the term "neighborhood" to those small primary groups, *i.e.*, face-to-face groups which, while they may not have such common interests as would make them a community, yet are enough alike in social characteristics to enable them to know and not dislike each other. There is vagueness in the term, but so there is in the social situation described by that term.[13] Neighbors see each other often. Sometimes they borrow from each other. Often they stop to chat together. In the country, the village, or even in the city they may call upon each other or visit each other in the home. In the rural districts they often exchange work, assist each other in sickness or need. Neighbors usually know a good deal about each other's business, often they gossip about each other. Here so far as families are concerned the most intimate contacts take place. Likes and dislikes are here generated which develop into cliques, gangs, sets, etc. Next to the family it is the next larger culture medium of the social process. Cooley says that it is in these primary groups, the family, play groups, and neighborhoods, that human nature comes into existence.[14]

Sociology Treats of the Origin of Society. — It is possible to have a science of society without tracing social origins, yet there are advantages in studying how primitive peoples have organized their social relations, describing the processes seen at work in such societies. Since many of our present social arrangements are hangovers from a long distant day, the study of social beginnings often throws a great light on little understood institutions and ways of looking at things.

[13] Steiner, *Community Organization*, New York, 1925, pp. 20–22.
[14] See his *Social Organization*, New York, 1909, p. 30.

Just as the botanist includes in the description of a plant the nature of its development from the seed and traces the law of growth from the beginning, so the sociologist follows the growth of society from its primitive conditions. Biology's great advances began with Darwin's *Origin of Species*, a work characterized by the use of what has come to be known as the "genetic method," that is, the study of biological origins. So, sociology is given a sound basis by the study of the primitive social institutions and processes. Many present-day social institutions and processes cannot be fully understood without a knowledge of those ancient ones from which they have developed. Therefore sociology begins with a study of social origins.

Sociology Treats of the Growth of Society. — Beginning with a simple association, society has expanded or developed into a highly complex organization. Its growth is recognized by the addition of new forms and new functions and increased energy; by the greater systemization of its parts and the greater precision of its recurring actions. To show the gradual unfolding of society, how it developed from primitive forms to the forms found in highly civilized societies, is one of the tasks of sociology. By some this process has been called "social evolution." In the beginning of social life society had not become highly differentiated into groups with specialized functions and complex institutions. As time went on groups of individuals became increasingly interdependent. The parts of the whole mass became segregated and a specific function or service was given to each part. These parts gradually became more closely related and interdependent. At first a mass or horde of people driven about by the influence of circumstances, following each other through imitation or led by their own indefinite desires, gradually in response to new conditions took up new activities which were performed by separate groups and individuals. This multiplication of services and duties in time brought about a high state of social complexity.

Social Activities. — But while historic development is of much value as a groundwork of sociology, giving the student a broad conception of society as well as instructing him in the elemental points of social order, nevertheless, the real work of the science

is with the forms and activities of civilized society. Sociology is interested primarily in contributing to an understanding of present-day social life. What men are doing in concert or in groups concerns the student more than how they began to work together, so that the social activities present the formal basis of the science.

Moreover, to describe what goes on within the groups which form is of great interest to him who would understand society about him. Just as the processes chemical and physical which go on in the plant or animal are of profound significance to the botanist or zoölogist, so the processes which one may see going on in organized society are of interest to the sociologist. Here are men and women going about in all sorts of activities. They play, work, join clubs, plow and reap, buy and sell, make things, worship, make music and all the rest of what seem the infinite number of things which people do in groups. They love, mate, are jealous, imitate, stimulate each other. They act upon and react to each other. These actions and reactions in time become organized into definite forms, which rigidify into customs, conventions, beliefs, traditions, and folkways. A study of these activities and processes may throw light upon why people behave in these ways in associated life.

Social Forms. — It is quite impossible, however, to treat of social activities without treating specifically of the structure of society. In all development of social groups the function or the action always precedes the formal organization. The United States Senate, for example, if considered as to its structure, would be treated as an organization composed of a group of individuals chosen in a specific way for a definite purpose. These individuals meeting together complete their own organization by choosing various officers. Thus far we have nothing but the *structure* of a group in society.

Moreover, as we look about us we discover that the activities of people become organized into formal structures of all kinds. The various forms of government represent social structure for governmental purposes. Our economic life is organized in various ways differing from those of the primitive savage to those of a

modern industrial society. In addition to these forms of social organization, we have a multitude of other forms, or social structures, into which our activities as individuals are organized in our relationships with others. The family, for example, is the organization of those activities which pertain to the perpetuation of the species. Around that central fact group all kinds of subordinate organizations, such as courtship customs, the accepted forms of courtesy between members of the family and between the members of one family and those of another, the division of labor within the family, dress and costume, etc. So with all the other life-activities. They are organized in certain forms by reason of the fact that individuals live together in groups.

Sociology Describes the Social Forces. — Wherever there is action or motion there is some force or condition which accounts for it. Part of the work of sociology, then, certainly is a consideration of the forces or conditioning factors which are in operation in human society. What causes mankind to associate in groups? What forces brought about the establishment of the family and the perpetuation of the family life? What are the forces that give rise to the religious group and cause people to build churches and carry on religious association? What forces cause people to come together in large cities, to organize in industrial groups, to build a state or a nation, and to develop a government? In short, what are the forces that are working to create and perpetuate the social organization? These are questions that must be answered by the sociologist. One of the primary purposes of sociology is to discover these forces and to trace their operations.[15] Some of these conditioning factors are drives within the individual himself, some are geographical, such as the configuration of the country, the natural resources there to be found, heat and cold, mountains

[15] Professor Hayes contends that the "social forces" concept is an error. See *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI, p. 613 (March, 1911).

Ward looked upon social forces as social causations. His conception of a social force, therefore, was a cause which influenced the origin, development, or activity, of society. So far as it goes, this conception was a valuable one and cannot be explained as an error. However, it would have been better had he used the term "socializing forces," as this concept conforms to what he actually described. The force which is social in its origin arises from the *fact of association*. It is social energy. It is an increment of power arising from two or more persons working together harmoniously above that which they would accomplish working separately. It is increased utilization of energy caused by group activity.

and plains. All these have an influence on man and his associated life. They condition the activities in which he engages with his fellows. Often they influence the beliefs he holds, the kind of group he forms, the form of family life, the structures he builds, the leisure he has for the development of culture, and the patterns of behavior he and his fellows develop. The interplay of his innate urges, accentuated and modified by the patterns set by custom and tradition with the conditions of the external world around him, are studied and described in order to understand what we see in man's social life.

Moreover, the density of population affects man's social organization and the patterns of his conduct. With the increase of population changes come in the ideals he holds, modify the forms of social organization, and alter the standards and codes of conduct. All these factors which affect social life must be studied and described as accurately as possible, if we would understand the phenomena of social life.

While many activities tend to create and perpetuate society, none are more important than the psychic forces. There are influences of physical nature that compel men to coöperate and combine. There are certain physical characteristics of individuals that cause their association. But the individual characteristics which arise from the psychical nature of the associational process are among the chief causes of the creation of human society. All society represents the "feeling, thinking, and willing together" of people, and these elements are the most constant and permanent found in society. While the study of biology may come to the support of sociology in very many ways, social psychology is more than an analogy — it is a distinct branch of the science. After all, the strongest currents that draw society together when followed to their origin are psychical.

The Cosmic and the Ethical Forces of Society. — Man is a part of the universe, and its laws also bear upon and move him. He is influenced by physical and mechanical as well as by vital forces. Certain writers have attempted to subject him entirely to the operation of natural law, giving him no position of independent activity. They have treated him as a particle of the universe

being moved here and there by the various forces of nature and of his own being. This doctrine came as a reaction against the extreme theory of the freedom of the will and as the result of the study of natural evolution. As Ward first pointed out, some social processes and products are spontaneous, while others are telic, or the result of social purpose.

The struggle for existence in the early history of mankind gives unmistakable evidence of man's common lot with other living organisms. As such, on the one hand, he was dependent for survival upon physical surroundings and, on the other, upon his own effort. At first this struggle was common with the beasts of the field. It was a wolfish struggle for life in which instincts and feelings were uppermost. Mutual aid developed spontaneously in the struggle for existence, and reason began to play an increasing part.[16]

The Shifting of the Struggle from a Physical to a Psychical Basis. — Meanwhile, as the altruistic principles became ascendant, the competition between individuals of the same species became less severe, and changed from the instinctive to the rational. At first this change was shown by the individual directing his energy to some line of pursuit for the purpose of accumulating wealth instead of trying to insure survival by destroying real or supposed enemies. Each in the attempt to satisfy his desires learned to respect the rights of others. Subsequently, men learned to coöperate with one another in defense and in the pursuit of wealth. Gradually the altruistic principle became more important and each tended to seek the well-being of the group as well as his own safety, believing that his final success depended upon it.

The Survival of the Best. — Through the development of altruistic sentiments and the extension of the coöperative practices of mankind, the old struggle became modified and the survival of the fittest biologically tended gradually to become the survival of the best socially. The adaptability of the individual to his physical environment was accompanied by adaptability to his fellow men. Those who coöperated survived and those who failed

[16] For a classic exposition of the change see Drummond, *Ascent of Man*, Chaps. VI, VII. See also Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution.*

to coöperate perished. One can scarcely estimate the importance of this social fact in the development of the human race. So it came about that those who were most interested in their fellow men became known as the best, or, in other words, the best included not only the physically and mentally strong, but those of the largest coöperative power and adaptability to social life. In this process of coöperative protection the virtuous as well as the vigorous survived. It is really nothing more than an extension of the idea of the survival of the fittest to social environment, that is, to associated human conduct, when once social relationships were established and survival became dependent not only upon fitting into the physical environment, but also fitting into a social life in such a way as made coöperation possible. Then the fit was he who could control his impulses in the interest of group coöperation for purposes of survival.[17]

The Telic Process of Society. — As individuals become more unified in sentiment, thought, and action there is developed what is known as social consciousness, whereby society recognizes its own collective power. In its endeavor to use this for the benefit of all its members the society or group exercises its telic capacities. In other words, the attempt to force society through certain channels, to cause it to perform certain acts for the general well-being of the social body is a recognition of the conscious effort of society to change or reform itself. To a large extent society has been created by the effort of each individual to follow his own personal desires as they related to himself and his fellows, regardless of any attempt to build the structure of society. However, through the influence of social consciousness there is an appreciation of social ideals and social aims, as well as social defects, and there arises an attempt to remove the defects and attain to social well-being.

Sociology Deals with Social Pathology. — Social change was not as marked a phenomenon in early societies as in modern. Social stability marks undeveloped societies whether among primitive peoples or among backward groups isolated among

[17] For the clearest exposition of this point see Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution*, pp. 1–9.

mountain valleys, or rural communities not yet touched by the tides of material inventions and methods of communication. Social instability is characteristic of peoples and groups among whom have come railroads, automobiles, the latest offerings of the press, the telephone, the radio, the airplane, the modern organization of business, and the host of new ideas. These rapid changes introduce strains on the social organization, and make necessary readjustments in social arrangements difficult to make. The social organization has not been built up in a day; it has grown slowly and has become rigid and ossified. It is like the bones of an old man in contrast with those of a child. The social structure may break, but cannot easily bend. Under the strain of these new conditions break it often does. An institution often is broken, since it cannot easily adapt itself to the new conditions.

Hence results social disorganization, or the condition which we call social pathology. People able to get along fairly well under other conditions now fail. Those once able to make a living become dependent. The immigrant adapted to the customs of his own country finds himself bewildered in the midst of a culture strangely different. His children much more pliable than he adapt themselves to the new conditions, and fail to keep intact the ideals and customs which their fathers knew. Without the guidance which children experience normally in the family in making their adjustments to social life they become delinquent. The emotions become disturbed because the individual is torn between ideals and loyalites which clash. Those of the less able to reconcile such conflicts in their own personalities become disturbed and go insane. Those deficient in mental capacity cannot make the adjustments required of them in the more complicated social life. They become failures in the economic struggle, they break the social taboos, illegitimacy increases, marriages are broken, divorces increase. On the other hand, society in its corporate capacity fails to provide those stays and shelters which once shielded these incapables from the stress of rapid changes. Until such time as society has adjusted its institutions to the new situations, individuals suffer, and group relations are strained.

Sociology attempts to describe the facts in any given age con-

cerning these matters, and to ascertain the conditions which produce these maladjustments.

The Place of Sociology among the Social Sciences. — This point involves the real nature and scope of sociology. It is one that has caused a vast deal of discussion among writers on sociology and one which, to a certain extent, is still unsettled. There is one group of writers who hold that sociology is a synthesis of all the social sciences, that the science is fabricated by running a thread through all the sciences and stringing them together in one mass. Others a little more discriminating hold that it is a synthesis or rather an amalgamation of the results of other social sciences. Herbert Spencer used the term " sociology " as a generic term to include all the other social sciences. From a scientific standpoint such a usage might be of value in showing that all are branches of one great science called " sociology " just as Spencer included the group of all natural sciences relating to life under the term " biology."

But the present writers hold that sociology is one of several coördinate social sciences, the most recent of the group, created for a special purpose and standing on an independent basis, and that while economics, political science, or ethics may deal with certain aspects of society, sociology deals specifically with principles and methods which apply to the whole structure.[18]

The Differentiation of the Social Sciences. — Let us suppose that there are numerous phenomena of human society which continually increase with the development of social order. Society may go on developing from century to century without any scientific attempt to make an orderly arrangement of these phenomena. But gradually in the progress of knowledge scholars begin to realize that there are facts that constantly recur in the social process, for instance, those relating to the moral conduct of the individual. As a result there is developed the science of ethics. The classification of these phenomena and deduction of general laws and principles make this chronologically the first of the social sciences. Again, some observe that there are other groups of facts relating to government, and that there are certain principles

[18] Cf. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 29–35.

involved in the development of social control. These facts are collected, classified, the principles established, and the science of government — political science — is brought forth. But there are other social phenomena unclassified and other purposes unsatisfied. The processes of obtaining and distributing wealth as independent activities may not be involved in either ethics or politics. And so a new science called political economy or economics is created. These various sciences continue to expand in their natural order but there still exist, outside their legitimate boundaries, other social phenomena unclassified and other scientific purposes still unsatisfied. No one yet has shown the universal forces at work in the growth, development, and structure of society as a whole. The laws of social being have not yet been set forth. Political, religious, ethical, and economic life have been presented from specific standpoints, but the general laws of society, the regularities to be found in man's thoughts, feelings, and purposes when engaged in any of his social relationships, whether they be economic, political, ethical, or religious, have not been developed. Here, then, is the opportunity for a new science called sociology. It refuses to be included in any of the other social sciences, and the other social sciences refuse to be grouped under it or to be absorbed or assimilated by it. From scientific and pedagogical considerations it stands alone. It has a definite purpose and a specific body of classified knowledge, as well as a body of laws and principles of its own.[19]

Characteristic Mark of Sociology. — Much of the confusion concerning this science has arisen from books whose writers fail to acknowledge that science has a subjective as well as an objective boundary. It is the aim of a science, the course of reasoning and the end to be sought as much as the phenomena with which it deals that give it its distinctive mark as a science. For instance, botany and chemistry may be dealing with the same material in a certain sense, but with entirely different aims. However, added to this is the fact that in the scientific sense the " material " with which each deals is quite distinct. The chemist is dealing chiefly,

[19] See Stuckenburg, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, pp. 75–77, or Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress*, pp. 71–87.

though not wholly, with inorganic matter and is interested primarily in molecules and atoms of different kinds and their relations to each other. The botanist, on the other hand, is interested in molecules and atoms only incidentally. He is studying organic matter primarily and is concerned with cells and the forms into which they build themselves. Both are studying matter, but quite different aspects thereof, and in widely varied relations. So with sociology, ethics, economics, politics, and history; while they all deal with the same thing in a broad sense, viz., human society, each is interested in a different aspect of social relationships. In the history of the natural sciences biology was the latest to develop. It is a general science, in the sense that it deals with facts and principles which underlie all the special sciences concerned with various forms of life, such as botany, zoölogy, anthropology, etc. While biology rests on all these special biological sciences in the sense that they provide facts and principles upon which larger generalizations can be made, yet its field is not precisely that of any of these special sciences. It deals with fundamentals common to them all. So with sociology. While economics, politics, history, anthropology, and all the rest deal with particular aspects of human association, sociology is the science which investigates the regularities of human association in all its varied aspects. The special social sciences take as presuppositions the general aspects which are the objects of sociology. Take, for instance, the "big business" organization and consider all the facts and phenomena of society that arise out of it. If we consider it from an economic standpoint, we shall be determining how it increases the development of wealth, its effect on wages or on general distribution of products, and many other economic questions. It is evident that we are working within the province of economics. If we consider the moral conduct of the individuals interested in the organization, and its general effects on the morals of the community, we shall be studying ethics. If, however, we consider what legislation may be brought to control or regulate the business, we shall be in the realm of political science. If, finally, we consider the trust-phenomena in relation to their effects on the homes and migrations of people, the

dispersion and concentration of social groups, in fact, the general effect on the social standard, we shall be in the realm of sociology. So we shall find, so far as the material field of operation is concerned, that all sciences cross each other more or less, and we must not forget that in reality there is but one science, — the science of the universe, — and that the division of this science into groups and individual branches is merely a matter of convenience and pedagogical relationships. Let, for instance, in the accompanying figure — which is merely illustrative, not exhaustive, — the rectangle *A*, *B*, *C*, *D* represent all possible social phenomena, that of *E*, *F*, *G*, *H* all the phenomena of the science of ethics, *M*, *N*, *O*, *P* that of economics, *X*, *Y*, *Z*, *W* that of political science, *S*, *V*, *T*, *L* that of history, and *I*, *J*, *K*, *R* that of sociology, and they will have a tendency to overlap each other somewhat similarly to the arrangement represented in that figure. But the sciences themselves do not overlap for the reasons stated above.



The Pedagogic Limits of Sociology. — For pedagogic reasons, if for no other, sociology should have a definite boundary. It should not attempt to displace or absorb either political economy, ethics, political science, or any other well-established social science. It should not attempt to be merely a generic term including them all in a group, nor indeed is it a science built up of the parts of the several social sciences. Much less is it a classification or coördination of the results of the independent social sciences. It is an independent science having a separate existence and its own methods of investigation. Nevertheless it does obtain data from economics, politics, and other social sciences. So, too, does it obtain material from biology and psychology, and yet no one would think of including these within the scope of sociology.

Sociology therefore occupies a very important place in the group of social sciences. As already stated, it occupies much the same position with reference to the social sciences that biology holds to the natural sciences dealing with organic phenomena. Therefore, its relation to other social sciences in the university curriculum must be very close.

The Relation of Sociology to Psychology and to Biology. — Biology studies the completed individual unit and seldom goes beyond this. Its object is to show the origin and development of life in all of its various forms, and in its study it pursues the history of the individual from the first protoplasmic germ to the completed organism. On the other hand, psychology deals with the mental powers and habits of the individual. Its whole aim is to discover normal and abnormal action of the mind. These two sciences dealing alone with the individual have completed the range of their scientific investigation when they have discovered and classified all the phenomena concerning the individual; the one, those manifested by him as a living being, the other, those manifested by him as a being who thinks, feels, and wills. It is true that biology incidentally touches upon some phases of social life influenced by biological conditions, and also that psychology branches out occasionally into social psychology for the purpose of interpreting individual characteristics. But in neither case is there any aim or purpose to present systematically the phenom-

ena of social life. On the other hand, sociology has to do with the association of the bio-psychical units. It does not inquire into the growth of the individual man, either as to his origin, structure, or evolution, but deals with the phenomena arising from his association with his fellows.

The Relation of Sociology to Economics. — Prior to the development of modern sociology, even before Spencer had written his monumental work and Ward had published his *Dynamic Sociology*, there was a tendency for economics to expand from the old narrow bounds as laid down by Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others. This tendency grew with the expansion of industrial life until economics was reaching out to grasp a large group of phenomena which might be treated either from the economic or the purely social standpoint. The historical school of economics brought into economic life many of the details of human society which are rather the effects of competitive economic processes on social well-being, than fundamental principles of economics. Indeed, some went so far as to weave into their economic writings much of ethics and politics, and also some characteristics of social life other than the purely economic. But as sociology has developed and covered its own particular field, economics withdraws to its own natural boundaries. Economics deals with the social phenomena that arise from man's activities connected with the production and distribution of wealth. In a general way it may be said that wealth is its central problem, and only the social phenomena that are closely grouped about it may be considered as economic. Economic relations are social relations, but the problems of economics are different from those of sociology. Yet sociology may use for its purpose certain conclusions of economics, just as it may use the laws and principles discovered in any other scientific field which have social bearings, as data for broader generalizations.

The chief differences between sociology and economics, then, are to be found in the fact that economics works in a specific, while sociology works in a general social field. Economics has to do with the wealth phase of social life, both as it existed in the past and as it exists to-day, while sociology searches for the general principles underlying the entire structure and activity of society. Thus,

their boundaries are clearly defined, since their purposes are widely different, and their material fields of operation are separate, except for certain overlappings, where they deal with the same social phenomena, but look at them from a different angle.

The Relation of Sociology to Political Science. — Political science generally purports to be, as its name indicates, — the science of government, — which would include the classification and study of the methods of local, state, and national governments or, in America especially, the interpretation of government and methods of administration. The theory of politics, the development of the state, and statecraft are subjects for its consideration. While political science is seeking to set forth the principles of government, sociology, on the one hand, is seeking for the universal elements of social activity to be found in political development, as in economic development, and, on the other hand, is studying the effects of those principles on society. Here, as elsewhere, sociology uses as data the product of another social science. There may be times when it is difficult to draw a line dividing the field work of the two sciences, although the respective aims of these sciences and the social facts studied in each case are clearly distinguished from each other. The history of the development of constitutions and systems of administration, while it records the progress of humanity in a given direction, is not strictly sociological, but it supplies raw material for sociology in that like every other special social science it furnishes a basis for generalization as to the way in which society as a whole originates and develops.

The Relation of Sociology to History. — History deals with the details of evidence, while sociology deals with general principles of social action. History would be interested in the narration of the various facts attendant upon the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, but after giving a full and complete description of every movement its service would be finished; on the other hand, sociology cares nothing about all of these details except as they lead to some general truths relating to the origin or progress of society. However, certain treatments of history have approached nearer to the realm of pure sociology. Thus, for instance, recent philosophy of history, represented by Barth's writings in contrast

with Hegel's, deals with the social causes and effects of nation building and furnishes general concepts concerning the development of single groups of known societies. A good deal that has been written under the title of sociology is nothing more than the philosophy of history interpreted in social and economic terms and frequently the philosophy of history has so broadened its scope as to be a social philosophy.[20] But the philosophy of society proceeds deductively while sociology works inductively. Among historical writers the social phases of history have increasingly received attention, and as history broadens its scope it is becoming more serviceable as a means of culture.[21] However, in its broadest aspect it fails to include the whole range of social phenomena. Facts about society do not, in themselves, make sociology.

The Relation of Sociology to Anthropology. — Anthropology in its broadest sense is the science of man, — physical, intellectual, and social. There is a sociological aspect to some parts of anthropology; for example, that which refers to social characteristics and to the natural habitat of man. But anthropology in its limited view should really only include the natural history of mankind. It does not include such sciences as biology, psychology, sociology, political science, or economics. Its chief purpose is to view man as an animal possessed of mental and physical characteristics, and in his normal habitat in comparison with other animals. Its purpose is somewhat different from that of any other social science, but it very nearly approached sociology in the fields of social origins, and in social population, and certain fields of social reform, like criminology, it provides data of the greatest importance to sociology. If it were purely biological, as is one branch of it, somatology, treating of physical structure, — of anatomy and physiology, — it would be purely a branch of zoölogy. A large portion of this work must be given up to the description of the social life of primitive people in order to represent man in his true characteristics, individual and social. There

[20] Cf. Paul Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie.*

[21] See James Harvey Robinson's essay on *History.* Columbia University Press, 1908. See also his later *The Mind in the Making,* New York, 1921.

are many divisions of the subject of anthropology, such as somatology, or the determination of physical characteristics; anthropometry, which relates to the system of measurement of mankind; ethnology, which treats of racial characteristics; and ethnography, which concerns itself with the origin, subdivision, and distribution of races over the earth's surface; cultural anthropology, which treats of the achievements of man as represented in customs, mores, and institutions and in the industrial and fine arts furnishes a ground work of data for determining the movements of society and indeed the progress of civilization.

Various Conceptions of Sociology. — While various writers have viewed sociology from many different standpoints, such as economics, philosophy of history, anthropology, biology, and political science, there are other writers who see sociology as a general science, distinct from any of these special sciences, and who seek to find some single unifying principle on which to base it. They differ, however, as to what is the fundamental social fact on which society is built up, and consequently as to the central principle or conception in sociology. For example, M. Tarde in his *Laws of Imitation*, has laid unusual stress upon a single feature of social action, viz., imitation. This is made to dominate everything else. Later, in his *Social Laws*, he has attempted to reduce sociology to three fundamental conceptions; namely, "repetition, opposition, and adaptation." Giddings, in his *Principles*, viewed sociology from a single fundamental principle, "The consciousness of kind." In his later works, however, Giddings has broadened out his structure of sociology and has reduced "consciousness of kind" to a subordinate place, where, although it is a very important concept, it occupies its true position. Gumplowicz, in his *Der Rassenkampf* (*War of Races*), has viewed society from the standpoint of the contact of races, group-struggles being the fundamental fact. Novicow, in his *Les luttes entre sociétés humaines* (*Struggle among Human Societies*), has approached this same idea from a different standpoint. And, finally, we have a new conception termed by Ward "unconscious social constraint," which represents a number of writers who try to show that society has been built through the moral or psychic

action of individuals in association, and that this represents, indeed, the important characteristic. More recent sociological thought, especially in America, departs wisely from any one-sided explanation of social phenomena and, while recognizing that the social process is at bottom psychological, attempts to describe scientifically social organization and social processes, and to interpret the phenomena by an analysis which takes into account all the factors which have produced organized social life.[22]

READING ASSIGNMENTS

Case, C. M. *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. I.
Ellwood, C. A. *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chap. I.
Giddings, F. H. *The Principles of Sociology*, Chap. III.
Small, A. W. *General Sociology*, Chaps. I–III.

OTHER REFERENCES

Giddings, F. H. *Studies in the Theory of Human Society.*
Sorokin, Pitirim. *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. VIII.
Ward, Lester F. *Pure Sociology*, Chaps. II, III; *Dynamic Sociology*, Chaps. III–VII; Contemporary Sociology, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, pp. 475–500, 629–658, 749–962.

[22] Even a cursory survey of Ross' *Principles of Sociology* reveals this tendency in a striking way. Giddings in his recent *Studies in the Theory of Human Society* shows the same tendency to depart from the unilateral explanation of society on the basis of the principle of "consciousness of kind." His latest statement of his system of sociology is as follows:

"1. A situation or stimulus is reacted to by more than one individual; there is pluralistic as well as singularistic behavior. Pluralistic behavior develops into rivalries, competitions and conflicts, and also, into agreements, contracts and collective enterprises. Therefore, social phenomena are products of two variables, namely, situation (in the psychologist's definition of the word) and pluralistic behavior.

"2. When the individuals who participate in pluralistic behavior have become differentiated into behavioristic kinds of types, a consciousness of kind, liking or disliking, approving or disapproving one kind after another, converts gregariousness into a consciously discriminative association, herd habit into society; and society, by a social pressure which sometimes is conscious but more often, perhaps, is unconscious, makes life relatively hard for kinds of character and conduct that are disapproved.

"3. Society organizes itself for collective endeavor and achievement if fundamental similarities of behavior and an awareness of them are extensive enough to maintain social cohesion, while differences of behavior and awareness of them in matter of detail are sufficient to create a division of labor.

"4. In the long run organized society by its approvals and disapprovals, its pressures and achievements, selects and perpetuates the types of mind and character that are relatively intelligent, tolerant, and helpful, that exhibit initiative, that bear their share of responsibility, and that effectively play their part in collective enterprise. It selects and perpetuates the adequate." *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, pp. v, vi, 291, 292.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What are the essentials of a good definition? See Century Dictionary.
2. Judged by these essentials, which is the best definition of sociology given in this chapter?
3. Can you cite any sciences that have benefited by the use of the genetic method?
4. How do survivals in clothing illustrate the point that it is impossible to understand certain things in existence without knowing the origins from which they developed? Can you think of other illustrations?
5. Write out a careful analysis of the social activities and the social structures through which the activities are carried on in your home or other community with which you are acquainted.
6. In what respects are a lodge, a bank, a state, like a tree or an animal? In what are they different?
7. Name three influences of physical nature which cause men to coöperate and combine.
8. What physical characteristics of individuals cause them to associate together?
9. Name some physical differences which keep them from associating together.
10. Explain how a struggle based on destruction of others could result in a being whose guiding principle is love and service of his fellows and whose practice is to "turn the other cheek."
11. Explain how, when such a creature once appeared in the midst of a "Nature red in tooth and claw," he and his kind could possibly survive.
12. State clearly the differences between sociology and the following social sciences: economics, politics, ethics.
13. Explain the differences between a society, a community, and a neighborhood.

CHAPTER III

PURPOSE, PROBLEMS AND METHODS

The Purpose of Sociology. — The foregoing chapter pointed out the position of sociology among social sciences and indicated the field in which it operates. Its scientific purpose is primarily to describe society as we find it, ascertain how it developed, and learn what are the processes by which it develops.

He who would understand society must not guess about it or philosophize about it according to some preconceived idea, but must look at it as he would look at any other phenomenon and attempt to describe what he finds. Moreover, one must remember that sociology deals not with one people or one civilization. So far as possible one must make himself acquainted with society the world around. As we have already seen in a previous chapter, sociology studies mankind in groups. Sociology is interested in ascertaining how men actually live in group life and how the group affects the individual and how the individual on the other hand modifies the group. He is also interested in noticing the processes by which the relationships between man and man, and between group and group, are established, what results come out of that association, such as institutions, the whole complex of things that we call culture, the process by which man becomes adjusted to the ideals and traditions of the group, and the ways in which maladjustment between the individual and the group and between one group and another comes about with the different results in each case. Moreover, sociology attempts to ascertain how these institutional relationships grew up. Therefore it is a comparative study of institutions among various people. However, it may fairly be claimed that the full purpose of the science will not have been attained until it contributes to the social well-being and the individual happiness of mankind. Sociology has a

practical purpose. Based upon a knowledge of how society has come to be what it is to-day, sociology can better point the way in which the social organization can more effectively adapt itself to the changing conditions of life. From a careful analysis of the social structures and processes of society as organized at present, sociology will derive that understanding of the nature of society which will suggest remedies for its ills. A sound social technology is based upon a careful study of the origin, development, and analysis of present-day social structure and processes.[1] The *ought* of social conduct, then, must be considered. The purpose of sociology is not fulfilled when it has classified and described social phenomena, discovered the social forces, and formulated laws of social being and growth. It should point the way to a better social life and to the improvement of the social mechanism. *In short, we may say that the purpose of sociology is, first, to understand society; then, to enable us to formulate a scientific program of social betterment.*

The Problems of Sociology. — The numerous problems confronting the sociologist are of a varied nature. Perhaps the fundamental problem is a correct conception of the origin, structure, and activities of society. A correct knowledge of the parts and functions of society and their relation to one another is of prime importance to the student. It is essential that he understand not only social phenomena, but the causes producing them and the effects which grow out of their interrelations.

One of the best ways to understand the present structure and processes of society is to study the origin of our customs, traditions, institutions, and organizations. Only as we compare such institutions as the family, property, political institutions, morals, standards, and beliefs, with those of more primitive peoples or with those of civilized peoples of an earlier period can we understand many of the social phenomena which meet our eyes to-day. Many of the institutions and attitudes which we now have descended to us from the past. While the old evolutionary theory

[1] "It is vicious to encourage students to speculate about great questions of social reform before they have learned to know intimately the facts of social structures and functions." Small and Vincent, *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 20.

that all of those that we have to-day are derived from those of savage or primitive peoples can no longer be held, nevertheless the comparative study of such institutions and processes of development among peoples of different stages of culture will throw much light upon how individuals of different ages and in different environments have responded to difficulties and have solved these problems of social relationship.

The regularity of recurring social phenomena is no less important, for without this no generalizations as to how men act in association under differing or similar conditions can be made. If there are no regularities in social life, no general laws under which large bodies of social facts can be subsumed, then sociology has not reached the dignity of a science. When one finds, however, on comparing the family among different peoples that its form varies with the state of culture reached, with the economic conditions under which they live, and with the contacts which they have made with other peoples, he begins to see a regularity of occurrence of social phenomena and the connection of that occurrence with such conditioning factors. So with the form of political control. Even Aristotle on a comparison of the various forms of government in his day was able to make a tentative generalization as to the development through which the forms of political control went. Likewise moral codes vary from people to people. These vary somewhat even under similar conditions; nevertheless there is a certain regularity of recurrence of methods by which moral problems were met which are of the greatest interest.

The question of the freedom of the human will in shaping social development is another vital problem. Can the conscious purpose of man control social events? In its solution is involved the relation of the so-called natural development of society to its development under the control of the social purpose. Moreover, it determines the position and influence of the individual in social activities. If man's purposive efforts for the changing of social conditions are useless, he might as well sit down and fold his hands while the slow but merciless process of natural forces works out the destiny of the race.

This problem is followed, on the other hand, by the question of

the possibility of applying the principles of organic evolution to society. If a man can control society, then what part is left to natural forces of the world in the shaping of social development? Our present knowledge, however, indicates that man can to a degree control his natural environment and yet that natural environment and his own inherent nature place limits upon what it is possible for him consciously to effect.

Again, if progress is brought about through the struggle of individuals and races and the survival of the fittest, is peace or war of greater value to the human race?[2] Only by a careful study of what has happened in both peace and war, not only in modern times but in ancient times can this question be answered. The struggle between individuals and races has marked at least the recent history of mankind. Periods of peace have intervened between wars. Is there any evidence that war may have served a useful purpose among earlier peoples when its methods were less mechanical and the outcome depended more upon the individual prowess than at present? Does peace have enervating effects upon the individuals of the group in that it allows weaklings to live who in war would die? These are questions which cannot be answered by philosophizing but by actually ascertaining the results of peace and of war.

Another set of problems to which sociology addresses itself are those which pertain to the processes of socialization, the mechanisms by which the individual as he grows from infancy to manhood becomes adjusted to the groups of which he is a member. What inherent qualities does he bring with him into the world which promote or hinder his adjustment as a useful member of society? What institutions, codes, and patterns of conduct has society set up by which to control him from birth to death in ever widening circles to its consciously conceived end. Hence the processes of socialization and the means of social control are important problems to sociology.

Furthermore, sociology studies the social ends or ideals, such purposes as society sets for itself. How did these aims arise?

[2] See "The Problems of Sociology," by Gustav Ratzenhofer, *American Journal of Sociology*, Sept., 1904.

Were they the result of chance or of conscious adoption; how were these ends secured; what are the mechanisms which society has invented to achieve them?

Again, sociology faces the fact that many individuals fail to adjust themselves to the demands of their group. Every school has children who cannot make the grade, every community has its delinquents, juvenile and adult, who are maladjusted to the social organization. Thousands upon thousands of people fill our insane hospitals and asylums, others are so mentally defective that they cannot function in our present social organization sufficiently to earn their own living and keep themselves out of trouble. Thousands of epileptics are unable to hold a job and are a menace in many cases to the community in which they live. Adolescents who are normal in mind in passing from childhood to manhood and womanhood frequently find themselves in conflict with the standards and codes set up by society. Great numbers of our people are unable to adjust themselves to the economic and political demands of our civilization. Are these maladjustments the result of inherent incapacities or of the lack of adaptation of our social machinery to these varying individuals or both? Only careful study of the facts as we find them can answer these questions. Hence, here sociology seeks to discover what are the facts about these people whom we may call pathological deviates. It also seeks to answer the question as to whether the social organization, meaning by that not only the organized structure of the state and of the educational system, but also the codes which have grown up, the patterns of conduct approved, and the attitudes expressed by society toward these individuals, are so nicely adjusted to their incapacities and their peculiar qualities that they can find a comfortable place in the social organization and that their kind may be increasingly limited in number. Hence a part of the task of sociology is to study social pathology.

Again, sociologists are constantly studying the methods by which men in all ages have studied society. We shall learn something if we know about how men from the earliest times who are interested in social problems went at the job of finding out about them. Hence, sociology studies methodology.

In the wake of these fundamental philosophic problems connected with sociology come many practical problems. There are the questions of the relation of ethical and religious culture to social development. Are they part of the *process?* Are they causes or are they effects, or each in turn? What kind of government should be sought in view of the history of social development? What should be society's attitude towards its waste products — the dependent, defective, and criminal classes? What message, if any, has sociology for the educational and business systems of society? Does it throw any light upon the measures to be taken to direct society along lines of future development in the interest of the highest type of social personality and of social group? All these and many more problems thrust themselves upon the sociologist for answer.

Let us summarize. Among the points previously under controversy the following may be considered pretty well established: (1) The origin, nature, structure, and activities of society; (2) A knowledge of the parts of society, their functions and relationships; (3) The regularity of recurring social phenomena; (4) Psychical phenomena in relation to biological; (5) Determination of the method of the development of social personality; (6) The social processes, causes and methods of social organization.

Of the many important tasks yet to be faced, the following may be mentioned: (1) the generalization of the results of special investigations; (2) a synthesis of the results of investigators which would establish general principles, and unify sociological thought; (3) the establishment of a standard of measurement of social conduct; (4) determination of the extent to which society may direct its own course, and how much may be determined by the natural course of evolution; (5) what may be done to conserve human energy and to eliminate social waste; (6) how may the study of the individual life, the family, or other social group contribute to the development of the science of sociology; and, (7) specific problems of crime, poverty, birth control, and population.

Past and Present Methods of Sociological Study. — The methods of approach to the study of society and to the development of social theory are so many and varied that their satisfactory

classification is seemingly impossible. The history of social thought reveals a multitude of points of view and methods of investigation by philosophers and social scientists. In general it shows how the attitude of mind toward human behavior has changed from the imaginative to the reflective, and from speculative philosophy about social relations to scientific observation and analysis. It is a long trail marked by abandoned theories, discarded methods, and reconstructed systems, to the scientific investigation of society by actual study of its nature at first hand. Perhaps a brief review of the way some of the leading sociologists have attacked the study of society will give us some conception of methodology in the study of society.

I. *The Philosophical Method.* — From early times, especially in western civilization, there were men of learning who philosophized concerning the nature of human society, its character and purpose. They based their opinions on the knowledge concerning historic societies and from casual observation of contemporary societies. In many cases they observed the defects of society and through a philosophical idealism advocated changes to correct the defects. Plato and all of his followers based their socialistic theories on the imperfections of society as compared with their established ideals. The philosophers of the middle ages and the early modern period followed the same method. It was not until the accumulation of knowledge and the beginnings of scientific methods in other fields that men began anew a serious study of society. Auguste Comte,[3] sometimes called the founder of sociology, in his classification of the sciences made a place for sociology. He used the terms "social physics" which he divided into "social statics" and "social dynamics" as indicating his conception of the methods of approach to the study of society. He said human thought evolves through three stages, (1) the theological, (2) the metaphysical, and (3) the positive. The theological stage is characterized by the attempt to explain all phenomena on the basis of action by supernatural beings. In the metaphysical stage men account for phenomena by the supposition that abstract forces instead of supernatural beings produce the

[3] *Positive Philosophy*, London, 1875, 2 vols.

phenomena. That is, for example, the wind is now produced not by being set in motion by a god but by a force. These forces are conceived of as abstract entities, like Gravitation. This metaphysical conception still obtains when people speak of the force of gravitation, when scientifically gravitation is only a law describing how things act under certain conditions. In the positive stage, Comte said, the human mind no longer searches for abstract entities to explain things, but applies itself to the study of phenomena in their relations of succession and resemblance. Under given circumstances certain things are observed to occur. This is the positive or scientific stage. Book VI is devoted to "Social Physics." In this part of his work he shows how men have followed these three methods in the study of society, and points out how the positive method may be applied to its study.

Herbert Spencer[4] approached sociology as a corollary to his system of philosophy. In this respect he followed Comte. The central ideas of his social philosophy were reinforced by a conception of the laws of evolution and causation. He based his conception of society on biological structure and explained society in comparison with a biological organism. His organic conception of society became the center of sociological controversy for many years. Spencer gathered an immense amount of ethnographical material with which he illustrated his analysis of social phenomena. But the material was secondary to his analysis. He threw a flood of light on social origins, but his work was vitiated by his theory that in social development evolution occurred according to his so-called law of evolution. While the development of social theory has left the Spencerian philosophy of sociology far behind, no other man has had wider influence on the development of sociology. His great contribution was the stimulation he gave to the study of the subject, rather than his particular system. It was more what he suggested and left unsaid than his evolutionary system that challenged thinking about the study of society. His extreme laissez-faire doctrine, his evolutionary philosophy, his freedom of thought, his wide range of scholarship, and his challenge of the political philosophy of his day, inspired thought in his

[4] *Principles of Sociology*, 3 vols.

contemporaries and his followers. Not one of his critics, either friendly or antagonistic, but owes much to Spencer's theories.

All of these early social philosophers were interested in reducing social phenomena to the working out of one or a few simple principles. In further illustration of the early philosophical period the method of Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1910) [5] is worthy of attention as a representative of the social conflict theory. Rejecting the mechanistic individualism of Comte and the organic analogies of Spencer, Gumplowicz conceived society as founded on primitive groups or hordes of human beings warring with one another for survival. The chief cause of this perpetual conflict was the encroachment of population on the food supply. His theory is the survival of the fittest of Spencer and Darwin applied to social groups, in which the strong survived and enslaved or exterminated the weak. In this way permanently organized social groups became established. Thus he made the group the central factor of action as contrasted with the individual. It was bound together by various unified interests dependent upon community life, mores, customs, and laws. While the recognition of group conflict is a factor in the development of society it is only one of many factors and is not the universal determiner of social order. The internal social process of individuals in relation to one another and in their relation to the group was not fully considered.

Gustav Ratzenhofer [6] (1842–1904) developed a slightly different conflict theory. So far as the eternal struggle for survival of groups and races is universal as a foundation of society he agrees with Gumplowicz, but he finds coöperation rather than dominance the result. He pictures man in a continual struggle against natural enemies including savage man. If the strife between groups or races led to war, the result was necessarily coöperation. Though it was a philosophy of conflicting forces, class interests to prevent destruction compelled coöperation which was the basis of social organization. Moreover, he paid more attention to social structures.

[5] *Der Rassenkampf*, Innsbruck, 1883: *Outlines of Sociology*, translated by F. W. Moore, Philadelphia, 1899.

[6] *Die Sociologische Erkentness*, Leipzig, 1898.

George Simmel [7] (1858–1918) represents another distinct phase of the philosophical sociology. Adhering to the theory that sociology should have its own field of study independent of other social sciences he held that its only subject is the forms of human relationship, and that forms and not contents are the subjects of sociological investigation. A conception of form without function as cause is vague and speculative, to say the least. He fails to observe that the mark that divides sciences is a psychological convenience and that different sciences may use the same data with special aims and methods. Simmel's philosophy is analytic rather than synthetic, speculative rather than constructive.

Gabriel Tarde [8] (1843–1904) noticed the importance of imitation in social development. He held that imitation is the principal cause of the resemblance of individual action and of their coöperation in social groups. It was the important factor in social development. While he placed undue stress upon his theory, it is inevitable in the early development of a science that individual scholars should emphasize one aspect of the social process or study one phase of social phenomena. Tarde was one of the most notable social philosophers of his period. His introduction of the psychological element into sociological study marks an important era in the development of sociology. He insisted that social phenomena resulted from the interaction of individual minds. Like Spencer and Comte he was interested in formulating social laws or generalizations.[9] He opened up a new field of thought by his social philosophy, different as it was from any of his predecessors or contemporaries. His work has been suggestive to nearly all American sociologists of his period and since. Incomplete as his system is now regarded, it was a pioneer work and one step farther toward that aspect of sociology known as social psychology.

It will be observed that the method of approach to the study of society by all these writers was philosophical. They held certain theories which they then set out to prove. Each stressed his

[7] Spykman, N. J., *Social Theory of George Simmel*, 1925; Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 489–502.

[8] *Laws of Imitation*, translated by Elsie C. Parsons, New York, 1930.

[9] *Social Laws*, translated by H. C. Warren, New York, 1899; *Les lois de l'imitation*, Paris, 1890 and 1895.

philosophy from a particular assumption or viewpoint as the foundation of his particular theory, and attempted to prove his hypothesis by the inclusion of only those facts which favored it. Though open to criticism in the light of modern social thought, what they taught brought to the foreground many hypotheses that had to await the test of a more scientific method.

II. *The Genetic Method.* — The genetic method of sociology corresponds to the historical in economics. It studies the origin and development of society with the purpose to find out how it came to be. Only as one understands the history of one institution does he know how to appreciate its present form and its functions. It seeks to learn the nature of social organization and social processes by seeking to learn about them in earlier times. For example, many of the present forms of the state, the family, property, kinship, crime, justice, etc., cannot be understood without knowing their history. Spencer pioneered this method although his results were somewhat vitiated by his emphasis upon a linear evolution of forms. He failed to consider sufficiently functional group activities. The genetic, or historical method, however, has great value for the student of institutions.

William G. Sumner (1840–1910) applied the same method in his study in a narrow field of social phenomena which he called the *Folkways.*[10] Here the data on social origins and primitive cultures throw a flood of light upon customary ways of doing things, such as customs, traditions, and morals. His work revealed some of the mechanisms by which social institutions became established. He showed the importance of these origins, and made a contribution of real sociological import. His work has been useful in the study of the origin and evolution of many social institutions and processes without Spencer's effort to press his data into conformity with an evolutionary hypothesis. However, like Spencer, he was an individualist and an advocate of biological evolution. His description and analysis of folkways, customs, and mores as societary phenomena have been of importance in the development of sociology, though the psychological interpretation character-

[10] *Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals*, Boston, 1907.

istic of more recent times was not emphasized. William Wundt,[11] in his *Folk Psychology,* supplies what Sumner lacks in this respect as he discusses the processes that bring human beings together in social groups.[12]

Edward Westermarck,[13] in his study of the evolution of morals and in his *History of Human Marriage,* has given an excellent type of the genetic approach to two phases of group life. Both are marked by concreteness, scientific objectivity, and thoroughness. His book on *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas* was important for sociology in that he showed that "society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness" and that there is a similarity between the conscience of an individual and of a community.

Recent studies and researches in anthropology and ethnology have contributed much to the genetic method of sociology. The early anthropologists were satisfied with the enumeration and description of examples of material culture as shown in food, tools, shelter, clothing, and ornaments and in the spiritual culture as shown in languages, religious ceremonies, and social customs. Reacting from the linear evolutionary theory of Spencer, Morgan, and others, they have not tried to show the relation of culture to social origins and social development. They have been more interested in studying the origin and spread of culture patterns, without theorizing about any evolutionary hypothesis.

Nevertheless, the work of such anthropologists as Boas, Kroeber, Wilder, and others have shown the connection between the anthropology and sociology of primitive peoples. They have revealed that culture is a common field for both sciences. Their studies have brought sociologists to face the question as to how far the discoveries in biology apply to the origin and development of man, and to what extent organized social life is dependent upon the cultures arising from invention of tools, machines, clothing, and of ceremonial institutions. "Here then," says Kroeber, "is a specific task and place in the sun for anthropology, the

[11] William Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology,* London, 1906–1908.

[12] A. G. Keller has carried forward Sumner's ideas of variation, selection, and adaptation in *Societal Evolution,* New York, 1915. Further elaboration of Sumner's hypothesis is found in the *Science of Society* by Sumner, Keller, and M. R. Davie, 4 vols., New Haven, 1927.

[13] Ed. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas,* 2 vols., 1906–1908.

interpretation of the phenomena into which both organic and social causes enter. . . . To deal with this interplay of what is natural and nurtural, organic and social, anthropology must know something of the organic as such and of the social as such." [14] Thus the anthropologists adopting the genetic method of research and starting with the biogenic study of man and continuing with the interpretation of his early cultures would extend their studies in organic and cultural relations to the whole range of human society. Such study undoubtedly is of far reaching importance in checking up assumptions and hastily formed conclusions as to the life of primitive peoples. Their work throws much light on the way man in different circumstances has responded in different ways to meet his life problems.

Lester F. Ward (1841–1913) occupies an independent unclassified position in the development of social philosophy and indeed of social science. As a geologist and paleobotanist, Ward approached the study of sociology with a scientific attitude of mind. Yet withal he was primarily a philosopher. He proceeded from the standpoint of the physical sciences and extended his system of thought to human society (tertiary aggregates) to discover universal laws regarding man's relation to physical nature. While on the whole he approached the study of society from the genetic point of view, and while he had no quarrel with the evolutionary hypothesis, yet he recognized that there are two different stages in social development. In the earlier stage social institutions develop spontaneously by the working together of physical forces in nature and in man. In the second, man by his intelligence directs social development to preconceived ends. By reason of the second he is able to repudiate Spencer's narrow determinism and his extreme individualism and to hold that man through conscious effort may control not only the forces of the natural world but by dynamic action may transform and direct the course of human society. This necessitated universal education as a necessity in social control. Following out his scheme he departed further from the organic basis of society and ended by showing that society is psychical in its nature. Thus he traced the develop-

[14] A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, New York, 1923, pp. 3, 4.

ment of society through the working together (synergy) unconsciously of the forces in nature and in man to the establishment of a conscious purpose (telesis) in social groups directed to its own development and to the control of its own behavior. This was made possible through the feelings and intelligence inherent in the nature of man. While many of his views on psychology and social causation are subject to criticism in the light of modern study, his system in general is to be accredited with a tremendous influence in the advancement of the science of sociology. That man has directed the development of social arrangements in part is a needed supplement and corrective to the theory that human society is the result of the blind forces of inanimate nature. This is a lasting contribution to social science.

III. *The Statistical Method.* — The methods so far described may be characterized as fundamentally philosophic in character. While Comte, Spencer, and Ward performed a great service to sociology in gathering from the various fields of knowledge, such as biology, psychology, and especially anthropology and ethnology, an immense amount of material on social customs, ceremonies, institutions, and beliefs, they were essentially systematizers of these facts on some philosophical principle. They did not attempt to apply measurements to social phenomena. In following their methods they were applying to the field of sociology the methods used in the physical sciences. With the development, however, of quantitative methods in biology, physics, chemistry, and psychology, the social scientists have seen that the systematic arrangement of descriptive material, while important, will not satisfy the strictest scientific canons, and therefore have begun to apply statistical methods to social phenomena. The matter has proceeded far enough now so that it is clear that some phenomena cannot yet be measured by present statistical methods. However, it is also clear that what can be treated quantitatively should be so treated in the interest of exactitude. The gathering of social statistics and their classification and interpretation as a means of understanding society is one of the most important methods of social study and sociological investigation. Social statistics means something more than the mere enumeration of facts. Their

classification and interpretation are more important. Otherwise they are meaningless. Numbering of recurring phenomena is necessary and mathematical calculations are of value, but what these facts mean regarding traits, movement, composition, and processes of society, is what the social statistician is seeking.

Whatever social phenomena can be counted and measured supplies an invaluable corrective to impressions gained from individual observation and to philosophic generalizations. For example, before the figures were published for the United States census on marriage and divorce it was the general impression that people were marrying later in recent times than they did earlier in the history of this country. However, the statistics of marriage showed that in the last years studied people were marrying younger than they did in 1867, or any period between the first and last dates of that survey. Again, whether the coal workers in Pennsylvania had a living wage or not was in dispute between the coal workers' organization and the operators, and, until various careful studies were made to find out exactly what a large number of men earned, the dispute could not be settled. Again, it was once believed that alcohol was responsible for 75 per cent of the dependency of the country. When some one took the pains to go through the records of social work organizations which dealt with dependent families, they found it was somewhere between 17 and 25 per cent. So with many other generalizations which sociologists have made. Unless they have actual facts at hand with respect to large numbers they are likely to put forth generalizations which are only guesses at the best. Consequently, at the present time in sociology there is an increasing emphasis upon the use of statistical methods in the study of social phenomena.

In connection with our emphasis upon the importance of measuring social phenomena we must be careful that we do not attempt to measure the immeasurable, or to weigh the imponderable. While a great deal more of the social area can be measured and treated statistically than is at present being done, it is recognized by all careful sociologists that there are many phases of social life to which we cannot apply any methods of measurements now known to the statistician. If this is kept in mind, and one is

careful not to deny to those who pursue some other method the appellation of scientific, we can only look with favor upon the present emphasis upon applying measuring rods in social science.

The statistical method irons out all peculiarities and shows trends and tendencies in mass phenomena. By reason of that very characteristic of the statistical method, however, sometimes a distorted picture of details is given. Only by studying cases can details of the picture be supplied. Consequently, in connection with the emphasis upon statistics, recent social science has tended to emphasize the value of the case method in sociology.

IV. *The Case Method.* — While for many years the case record has been a device in use in the charity organization societies and in the juvenile court, only recently has the value of the case records in the study of human relations become apparent. In medicine the case method has long been used. In the study of law it has been recognized recently as important. As a supplement to the statistical method in social science, the case method both for individuals and communities is now increasing in use. Its value is to be seen in the fact that certain of the subtle reactions of individuals to their environment cannot be statistically tabulated. True, you can tabulate with some degree of accuracy the social conditions which surround the children who have become delinquent. The results of the statistical treatment of these facts will yield some important information. Yet how little those statistical results will tell you of the delicate differences in response of one individual as compared with another to any conditions which you may be able to tabulate statistically. The well done case record, on the other hand, will reveal to you, for example, that this child has been spoiled by his parents. He has learned to demand certain things of them which he cannot expect in the ordinary social relationships. He may have a perfectly good home by any standards which may be devised to measure it statistically. Yet there may be subtle influences at work in that home even with the kindest father and mother which will be revealed only in the case record and will help explain why this child becomes delinquent.

This method has been most successfully applied in the study of the psychopathological state of individuals who were maladjusted.

The method has thrown a great light upon the infinitely delicate processes in the individual's reaction to other individuals in his environment. The modern study of problem children, the recent development of the psychopathology of adults, with their emphasis upon the importance of certain social experiences in developing insanity is of the greatest value to social science. A beginning has been made to apply this method to the ordinary psychical reactions of normal individuals to the circumstances of life. It promises to reveal some of the processes by which our social codes, customs, and institutions are built up. In this way it will supplement all of these various methods which we have already discussed.

This has become a scientific process in determining the nature of family life, of normal and abnormal character, and social conditions by actual observation of personal life. It involves the actual study of personal as well as family life in relation to industrial, educational, religious, and social conditions of all members of the family. It involves the questions of health and disease, employment and non-employment, income, recreation, personality, marriage and divorce, and the harmony or disharmony of the family life.[15] An excellent exhibit of the method of personal histories will be found in the case studies of the Judge Baker Foundation.[16]

There is no reason why after a sufficient body of case studies have accumulated they may not be analyzed and treated statistically. In fact, some of the early statistical studies of dependency were based upon the case records of charity organization societies.[17] Some recent studies of delinquency illustrate the application of statistical methods to the material found in the case record.[18] The combination of these two methods in certain kinds of problems is promising for social science.

Present Trend. — The trend of sociology at present is a zealous effort to supply a long felt need of a larger volume of social facts. Accompanying this is an attempt to perfect scientific methods of

[15] M. E. Richmond, *What Is Social Case Work; Social Diagnosis;* Ernest W. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization.*

[16] *The Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies*, Boston, 1923.

[17] Devine, *Misery and Its Causes*, New York, 1909.

[18] Healy and Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals: Their Making and Unmaking*, New York, 1926; Shaw, *Delinquency Areas*, Chicago, 1929.

research which will conduce to accuracy. While hasty generalizations are still made, there is an earnest enquiry by sociologists as to whether assumptions and generalizations may be supported by the facts, and whether the facts are complete. The laboratory of the sociologist is the whole world of social life and social activity wherever found, no matter how far extended, or of what nature. Great as is the difficulty the observation of concrete social phenomena furnishes the only true basis for the development of a formal science of society. While much has been gained much needs to be done.

The Unit of Investigation in Sociology. — Each science has its unit of investigation, that is to say, its specific object of study. Thus, biology studies the living being, and anthropology man in his physical and cultural relations. Sociology studies the *socius*, or man in his social relations. As in the case of each of the sciences mentioned, processes and products are studied also, but in sociology these are studied in order to throw light upon the main problem, that of man's social activities.[19] Connected with man's social activity are all those products and processes which we call social phenomena. Social phenomena, as Ross reminds us, "are all phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action of one human being on another."[20] Moreover, these phenomena must not be exceptional, but must be so characteristic of a large group of people that they provide a basis for generalization. For example, the phenomena which arise when two people meet and associate have no social significance if they are peculiar to those two only and are not likely to occur when two other people meet and associate under the same circumstances. *Sociology studies man in his social relations, as affecting and as affected by association, together with all the products and processes consequent upon such association.*[21]

[19] See Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. IV, where he contends that there is no one unit of investigation, but many, such as products and processes of association, as well as the socius himself.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[21] The position taken here is essentially that of Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 38, where he says: "It (sociology) does not really study men or the human race at all. That belongs to other sciences than sociology, chiefly to anthropology. It studies activities, results, products, in a word, achievement."

READING ASSIGNMENTS

GIDDINGS, F. H. *Inductive Sociology*, Chaps. II, III; *The Scientific Study of Society*, pp. 1–140.
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RICHMOND, M. E. *Social Diagnosis: What Is Social Work?*
WARD, LESTER F. *Pure Sociology*, Chap. IV.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. How is the primary purpose of sociology related to its practical purpose?
2. If it should be established that the conscious purpose of man can have no influence upon social development, what would be the practical effect upon movements to improve social conditions?
3. Make out a broad, general outline of the things you would want to investigate, if you were going to study society so as to get a general idea of its nature.
4. In connection with the section on the problems of sociology, read Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 70–76, and then write out in outline form a statement of the problems of sociology.
5. Why is it that statistics were not applied so early to the study of social phenomena as to the study of, let us say, the biological?
6. Name all the groups of social fact which you know have been treated statistically.
7. Name some social phenomena which have not yet been studied by the statistical methods.
8. Outline a study of your own home community, dividing the study into the various heads and subdivisions under which the facts concerning it would best be grouped in order to enable one to understand that community from a sociological standpoint.
9. What is social diagnosis?
10. Explain the "case method" of social study.
11. What is the difference between the inductive and the deductive method?
12. Explain generalization as a factor in the study of sociology.

PART TWO

SOCIAL EVOLUTION

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

Social Evolution. — A systematic study of the changes occurring in society during a certain period of time contributes much to the understanding of social life. It involves the passing from simple to more complex forms, to new group functions, and new relationships of groups. Society is thus seen as a continuous development from primitive life to the modern, social action. Therefore, the student of sociology studies carefully the development of human society as it occurs at successive periods of time in all parts of the world. He turns to the descriptions of native peoples, to their folk lore, mores, and customs, to the life of classic peoples of the past, and to survivals of all kinds in our modern life, in order to learn the steps in the development of social institutions and social processes, that he may find regularities of social action and reaction common to them all, and thus make generalizations of social movement.

Contemporary Societies. — By studying contemporary societies one may learn something about how society comes into being. The student might begin by considering the evolution of several social groups which have grown up under his eyes. One might consider them in the order of their complexity, for example, first taking up the rural family, next, perhaps the farming community, then the village, and then the city.[1] On the other hand, an understanding of the simple processes in the formation of a society might be obtained by a study of existing social institutions, traditions, customs, and organizations in various societies in different stages of development. The latter method would show cross sections of societies in successive stages of evolution. Both methods are

[1] Such is the method employed by Small and Vincent in *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Bk. II.

needed in order that the student may get a comprehension of the way in which societies come to be. The social institutions of today have had a history, have gone through phases of development. We shall know them only as we understand their respective origins and the course of their various developments. Some are survivals from a stage long since passed. They are fossils as much out of place in the present-day world as the skeleton of the dinosaur. The sanctions which once gave them vitality and significance have passed away. They remain only as traditions, anachronisms. Others are living, vital social institutions and processes, deeply rooted in the social necessities of the present.

The work of the biologists, beginning with Darwin, has made clear to us many features of early social life. This knowledge has been supplemented by the culture historians and archeologists, dealing with both the prehistoric and the historic peoples. Perhaps most illuminating of all has been the work of the comparative ethnologists, who have brought to our attention in the last few years the social organization, the language, customs, beliefs, and ideas of what are called the nature peoples of all lands. Their labors have made it almost possible for the student of society to retrace, step by step, the road along which society has progressed to its present stage.

In our study of social evolution we shall follow the method of the comparative ethnologists.[2]

The purpose of the study of social evolution is to acquaint the student with social origins and the processes of social growth. He must bear constantly in mind that society has expanded from simple beginnings, part by part, and function by function. Moreover, society is always developing. It is changing in size, in character, in the complexity of its institutions, in the number of its interests, and in the diversity of methods by which it expresses its social purposes. This is not to deny that societies exist in a state of arrested development. There are such, but they too are phenomena of social evolution, for they have been different and have become what they are through reacting to cer-

[2] For a full statement of the reasons for following this method, see Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, p. 231; Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 3–13.

tain definite social and environmental conditions. By reason of the fact, however, that arrested or degenerate societies are societies caught in the back eddies of the stream of human life, our chief interest is in those societies which are in a state of progressive development.

The development in the art and industry of prehistoric man is evidenced in the recent studies and classification of cultures in the Paleolithic and Neolithic stone ages. These show a succession of cultures from the eoliths of the Pre-Chellean type to the more highly developed Magdalenian arts and industries of the Cro-Magnons. What their social life was like is now obscure. But comparison of the arts and industries of the people of this early period with the least advanced of living races such as the Australians, gives us some idea of the probable social development. It indicates that the social life, though simple in nature, had well begun at a very early period. The development of arts and industries shows very clearly the aggregation of the people in groups, the beginning of a well-established family life, the origin of speech, and the rudiments of language. The size of the brain shows capacity for these characters. Yet it must be remembered that this early period of social development must have extended over a vast period and that progress was very slow. Although our knowledge of primitive social life is meager, recent discoveries have made a little clearer for us that shadowy past out of which man emerged with some social organization and some social ideas.[3]

Social evolution is difficult to present summarily, for society has not developed uniformly from a single idea, but rather from a group of ideas more or less interrelated. Hence, in its treatment we cannot follow through successive stages a clearly defined process like the growth of the tree from the seed, but must consider different phases of culture, such as religion, government, law, political organization, industrial activity, and the family life, each leading from a simple to a complex state of society and each contributing

[3] For an introduction to the interesting and instructive discoveries of the past twenty years see Chapin, *An Introduction to Social Evolution;* Osborn, *The Men of the Old Stone Age*, New York, 1919; Hankins, *An Introduction to the Study of Society;* Kroeber, *Anthropology;* Wilder, *Man's Prehistoric Past;* Blackmar, *History of Human Society*, Chap. IV.

to the solidarity of society as well as to the enlarged number of its activities. An outline of origins followed by a brief survey of the development of important phases of social life is all that can be attempted here.

The Society of Animals. — While sociology deals with human society, it is well to note that the beginnings of social organization appear among animals lower in the scale of existence than man. This fact gives the student a ground plan for the superstructure of society. It indicates also how the informal beginning of society rests on a physical basis and develops in proportion to intelligence. It cannot be shown that there is an uninterrupted continuity of development from the social practices of animals to the social practices of human beings, but there is a similarity in many points between the lowest human societies and the highest animal societies. The chief difference is found in the variety and versatility of association. Another difference is found in more diversified emotional capacity and larger mental powers of the human group which permit a high state of coöperation and organization. In other words animal societies show a few social qualities in embryo and growing out of the fundamental instincts, while human societies show these and many others in a highly developed state.[4]

Illustrations of how animals form into groups are given by the herds of buffaloes which once covered our West, by the beaver colonies to be found even yet in parts of our country, and by such social insects as the ants and the bees. In some of these cases the group is a temporary one, in others more lasting, and in some so stable that one almost wonders if they do not in that respect surpass human social groups.

Recent studies by entomologists have shown remarkable insect societies. Not only do the social insects display a remarkable development of coöperative activities, but they have developed a division of labor in their colonies unknown in human group life. They have specialized castes or classes, such as the "workers,"

[4] Yet, how striking is coöperation among animals and how important a part it played in the evolution of animals and man has been clearly shown by Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution.* See also Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*, Chaps. XVII–XIX.

the "queens," and the "drones." The workers perform no sexual functions; the others no production. They also have domesticated other insects as a source of food supply. They cultivate certain fungous growths as a source of food for their young.[5]

The society of ants, bees, and wasps, however, bear little more than an analogy to human societies. In the former reflexes passing into instinct and habit unguided by intelligence seem to be their main characteristics. While in the latter conscious social intelligence appears to a certain degree in the lowest forms of human association. The young ant stays with his fellow ants because he has no initiative to do otherwise. He does the same things that they do because with his endowment there is nothing else to do, hence he coöperates. It is a perfect automatic mechanism. Yet ants and bees do not represent a society in the modern acceptation of the term. Lacking in social consciousness and social will they display an automatic gregariousness.

Some birds of different species work together unconsciously, each species seeking to help itself. Others of the same species develop a community life, they hold assemblages for migratory purposes, they mix out of pure sociability. But, as Darwin clearly shows, in all animal association the moral sense seems to be wanting. There is no reflection on past acts and no comparison of past acts with present ones, no valuation of their relative importance — characteristics which give rise to morality.[6]

Herds of antelopes live in harmony and peace, the leaders giving warning of danger to the group. Elephants have been seen in herds numbering from five to a hundred and fifty. These groups are based on family relationships. Monkeys of the Old World live in troops composed of family groups. One species (Cercopithecus) engages in expeditions under the direction of a leader. He commands the troop, stations sentinels, and gives orders that are understood and obeyed. Another species (Cynocephalus), according to Brehm, exhibits a still higher organization.

The Causes of Aggregation. — Many influences have caused individuals to associate in groups. Among the more important

[5] Wheeler, "Social Life among Insects," *Scientific Monthly*, June, 1922.
[6] See Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, Chap. IV.

may be mentioned the desire for companionship, including sexual attraction, the influences of climate, the physical conditions of the earth, the food supply, the consciousness of similarity, identity of interests, the necessity of protection against animals and men, the influence of controlling personalities, and coöperation in industry.

Responding to some or all of these influences, animals have formed social groups. Primitive men, moved by the same factors as the animals and often led by those with a more developed mentality and a keener social consciousness, formed themselves into groups in which social pleasure was fully awakened and in which various social and economic advantages appeared.

The Horde. — The simplest aggregation of people larger than the family without formal organization is called a horde. It is fairly the human equivalent of the animal "herd." Its leadership is natural, not formal. Its bonds are stronger in some ways, but very little different from those natural bonds of physical and mental superiority and deference to be observed in animal groups. It represents one of the phases of social development. Numerous examples of a horde are to be found in descriptions of savage peoples.[7] There is little organization among such peoples. The constituent families of hordes wander from place to place with no permanent dwellings; the group is large to-day and small to-morrow. There are some signs of temporary leadership, but no permanent organization. Life is largely subject to accident. Yet this group of people represents, to a certain extent, the foundation of human society, for it is out of this simple homogeneous assemblage that complex society has risen.

The Beginnings of Social Organization. — Within the human horde soon appear small, more closely related groups of people which form the primordial socializing forces. They are what Cooley has called the *primary social groups*. These are the family, the play-group of children, and the neighborhood group of adults. They are primary in the sense that they are fundamental in determining the social nature and ideals of the individual. The pri-

[7] See Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*, Chaps. XVII–XIX. Thomas, *A Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 461–468.

mary groups are to be found among all peoples, while the secondary may be one kind of group in some peoples and of a different nature in others.[8] Among the secondary groups are small industrial, governmental, and religious groups. These two kinds of groups gradually transform the rather indefinite mass into a social order. These small centers of organized power appear spontaneously. They are the radiating centers of organized social relationships. Here Vogue begins to establish its power. Here Tradition begins to lay down its sacred laws. In these centers social interests find their organized expression. The superior man finds here a way to forward his own ambitions through leadership. The weaker cleave to the stronger because thus they find protection and benefit.

Beginning in the differences of sex, at an early period of social life the division of labor causes the differentiation into inchoate industrial groups. As the struggle for a living in early society is intense, industrial specialization gives an impetus to the general organization of society. Yet one must not forget that some social classes grow up apart from occupational interests. For example, the ruling class springs in part from the lust for power and deference to the superior, the ecclesiastical from fear of the unknown, the secret societies so often found in primitive groups from the desire for acknowledged precedence, and those strange groups based on the sex taboo observed in some primitive communities,[9] from the mystery of reproduction and its allied phenomena. But in all of the changes that take place society is organized about small voluntary groups, springing up because of appreciation of the pleasure or advantage to be secured thereby. Illustrations of the beginnings of social organization are provided by the Wood Veddahs of India, the natives of Tierra del Fuego, the Bushmen of South Africa, and certain peoples of Brazil.[10]

Kinship. — In primitive society the family life was very different from what it is at present. It was more indefinite and irregular. But, beginning with the sympathy of the mother for her offspring, the unity of the family group grew as the bonds of com-

[8] See Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chap. III.
[9] On the last see Jenks, *The Bontoc Igorot;* Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, pp. 33–58.
[10] For details see Thomas, *op. cit.*, pp. 462–465.

mon interest multiplied. Members of the family group were held together primarily by kinship or blood relationship. Whether through the close association of the family group or through the actual consciousness of blood relationship, the family group finally became a unit of social order. Kinship played an important part in all the early phases of social organization. Those of the same blood recognized and protected one another, uniting in offensive and defensive war with other tribes. Such temporary union grew into racial or tribal unity and led to the development of race aversion. There is now a wealth of anthropological studies which illustrate how important a part kinship played in primitive society.[11]

Adoption. — But the family group enlarged in other ways than that of natural increase. In the warfare which occurred among various tribes it frequently happened that one tribe was conquered, broken, and scattered, and its members who survived the shock of battle had no protection except when they joined themselves to other tribes. There was no state, no political government, but only the family or tribal organization. Hence, when an individual or a small family group was left alone, it was obliged to fight its own battles independently or else unite with some family for protection. It became a common custom for conquering tribes often to adopt such survivors into their own tribes, the only condition imposed being that of a strict compliance with the laws and customs of the tribe. Thus it was that the family group enlarged continually by natural increase and adoption. The adopted members became identified with the family, helping to fight its battles, following it through its migrations and engaging in the economic pursuits of the tribe.[12]

The Consolidation of Groups. — There were always in early society certain tendencies to consolidate small, closely related groups into larger ones. Many causes contributed to this result. Among them may be mentioned war, the external pressure of the physical environment causing the various groups to unite for protection from the weather or from wild animals, the danger

[11] For the Australians see Malinowski, *The Family among the Australian Aborigines*, London, 1913, Chap. VI, and Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*. For a brief general survey see Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Chap. V.

[12] Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 77, 78.

from stronger hostile groups which often forced weak groups to unite to resist a common enemy, and the recognition of kind whereby like groups tended to unite and like individuals to associate with one another. The attempt to satisfy a common hunger led to a common sympathy and a common coöperation. This unity of effort extended to other departments of life and had a tendency to consolidate groups which otherwise would have been separated and destroyed.

The Origin of Language. — Probably language grew out of the instinctive cries and sounds produced by primitive man under the stress of strong emotions excited by elemental joy, fear, love, and hate, or out of the sounds which he heard about him in a nature full of danger or beauty. These sounds became conventionalized and united with his facial expressions and gestures — his prelingual methods of conveying his thoughts and feelings to others. Doubtless, progress became rapid in the development of language when the satisfaction of his social instincts led him to play with his fellows. Out of this social fellowship grew the rhythmic dance and choral song. The excitement of the primitive dance, linked as it so often was with the deepest feelings he possessed, the sex and hunger impulses, the joyous exhilaration of the mock combat, the awe-inspiring ceremonies of tribal religion, quickened and heated the mind to the pitch of forging a language, which served to satisfy in a new way his desire for expression and at the same time tended to become a new sharp instrument of emotional stimulation.[13] Once language had developed under social stimulation to the point where signs and sounds had become independent and distinguished in thought from the objects they designated, humanity had speech. After this achievement man was able to make comparatively rapid progress. While association provided the stimulus which gave rise to speech, the latter in turn became a veritable fulcrum of Archimedes in lifting social life to a new complexity and perfection.[14]

Another important step was taken when language became

[13] Darwin, *Descent of Man*, Chap. XIX; Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 66–72.

[14] On the development of animal language and its relation to human speech, see Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Man; Origin of Human Faculty*, pp. 51 ff., 163 ff. For the connection of the origin of speech with social excitement see Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 222–225; Blackmar, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII; also Chap. V.

written. Beginning with "reminders" like sticks stuck in the ground or holes dug therein or cords tied in knots, or strung with shells to assist the minstrel or medicine man of the group to recall certain important events, and proceeding through ideograms, signs standing for ideas, such as are still used by the Indians of our Southwest and as they were used by the Dakota Indians in Schoolcraft's time, written language developed phonograms, or signs which stood for certain phonetic values, as in the Chinese and especially in the Japanese language of modern times and in the ancient Egyptian language. The Phœnicians borrowed from the Egyptians certain of these phonograms, attached to them simple sounds and combined them variously in the different words in use and thus gave the world an alphabet. These probably in a general way are the steps in the development: "reminder," ideogram, phonogram, and letter. Written language had even greater importance for humanity in its social development than spoken language.[15]

Language has always fulfilled an important function in social organization. Through it as a means of communication the small group has been developed and strengthened and other groups have been united. People of similar languages are attracted towards one another, while those of foreign languages have a tendency to repel one another. The difficulty of establishing social order among diverse groups of people, speaking different languages and having diversity of thought and sentiment, is very great. Even now this difficulty of socialization is observed in our large American cities with their heterogeneous populations. But though in such cases language causes separation, it originally caused association. It is the attempt to communicate feeling that gives birth to language. Its effect on social development is of the greatest importance.

Physical Pressure. — Another of the important factors in the rise of social groups is the pressure of physical nature on the popu-

[15] For a brief survey of the steps in the development of writing see Starr, *Some First Steps in Human Progress*, Chap. XXI. One of the earliest valuable contributions to the knowledge of the development of speech and writing was Tylor, *Anthropology*, Chaps. IV–VII. Perhaps the most incisive and discriminating discussions of the importance of the development of language on social development is supplied by Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 68–79.

lation. Apart from the fact that the food supply caused people to assemble in the localities where food was most plentiful and most easily obtained, the influences of climate and the physical surface of the earth forced people into groups. Wandering along the rivers in pursuit of fish and game, men came into contact with one another and learned to dwell together. The mountain ranges stayed their migrations and caused a denser population on their slopes or in the adjacent valleys. The shores of the ocean and inland seas and lakes caused them to pause for long periods and finally to establish permanent homes. Violent storms led them to seek shelter in caves where early associations were formed, and the ice flow from the north caused the population to assemble in the southern valleys. Thus the influence of physical nature everywhere tends to favor the aggregation of men and their association. Go back to Paleolithic man in Western Europe. Notice that his camp sites are located most frequently during the chilly fourth interglacial period along the rivers, especially those rivers the banks of which provided rock shelters and caves. Ask yourself why this was, and you will see the influence of climatic and geographic factors on human aggregation.

Pressure of Population. — The movement of tribes and races over the earth has caused the extinction of some, the breaking up of others, but the consolidation of still others.[16] The pressure of nomad tribes on the ancient civilization of the various Aryan groups in Europe, of the Huns upon the Teutons, of the various Greek and Roman tribes upon one another, caused a closer social union among the survivors of the struggle. This pressure forced the growth of social institutions as a hothouse forces the growth of plants. These institutions are the result of new ideas, the result of the group consciousness struggling with new situations forced upon it by the pressure of a hostile group. Two of many historic illustrations may be cited to show this. When the white man reached America and began to settle in the North Atlantic region, two great groups of Indians were struggling for the possession of the Atlantic seaboard and the fertile valleys which led down to it.

[16] See Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia;* also his *Civilization and Climate*, New Haven, 1915, Chaps. XII, XIII.

The Algonquins were pressing down from Canada upon the Iroquois already in possession of these places. One result was a confederation known as the League of the Iroquois. An organization was devised whereby the various independent tribes were welded together for defensive purposes. A great development was taking place within these tribes when the coming of the whites interrupted the process. Another example may be seen in the Norman Conquest of England. The more or less loosely organized elements of the British population, consisting of the ancient population elements, Celts, Angles, Saxons, and Danes, fused somewhat already in the early Saxon kingdoms and then developing under Danish rule into a larger and more solid organization, were finally welded into a demotic unity and a strongly organized whole under the Normans and their successors. The process culminated under the Tudors and early Stuarts. During the course of this development social structures were greatly multiplied in number. The aggregation of unlike population elements resulting in class conflicts forced the development of agencies of domination, status, and toleration. The instruments of justice, like the courts, were improved, all kinds of judicial machinery were invented like the jury, grand and petit. The laws were greatly multiplied and changed to meet new conditions. Even the common law, the child of custom, was greatly elaborated. Every form of social life underwent readjustment. Social devices of all sorts multiplied.[17]

Common Ethical Sentiment. — The union of various groups of people always depends to a considerable extent upon the existence of a common ethical sentiment, for ethics are deeply rooted in the emotions. In the beginning of society, as now, feeling played a much more important rôle than reason. The sociological basis of morality is custom. Custom is rooted in the interplay of the instincts and feelings with physical and social crises. Therefore, tribal customs touching the relationship of man with man tended to repel groups with different moral codes and attract those with similar.

The importance of moral sentiments in the formation of social

[17] For many of the facts of this illustration the writers are indebted to unpublished lectures by Professor Giddings.

groups rests on the fact that the moral codes of primitive peoples are very rigid and exacting, and therefore play a great part in the socializing process which makes for group unity. Hence, the origin of morality is of importance in any study of the origins of society.

Morality had one of its roots in mother love. At first it was purely instinctive, probably caused by blind natural selection. As such it brought in the wake of its manifestation its own emotional reward and thus became established in the feelings and habits of the creature.

The social root of actions which may come to have a moral value is to be found in custom, by which is meant an act adopted, for what reason we may only guess but practiced by a group of people.[18] Out of some customs grow moral acts. Which actions shall become customary, and which of the customary actions of a group shall become moral in their nature depends upon social considerations arising from the social life of the group rather than upon legal or economic considerations.

How an act may come to be customary and then moral may be illustrated best by a concrete example. A group of primitive people come face to face with a new experience such as a pestilence or a famine. At once individuals in that group begin to struggle with the problem of how to avert the calamity. In the individuals' minds psychologically there arises the stress and tension induced by fear in the presence of a new danger. The tendency of the human mind under such conditions is to relieve itself by motor reactions of some kind. Instead of anticipating the modern adage, "When you don't know what to do, do nothing," the primitive mind tends to do something — or anything. What shall be the act which is to relieve the emotional tension depends much upon the character of the minds composing that group, and upon their previous experiences — what they did in previous more or less similar cases. Or, in the absence of any similar experiences some one will do the first thing that suggests itself to him as in any way appropriate. Others may follow his example. Perhaps the families of these men do not die. After the danger is past what

[18] See Wundt, *Principles of Morality: Facts of the Moral Life*, Chap. III.

they did is recalled, it is related to others and becomes a part of the group's traditions. In any recurrence of the same or a like danger this act will be performed by many imitators. Thus it will become established in the customs of that group. It is a psychological fact that custom, mere group habit, will soon attract to itself certain very definite and strong emotions, and these emotions will be strengthened when the act becomes traditional, fostered by forceful and dogmatic personalities and associated in the common consciousness with group safety.

Again, since some religious practices have their roots in similar emotional tensions,[19] the custom often will be adopted by religion and be still further strengthened by coming under religiously dominating influences such as the fear of punishment or the hope of reward by supernatural beings. In all such ways may custom be established.

Whether a customary action was considered moral, immoral, or unmoral was determined by such considerations as the relations of the act to the welfare of the group, and the relations of certain impulses of the individuals to the traditions of the group. The falling away of certain individuals from fixed customary standards aroused ethical questions. This is in accordance with the law of mental development, that matters come to our knowledge by our first becoming aware of the incongruity between the feelings we have enjoyed in the presence of the usual and the feelings aroused when the smooth current of our consciousness has been disturbed by the unusual. Therefore, originally morality was chiefly negative: "Thou shalt not" do this or that. Primitive life is largely a life of privation, a constant struggle against the forces of nature, against wild animals and hostile men. Suffering was the common lot. It was an economy of pain.[20] Hence, primitive ethics and primitive religion stressed negative acts of self-deprivation and suffering. This tendency, moreover, was in entire accord with the necessity of repressing the individual in the interests of the group. Only after the group had become consolidated

[19] King, *Development of Religion*, pp. 54, 101. For a slightly different emphasis see Wundt, *Principles of Morality; Facts of the Moral Life*, pp. 134–139.
[20] Patten, *Theory of the Social Forces*, pp. 75–80.

and unified to a certain degree was it safe to emphasize and encourage individual acts positive, independent, and original in their nature. Such acts again were connected psychologically with the partiality of the mother for her child, leading her to sacrifice herself for its benefit, and strengthened by the fact that after a certain social development had been reached they were of advantage for the survival of the group, so that they finally became sanctioned by the whole group. Thus moral sentiment expressed itself in positive acts, and morality became conscious and rational.[21]

Beginning thus with self-sacrifice for the young, the altruistic act extended to self-sacrifice for the wider kindred within the group, then further with the growing consciousness of kind so as to include the nation, the Kingdom of God, and the whole world.

Origin of Public Control. — Leadership is implied in all movements of mankind where there is human concerted action. It may be only temporary or accidental leadership, but it must exist under all circumstances except where men are moved to act by common impulse. Wherever, then, there is social order there will be, to a certain degree, leadership. Whether the leader is the head of the household, the medicine man, the man rich in cattle and land, as in ancient Ireland, the chief of the tribe, or the temporary war chief, who leads the host in battle, social order is established in proportion as leadership becomes strong and permanent. As social development proceeds, leadership becomes more varied in its fields. At first the leader was only the strong man, or the man of superior cunning, as the medicine man. Out from these crude beginnings of social leadership, however, in response to growing complexity of social interests and specialization of functions sprang what Mallock has called "the struggle for domination." Eventually this leadership may develop into a kingship, a parliament, a council, or a constitution; or into fashions and crazes; into educational, economic, and social orthodoxies; into vogues, philosophies, modes of thought, and varieties of the *Zeitgeist;* but it must appear somewhere as a representative of social authority. It becomes a mighty power for consolidating and unifying the group,

[21] See Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 187–188. Cf. Ross, *Social Control*, Chaps. XXV, XXVI.

tribe, or nation and then for enriching the social life of the particular group.

The Beginning of Justice. — While the establishment of justice is not the primary cause of social amalgamation, yet once the group has been established, it certainly hastens the process of socialization. In fact, wherever we find social order appearing there is an opportunity for the development of civil justice, for people cannot associate on a common basis without some means of enforcing justice. The social elements act and react against one another blindly before formal justice is established. Conflicts arise between individuals in the group which must be settled. At first might makes right — the stronger man overpowers his antagonist and makes a decision from his own standpoint. But soon civil justice brings in a third party who adjusts the relations between the two, allotting to each man his just dues. The first stirrings of a sense of social justice may even be observed in a herd of animals when one bullying member finally attracts the attention of a number of the herd who unite in meting out punishment to the offender and so secure a form of justice between the two individuals primarily involved. In the human group the origins are much more complex. Here the brute strength, impartial judgment, and finer sympathy of a third individual are supplemented by the weight of tradition as to moral rights and duties and the usages more or less applicable to the dispute, and by an appreciation of the necessity of smoothing out differences that imperil the welfare of the group. Moreover, the increased appreciation of leadership and the growth of moral sentiment in even the lowest savages make for increased deference to the decision of the third party. Like moral sentiment justice began within the group. Within the confines of a blood-kindred the moral sense first expresses itself most naturally and easily. Special impetus to the tendencies just noticed to secure formal means of settling disputes doubtless was given by the danger from a hostile group.

The Rôle of War in Early Social Development. — War in any stage of social development is wasteful and disgenic. However, it was less so in the early than in modern society. Then victory was largely a matter of individual powers. It was hand to hand

conflict rather than battles by machinery. Victory was to the strong, the swift, and the cunning in larger measure than to-day. Moreover, in early warfare the victors took the women of the conquered and so social antagonism occurred. Thus a new race of men fathered by the victors arose.

More important socially, war was the means in early societies whereby many changes in social structure were brought about. It provided discipline for wild savage people, developed law, and out of the close relations between alien groups entailed by war grew many early social institutions.[22] War gave rise to a firmer social structure chiefly by a rough-hewing selective process which threw out all unsound material, and, as Ward has shown,[23] by so multiplying social contacts between alien peoples as to stimulate the growth of rigid social structures. It was especially important in securing the transition from an ethnic to a civil society.[24] Viewing the matter historically war has been the mother of many social virtues.

Mutual Aid in Early Social Development. — On the other hand in mutual aid, we have a social factor of great importance.[25] Arising in the animal group by natural selection mutual aid developed in the kinship group by reason of the heightened social pleasure it provided, and was firmly established in the war measures invented against enemies of the group. Thus war and mutual aid worked hand in hand to develop definite social relationships, generate new ideals and customs and increase the complexity of the social structure.

War Not Necessary for Social Development. — The development of national selfishness shown in the intense desire of each nation to extend its territory and the dominion of its trade has led to sharp contentions in modern life resulting in war. Formerly wars were caused by struggles over property and women, land

[22] See Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 202–215.

[23] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 193, 215.

[24] The best exposition of war's connection with this important step is by Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 473–480.

[25] For a detailed presentation of the part which mutual helpfulness has played in the beginnings of society see Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution*. Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 201, 202, 215, 216. For a corrective discussion of Kropotkin, see Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*, pp. 404–406.

and treasure as well as territory. Frequently conflict of religious views led to war as well as the conflicts caused by the differences of race, but in modern times war is based upon national differences or national domination, and because we are in a commercial age trade advantages have become primary in causing modern war. Granted that the fact remains that war has had a tremendous influence in the development of races, nations, and social organizations, it is no longer necessary for modern development in any line. Courage, skill, energy, patriotism may be developed as well in other ways than war, — ways conducive to the peace and progress of a nation or race. Peace among nations is the ideal of great societies to-day. War is to be tolerated only as a necessity, in case of defense, or as a means of righting wrongs inflicted on other people. Modern warfare is so machine-like and so destructive to all forms of society that it has a tendency to lower the ideals of those engaged in it and thus retards civilization. Whatever the results of the modern war may be, we are sure that it leaves "three armies, — of cripples, criminals, and paupers." The fact that in many instances war arises because nations are unable to understand each other does not change our ideals of peace. Surely "the victories of peace are greater than the victories of war." Although war permits a new alignment of social forces and establishes a new social status, it seldom settles strife. War even for a good cause is social shock from which society does not recover until long after grass has grown over the graves of fallen heroes. The psychological effect of war lasts long years after its close. Modern humanity loves peace, and when men are trained to kill each other there develops a psychology of hatred which is more lasting in the population that remains at home than in those who do the actual fighting.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Why should the student of Sociology study social origins?
2. What are the fundamental institutions, the origins of which go back to a very early time in the history of man?
3. Trace back to its beginning, in outline, one modern social institution.
4. What is the importance of language in the development of human society?
5. How does the human horde differ from the animal herd?
6. Name the agencies which originate common ethical sentiments in your home community.
7. What bearing on the peace movement has the view of war presented in the text?
8. What is the difference between individual heredity and social heredity?

CHAPTER V

CULTURE AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The Significance of Culture. — Recent studies of cultural anthropologists [1] have thrown much light on the character of social origins and social evolution. They have carefully studied and described the entire culture of an increasing number of primitive people. They have tried to picture the culture of these peoples without reference to the result of their findings on any generally accepted theories, although their studies have resulted in correcting many notions previously held. By emphasizing the cultural factor in social development they have contributed to a more accurate knowledge and a better understanding of human society, much to the advantage of the sociologist. While admitting the value of the work of the physical anthropologists they have turned from the biological development of man to the products of his efforts to adapt himself to nature and to bend nature to his purposes. This method of approach has contributed to new knowledge of the qualities and conditions of early society, bridged the gap between the organic and the social and thrown upon the sociologists the responsibility of recasting certain sociological conceptions to accord with these new discoveries.

Departing from the traditional concept and popular use of the term " culture " as fixed by the ethical philosophers to mean education and refinement of mental and moral habits, they have used " culture " to express the achievements of man as shown in mores, customs, ceremonies, tools, machines, houses, in fact all of the products of human invention. They try to re-discover the social life of primitive man by a study of what he actually does. Hence a

[1] Notable among these are Franz Boas, A. Goldenweiser, A. L. Kroeber, H. H. Wilder, Clark Wissler, E. Westermarck, B. Spencer, and F. J. Gillen.

culture may be a visible product as a stone axe, a bow, a bread board, or an invisible product such as a law, a ceremony, a belief or an idea of God or of nature. The various elements of culture may be widely different in purpose and use but they are all inventions, achievements of men in their struggle to control and understand the world about them. Thus we have a new and enlarged use of the concept of culture and of its part in determining social development.

Cultural Evolution and Social Evolution. — Cultural evolution in its widest sense is a development of civilization; in a narrower sense it may mean progress in a given art or invention. As an example of the latter, suppose uneultured man desires to cut something. He picks up a sharp stone for the purpose, using what nature has given him. To make the stone cut better he chips its edge. He carries this with him and perfects its use. The achievement is not only in creating a useful tool; its greater accomplishment is in originating the idea of cutting. The idea is followed out in the stone knife of a particular pattern. This may be lost but the idea of making cutting instruments remains. Other forms of cutting instruments are formed as needed, such as the arrow head, the spear head, and later the sword, the knife, the saw, the axe, and a hundred others. From this simple beginning all modern machines that cut are developed. Many people of different groups and races through many ages have taken part in the creation of tools and machines that cut. There is an evolution of the idea of cutting in its adaptation to needs, with variation and rational selection. So through continuous progressive change the modern cutting machines are developed. The cutting instrument is an invention, a cultural achievement.

All the products of the development of civilization are brought about in a similar way. It is the continued use of an idea that makes civilization cumulative. The products once formed through imitation and coöperation become social products. They are diffused among the members of the group, extended to other groups, and developed with a variety of forms and adaptations. An invention once used, becomes diffused and leads to others through social imitation and adaptation.

Society undergoes continuous changes — changes often irregular, not, as Spencer conceived them to be, regular and always from the simple and homogeneous to the complex and heterogeneous. These changes are called by the term "social evolution." The study of culture among primitive peoples by the culture anthropologists is sometimes denominated "cultural evolution." Both sociologists and cultural anthropologists are talking about the same things, but with somewhat different backgrounds. Here both are on common ground. The study of backward peoples by ethnologists reveals a simple state of society as compared with the complex state of society of which we are a part. Backward peoples have a state of culture that by comparison with the stone cultures of earlier civilization, alike in many respects, warrants us in assuming that the social status of the two civilizations in different countries and at different times were similar, and that men living under similar conditions have responded to like needs, sometimes in similar and sometimes in different ways. From its beginning to the present social groups have been changing their social forms and functions. These changes have been brought about by the needs created in the food quest, the safety of the individual and of the group, by the problems presented by growing aggregates of people living an associated life. Consider the use of fire as a discovery, and its reproduction as an invention. It soon becomes a culture complex which involves all kinds of changes in social arrangements. Used to produce warmth or to cook food, fire increases closeness of association among the members of the group and develops a division of labor in procuring food and fuel, and in cooking. It also is a factor in the development of family life. Take another invention like the bow and arrow. It becomes a means of procuring food by a group of hunters. This demands a group of artificers for making the bows and then with increase of population and group-crowding, a group of warriors for the defense of the tribe. Out of that situation naturally develops group conflict or coöperation. Relationships within the larger group must be regulated. Hence develop customary or legal regulation and division of functions and functionaries.

Let us take a familiar invention, the automobile, a complex

machine brought about by cultural evolution, and accompanied by social changes of the greatest importance. Just when and how the wheel was invented is not known. Probably, judging from subsequent civilization, it was discovered that bodies could be moved by pushing them over a round revolving log. Then some one conceived the idea of cutting off a section of the log, putting in an axle and making a one-wheeled barrow. The next step was the two-wheeled cart with connected axle and finally the four-wheeled vehicle. All this affected transportation and transportation groups.

Probably the first knowledge of explosive gas was discovered by the Chinese in the invention of gunpowder. This led to other social groups and war methods. Later other gases were developed and finally gasoline. Then an engine was invented that put the explosive power of the gasoline under control, attached to a four-wheeled cart, and with the invention of the method of ignition the automobile was produced. But the final result on social order is to build great factories, employing thousands of men in the manufacture of automobiles, other thousands to distribute them, and still other thousands to provide the fuel. It caused the division of labor into groups, which coöperated with one another and revolutionized the industrial social order.

All of these things both material and social which have come about by reason of the invention of the automobile we call a social complex, because they go together. The changes in social life — in morals, the family, the schools, housing, and city-planning — which have resulted from the use of the automobile, we call social evolution.

It will be noticed in these examples that cultures, originally dependent upon individual invention and discovery, soon became the product of the group and that society in developing wants and ideals turns to invent methods of satisfying them and supplying needs of protection. Through man's invention he attempts to satisfy human needs by mastering some of nature's forces. Thus he adapts himself to his environment and the environment to himself which makes a ceaseless change in social order and social movement and demands constant accommodation to new conditions.

This continuous change in social activities increases the demand to satisfy new conditions and new desires.

The Culture Pattern. — It has become customary among certain investigators and writers to consider an institution, custom, invention, tool, or ceremony established by a group of people as a pattern to be borrowed, copied, or imitated by other groups. The application of the term "pattern" to cultures is a method of explaining a process of civilization by a general concept. Owing to the universal traits of the human mind, it has been assumed that there is a tendency of segregated groups of people of the same degree of advancement with similar environments to develop with certain variations independently the same general types of culture. In reality, however, different groups develop a variety of cultures which have been spread through contact among the races of the world, by the process of borrowing, copying, or imitating the original invention. It may be a stone implement, a type of dwelling, a method of clothing, a ceremonial institution, or a process of social organization that may be copied in whole or in part, or it may be an idea used to develop a new form of culture. The invention, of whatsoever nature, that has become stabilized and recognized by the group is called by anthropologists a "pattern."

Hence a pattern may be a type of mental action or a habit; it may be a material object formed from a mental invention or it may be the tradition which passes on through the generations. The origin of the culture pattern is not always known. It is usually a composite growing out of social relations. The designs of to-day's clothing, houses, decorations, or machines may each have a definite pattern, but it is formed from many influences. Its originality consists in the perfection of an old type, the adaptation of the principle involved to new conditions. The origins in primitive culture cannot be accurately determined. They are based on assumptions which may have a high degree of probability, but of which often we are uncertain. Even the modern achievements in inventions, in philosophy and science appear at the end of a long trail of gradually increasing knowledge. For instance, the idea of making bodies heavier than air fly like birds is very old. But all trials failed until

chemistry, physics, and mechanics had advanced along many lines. Langley very nearly made a successful flying machine and failed because he had not a completed mechanism. The Wrights took up the enterprise where Langley left off and made a success. Many changes have been made since in the many types of airplanes, yet all are based on the principles of physics, mechanics, and chemistry hitherto determined by scientists. While each new pattern is determined by individual initiative the final result is a social achievement contributed to by many minds through many centuries.

The Unknown Man. — Who made the first chip in a piece of stone that led through the centuries to the creation of the stone axe effective in use and beautiful in line? Or who chipped the first stone knife to render its cutting more perfect and led on to the types of stone knives, spears, and arrow heads and subsequently, through bronze and iron, to all the modern cutting tools and machines? He is still unknown. So, too, is he who made the first wheel, or domesticated the first dog, or who first conceived the idea of spirit, or of the origin of the earth, or the first fixed symbol for the communication of thought. This unknown man through the greater period of human existence had no press agent or record keeper. Even to-day it is difficult to trace the multitude of influences of unknown persons who have contributed through indirect impulse and suggestion to the great achievements of modern times. The " doughboy " in the trenches dying unknown helped to make the gold-braided general; the unknown teacher in the humble school to make the statesman crowned with political glory. The great tombs, pyramids, and obelisks of Egypt, the art of the Romanesque and Gothic cathedrals, with their unsigned frescoes, the legends and tales that bear no author's name but which furnished the material of great authors, are the products of the unknown man. The possibility of modern civilization rests with him.

Material Patterns. — The tool is an invention to increase the power of the physical body in its contact with nature. The arm and the hand have power to strike, but by placing a stone hammer at the end of a shaft the striking power is increased many times.

The knife in the hand may be efficient in cutting but placed at the end of a shaft it becomes a spear formidable in war and in procuring food. The stone hoe in the hand may dig the soil, but the plow, even though formed from the branch of a tree and pulled through the ground by man power or animal power, increases the efficiency of the human body. The food quest necessitated invention of many material forms of culture for the preservation of life. So too for the same purpose the house becomes a protection of the life of individuals and the perpetuation of the species. Incidentally it becomes a basis of social organization. Material patterns are varied even for the same purpose but they are handed down to future generations; are changed, borrowed, and diffused and may become obsolete.

Mental Patterns. — While material patterns must have had mental concepts, there are those that are especially confined to the realm of ideas. The attitude of the mind toward the unknown world brought forth certain notions of nature, of the universe, of its origin, and of the spirits that govern it. In the mystery of "no man's land" the imagination reached out to make mental patterns of the types and purposes that control man. Mental pictures of spirits and their purpose regarding man were sought for man's protection. Religious patterns were prominent in primitive culture and controlled the destiny of the people. In North America there are more than three hundred Indian tribes that have different patterns of religious belief, but underlying them all is one general religious pattern of Shamanism. In its practice a variety of beliefs and customs appear. Also, there is a general stock pattern of language, a basic pattern of agglutinative speech, though there are hundreds of differentiated dialects belonging to different tribes. The mental type of thought established by the Greeks, that of the Medieval philosophers, and of the modern scientist vary, though they all sought to explore the relation of man to the universe.

Social Patterns. — The social pattern frequently becomes a symbol of tribal or family group life. United with the religious function it becomes totemic in nature. The decoration of works of industrial art become sacred to the tribal group. Nearly all decorations

of primitive pottery, implements of war, and ornaments have a religious significance. Hence they become permanent symbols of social unity.

The family, though having a biological foundation, soon adds to its origin a permanent social character. The household art develops a pattern which varies in different family groups, thus leading to pride and solidarity of the home. While universally the family has a fundamental principle in its organization, the religious cult limited the extension of the family pattern. Nevertheless the contacts of groups in trade and war caused the spreading of social patterns. Through suggestion, borrowing, and changing, there was developed a more or less uniform method of social development and a general similitude of social practice.

Geographical Centers of Culture. — Cultures spread from the center of their origin through social contact of tribes and races. These centers of origin are not easily determined, indeed many of them are conjectural or unknown. Some, however, have been established by following the movement of the people and the concurrent spread of culture. In localized areas, arts, industries, mores, customs, and language become identified with the territory of a more or less distinct boundary. According to Clark Wissler [2] the center of the Eskimo culture is in a small area west of Hudson's Bay from which it extended east and west. An unknown region of Asia is supposed to be the center of the domestication of the horse, the dog, and the hen. From there they spread to Eastern Asia, Europe, and America. Peru seems to be the center of the cultivation of the potato; the turkey was domesticated in Mexico and maize was first cultivated in North America. Wheat, barley, and alfalfa (Lucerne) came from Asia. Alfalfa came through southern Asia to Spain, thence to Mexico and California, and thence moved eastward to other states. The centers of architectural development are definitely marked, as the adobe buildings of the Euphrates Valley, Egypt, and New Mexico. Greece developed a special type of architecture, and the true Roman Arch was a distinct invention. These have spread over all western

[2] *Man and Culture*, p. 129.

civilized areas. Each center has had its limited area of distribution, which generally becomes extended. Yet no one culture has been spread among all peoples.

The Diffusion of Culture. — Diffusion implies a spread or extension of cultures through contact, by communication, or indeed through the amalgamation or assimilation of groups. Simply expressed, diffusion means borrowing or imitating. While there must have been original centers of pattern making there has been a wide spread of the original creations in primitive times, and much more rapid diffusion in the modern era of universal communication. In recent times there is nothing new under the sun that may not be universally known in a relatively short interval of time. The processes of distribution are varied. They may be the transmission of a mental pattern to be expressed in new forms, through suggestion or imitation, or by copying or appropriating a material pattern.

The means or occasion of the culture diffusion are trade or barter, social contact, and migration. Language is a necessary and powerful instrument used in diffusion. Usually contacts between groups and races are established by individual or social spontaneity and diffusion is voluntary. However, there are methods of organized diffusion which sometimes involve force. Among these are war and conquest, organized trade, missionary effort, colonization, and immigration. By these methods one culture may be substituted for another, or a new culture may be added, or an old culture transformed by adding new elements. The spreading of weaving, pottery making, and of animal and plant industries among primitive people are indications of the extent of diffusion.

The extension of the use of the horse over the world is an interesting example of the spreading of a single culture. The horse was known to the Paleolithic people of Europe, when he was used for food. Probably his domestication occurred in the center of Asia. He was first used for food, milk, and clothing, and later as a pack animal, then for riding. Later the horse appears in Egypt and in Greece and afterwards in the countries of western Europe. He came into prominence as a war horse under the Romans. Finally, to be ridden or hitched to the war chariot, he

was used in harness to draw wagons in transportation, to move families in migration and as a draft animal in agriculture. The horse has never lost his position in war even though his other occupations have become more extensive. He was brought to America by the Spaniards. From the lost or abandoned horses of the Spanish invaders bands of wild horses spread over western America. The plains Indians caught, conquered, and rode them on the hunt, in migration, and in warfare. Before the Indians came in contact with the colonists of the eastern coasts they had an extended use of the horse.[3]

The art of smoking tobacco originated in tropical America where it was indigenous. It spread north and south over a large area of both continents. Different devices in the form of pipes were invented as the use of tobacco was extended. First a long tube, then a tube surmounted by a bowl in the middle of the stem, and then the bowl at the end of the stem followed. Indians practiced the cultivation of tobacco sometimes to the neglect of the cultivation of maize and squashes.[4] The Spaniards took tobacco to Europe where it soon became of extended use over the eontinent. Subsequently the Spaniards and Portuguese spread it to the various points on the shores of Asia, Africa, and the East Indies. Thence it spread inland and soon had a world wide use. The use of tobacco has become a world habit with tremendous industries connected with its cultivation, manufacture, and distribution by commercial agencies.

Another well-established diffusion from a single source is the story of the Magic Flight. "It recounts how the hero, when pursued, throws behind him successively, a whetstone, a comb, and a vessel of oil or other liquid. The stone turns into a mountain or precipice; the comb into a forest or thicket; the liquid into a lake or river. Each of these obstacles impedes the pursuer and contributes to the hero's final escape. This incident has been found in stories told by the inhabitants of every continent except South America." [5] The myth is repeated with variation in dif-

[3] Kroeber, *Anthropology*, pp. 211–214.
[4] Wallis, W. D., *Introduction to Anthropology*, p. 215.
[5] Kroeber, *Anthropology*, p. 198.

ferent areas, but there is sufficient uniformity in the tale to show that it had one origin.

Parallelism. — It is often difficult to determine whether a culture of any group is independent and indigenous or is borrowed from others. There are many instances of well-established diffusion, but the proof of independent origin is hard to establish. It must be traced back to a period wanting in positive evidence. It is only when there is no probability of the contact of races or groups on account of geographical separation that we may reasonably assume that it is of independent origin. However, the lack of historical evidence does not preclude the probability of independent origin because the psychic unity of mankind and the universality of the power of invention are much in its favor. The manufacture and use of bronze is an excellent example of independent or parallel invention. It was widely used in Europe in a period beginning with 4000 B.C. It has been found in the Bolivian mountains of South America. There is no possibility of geographical connection between the eastern and western hemispheres, nor any possibility of the contact of peoples at this early time by migration. Moreover, bronze being a composition of tin and copper, it could not be made in the absence of tin which had comparatively few locations, and the bronze art was not widely distributed.

Illustrating the difficulty of determining whether a culture is independent and parallel the story of the double-headed eagle shows the extended and irregular flight of an idea and how easy it is to reach wrong conclusions.

The Huichol, a mountain tribe of Mexico, use the design of the double-headed eagle in their textiles. They seem to believe it was a tribal symbol known to their ancestors. Kroeber [6] has traced its origin to Egypt. The sun was one of the Egyptian gods, and the hawk and the vulture were sacred birds. A combination design was made of the disc of the sun and the head and wings of a bird. "From Egypt the design was carried to the Assyrians of Mesopotamia and to the Hittites of Asia Minor. A second head was added, perhaps to complete the symmetry of the figure." "The design was carved on the cliffs of Asia Minor." In the

[6] Kroeber, *Anthropology* pp. 202–203.

twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.D. the design appeared on the coins of the Turkish princes. It was brought to Europe by the late crusaders where it was used in heraldry. It finally came to express the idea of imperialism and was so used "as a symbol in the late empires of Austria-Hungary and Russia."

At the time of the Spanish conquest of Mexico, Charles V. was King of Spain and imperial sovereign of the Holy Roman Empire. The Spanish invaders brought the imperial design to Mexico and it was appropriated by the Huichol and used in their weaving. Just how the Indians came to use it as an ornamental design in their industry is not known. Without tracing its history the casual observer would easily assume that it was of independent Mexican origin.

The well-known example of parallel or independent origins is found in the musical instruments known as Pan's Pipes, found in Brazil and the Melanesian islands. Two distinct and widely separate peoples, who could not have had any contact owing to geographical separation and who were different in all other traits of culture, invent and use similar instruments based on identical pitch scales according to the physical laws of sound.

Enough has been said and sufficient examples given to show that cultures may have independent or parallel origins, and also that borrowing of cultures, though widespread, is not universal, and that the universal pattern advocated by some anthropologists does not exist anywhere except in the human mind. Nevertheless neighborhood and tribal borrowing is easy to determine and exists among all groups that come in contact.

Language as a Culture.[7] — Language, the most universal and most spontaneous of all human cultures, has developed according to the needs of social life. It determines to a large extent the personality of the individual and the character of society. It is thus a factor in the evolution of man and the evolution of society. It is an essential force in the framing of thought and its expression to others. It depends primarily upon the physical mechanism of the body, upon the lungs, trachea, epiglottis, chambers of the mouth, and the tongue. Its development is closely connected with

[7] See Kroeber, *Anthropology*, Chap. V.

the growth of the brain and consequently with the unfolding of mental processes.

There are many evidences in the nature and use of language to suggest that the earliest types of man had little or no language. The inarticulate animal cry and the first cry of the newly born child have a close analogy. Yet, however primitive, it is a self-expression of sensation or emotion to be communicated to others. But language as such starts from a point where the human mind discriminates between the sign and the thing signified, and is completed when the sign, whether it is a sound or a gesture, is generalized so as to be understood by those to whom communication is sought. Lower animals may have no real language, lacking in physical structure and mental power to formulate it. They make known their wants without a generalized sign dependent upon reflection and memory. This admits of no change or progress as in man.

Language as a culture is passed on from generation to generation through social heredity. And each generation accommodates itself to its environment through language. Thus it becomes essential in all forms of human association and the primary step in social education. One of the greatest difficulties in modern education is the failure of the students and their instructors to have a common language. The books the students read speak a different language than that of their individual expression. Racial attitudes and differences arise from lack of a common language, perhaps more than from any other factor. It is common knowledge that most difficulties between individuals, nations, and races come from misunderstandings, often from lack of a common language. On the other hand, a common language will help to harmonize race differences, solidify the social group, and contribute to social development. One need only to visit an open forum where people fail to agree to observe that their differences are more of language than of thought and opinion.

Domination of Culture. — When once a culture created through long periods in human progress becomes thoroughly established and traditional, it becomes dominant and enslaves those who inherit it, controlling their thought and their lives. A product of

human endeavor seeking the betterment of mankind may become traditional and take on the function of a tyrant. Seeking his own advancement in his adaptation to natural forces man creates a social pattern which may enslave him. From its binding influence, reform and revolution seek to free the mind to act and to change modes and customs of life. It involves a slow struggle for freedom over a long cycle of change. While it is dominant, tradition is a most persistent coördinator of human action. Yet, in the face of changed conditions tradition often stands in the path of social development and creates impossible conditions for the aggressive and inventive individual. We strive to build machines to save labor, to create wealth, and then discover that we have a machine-made world from which we would escape. We have not yet made our social adjustments to the new inventions.

The development of the modern cinema is a familiar example of how a new culture can change social organization. It interfered with the old method of play-acting on the stage by stock companies. The silent movie took the place of the spoken drama. The "talking movie" has crowded out the silent picture show, and now the perfection of the former may spell the doom of the opera.

Modern Culture and Social Organization. — Modern modes of creating wealth have changed our economic and social system. Great corporations of industry extend their influence around the world, changing the forms of social order. More things to do, more things to do with, and more methods of doing; the theory of bigness and the theory of greatness become interchangeable in the mental attitude. The individual becomes a small cog in the great social machine. The organized religious bodies multiplying through the centuries by differentiation, since the concentration of business have begun to turn toward unity of organization, seeking coördination and coöperation to reduce overhead charges and to increase efficiency. The political groups of the world are trying to get together in a league to control the relationships of nations. The educational systems are growing toward unity of purpose and of practice. Modern cultures in transportation, publication, radio, and education have unified human life and put a new aspect on social organization. This is an improvement in many ways,

yet it may be overdone, for variety is essential to real human progress, and the forces that have been built up may turn to dominate the builders. Civilization may become so large that it will break with its own weight. The situation seems to some to indicate that society must so adjust its social arrangements to the new culture that the latter will serve social purposes. To others it seems that if we let the matter alone in time the social institutions will become adjusted to the new cultural conditions, or the new conditions will be modified to meet the demands of human welfare. Probably we shall try all sorts of experiments to solve the problems which social change has raised. Who can predict the outcome?

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. In the sociological interpretation is there any difference between achievement and culture?
2. Show the relation between cultural evolution and social evolution.
3. To what extent does culture depend on environmental conditions?
4. Compare social invention and material culture.
5. Explain the diffusion of culture by examples.
6. Give examples of organized diffusion.
7. Show the relation between population and culture.
8. How does culture come to dominate man?
9. Do the cinema, the movie, the radio, and the automobile increase the happiness of people?
10. To what extent do cultures show independent invention; borrowing?

CHAPTER VI

THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

Physical Nature and Social Development. — In a previous chapter reference was made to the influence of physical nature on the origin of society. It is still more influential on social development. Everywhere we find man's possibilities limited by the conditions of his physical environment. It would almost seem as if man sprang out of the soil, so great is his dependence upon it. Always the lines of his development are determined in part by the nature of his contact with the soil, and his social progress is measured by his effective mastery of the forces of nature. For early man at least the character of social life is conditioned primarily by the manner in which the group attaches itself to the land. The compactly organized Oriental tribe that wanders in the desert is very different from the Teutonic village community, and the manorial group very different from the community settled in the United States on small independent farms. The prevalence of great estates means a peasant population and possibly a race of serfs.

Just what influence physical environment has upon intellectual and social development is a matter of controversy. Some, for example, Montesquieu and von Treitschke, have thought that climate and the topography of the country affect a people directly. The former thought frankness was produced by cold climates, the latter that the difference in artistic temperament between Switzerland and other Alpine regions and the more level regions of Swabia, Franconia, and Thuringia was due to the paralyzing effect of majestic mountains upon the minds of men. Buckle, Spencer, Ellen Semple, Giddings, and others have seen that the problem is not so simple.[1]

[1] For a good brief review of the steps in the development of the conception of the influence of physical environment on a people see Giddings, "A Theory of Social

The Conflict with Nature. — Everywhere and at all times man appears to be in conflict with nature. He struggles against the wild animals of the forest, exterminating or subduing them; he seeks to avoid the winter's cold or summer's heat; he wrests from the forest, the stream, and the soil his means of subsistence. He turns the forces of nature from his destruction to his salvation. Water power and wind, steam and electricity finally become his servants. On the other hand, he is attacked by parasites and germs of disease. The deadly microbe demands his perpetual warfare for its extermination. Two theories prevail among philosophers, one that nature is niggardly and harsh; the other that she is bounteous and generous. There is truth in both. By his intelligence man arranges his life in conformity with the regularities of nature and by his effort he forces nature to yield her treasures. Nature is bounteous in the supply of all man's needs if only by intelligent effort he compels her to open her treasure house. Certainly the medial statement is true, that all of man's wants are supplied from nature through intelligent and well-directed effort.

Character of the Land and the Development of Society. — By "land" is meant land, air, and water — the physical environment. Climate, soil, and humidity determine whether there shall be any society at all. Nine-tenths of the globe's surface is not suitable for man's occupation. Parts of it are water, other parts are too high in altitude, some lack water, others have an impossible climate, and still others lack the plant food which we call fertility of soil.

One has but to reflect in order to appreciate how important are the influences of the physiography upon man and his social development. Oceans and mountain ranges have great influence upon climate. One ocean current makes Labrador, with the same latitude as England, uninhabitable, while another has made it possible for England to be an important seat of Western civilization. The contour of a coast together with an ocean current may make a harbor of one place while destroying the entrance to another. Mountain barriers, on the one hand, and rivers, the natural high-

Causation," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Third Series, Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 151, 152. See Siegfrid, "The French Mind," *Atlantic Monthly*, Dec., 1929, p. 749, for relation between attachment to the land and democracy.

ways, on the other, determine the direction in which an inflowing tide of immigrants shall go. Witness the directions taken by the barbarian invasions of Europe. Moreover, it is probable that those invasions were started partly by physical causes, the drying up of the central plateaus of Asia.[2] Coast lines much indented by the sea, thus offering harbors and abundant opportunities for man to reach the interior easily, have much to do with social development. Minor features of topography, such as lakes, waterfalls, mountain passes, cañons, and fertile plains, have determined where settlements of men should occur. Valleys, like rivers, are natural highways of communication. One has only to look at a map of our own country to see how important has been the influence exerted upon American society by the physical factors.[3]

Moreover, the primary and secondary sources of subsistence, as Giddings, following Buckle, calls them, have much to do in determining where human settlement shall occur and, to a degree, the character of the society man creates.[4] Out of these physical conditions grew man's economic relations, his social attachments, and many of his interests and animosities, forces so important to human society.

Man Touches Nature at an Increasing Number of Points. — In primitive society life was simple and the wants of man were supplied from a few sources of nature. But as civilization advanced man continually came in contact with nature at an increasing number of points. Thus, in primitive life when man obtained his subsistence from roots and berries, his shelter from rocks and caves, and his clothing from rushes and leaves, his command of the resources of nature was very slight. During all this period he was at the mercy of the elements. Subsequently when he had learned to hunt and to domesticate animals, and when the women had learned to keep a fire, other great steps forward were taken, but

[2] Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution*, New York, 1904, pp. 118–119. Pumpelly, *Explorations in Turkestan*, Vol. I, pp. 13, 16. Huntington, E., *The Pulse of Asia*, pp. 106–132.

[3] Gregory, Keller, and Bishop, *Physical and Commercial Geography*, Chaps. I–IX. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Secs. 6–21.

[4] Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, p. 68. Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, Chap. II, quoted in Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress*, Chap. X.

when he obtained a permanent relation to the soil and developed agriculture, he added to the momentum of his progress a thousandfold. In the history of the race man has advanced the practical arts of civilization exactly in proportion as he multiplied the number of points of contact with nature, and utilized the possibilities of this contact for his advantage. The use of the streams and the seas for transportation, of the winds for propelling ships, of water power for turning machinery, of steam power in its numerous and extensive offices, of electricity in all of its varied services, of the commercial value of minerals, and of new articles of food made him independent. These things give evidence of the fact that man's progress is due to the utilization of all the forces and materials of nature. The story of civilization has been one of more and more complete understanding of nature, of man's adaptation to nature, and therefore the more perfect subjection of her powers for man's benefit.

Attachment to the Soil. — Beginning with a very loose attachment to the soil, man has come to an ownership of the soil in fee simple. At first the primitive individual owned no land. It was merely the hunting ground of the group; each individual member of the group took from it what he wanted. There was only group ownership and for the wandering, pastoral Bedouin tribes that was so loose that it was often disputed.[5] The group was here to-day and there to-morrow. Ownership focused now about a well-watered old glacial delta in a rapidly drying-up plateau, as in the case of the long-buried cities so recently brought to light in Eastern Turkestan,[6] now about a spring in a desert, as in the Arabia of the Nomads, and again about a clearing in the forest or a *tun* or hill easily defended. The pastoral or tillable land about this center was the group's possession so long as they could hold it by force. That was the beginning of a closer attachment to the soil. Feudal agrarian relations grew up partly on the basis of pastoral feudalism and partly on the newly developed emphasis upon cultivation of the soil.[7]

[5] For the proper qualification of this general statement see below, Chap. XIV.
[6] Pumpelly, *Explorations in Turkestan*, Vol. I.
[7] Giddings, *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 467–473, and *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 267–269.

Through his permanent attachment to the soil man was enabled to develop a distinct and separate class of social services. It aided the tendency already strong towards the segregation of families into separate permanent homes and thus developed family life, which furnished the strongest element in social order. The close proximity of more people than could possibly be supported by pastoral industry taught respect for mutual rights and established duties, for higher socialization takes place only when people are brought into close personal relationship. Under such circumstances custom changes into law; powers of government become differentiated and established; the division of labor in industry prevails; and society is divided into interdependent groups, each having a common relationship with the general social body. But so important is this attachment to the soil in determining the character of civilization that its history would reveal the fundamental characteristics of social life. Thus the tribal method of occupation, the village community, the feudal system, the manorial system, and the ownership of land in fee simple, are so many different economic phases of social relationships.

Nature of Land Determines Population. — In man's choice of land the three chief considerations are position, fertility, and mineral products. The first has reference to situation and also to sheer standing room. The relation of the population to the soil and its distribution give rise to many distinct social phenomena. It would seem at first thought that there would be ample room for the millions that inhabit the globe, but their distribution and the means of support afforded by natural features and resources cause the population to arrange itself in various centers, pressing more and more together on certain small territories until at length such cities as New York and Chicago are formed. This crowding of the population into congested groups has a vast influence in the development of social relationships. Villages in fertile valleys, the great cities of manufacture and trade, and the mining towns that spring up in a single night are made by people attracted by the lure of commonly appreciated advantages there to be found. The result of this is increased land values rising in some instances to enormous figures. Thus the land on lower Broadway in New

York sells for hundreds of dollars per square foot simply because there is demand for it by many people for commercial and social purposes. On the other hand, in the Far West hundreds of acres may be bought for the price of a single foot on Broadway.

Because man may obtain from the soil the means whereby he may satisfy his wants, he seeks to possess it. Grain, vegetables, and live stock for food, trees and forests for houses and furniture, and various mechanical uses are all yielded from the riches of the soil. Likewise man obtains from beneath the soil gold and silver, iron and coal, and all the minerals for mechanical services. Thus a general human demand for the products of certain soils causes the aggregation of population and brings all types of society into accord with the uses made of the soil and its products. Every increase in population which causes an increase in demand for the products of the land augments the value of land and often leads to changes in the uses to which it is put.

Increase of Population Dependent upon Way in Which Nature Is Used. — In primitive society tribes were obliged to go where the food supply existed, and consequently when a tribe exhausted the food supply there was division, colonization, or migration. The increase in the food supply by the use of a new variety of food frequently changed conditions so that it was not necessary to migrate. The same effect was produced by the discovery of processes by which some natural product hitherto not fit for food could be used for food. Such a discovery was the use of fire by primitive man in the preparation of food. By that means not only was food made more palatable and more easily digested, as in the case of meats, thus releasing energy for social purposes, but it increased the food value of many products, such as the starchy foods, and rendered edible others which up until then had been almost, if not entirely, worthless as food.[8] Moreover, with the adoption of agriculture food supplies were increased. Domestication of animals leading gradually to breeding for a definite purpose was another step which increased the food supply and made certain semi-desert parts of the earth's surface available for human habita-

[8] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Sec. 26. Starr, *Some First Steps in Human Progress*, Chap. III.

tion. The development of transportation and the practice of exchanging the products of one part of the world for those of another part have further increased the ability of the world to support a larger population. New inventions, furthermore, in agriculture, stock breeding, and in manufacture, new methods of organization both on farm and in factory, have further increased the available food supply. These, and many similar facts, also explain the concentration of ever larger aggregations of people in one small area, as in New York and London, because each draws its sustenance from a large territory. If the population of New York City was limited for its food supply to the territory within one hundred miles, most of its people would starve within a few months.

Influence of Physical Environment on Man's Impulses. — It must be apparent that man is moved in social matters by two sets of factors, (1) physical conditions either limiting or stimulating his organism, and, (2) emotional impulses arising from within his own organism, stimulated and given direction by the environing physical and social influences. Two great physical instincts man possesses in common with all animals, the hunger and the sex instincts. The physical environment plays an important part in giving direction to his activities. He has been forced here and there by physical influences and through their operation he has found himself associated with his fellows who were influenced in a similar manner. For example, the storm causes people to seek the same shelter, the stream draws them to the same spot, and they meet on the best hunting ground. In seeking to satisfy hunger and to avoid the discomforts of inclement weather, primitive men were forced together, sometimes into companies. The sex instinct and the desire for companionship operated powerfully upon primitive men to cause them to congregate together. Where they should gather depended largely upon physical conditions. Without forgetting that sometimes a land poor in food supplies forced men to separate into small groups, watercourses, teeming lakes and rivers, game-filled forests, and plains strewn with herds of animals good for food were attractions which often caused primitive men to converge. Mountain barriers, deserts, and broad seas determined

bounds beyond which even hunted men could not go. Ever acting with the impulse of hunger were the social instincts, — the attraction of the novel in sex and the mysterious but alluring adventure of establishing companionship with the unknown stranger more or less like himself. Aggregations were thus easily formed, impelled by such instincts, but effectively conditioned as to mode of formation, size, and distribution by the influence of climate and soil, mountain, stream, and ocean.

The Environment and Character of the Social Group. — The character of the group is dependent to a considerable degree upon the nature of the country within which it has been formed. The ultimate determinant of the composition of a group of people is the physical characteristics of the place where people congregate and form in social groups of a permanent character. In their bearing upon the nature of the social groups naturally nurtured by them the various physical environments may be divided into four different kinds, as pointed out by Giddings, viz., a poorly endowed region isolated by natural barriers, one poorly endowed but easy of access and egress, a richly endowed but isolated region, and one richly endowed and readily accessible.[9] In the first the population will be formed by the natural birth rate rather than by immigration and therefore will be relatively homogeneous in blood. Whether it increases will depend on the relation of the birth rate to the death rate. In the second kind of country the vigorous, alert spirits will emigrate, but there will be few immigrants. The population, again, will be homogeneous in blood. In both cases there will be little or no group conflict, the result of intermixture. The tendency in the population in the first case will be inbreeding, but with a slower deterioration than in the latter; in the latter rather rapid degeneration both in stock and in culture will occur. Examples of the first may be seen in Greenland, Central Thibet, and Central Australia, and of the latter in many of the New England rural districts whence the former inhabitants emigrated to better lands. In the third kind of environment, such as is exem-

[9] Giddings, "A Theory of Social Causation," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Third Series, Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 151, 152; *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 68, 118–121.

plified in the Hawaiian Islands and Central Africa, one finds again a genetic group of one blood, but large in numbers. It is a variety of this kind of environment which has furnished the migrations of history. Let such an environment change its character by reason of either a gradual desiccation or of a sudden failure of crops, and the sturdier and more restless elements of the population will surge forth in search of better habitats. The fourth kind of environment, typified by such regions as the Nile Valley, the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, and the fertile fields of our own Gulf States, or better still the great Mississippi Valley, attracts people from everywhere. This makes for a highly mixed population, made up of the strongest and most venturesome spirits from all parts of the world.

After the social group is fully formed so that it has a permanent identity and its numbers have increased sufficiently to crowd its habitat, it begins its career of struggle for the soil with other groups. If the group represents a vigorous racial stock and is successful in locating under favorable circumstances, it has many opportunities for survival. The larger and stronger group is, by its vigor and foresight, sure to locate in the best territory. However, if through accident a strong racial stock is forced to remain for a period of time under less favorable circumstances, the opportunities for success are much decreased. On the other hand, if a race lacking in vigor of body or in intellect should locate in the most fertile district and with the most favorable environment, the opportunities for survival would be even less than that of the vigorous race which settled under unfavorable circumstances, because the well-directed effort of man is the prime factor in his survival. Hence, where a race of low vitality locates on a barren soil or is thrust back on poor hunting grounds its chance for survival is very small. The history of races shows how thousands of these groups are thrust aside by stronger races and perish, leaving no record of civilization. The results of land occupation, therefore, will depend largely on the size and activity of the social group which settles upon it. If the group be strong and vigorous, it moves more rapidly in subduing nature and bringing to its support her various bounties.

Interrelations of Land and Culture. — From what has been said thus far one might conclude that the most extreme interpretation

of the slogan of Dr. Ely, "Under all the land," would not be saying too much. However, a strictly scientific description of what takes place as one looks back over history and observes the interplay between the land and man's culture must take into account the influence of man's inventiveness in using more and more of the resources of the earth, in devising new ways of using them, and in contriving new social inventions, such as institutions, culture patterns, standards, and codes. Suppose that the people who settled the Mississippi Valley had possessed a belief that to use the meat or milk of animals was sinful. How many of the broad acres now raising corn would ever be planted? They might raise some from which to make corn bread, possibly a few more to raise the corn necessary to supply corn flakes for breakfast. But where would the great animal husbandry industry of that section be now? Or suppose that, as has actually happened, the food habits of a people change, so that in place of a diet of meat and wheaten bread, people demand more green vegetables, fruits, and sweets. What happens to the meat and wheat industries with their allied interests? Every farmer can tell you what happens.

The point I am making is that while the nature of the land determines many things in society, the fancy and will of man finally congealed into vogues, standards, customs, folkways, traditions, and culture patterns react upon the use made of the land and natural resources. These two factors condition each other in the development of society. Together we can see them interacting in the social process, now the one predominating, then the other. Sociology has the task of describing how they intertwine in social evolution, and so far as possible determining their relative importance. Up to the present, while we have been able to see that they each play a part, just what part each plays in the development we cannot yet say.

It is possible that among the more uncivilized people the land was a greater conditioning factor than it is among the civilized. That, however, cannot now be dogmatically asserted. To take one case, the American continent was occupied by what we call uncivilized peoples at the time of its discovery by the whites. Some of them, like the Incas, the Aztecs, the Mayas, the Pueblos,

the Cliff Dwellers, and the Mound Builders, have left some records of the beginnings of culture.[10] Art and industry, religion and government had been developed to a considerable extent. They occupied intermittently nearly all the land areas of America. They used them mostly for hunting purposes, so that their land tenure was of a very primitive sort, usually consisting of nothing more than temporary occupancy, although certain tribes had permanent settlements with an agricultural economy and even a town life. Tribal ownership prevailed with the exception that in some tribes a family or an individual had certain property rights to the soil.[11] However, the beginnings of a settled agriculture were made among some of them, and the evolution of political organization was developing when the coming of the whites stopped the process of evolution. For example, the Iroquois and probably some of the other American Indians, had developed a gentile confederacy of tribes.[12] They were undergoing a transformation such as many civilized societies have experienced. Had they been permitted to continue their development without interruption by the whites, it is possible that they would have developed, after a time, a civilization of a high type. The achievements of some of the Central and South American tribes in architecture certainly point in that direction.

During a long period certain tribes continued to migrate or kept changing their locations. However, there was not so much real migration as is generally supposed, because the tribes had two methods of occupation. One was the territory where their villages, pasture lands, and permanent hunting grounds were located, and the other was the territory claimed by them for temporary hunting purposes. At different seasons of the year they were found going from their villages to these hunting grounds and back. It was out of contention over these less permanent abodes that most of the Indian wars originated. In the migrations of tribes, often when the stronger invaded the territory of the weaker, the former settled down in tribal ownership of the soil, which it

[10] *National Geographic Magazine*, Vol. XXI, pp. 596–621, 1003–1020; Vol. XXIV, pp. 315–338, 403–573.

[11] See Chap. XIII.

[12] Morgan, *Ancient Society*, New York, 1878, Chap. V.

held for the good of all. This is true even among semi-civilized groups like the early Greeks, the Romans, and the Teutons, in their migrations.

Habitable Land Areas. — The lands of the world are considered either habitable or uninhabitable, but these are really relative terms, for the habitability of land areas depends upon the stage of civilization and the standard of life prevailing in the various countries of the world. There are unoccupied territories that could be made to support a meager population. Many low tribes lead a miserable existence on certain barren soils or on inferior hunting grounds. Some of the arid land west of the Mississippi River, generally considered uninhabitable, has been subdued and utilized through the science and indomitable efforts of a civilized race. The rather poor land of New England supports a high civilization largely on account of the character and energy of the people who brought with them the arts and industries of a civilized life. Many of the mountain ranges and their approaches will not permit a thickly settled population and, indeed, in some instances, practically forbid the permanent habitation of man. On the other hand, the fertile valleys of the Mississippi and of other great rivers permit a gradually increasing population of great density. Mankind is constantly searching out such fertile spots and developing all their resources to support a large population.

The Settlement of Tribes. — The Indian tribes of North America had spread over nearly the whole territory habitable by people in their stage of culture. The great Algonquin tribe occupied nearly the whole of British America and extended into the boundaries of the United States, covering the New England States and the northern Mississippi Valley; the Iroquois tribes occupied New York and a part of North Carolina, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Georgia. On the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains were the great Siouan tribes, and the southwestern part of the United States was occupied by the Shoshonean tribes. The Athapascans occupied the northwestern part of North America and a part of the territory in the extreme southwest of the United States.

Other tribes were located on different territories of the United

States, a large number of them clustering along the Pacific coast. They all showed the effects of migrations and wars in the struggle for territory. While they occupied large areas their centers of population were along the streams and in the fertile valleys, following, like civilized man, the sources of food supply and the natural lines of travel. Very few of this vast body of natives could be considered sedentary. Most of these were located in Arizona and New Mexico. Possibly also a few of the Iroquois tribe and some of the ancient Mound Builders in the southern part of the United States occupied permanent habitations. When the Europeans came to America their migrations followed the same natural routes as those followed by the natives. Their most densely populated groups were located in the districts most thickly populated by the Indians. The streams were followed, the valleys occupied, and subsequently the great plains. The character of the land determined settlement.

In view, however, of the extensive migrations by individuals which have occurred in the last one hundred years among civilized nations one is tempted to say that the movements of the American Indian tribes or even the historic migrations of the Aryans in comparison were but pygmy affairs, and that these primitive peoples were relatively settled in their life as compared with modern peoples. Nevertheless, there is a great difference between the two migrations. The migrations of the Indians and of the peoples in Europe in historic times were group affairs, while modern migration is predominantly an individual matter. When comparing individuals, one can say that there is more movement to-day than at any previous time. When, however, we think of groups, we must say that the tribes of American Indians, of Arabian Bedouins, and of Aryan peoples were less settled on the land than are our modern peoples with their highly organized governments which give permanence to a population even when the individual constituents of that population are constantly and swiftly changing. The wit of man in the face of the loosening of the former immemorial bond of kinship has caught at the device of substituting for it settlement within a given geographic area combined with a sharpening of the consciousness of political unity. An absolute prerequisite

of political stability is attachment of the social group to a definite territory.

Growth of Population in Relation to Land Areas. — The extent and character of the land, as we have seen, has always been a controlling influence in the development of population, not only on account of the limitations of the food supply, but also on account of the union of various tribes and groups into a more compact and integrated body. Here, as elsewhere, the impelling forces of nature have a vast influence in advancing social union. If, for example, the land is broken by mountains and valleys so that people in the different valleys are kept apart from each other, social integration is retarded. In fact, differentiation sets in. The language varies in the different valleys in course of time, customs become different, modes of thought and codes of conduct grow up, varying within degrees in each of the isolated groups from those prevailing in the others. Good examples of such social variation are to be seen among the inhabitants of the various valleys of the German and Swiss Alps and of the Kentucky mountains.

But especially has population been limited by land areas when there was no room for expansion, for then it must be limited in its resources for supporting life. When the food supply, with the method of utilization in vogue, would support no larger population, either new methods of increasing the food supply were found, or the standard of living was lowered, or else the population expanded beyond its earlier boundaries. Colonization has usually grown out of the pressure of population upon food supply furnished by the area occupied in comparison with the real or reputed possible supply to be found elsewhere. The Greeks colonized when there was an overcrowding of the population, the barbarians of the North invaded the Roman territory when their own territory would not well support them with their existing mode of life. The great modern movement of elements in the populations of various countries of Europe offers a modern instance. On the other hand, the intensive agriculture of the Nile Valley in ancient times and of the valleys of Indian and Chinese rivers to-day has made it possible for a small area to support an enormous population. Often, however, as in the case of the Chinese and the inhabitants of India,

a lowering of the standard of living and intensive farming have been the double alternative to emigration.[13]

Various Forms of Land Tenure.[14] — When the tribe settles down upon the soil and controls it at first there is little individual ownership of the land and a limitation is placed upon man's individual effort. There is a tendency for and likewise a tendency toward democracy so far as property is concerned. It also develops a closely integrated social group that wields absolute authority. Forms and customs prevail and are perpetuated because of the dominance of tradition as a method of social control. In the old village life we find a variation in that permanent ownership of the home or house lot exists for the family and the small family group. In both forms, however, community control over the cultivation of the soil is involved. Each cultivator is assigned periodically a plot of ground which is often reassigned. Under this system there is no incentive to the cultivator to do more than " skin " the land, for no one knows whether in next year's allotment he will have the same piece to cultivate as he had last year.[15] Before great progress in agriculture can be made some form of land tenure by which the land can be held and cultivated by the same individual year after year must arise. Two forms of such tenure did arise, tenancy for years and ownership in fee simple. The old Roman laws developed from land holding gave character to the entire Roman policy. The basis of feudal society rested upon the system of feudal land tenure. The great farms and estates of England and Scotland were conducive to the development of aristocratic government, while the small, individual holdings of America, if persisted in, insures democracy.

Land tenure has usually been of a limited communal nature among primitive tribes, but the individual system early developed out of it. Wherever individual possession has been recognized, there has always existed a great diversity in the size of the holdings. Large and small holdings have existed side by side, although in most instances the tendency has been to increase the large holdings and to develop a landed aristocracy.

[13] Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, Chap. IV.
[14] See Chap. XIV for details.
[15] Gibbins, *Industry in England*, New York, 1906, p. 41. Warner, *Landmarks of English Industrial History*, London, 4th Ed., p. 44.

Thus even this inadequate presentation of the connection between the land and the people indicates that in the formation of social groups, in the size of the population, in the standard of living, in the arts which arise, and in the fundamental forms of culture the land is more or less determinative. Also the nature of the land has secondary consequences in the social structure. The forms of social organization, the standards and codes, at least so far as they pertain to getting a living, many of the patterns of conduct are conditioned by the physical environment. Even religious ideas and practices revolve about the methods of securing livelihood, like the ceremonies connected with fishing and hunting, the hearth ceremonies, the decoration of the house, the taboos against eating certain things, the snake-dance among the Hopi Indians, which is believed to affect the rain, the totem poles with their ceremonies among the fishing tribes of the northwest of America, the milk custom among the Todas of India. Anthropological literature is full of instances which show how closely many of the social patterns are connected with economic processes. On the other hand, beliefs and traditions arising in other ways affect the economic arrangements. The diffusion of traditions from another group often modify patterns of conduct based on those which have risen in connection with economic activities. For example, the dissemination of modern scientific ideas about the growing of crops modify, or even eat away, old methods which we now call agricultural superstitions, like planting potatoes in a certain sign of the moon. The interplay of the influence of the land, and beliefs generated in the experience of the people may be seen on every hand.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Trace the origin and growth of the various settlements in your county showing what physical and geographic features had to do with the establishment of the various villages and cities of the county.
2. Why was Virginia settled before Ohio?
3. What were the geographical features which determined the location of the railroad in your city or village?
4. Show how a "backwoods community" of which you may know has been made different by physical conditions so far as the character of the people is concerned.
5. Account for the backwardness of the Kentucky mountaineers on the basis of the influence of physical conditions.
6. Point out specific ways in which the White Man who dispossessed the Red Man was more closely attached to the soil.
7. What physical reason is there which helps to make land in New York City worth thousands of dollars per front foot, while land on a fertile prairie of the Central West is worth only a hundred dollars per acre?
8. Show what physical conditions predetermined America to be a country of a very composite population — a very "melting pot" of the nations.
9. Show that the physical factors alone are inadequate to explain social phenomena, by indicating the reasons why the White Man is able to sustain a very much larger population in the United States than was the Indian.
10. Why does individual tenure of land make for the betterment of a country rather than the communal tenure of Europe in the Middle Ages?
11. Take a city block and a rural square mile and compare them as to the proportion of the occupants who live in rented places in each and the proportion who own the places they occupy.
12. Compare the results as to exhaustion of the soil and careful farming in the modern rental tenure of farms with the same points in the communal tenure of land on a manor in medieval Europe.
13. How does the use of the land determine the character of society?
14. Show how the food quest has determined the use of the land?

CHAPTER VII

POPULATION AND RACE

How Population Pressure Arises. — The problem of population pressure is closely related to the principle of supply and demand. Since there is only a limited supply of food resources in the world the number of people that can be taken care of is necessarily limited to the amount of food that can be made available. The amount of food material that can be supplied for consumption, moreover, is limited by the stage of technique for food-getting that a group of people has reached at a given time and place. Thus, it is said, that for the Indian's manner of life twenty-five square miles of territory was necessary to supply the needs of one individual. To-day with our modern technique of food-getting that same territory can be made to suffice for not one, but twenty-five people. Another example illustrating the same point may be found in India. Many people believe that India is not overpopulated because of the tremendous potential possibilities for more efficient cultivation of the land, and because of the opportunities for industrialization of which the Hindus have not yet availed themselves. But as Thompson points out, *under existing conditions* there can be no greater production per head even though India be pregnant with the *possibility* of greater total production.[1] We see, then, that the number of people that any society can support is definitely limited by the amount of food that its given food-getting technique can make *available*. When the balance between the number of people and the supply of food is disturbed, population pressure results. To be more specific, overpopulation or population pressure is present when "difficulty is experienced in normal time by the industrious and frugal in obtaining the necessaries of life." [2]

[1] Thompson, W. S., *Danger Spots in World Population*, New York, 1929, p. 146.
[2] Ross, E. A., *Standing Room Only?* New York, 1927, p. 120.

For a given stage of technique and within a given geographical area, there is an *optimum number, i.e.*, a supply of human beings which will function with the maximum efficiency and to the greatest advantage of all. That is, there are some peoples who concern themselves not only with how many people can be supported at a subsistence level, the point where body and soul is barely kept together, but are also interested in how many people can be comfortably fed, so that they will be fit to function most efficiently for the best welfare of the group. The groups who concern themselves with this principle are, of course, those who have both the knowledge and desire to limit voluntarily their population numbers. Among these people, then, there would be population pressure when their numbers increased to such a point where the given food supply was insufficient to allow people to function with " the maximum efficiency and the greatest advantage to all."

Theory of Malthus. — The earliest manifestations of serious thought directed toward population problems do not belong to the present century, as one might be led to believe in view of our phenomenal advances along other lines during this period. They belong rather to the latter part of the eighteenth century which was fraught with more than one perplexing problem. It was the time that marked the birth of our modern industrial era.

William Godwin, a political economist of the eighteenth century, saw in the industrial progress of that day unlimited opportunities for human advancement. He saw the dawn of a new and better day for the workingman. In his writings he prophesied universal well-being and human perfectibility, and on this basis he urged programs for population increase. His optimism for the future truly knew no bounds. It happened that there lived at that time another person who was not quite as optimistic as was Godwin. This man was T. Robert Malthus. Malthus was extremely skeptical about the whole matter. He countered by saying that no matter how great the food supply may become, human reproductive power would so adjust itself that food would always be scarce in relation to population. He claimed that populations tend to increase faster than material sustenance can be increased and made available for them. His three main proposi-

tions as set forth in his *Essay on the Principle of Population* published in 1798 are:

1. "Population is necessarily limited by means of subsistence."
2. "Population invariably increases where means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by some very powerful and obvious checks."
3. "These checks, and the checks which repress the superior power of population, and keep its effects on a level with the means of subsistence, are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery." [3]

When a broad interpretation is put on these three propositions no fault can be found with Malthus. But almost every serious student of population problems has criticized Malthus for making the statement that the food supply increases by arithmetical progression while population increases by geometrical progression. The two can be illustrated as follows: the series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, is an arithmetic ratio or a process of addition, and the series 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, is a geometric ratio, and in this case a process of doubling. One writer has fittingly called this statement the "Unfortunate Corollary" for on this statement is hung most of the criticism directed at "the Malthusian doctrine."

To a certain extent Malthus cannot be blamed too harshly for making what we now term rash statements. Malthus could not have foreseen the opening of vast agricultural territories of fertile land and the tremendous possible exploitation of natural resources that have been carried out in the last half century. No one in his time could visualize a country like Great Britain receiving food from Australia in exchange for textiles. This was made possible by the development of better and cheaper transportation facilities and by the introduction and perfection of the art of food preservation. Malthus offered no means of keeping down numbers except postponement of marriage. The acceptance and widespread use of birth-control devices by most western nations has contributed its share toward keeping them relatively free from famine in our time. All these, together with the breeding of more

[3] Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, *Social Problems*, New York and London, 1928, pp. 89–90.

productive varieties of food grains and food animals, have made many changes in the picture that Malthus saw. In a word they have made possible the existence of a larger population and at an even higher standard of living.

Problems Brought about by Population Increase. — Perhaps one of the most perplexing and far-reaching problems that challenge present day intelligence and ingenuity is that of war and all the evils attendant upon it. The causes of war between nations have been many and diverse. At various times economic, political, and religious motives have been assigned as dominant factors in this war or that. Seldom has population pressure been given as an important factor in the precipitation of mass-conflicts. Yet an unbiased examination of the facts will readily show the rôle that pressure on food resources and "standing room" played in bringing about the last war. For about forty years before the outbreak of the World War the Germans had been experiencing a growth of their industry and commerce somewhat similar to that of Great Britain before the Napoleonic wars. The effects of this industrial expansion on German population growth were tremendous. "The population of Germany at the close of the Franco-Prussian war was slightly over 41,000,000; in 1910 it was almost 65,000,000 and at the outbreak of the World War was about 67,000,000. Thus there was an increase of sixty-three per cent in the population of Germany in the forty-three years between the two wars." Thompson states further that "the fact that Germany had no colonies of its own suitable for settlement by its rapidly multiplying people was one of the causes of the war; for as time went on, the Germans felt the pressure of increasing numbers and increased efficiency and saw that the resources available to them were inadequate for their continued expansion." [4] The close relation of population pressure to war cannot be disputed. If space permitted a consideration of the possibilities of future wars resulting from lack of "standing room" would be valuable.[5]

[4] Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 241–242.

[5] For a full and excellent discussion of this problem which is facing the nations of China, Japan, India, Italy, etc., see Thompson, *op. cit.*

Other penalties of population pressure that cannot very easily be separated from one another are: (1) congestion in cities; (2) a low value set on human life; (3) extreme poverty; (4) prevalence of crime; (5) class struggles; (6) a reduction in the standard of living.

International Movement of Population. — It is not very difficult to find evidence of the movement of population from one geographical area to another. History records innumerable cases of migrations of entire peoples in search of food or in flight from an enemy. There is evidence of the movement of certain tribes of American Indians from one part of the country to another. The present distribution of European population was largely determined by the major mass movements of population. The invasion of Europe by the Mongolian hordes, the trampling of Southern Europe by the Goths, the scattering of Greek, Roman, Teuton, and Celt to different parts of Europe are examples of hungry peoples breaking ground in quest of more fruitful "hunting grounds." Each one of these people has contributed certain characteristics to the population composition of present-day Europe, much the same as the different peoples of Europe have determined the composition of our own population.

Up until a few years ago, as will later be pointed out in greater detail, large numbers of immigrants chose to settle in this country either by reason of religious persecution, hunger, or the spirit of adventure. A logical question may here arise as to whether movement of present-day population differs essentially from earlier migrations of people. An examination of available facts shows that migrations in earlier times were essentially mass movements. Whole groups of people wandered from their homelands in order to improve the welfare of the entire group. Present-day immigration does not have the aspect of a mass movement of people. While the purpose of improving living opportunities remains, we now are dealing with individuals and families. Movement is more voluntary and for the betterment of the individual rather than group welfare. Thus in early times, if a tribe found the food resources of its homeland giving out, it had either to move on or starve. In our day the crossing of national boundaries by indi-

viduals does not come about as a result of total want of food. Emigration from one national territory to another means rather prospect of more religious freedom perhaps, or it may mean better economic opportunities, or a more democratic government. It isn't a matter of move or starve, but a matter of having more or less of some things.

As a rule the country that receives large numbers of immigrants with open arms is young, undeveloped, vigorous, and prosperous. In the main the emigrant nations are older and more densely populated. What is it that attracts large numbers of people from these older nations? A comparatively high standard of living and the prospect of greater equality of social and economic opportunity.

Immigration to the United States. — Without considering any of the aspects of world immigration and its results, a brief reference to the experience of our own country will bring to our attention the chief problems that must be faced by a country entirely peopled by immigrants.

In the early history of this country, the English constituted the main contributors to the population. Later the French Huguenots and the Dutch joined them and adopted their language and easily became one with them. Strictly speaking the Colonial Period ends with the recognition of the new Republic by England in 1782. But between 1782 and 1820 it is estimated that 250,000 immigrants came in who were mostly from Great Britain and Northern Europe. Since the colonists were from the same stocks, no difficulty in assimilation was experienced. In fact, their assimilation was quick and complete because of the similarity between their cultural backgrounds. Since there was an abundance of land and plenty of work to be done they were welcomed with open arms by those who had preceded them.

After 1820 three general periods may be recognized: the old immigration which extended until 1880; the new immigration which lasted until the World War; and the period of restriction which came at the end of the War.

During the period down to 1875 there was very little attempt to regulate immigration. The first national immigration law was passed in 1798. This law empowered the President to deport

aliens whose influence he might consider detrimental to the country. In 1819 a law was passed to protect immigrants in passage, and state laws were passed in New York and Massachusetts in 1829 and 1837 respectively for the regulation of immigration at the receiving ports. New York's law consisted of a head tax on immigrants arriving at its port. Subsequently, these state acts were declared unconstitutional, the supreme court deciding that regulation of immigration was a national rather than a state matter. The first national laws of real importance regulating immigration followed.

While the number of immigrants arriving in this country steadily increased, it was the period between 1840 and 1855 that gave the United States its first real waves of immigration. During this period religious reform movements in England, revolutions in Germany, severe famines in Ireland, and bad economic conditions in Europe generally, gave thousands of people the impetus to seek refuge within the protecting walls of our country. It was largely as a result of these last waves of immigration that the "Know Nothing" party sprang up in the '50s to develop the first agitation against foreigners. They inaugurated the first cry of "America for Americans." They got their name as a result of their secret operations and from the fact that whenever one of their number was asked about the organization his answer was usually "I know nothing." Their type of agitation which was designed to frighten the newly arrived immigrants and make life miserable for them got no results in the form of laws designed to restrict immigration. Their chief claim was that the Germans, Scotch, Irish, Scandinavians, etc., were flocking to this country solely for economic gain; that they did not have the lofty ideals that were characteristic of the early settlers of this country and therefore were not desirable.

The first general immigration law was passed in 1882. This law was selective and aimed to exclude the worst elements — convicts, lunatics, idiots, and persons likely to become public charges. In the same year Chinese laborers were denied entrance into the United States.[6] This law did not have as its objective

[6] Baker-Crothers and Hudnut, *Problems of Citizenship*, New York, 1924, p. 65.

to restrict the number of able-bodied and able-minded people. It aimed merely to keep out undesirables and defectives.

A glance at the table on the following page will show that the source of immigration to the United States between 1890 and 1910 had taken on a decided change. Whereas previous to 1880 about 94 per cent of our immigrants were from North European countries, by 1910 the percentage had dwindled to 21.4 per cent. The countries that were making up the bulk of our immigrants now were of Latin, Slav, and Semitic extraction. This constituted what we call our "new immigration." The problems arising out of this new situation will be treated later on in the chapter.

The rapidity with which these millions poured into America was a cause for alarm, because they came so fast and were of such a character that they could not be assimilated into our economic and political system. After the World War with millions clamoring for entrance and our own employment situation becoming quite serious, steps were taken by Congress to curtail the great influx of foreigners. In 1921 a law was passed to limit the number of able-bodied and able-minded, this being the first general law of its

TABLE SHOWING THE CHANGE IN THE SOURCE OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

YEAR ENDING JUNE 30	NUMBER	NORTHERN EUROPE*	SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE	OTHER COUNTRIES
1820–1830	124,640	86.5	3.4	10.1
1831–1840	528,721	92.3	1.2	6.5
1841–1850	1,604,805	95.9	.4	3.4
1851–1860	2,648,912	94.6	.9	4.4
1861–1870	2,368,878	89.2	1.6	9.2
1881–1890	5,246,613	72.	18.3	9.7
1891–1900	3,687,564	44.8	52.8	2.5
1901–1910	8,795,326	21.4	71.9	6.3

* Countries of Northern Europe; Ireland, England, Scotland, Wales, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.

kind. It provided that the number of immigrants allowed to enter from any country would be equal to three per cent of the number of that nationality that were present in this country in 1910 as determined by the census figures. This law was admittedly

an emergency measure to tide us over the period of unemployment and business depression that this country was then passing through. The law was to last for two years. It was then extended to three years, and finally when it was seen that our serious unemployment condition was not a temporary matter, the law was made permanent in 1924, with certain revisions. In the 1924 law the per cent was changed to two and the number was fixed by the number of nationals in this country determined by the census of 1890. Since the bulk of immigration from southern and eastern Europe to this country occurred after 1890, the design of this new feature is quite obvious. This law was both selective and restrictive and provided for careful inspection of immigrants before they were allowed to embark for the United States. It prohibited a large number of able-bodied and able-minded immigrants from entering the country. It was selective in the sense that it allowed less of those to enter who in the judgment of congress were less desirable peoples.

While the law of 1924 worked quite satisfactorily as far as could be judged, new agitations on the part of eugenists and others resulted in the enactment of a new law in 1928 to take effect in 1929 called the National Origins Law. It changed the basis of selection from the number of foreigners in the United States from each country according to the census of 1890, to the number of inhabitants residing in the United States, both native and foreign born, who are derived from a country to determine the number that may be admitted from that country. The law also limited the total annual immigration to 150,000 aliens. Thus if ten per cent of the population of the United States is of German birth or of German descent, then ten per cent of 150,000 or 15,000 might be admitted from Germany annually. If practically applied, the law would increase the quota from Northern Ireland and Great Britain and reduce the quota from Southern Ireland. It would cut down the number from Scandinavia and increase the number from Italy. The purpose of the law is to increase the stock of the nations that have founded the institutions of our country. The law has not yet been sufficiently tried to determine whether it is any improvement over the law of 1924. Even though its

purpose be worthy its working out in practice equitably is questioned. The reason is that correct knowledge of national origins is extremely difficult to obtain.

We have seen the evolution of America's changing immigration policy. We shall now examine the specific problems created by an attempt on the part of so many varieties of people, each with his own cultural background, to live side by side.

Problems Created by Immigration to the United States. — The main problems which had to be faced through all the years that America acted as a haven of refuge to the hungry and the persecuted, divide themselves as follows: (1) Those concerning numbers or too rapid increase; (2) those concerning the quality or type of immigrant that landed; (3) those questions growing out of the attempts to assimilate peoples with divergent cultural backgrounds.

A large share of the people who made their way to this country did so in the hope of improving their economic lot. They had no capital to speak of with which to open up a business, or to go into agriculture, so they swelled the ranks of the city workers. They lived in the worst parts of the cities from the point of view of light, air, and sanitation with the result that disease spread rapidly among them. Since their European standard of living was considerably lower than that of the American worker their meager wage demands were easily satisfied. Each group of immigrants was readily lured by the American manufacturer to take the places of those that preceded them, at a lower wage. This had two effects: (1) It forced down the wages of those already here, and thus resulted in a lowering of the standard of living; (2) it was instrumental in the disruption of trade unions that had begun to form. In 1905, for instance, when immigration to America was at its height, the union in the steel industry was broken down largely because of the increasing supply of immigrants that was always available.

Unrestricted immigration is in a sense selective. The upper classes usually do not emigrate from a country unless they are driven to it by religious or political persecution. On the other hand, members of the extremely poorer classes usually do not

" hit the trail," either, because they lack funds for transportation, or else because of their own inertia. The greater proportion of people we receive here as immigrants, therefore, are drawn from the lower middle classes. Immigrants as a whole, then, are not representative of their stocks.

Much has been written about the " old immigration " and the " new immigration." Some writers have attempted to prove that the " old immigration " came of a much better stock mentally than the " new immigration," and therefore were more desirable. In this respect the following will prove quite interesting. " Immigration restrictionists claim the new immigration is less desirable than the old . . . yet the same arguments brought against the new immigrant were used by restrictionists in the Nineteenth Century against the very classes now considered ' desirable ' — Germans, Scotch Irish, Irish, Scandinavians, etc." [7] Other writers take the view that our more recent immigrants come from countries whose culture, *i.e.*, whose mores, folkways, traditions, etc. differs markedly from our own and as a result these people are harder to assimilate. That is, their social values, their ways of doing and thinking, their tendency to maintain loyalty to the fatherland, the desire of each group to keep its customs alive, all these things are incompatible with Americanization processes. They tend to group themselves into groups of their own, distinct and apart from all others. Thus we have within a city communities of Italians, Jews, Germans, Scandinavians, Poles, etc. Many of these groups maintain their own schools in which their children are taught in their native languages. Their social functions as well as their worship is carried on in their native tongue. The tenacity with which they resist attempts at making inroads on their cherished customs and traditions create live problems. These people present difficulties in Americanization. Their children, however, are the real sufferers. The parents in most cases move along smoothly because they do not attempt to break the old way of doing and thinking. To the boy or girl who attempts to reconcile the two clashing cultures comes much misery. In many cases such conflict between cultures may result in antisocial action.

[7] Baker-Crothers and Hudnut, *Problems of Citizenship*, New York, 1924, p. 60.

W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in their great work *The Polish Peasant* have recorded a large number of cases in which the major cases of delinquency on the part of growing boys and girls were mental conflicts, which were the result of an inability to remain faithful to the old and new world at the same time. These are some of the problems of the " new immigration."

Measures Operating to Control Population Increase. — Perhaps the most potent factors which operated to limit population numbers in the past were wilful infanticide and abortion, and a high death rate produced by war, famine, and disease. While these checks still prevail in parts of the Orient like China and India, they are negligible as far as influencing the population barometer of the countries of Western Europe. Science, the great benefactor of mankind, has muzzled famine. It has throttled pestilence, and conquered such diseases as typhoid fever, diphtheria, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, malaria, smallpox, and leprosy.[8] Never in the history of the world has man made such great strides in the saving of human lives as has been made in the first quarter of the present century. A rapid decline in the death rate has resulted. Yet the net population of most Western European countries has not increased in proportion to the decline in the death rate. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the birth rate has been influenced. We now turn our attention to some of the more important factors that have led to a fall in the birth rate.

The widespread diffusion of ability to read, the subtle influences of advertisements, the stimulation that goes with travel made cheap by improved transportation facilities, the habit of the lower classes aping the manner of life of the upper classes have all conspired to stimulate our wants. Fifteen years ago an automobile was a luxury, to-day that family is considered poor indeed that does not possess one. Whether all these wants are artificially stimulated as has been suggested or whether they are " natural " is of little consequence in this discussion. The point that interests us here is that the standard of living of most of our people has been pushed up. Once established, people are loath to see it decline.

[8] Ross, *op. cit.*, Chap. IV.

To maintain it they will go to almost any lengths. Limiting the number of their offspring seems to be one of them.

Not only has the birth rate suffered as a result of multiplication of our wants, but also because of the growing emancipation of women. Women are no longer looked upon as mere instruments for man's sexual gratification. Since women have become less dependent on men economically as a result of being allowed to enter industry, business, and the professions, their demands have increased. They are the ones who must endure all the pain and hardships that the bearing and raising of children involves in many cases. Therefore, they demand the right to have a voice in the matter of the number of children the family should have. If their demands are not met, divorces result in many cases. Recent figures on the subject show that one in every six marriages ends in divorce. This in itself is a powerful factor which limits population increase.

The increasing educational, economic, and political opportunities opening up to women tend to postpone the age of marriage. Some women who desire to follow a career never marry at all, while others marry only when long past the most prolific child-bearing age. Ross says, "Among the various peoples the average age of brides at their first marriages ranges probably from 22 to 28 years, which means that about a third — and that third the most fertile — of the female's reproductive period has passed unutilized." [9] There is a large number of women who prefer to follow a career even after marriage. This entails a further postponement of child-bearing to the age when sterility is likely to occur.

The most important, perhaps, of all the factors operating to control population increase is the widespread knowledge and use of birth-control devices. Without a knowledge of the methods of contraception the other factors are nullified as far as their effect on the birth rate is concerned. At present the dissemination of birth-control knowledge and methods is unlawful in many countries. Some countries are more stringent, others less in the enforcement of the law. In any case birth-control information has found a method of getting to enlightened people. In those coun-

[9] Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

tries where dissemination of birth control methods is legal, birth rates have fallen considerably. In New Zealand, for instance, the birth rate has declined one third between the decades of 1876–1885 and 1906–1915. In Holland the decline in the birth rate went from 36 per 1000 in the early '80s to 28 per 1000 in 1920.[10] To offset this tremendous decline in the birth rate, there has been even a greater fall in the death rate of these countries.

Race Problems in the United States. — Properly to appreciate the "Negro problem" in all its ramifications, one must get a complete understanding of the background or "slave culture" in which the negro lived up to the time of the Civil War. Most anthropologists are agreed that there is no scientific foundation to attempts made to interpret racial differences as implying that one race is superior to another in intellectual capacity. "Racial inferiority and superiority are by no means self-evident truths," says Kroeber, and that "the belief in race inequalities is founded in emotion and action and then justified by reasoning."[11] Further, the presence of from three to five million mulattoes in this country is ample evidence that no innate antipathies toward the negro exists. If the inharmony that exists between the two races is not based in fact on innate mental superiority, or on physical differences, then the answer to the race question must be looked for in the cultural backgrounds of the two races.

The institution of slavery dates back to the colonial days of our country. The negro was brought here from a country that gave him no idea as to what civilization and democratic government meant. He was large, muscular, and uneducated. These qualities seem to have fitted him well for work on the large southern plantations. The manner in which they were bought and sold on the auction block very closely resembled a cattle sale. They were regarded by the whites as work animals. If they performed their work in a docile and creditable manner they were treated as kindly as any human can be disposed to an animal. If they were sullen or disobedient they were lashed unmercifully. In this manner the white man began to determine the negro's

[10] Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 276–277.
[11] Kroeber, A. L., *Anthropology*, New York, 1923, p. 59.

place for him in this country. In exchange for his hard work, the negro was given a one-room shack for a home, and enough food for himself and his family. That the white man did not share his moral code with the negro is evidenced by the number of mulattoes that never had a legal father. The white master, moreover, looked upon education of his slaves as a waste of time. It was looked upon as dangerous to educate some of the ignorance out of the slaves.

In this manner did the two races grow up side by side in the south, each living in a different world. The negro was the black beast of burden and the white man was the southern gentleman. The white man defined the negro's position for him, and he created an entirely separate culture for the negro wholly apart from his own. The white man was assured of his dominant position and the negro accepted the inferior position. Under these circumstances no problem of race relations existed as we understand the problem to-day.

With some understanding of the cultural backgrounds of the two races we now turn to the distinctive problems created by the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. By this edict the negro was legally placed on a par with the white. He was accorded the liberty to compete with his former master for power, prestige, and position.

The Southern Whites, on the other hand, were not only vexed at the thought of having to accept these people whom they considered as inferior beings on a plane of equality, but were actually terrified at the thought of negro domination. In many states the negroes outnumbered the whites by as much as 10 to 1. Many political privileges were taken away from those Southerners who had participated in the Civil War and were not restored until some time later. Northern Republicans had sent political appointees, known as "carpet-baggers," into the South with a view to making the newly acquired franchise a reality to the negro. They established schools for the negroes and appointed them to office. All this, together with the fact that Southern Whites could look at and judge negroes only in terms of their "slave culture," caused consternation in the hearts and minds of the whites.

They visualized their social, economic, and political supremacy about to be usurped by their former slaves, and very shortly took steps to again put the negro in his "proper place."

In the first place, the negro was disfranchised legally by the several Southern states despite the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. These states passed amendments to their own constitutions providing for tax, property, or educational qualifications for voting which the negro could not meet. To be able to read, write, and interpret the State or Federal Constitution was provided as a prerequisite for voting in some states. Other states required a voter to have five or six hundred dollars worth of property in the state. Still others demanded of a voter that he shall not be in arrears on his poll tax. In each one of these instances the negro was legally and effectively deprived of his vote. As shown by W. E. B. DuBois this condition still remains with us. In the presidential election of 1920 only 8 per cent of the potential voters cast ballots in South Carolina, 9 per cent in Mississippi, 11 per cent in Georgia, 14 per cent in Louisiana, 18 per cent in Texas, 19 per cent in Virginia, 21 per cent in Arkansas and Alabama, and 28 per cent in Florida.[12]

In the second place, the South has worked out a very effective means of reminding the negro of his place in relation to the whites through segregation of the races. All transportation facilities have separate accommodations for the two races. The negro is very often obliged to put up with crowded and unsanitary conditions when waiting for trains. Because only Jim Crow day coaches are provided for negroes, even if a negro is able to pay for sleeping accommodations he cannot have them.

Negroes and whites are not allowed to attend the same schools but must attend separate schools, with separate equipment and teachers. In many cases the quality of teaching and equipment found in the negro schools is very much inferior to that provided for the whites. The amount of money appropriated for negro schools is so low in many cases that what instructional staff they

[12] Quoted by Baker-Crothers and Hudnut, *op. cit.*, p. 116, from *The New Republic*, Jan. 3, 1923.

are able to attract is totally inadequately paid. The best teachers are not, of course, expected to flock to the negro schools under these circumstances.

In the matter of living quarters, the negroes are forced to live in the worst parts of the city and very often are so overcrowded that vice, crime, and disease, together with a condition of poverty are apt to flourish. Most hotels, theaters, and parks are closed entirely to negroes in the large Southern cities.

The relation of the two races presents a somewhat different but withal a serious problem also in the North. Before negroes came North in relatively large numbers, most Northerners had a vague sympathy for the negro. So long as the number of negroes migrating to the North was small they were tolerated and only mildly discriminated against. From 1910 to 1920, 3.8 per cent of the negro population migrated northward. When this ten-year period, which includes the World War period, a time when negroes were encouraged to leave the South by Northern manufacturers, is compared with the long period from 1860 to 1910 when only 3.2 per cent of the negro population came North, some idea of the shift in negro population can be gleaned.[13] The effect of this increase of negro numbers in the North was evidenced by a distinct change in the attitude of the whites toward negroes, particularly in the large cities where most of the negroes settled. When the whites saw negroes competing with them for the same jobs and thought that their social supremacy was being threatened, their attitude of mild antipathy changed to deep prejudice. "Antipathies may arise between individuals, even within the group, but give antipathies names, associate these names with emotions, and connect them with the larger values of the group, and we get prejudice." [14]

In the North this feeling of prejudice is made evident in a number of ways. The negro is segregated into the worst parts of cities where his health is menaced by disease, etc., much the same as in the South. Because he is refused admittance to trade unions and therefore must take the lowest paid jobs, he does not hesitate in many cases to "scab" on his white brother when the opportu-

[13] Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, *op. cit.*, p. 227.
[14] Young, K., *Source Book for Social Psychology*, New York, 1927, p. 482.

nity presents itself. Although social inequalities are less noticeable in the North, they remain nevertheless. Most of the restaurants, theaters, and hotels that cater mostly to white trade are closed to the negro. The writer recalls the case of a brilliant negro singer who after entertaining three thousand appreciative listeners was refused admittance to any of the large hotels.

In general the North puts no hindrance in the way of the negro in voting or educational matters. Laws designed to keep the negro away from the polls on voting day are, in general, conspicuous by their absence. Northern schools are attended by negroes and whites alike, there being no dual school system.

The whole question of the negro-white race problem in the United States may be summed up as follows. In both the North and the South the whites are prejudiced against the negroes because of fear of economic competition, which is strongly colored by the emotions. In the North it is mostly a color prejudice largely because they did not become acquainted with negroes until recently. In the South prejudice rests largely on caste-feeling because of the long-standing association of the negro with his "slave culture" by the white. By their unsympathetic attitude, whites of both the North and South have driven negroes back into their own race, to achievement within their own color line, and have forced a development of race consciousness.

Programs of Race Relations. — We have seen that a race problem does exist in the United States. We have examined the origins of the problem and the conflicts that have resulted. Now the question is — what can be done about it? Let us look briefly into some of the suggestions made for handling the problem.

(1) *Political Action.* — Ex-President Harding advocated the granting of full civil rights to the negro. He suggested that full political and economic freedom and equality, without, at the same time, social equality, would go far in solving the race problem. He gained a goodly number of followers and subscribers to this plan.

(2) *Amalgamation.* — There are those who believe that if we leave the races as they are eventually the colored race will disappear as a result of miscegenation with whites. This is a process demanding much time and patience, consequently there are some who

feel that some other method ought to be advocated. There are some, moreover, who feel that "a policy of favoring race amalgamation would arouse more antagonism and intensify the problem of race relations instead of helping it."

(3) *Caste System.* — Those people who believe that the negro is innately inferior to the white man advocate this as a "natural" solution to the problem. A system of this kind can exist only when conditions are such that one group will always remain "inferior" to another. Fortunately or unfortunately for the people advocating this plan, the negro does not intend to remain in his original state of ignorance. Many of them are attending the secondary schools and universities. By attending trade and professional schools many negroes are attaining distinction among their own race and are being accorded respect and recognition by members of the white race as well. The suggestion, consequently, does not fit in with the trend of the times.

(4) *Inter-Racial Coöperation.* — A number of other suggestions, such as segregation, migration, and colonization have been made but the trouble with them is that either they involve too costly a procedure to one race or the other, or they are impossible of achievement on some other ground.

The program of education and inter-racial coöperation at the present time seems to be the most sensible plan. It is not discriminatory against either race and it is possible of achievement at the same time. Providing adequate educational facilities for negroes will by no means solve the problem entirely. It is no panacea or cure-all, but it will eliminate at least one cause of friction that exists between the races.

W. I. Thomas after telling how deeply race prejudice is ingrained in the minds of people, says, "it (race prejudice) tends to become more insignificant as increased communication brings interests and standards in common, and as similar systems of education and equal access to knowledge bring about a greater mental and social parity between groups, and remove the grounds for invidious distinction." [15]

[15] Quoted by Young, *op. cit.*, p. 498, from *American Journal of Sociology*, 1903-1904; IX, pp. 609–611.

The participation of the two groups in conferences or in such organizations as the Chicago Commission on Race Relations is a part of the educational program. As one writer points out, "Bi-racial organizations cannot prevent racial conflicts. So long as two racial groups continue to occupy the same territory, the chances of conflict are always present. . . . Bi-racial organization does, however, serve to lessen the points of contact where friction is most likely to be generated, and sets up a *modus vivendi* which tends to become incorporated in the thinking and the mores of both groups with appropriate sentiments and attitudes to insure a maximum of participation with a minimum of hostility." [16]

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What were the chief causes that compelled man to wander over the earth?
2. Is there danger that the world will become over-populated?
3. What are the checks on the excessive increase of population?
4. What are the social effects of a dense population? Of a sparse population?
5. What causes race conflict and race prejudice?
6. How may they be lessened?
7. Enumerate some of the immigration problems in the United States.
8. What right has a nation to restrict immigration?
9. State the chief race problems in the United States.
10. What are the distinctive achievements of members of the negro race in the United States?

[16] Dawson and Gettys, *An Introduction to Sociology*, New York, 1929, pp. 491–492.

CHAPTER VIII

HUMAN URGES IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The Dynamic Human Urges. — We have now looked at two factors which condition the development of society, — the physical environment, which we called by the generic term, land; and the aggregations of population of varying sizes and differing characteristics, physical and social. For purposes of clear analysis we have torn apart these things which in actual life belong together. It must, however, be kept in mind that in actual life these things occur together.

Let us turn next to the urges in man which conditioned by the physical environment and by the presence of other men give rise to what we call society, and determine the way in which it has developed. These urges, some of them of the original nature of man, some modified by his social experience, have been named in various ways by scholars. Some have called them instincts. McDougall is perhaps the most extreme representative of the "instinct" school of social psychology. Recently, however, other sociologists have criticized adversely the large number of instincts attributed by McDougall to human beings. We prefer to use the larger but vaguer term "urges." Ward referred to these impulses of the human individual which impart drive to his being and lead to social activities as feelings. His theory was that the feelings are the motor forces which make man a social animal. The intelligence is the guiding function of man, shaping the direction his activities shall take.[1] Thomas has further analyzed the forces which impel to action as the four "wishes": (1) the desire for new experience, (2) the desire for security, (3) the desire for response, and (4) the desire for recognition.[2] The multitudinous concrete

[1] See McDougall, *Social Psychology*, Boston, 1909; Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 99–103.

[2] Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Boston, 1927, Chap. I.

forms which human desires take may be reduced to these four classes. These inherent urges of the human being drive him to activity of various kinds. He finds these activities intended to accomplish fulfillment of his wishes limited and circumscribed by the physical environment and by the presence of other human beings. The endeavor to find ways of satisfying his desires in the presence of hindering circumstances leads to those adjustments of means to ends which in connection with the physical universe results in the conquest of nature, and to those adjustments with his fellows which we call social institutions and social organizations.

The social activities, like those of an individual, result from the endeavor of the social group to adapt itself to its environment in order to secure the satisfaction of certain felt social needs. We judge of the composition of society by its activities, and of its organs or parts by the functions of such organs or parts. Ward asserts that the purpose of organization is function and thus he holds that the performance of social activities is the object of human institutions.[3] But primarily the social activities were merely to satisfy human desire and, incidentally, permanent human institutions composing the social structure were created. After the unconscious creation of the social structures the conscious social effort appeared and under its direction the structures were changed and improved by the conscious direction of society.

Feeling and Restraint. — The first general effort of man arises primarily from the sources of sensation. The sense of hunger causes him to make an effort to satisfy it. The pain of cold leads him to seek warmth by changing location, or else by making shelter. The desire for companionship induces him to seek associates. The emotions of fear and love prompt him to act in certain directions to satisfy his desires. Primarily self-interest was the only point involved, but by a process of social selection or a conscious weeding out of excessively self-seeking individuals by the majority of the group,[4] this gradually developed into a social interest. Feel-

[3] "The function is the end for which a mechanism is constructed." — Ward, *Pure Sociology*, New York, 1907, pp. 180, 181. Cf. Cooley, *Social Organization*, New York, 1909, p. 21.

[4] See Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, pp. 344–348, or Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress*, pp. 641–646.

ing came to be modified by social restraint, which represents one of the primary social activities. The socialization of the individual's egoistic feelings doubtless was also furthered by the advantage for group survival rendered by self-restraint in the interest of the group. Even in animals this restraint has been developed, partly the outgrowth of a prolonged infancy and partly of natural selection.[5] The instinct for the preservation and perpetuation of the individual was soon enlarged into the desire for the preservation and perpetuation of the social group, or what Ward calls social telesis. The ultimate justification of society as a whole can only be the superior advantages which association gives for survival and happiness. If association inevitably leads to the destruction of the individual, society and all its ways will cease to be. That it has flourished among human kind is a silent but cogent testimony that society means superior opportunities for social beings to live and perpetuate their kind.

While we now may look to the completed social structure with all its combined activities to find its ultimate purpose, this was not recognized by man in his primitive social activities. He went about following his natural desires and spent his efforts to satisfy his physical and social wants without any purpose to build a social structure. Viewed from the present standpoint, however, it is easy to perceive how these independent and individual activities, directed only to immediate ends, have worked together in a process which Ward called " synergy " [6] to produce a social structure with its various parts and accompanying activities.

Pleasurable sensation arose in a state of blind, non-purposive nature because it served to stimulate the functioning processes necessary for the survival of the creature. However, so intense is such sensation, that, unless restraints are imposed, the process which it promotes — the functioning of the organism — is overdone to the disadvantage of that organism.

So, to sum up, in the social world pleasant feelings arising from association under certain conditions promote the formation of social bonds which make for the survival of the group. However,

[5] Drummond, *Ascent of Man*, New York, 1894, pp. 230–318.
[6] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 171.

those feelings unrestrained within certain bounds destroy their own ends — social functioning — hence, the restraint of feeling brings about social order, and thus builds the social structure.[7]

Preservation of the Social Group. — Gradually concern for the preservation of the individual passes into concern for the preservation of the social group. A little nucleus of group-conscious individuals begins to work as a unit for the preservation of its own existence. Conscious social action by each individual of each group takes the place of instinctive action and is directed to group preservation. The community interest in the preservation of the group is seen in the development of war for defense, where all are united in a common enterprise. Such group concern may be seen also in the development of a government where individuals are working together in the preservation of common interests. Once the idea that certain social relationships are necessary for the welfare of the group becomes established the force of eustom causes members of the group to act as a unit and each individual who comes into the group through birth or adoption is subjected to the customs and traditions of thc group and finds himself controlled, not by one individual, but by a higher power — the will of the group — to which all must be subordinate. His feelings and desires are restrained, not only by the natural environment, but by a newly created social environment. Gradually this restraint is embodied in decrees, laws, or rules of action which are formally declared necessary for the preservation of the group. The conception of the welfare of the group, according to Sumner, transforms folkways into mores.

Moreover, in economic activities also there appears a great development of conscious coöperation. The individual primarily sought food independently and rcgardless of his fellows. The food supply at first instinctively and then consciously became a matter of social determination. Men hunt in groups and share the product of their combined labors. A whale found upon the shore or captured in the surf belongs to the family or tribe and not to the individual who discovers it. The field which is protected and defended by all belongs to the group, and consequently its products

[7] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, New York, 1907, pp. 119–135.

partake essentially of communal ownership. Although individual activity remains, group activities become increasingly important. Through this associated activity, and only through it, was man's present stage of development possible. In the course of social evolution these activities of social order and economic life expand until we now have a complex and highly differentiated form of political and economic life. The influence of social considerations is to be seen in the survival to our day of the social concept of property.[8]

The Perpetuation of the Social Group. — The love of life and its converse, the fear of death, have been important motives at the basis of the evolutionary struggle. These instinctive attitudes, however, are not alone in their primacy as fundamentals which explain the survival of the human race. They give rise to flight and other methods common to animals and men and adapted to promote escape from death; they give rise to conflict with foes; to attack of prey for food, with its joy of battle; and to the activities which end in the satisfaction of immediate desires.

They are supplemented by another urge for the perpetuation of race, the sexual. It is doubtful whether, primarily, human beings desire offspring. The sexual impulse, established as a fundamental characteristic by natural selection, and common to all beings reproducing bi-sexually, necessitated association. Out of emotional excitation incident to the association of the sexes and the association of parents and children other emotional values developed. In course of time the desire for offspring became a conscious rather than an unconscious matter. There is evidence that low down in the scale of animal life the parents had no concern for the offspring. Yet in some species of such low forms as fishes, there appears a care for the nesting place, in certain higher animals maternal concern for the eggs and the young, but paternal concern is much weaker among many species of animals, as may be seen in the case even of cattle. In gregarious animals, however, a beginning of paternal regard is to be seen in the care which a gander and certain other males take of their females and the young. Even among human beings there is a wide difference in father care between the lower grades of social development and the highest

[8] Ely, *Property and Contract*, Vol. I, Chap. VI.

grades. This growth in parental care doubtless developed owing to a process of natural selection and resulted in the better survival of those for whom their parents had manifested concern. Obviously such concern in most cases was of advantage to the preservation of the species. Even yet sentiment, that child of instinct and tradition, rather than reason, is the most effective weapon of appeal for the care of the young.

This instinctive concern for the offspring has produced important results in the history of mankind. Undoubtedly the child is the real cause of the home. Its long period of helplessness has caused the building of shelter and the construction of a permanent habitation. Around the child have been grouped all the early social affiliations. Clustered about the home we discover a variety of motives for the perpetuation of the whole group. Living together develops a tender feeling and sentiment among all inmates of the home. This is followed by family pride, which seeks to perpetuate the group and to cause it to survive the attacks of other groups. The ethnic idea becomes prominent and out of it springs national life with patriotism.

In the course of social evolution there appears, finally, a conscious effort for the perpetuation of the species. Certain customs and laws regulate marriage relationships. In some instances individuals are forbidden to marry outside the larger ethnic groups and also are forbidden to marry near relatives within the group, but are forced to take wives from the larger social divisions within the society, although it is uncertain how much of such regulations was consciously prompted by the perception of the advantage such arrangements gave for survival and how much by accidental taboos of primitive religion. Doubtless, however, to-day such regulations as laws against infanticide, child labor, and neglect of children are consciously directed towards race welfare. In a thousand ways the social group seeks to protect itself and to perpetuate its existence. It must be constantly on the defensive against external foes who seek to destroy it and also watchful to seize every advantage to ward off disease and to establish such laws and customs as will be conducive to the perpetuation of life. This social activity is absolutely essential to the existence of society and never ceases

its operations in the highest and most perfected forms of social life.

The Advancement of the Group. — Conscious efforts are made in several directions to raise the plane of living and to increase the efficiency of the social group. Among these may be mentioned all attempts to improve the physical conditions of mankind. The increase of the food supply, the invention of means of storing and preserving food, and the improvement of its quality, lead to a more constant and regular supply of the necessaries of physical life, do away with the loss of energy from hunger, and give the group leisure to improve itself in other ways.[9]

Scientific discovery for the improvement of the material conditions of society represents one of its chief activities. Also the training of the physical man and the protection from disease involves another group of social activities making for social development.

Equally important for the advancement of society is the recreative life, the games and the amusements which were of great variety in primitive society as well as among civilized peoples. Through the ages not only of the human but also of the animal world, there has existed the joy of play. Only recently, however, has our philosophy found any justification for the " foolish " practice. At last it has been discovered that the play element is essential to the highest development and the best welfare of the community. Hence this phase of social activity is important for the advancement of the race.

Moral and Æsthetic Activities. — Every well-organized community has an unwritten code of moral law which has much to do with the unity and strength of society. Societies are organized for the express purpose of advancing the moral standard of the community. Such are temperance societies, those for the prevention of cruelty to animals, and the large number of rescue and charitable societies which seek the betterment of particular classes of unfortunates. Every movement which seeks to bring about a more socially efficient association of individuals and to increase the integrity and adjustment of the mass to better social ends elevates society to a higher plane and adds to it strength and vigor. Such

[9] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Sec. 26.

efforts not only make for a lessening of social waste, but add to the labor capacity of the community, increasing its longevity and offering greater opportunity for survival of the group.

Very closely allied to the moral are the æsthetic activities which seek to elevate taste and to inculcate a love of the beautiful. No doubt the general effect of the love of the beautiful is increased satisfaction in life. Moreover, the love of the beautiful has close connection with a passion for those social purposes and standards which we call the truth, and which work for the advancement of the race by promoting social adjustment to better ideals, while the general effect of ugliness is toward degeneration. Here, as elsewhere, however, it is the proper use of the instrument that yields the highest reward, for the use of art may be directed toward immorality as well as toward morality. It is said that in Hungary, one effect of music is to develop a lazy emotional life, and many people have held that the excess of music in Germany, with its perpetual play on the emotions, has a tendency to destroy the power of inventive and logical thought. This is psychologically what is to be expected, for any stirring of the emotions — those social engines of prime importance — which does not result in action results in the atrophy of that natural connection between the emotional life and activity, and therefore in social degeneration. Moreover, it may be questioned whether the popular "jazz" music, although furnishing recreation to the faculties, has a beneficial effect upon the community. It usurps the function of good music. It also tends to appeal to such naïve and grotesque tastes that its effects soon pall. Further, it does not afford that diversification of satisfactions which best develops one's nature. However, the general effect of art is to improve the ideals, to motivate the social actions of the community, and to develop those activities which lead to the study of the beautiful in nature and art and which are essential to the progress of the social group.

Originating in the unconscious play impulse or in superstitious traditions, moral and æsthetic activities become rationalized, then critically examined and consciously pursued for social ends.

Educational Activities. — Growing out of the inherent urges of mankind in the effort to secure their satisfaction is a group of activi-

ties which may be called educational. Partly the result of the desire for new experience, partly for recognition, primitive groups devised methods of impressing the young with certain ideals which were held to be for the welfare of the group. Taboos, patterns of conduct both individual and group, ceremonies at important occasions in the life of the individual and of the group, religious beliefs, attitudes, and traditions grow up and are used to accomplish conformity to the patterns of social conduct approved by the older members. All these things are the prototypes of what we call to-day educational activities. Three illustrations may be cited, — religious, educational, and scientific.

Of the many thousands engaged in religious propaganda, all are directly or indirectly attempting to maintain or to change religious belief. Now religious belief has its most intimate connections with the emotions rather than with the reason. That gives it its peculiarly important function in society. It becomes a mighty dynamic force for social action. In all stages of social evolution it has played a very important part. Religion, moreover, has to do primarily with belief and secondarily with conduct. To change the belief from a lower to a higher form, that is, from a less to a more socially efficient form, and to bring the conduct of society into subordination to a belief is the vital process of religion so far as its effect on society is concerned. Since belief has a most vital connection with action, in this capacity it is a powerful social organizer. While a society might exist without it, nevertheless it has always been an important element in the process of integrating and conserving the social life, and the periods of decline in positive belief of nations have been periods of decline of national greatness.

The educational activities are the most positive and direct agencies for the advancement of society through the process of culture. To persuade people to supplant ignorance by intelligence, to balance the emotions with reason and thus give them rational direction and control, to prepare the young for efficient industry and citizenship, and to elevate the ideals of life, are the principal functions of the educational activities. It is in this field that the conscious activity of society is best seen. Through educa-

tion society seeks to force its own conduct into new channels of action. In the highest types of modern society the organized educational forces represent the most universal social activity that may be discerned. They make for the unity and solidarity of society and are the chief methods to insure society's adaptation to changing social conditions.

The scientific movement is a part of the educational; for while the object of science is to find out truth, its ultimate purpose is to make it useful to society. No sooner is a scientific truth discovered than great effort is made to bring it to a utilitarian basis. Science has thus become necessary to the material welfare of the human race. It is the handmaid of human betterment. When a tribe adopts modern civilization and fails to utilize the knowledge that science gives, it declines rather than advances. This principle is observed in the contact of savage or barbarous tribes with modern civilization. Failing to master and employ the full force of modern science in their adopted mode of life, they degenerate in the presence of civilized arts. They learn the vices of civilization while refusing to adopt the teachings of civilized science and morals. The result is social downfall.

Antisocial Activities. — As there are social activities which make for social advancement, so there are many activities which are supposed to obstruct it, such as the activities of bands of thieves or burglars, street gangs, counterfeiters, "thugs," "grafters," etc. As those activities which are social tend to result in social progress, these activities which we must denominate as "antisocial" tend to destroy group life, or thwart constructive social programs. Genetically many antisocial activities must be explained as survivals of past social practices which later social developments have rendered obsolete and harmful to the newborn social conscience. They illustrate that "the good is the enemy of the best," and provide evidence that clearer social vision has rendered "ancient good uncouth." Moreover, they may point to a lack of perfect adjustment in the later social activities and inventions to the needs of the people. The saloon, the low dance hall, with all their low and evil practices, the street gangs of city boys, and the neighborhood gangs of country boys with their pranks and fights illustrate this point.

They show that some social needs of the people of the community are being met in antisocial ways by reason partly of the fact that there are lacking for the satisfaction of those needs means that are socially constructive in their results. Organizations grow out of these activities against which the social group in self-defense must exert its most potent, preventive, repressive, and curative methods. These activities are also signs that in the struggle to satisfy the fundamental desires there is a conflict between the desires of one part of the social group, like the young, and the desires of another, say the older, or between the poorer and the richer, between the desires of those holding power and of those without it. Or they indicate that there is a struggle between those who desire experience and those who desire recognition. Such activities, then, are antisocial only in the sense that those who have tired of new experiences, have security, and are the recognized authorities in a group are jealous of their prerogatives as against those who are struggling for the satisfaction of their wishes. So long as the old and powerful are not wise enough to allow others to satisfy these fundamental wishes, they will dub the activities of these others antisocial. The proscribed activities may really be inimical to the welfare of the group, or they may only be thought so by those who have power to forbid them. If the methods of social control prevent the satisfaction of these fundamental urges in individuals, are not those methods and those in places of authority to blame for the so-called "antisocial" activities? The struggle of the individual against established order to bring him into subjection to that order gives us the phenomenon of the conflict between ideals of liberty and constraint seen in every society. It is a form of group struggle growing out of the fundamental human urges in every normal individual. The methods of social control will be discussed later.

Coöperative Association. — Much has been said previously in this volume about coöperation and it will suffice here to mention it in connection with the general social activities. It represents a unity of purpose and action in accomplishing ends which experience showed could not be reached without coöperative effort. The working of people in groups for a particular purpose involves a large number of social activities making for the advancement of

society. Remember that the individual driven by these innate urges is seeking their satisfaction. Remember also that he finds himself face to face with a somewhat intractable nature, also in contact with other individuals seeking the satisfaction of their individual wishes. Now often one individual seeking the satisfaction of his desires finds himself in conflict with another individual who is also seeking the accomplishment of his own wishes. For example, each of them wishes security of his own person and of his own possessions. He may fight all comers for such security. But as the result of experience he may learn that if he combines with others of his fellows, agrees to limit his desires in certain ways, he can secure the satisfaction of more of his desires or secure their satisfaction more often than without such coöperation. Hence coöperative effort, or what Kropotkin called "mutual aid" arises. The organization of mutual aid gives rise to organized society. So much of truth is there in Rousseau's social contract theory. If one wishes to be sure in the possession of his own wife, he must limit his desire to have any other woman he might fancy. So with his other wishes. Here one must distinguish the immediate from the ultimate end. A group of people organized for the purpose of developing a large body of iron ore are all desirous of making an income, but the real service to society is found in the production of a volume of useful metal which will improve the material and probably the social conditions of the whole community. When an entrepreneur borrows capital, hires men, and leases ground, he is bringing capitalists, laborers, and landowners into a combination of effort for his own profit. However, under proper economic conditions he and these other beings are working together, often unconsciously, but none the less truly, in a coöperative enterprise of great benefit to the whole of society.

Such coöperation is indirect, but coöperation for the improvement of society may be direct when a body of men organize themselves into a civic league, to advance the social and political interests of the community, or when a body of women form a club with social purposes. This kind of coöperation is common and represents a distinct group of social activities. Here we approach the idea of the social mind with its concert of feeling, thinking, and

willing for the welfare of the community. This is the highest generalization of social coöperative activity. It depends upon public conscience and public will for its action. Social activities in their highest forms are psychological in nature. This subject will be further discussed in a later chapter.

Social Evolution. — Let us sum up briefly our outline analysis of the factors which account for the origin and development of social relationships. Here is a physical universe which limits man in many ways. It nourishes him; it destroys him. Its very configuration determines his physical movements, much in the early history of mankind, less in his later. Everywhere it is a presence he cannot deny and with which he must come to terms in some fashion. Strange powers it possesses, some of them kindly, some awesome, some of them inanimate, others animate. Then here are individuals and groups of human beings, which might be considered a part of this physical universe, but which we have thought best to consider separately. Some of them are much like himself and his group, others are of different color, have different customs, and have a different language. Some of them he likes, others he dislikes. The presence of these others conditions his attitudes and his activities. Again, here is himself possessed by urges, likes and dislikes, desires and aversions, differing from those of his fellows in some respects, but fundamentally like them in many others. Both the physical universe and his fellows limit his activities in the effort to satisfy his fundamental urges. He must come to terms with these extraneous conditions. He cannot escape either the physical universe, his fellows, or himself. He also has what we call intelligence. That set of factors presents the problems which have faced man from his first appearance upon the earth to the present moment. His attempt to solve these problems has given us this interesting complex which we call social development. Being what he is, man could not resign the task of solving the problems. The result of his attempts to solve them is social evolution.

READING ASSIGNMENTS

Bogardus, E. S. *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chaps. I–IV.
Cooley, Chas. H. *Human Nature and Social Order*, Chaps. I, III.

Ellwood, Chas. H. *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chaps. III, XII.
Giddings, F. H. *Studies in the Theories of Human Society*, Chap. XV.
Thomas, W. I. *The Unadjusted Girl*, Chap. I.
Ward, Lester F. *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 468–502; 524–565; 581–706.

OTHER REFERENCES

Park and Burgess. *The Introduction to the Science of Society*, pp. 159–215.
Spencer, Herbert. *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 473–478.
Sumner, W. G. *Folkways*, pp. 2–8.
Webster, Hutton. *Primitive Secret Societies.*

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Show how in the early history of the relief of the poor in your country social activities preceded social forms.

2. How would you explain the fact that in early Iowa history laws providing for poorhouses preceded the building of any such institutions? (See Gillin, *History of Poor Relief Legislation in Iowa*, p. 183.)

3. After reading Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 119–135, supply instances from your own observations in elections, church revivals, and church quarrels, in tariff and tax controversies, in the history of women's clubs, and in the conduct of nations showing how feelings furnish the motive power of social action.

4. Describe in your own community a social action inspired by intense feelings upon which serious restraints had to be placed in order to further the success of the action.

5. Describe some present-day laws which restrain the individual in the interests of the preservation of the group. Some customs.

6. What evidence does "race suicide" supply in support of the assertion that instinct rather than reason must be depended on for the perpetuation of the race? Point out the fallacy, if any, in such argument.

7. Make a list of all the activities in your community which have for their purpose the advancement of the group.

8. Classify the following activities: A church, a county fair, a temperance campaign, a social survey, a city planning exhibit, university extension work, a baseball game, a political campaign, a women's club.

9. If love of the beautiful has a close connection with virtue and truth, show the social justification of the movement for city planning, housing laws, art galleries, training in domestic science and art, and good music.

10. Explain the origin of a boys' gang, showing how that organization satisfies an individual wish. Show how it often achieves an antisocial result.

11. Explain the statement that human urges create social organization.

12. What light does the discussion in the text throw upon suicides, murders, business organizations, organized government, family ethics, welfare societies, boys' gangs?

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

In the process of social development, the conditioning factors of which we have just discussed, men fall into certain ways of working together. These ways become established in the habits of individuals and in the customs of groups. They become fixed as the approved ways by transmission from generation to generation by tradition. These forms of social relationship are called " social institutions " or " social organization."

Meaning of Social Organization. — By *social organization* we mean the system of relationships established between individuals, between individuals and groups, and between groups in what we have defined as a society. An outgrowth of the human mind struggling to bring order into social relationships is *an institution*, which Cooley describes as the result of human thought directed for a long time upon a particular subject and so crystallized in definite forms, such as enduring sentiments, beliefs, customs, and symbols. The term " social organization " is often used as almost synonymous with social institution.[1] In this sense by the term " a social organization " we mean a certain organized relationship. Thus, for instance, the church as an institution makes itself essential as an instructing and controlling body. So do all trades and businesses, such as the banking business, which perform an essential economic service to the community. Above and over all private social organizations is the state and the various subdivisions which, as a sort of framework, hold the great social body together in a definite form.

[1] For more detailed discussion of the two terms see Ward, *Pure Sociology*, New York, 1907, pp. 185–193; Cooley, *Social Organization*, New York, 1905, Part V; Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, New York, 1905, Chap. XVI. Giddings insists that organization is the more general term, while institutions are the result of the group's positive approval of organized relationships.

The explanation just made applies more especially to societies which are somewhat developed. The term "social organization," however, must also be applied to the social relationships to be found in groups much less developed than civilized societies. It must also cover the crude beginnings of social organization. Any fixity of social relations whether the outgrowth of instinct, feeling of likeness, or of conscious social purpose must be characterized as a social organization. The essential idea in a social organization is permanency of social relationships. Sometimes such relations are produced by instinct, sometimes by the pleasurable feelings excited by being in the company of those whom we like, and at other times by the conscious appreciation of certain advantages of such relationships. They may grow out of fear and patronage, congeniality, or even force. Or, they may develop from a contract entered into by superiors and inferiors or between equals. Social organization includes all sorts of permanent relationships upon any basis whatsoever.

Development of Groups out of Social Aggregations. — Granting that the primal condition of society is a loosely constructed horde brought together through accident, from following the same desires, or from responding to the same stimuli, how did it happen that this loosely knit group finally became organized? Within this horde, smaller groups must have formed, clustering about a central interest or activity. Sometimes these social bonds centered about the sex interests, sometimes about a strong personality who established bonds of authority and obedience, such as may be seen in tribal and historic feudalism, and in the primitive religious or secret society, and sometimes about economic interests. When it was sexual attraction which brought more definite social relations, gradually the family and home life was built up, with their taboos, customs, and traditions. Likewise, the religious motive causing a repetition of ceremonies finally produced an organized group of people attending to religious services. In various industrial occupations individuals began to work together to secure means of subsistence, they combined in building homes, in games, and in other social activities. All this had a tendency to diversify the life of society.

Necessity of Social Integration. — Each of these small social groups, however, arising about various social interests, came into existence independently of other groups, and integration became necessary. They were often found working at cross purposes socially; the interests of one small group clashed with those of another. In this struggle the paramount interests of the whole body of people, which might be called an aggregation, were often placed in jeopardy, especially in the presence of a hostile aggregation. This made necessary the subordination of small circles within the group to those interests which meant survival for the whole body of people closely allied. Hence, little by little, independent social groups became merged or subordinated into a central organization. This integration brought many of the scattered elements of society into compact union well illustrated by that very highly centralized organization, the patriarchal family, in which almost complete control centered in one head, who represented the controlling power of the whole. Another example is to be found in the tribe which is formed by many clan groups united for the common purposes of religion, war, and association. The confederating of various tribes into still larger groups also is a continuation of the process of integration that went on through the centuries of development of human society. Nor is this integration, though it may have logically preceded other phases of social development, ever eliminated from the social process. It is a constant factor in social development, recurring in ever larger and larger ways as society becomes more extended.

Component and Constituent Organizations. — By the term "social composition" is meant those natural divisions of society comprising all ages, sexes, marital conditions, and ethnic relationships which are each self-sufficient for their perpetuation. The term signifies the natural groups of people occupying a common territory, as contrasted with those groupings which are the results of conscious planning for definite purposes. Examples of social composition are the family groups in modern societies, the kinship groups in primitive societies, the village, or community, groups which have grown up largely on the basis of blood relationship in both primitive and modern societies, the town, the neighborhood,

and the state. Social composition predominates in the social organization of the primitive societies; the family, the horde, the tribe, and the village are the characteristic component organizations. On the other hand, in the modern civilized society the constituent society, or a group based upon likeness of interest, and formed for a definite purpose, such as partnerships, and industrial, cultural, and civil corporations, is in the ascendancy. The chief mark of a component society is that it is practically complete in itself, so that it could carry on an independent existence. In a constituent society the groups are interdependent. Under the primitive régime society was composed of a blood kindred, a development from the family group with the family relationships repeated in different forms and combinations. These various relationships held society together. Gradually the blood ties were supplanted by other social bonds, and society was composed of individuals, each of whom was connected with the whole group regardless of family relationship. As Giddings has pointed out, this change took place when for blood relationship there was substituted propinquity in the same political area.[2]

Increasingly as society develops, social organization is made up of groups of people each working for a definite purpose, and bound together in psychological and social union with other groups working for different purposes no less definite. The basis of their organization may be custom or tradition on the one hand, or, on the other, a written constitution. A social organization may be a playground group drawn together by a common play interest, a primitive tribe bound together by a common blood, or a highly organized state united together by a written covenant. A group organized consciously into smaller groups on the basis of common social likenesses and interests, and these smaller groups in turn integrated by common social purposes into a larger social group, like the city or the state, represent a much more highly developed organization, because the social bonds are purposive and deliberative as compared with the sometimes accidental bonds of the blood group. Both types, however, are included under the term "social organization."

[2] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1900, p. 321.

Federated Groups. — All federated groups in primitive societies as well as those which spring up by the coalescence of family groups into hordes come under the category of the social composition rather than that of the social constitution. These various groups do not come together to supplement the work of each other and thus gain social advantages, but they are merely two groups of the same sort with similar purposes and near enough in race to make their union bearable in days when the blood bond was the important social tie. The union of the various Indian tribes about the lakes of central New York was such a federation.[3] Such federations usually develop on the basis of blood and cultural kinship out of necessities of common defense. They result in the development of larger organized groups. Magnitude of population, however, is a question that becomes more interesting from the sociological point of view when it concerns a society that has grown out of the primitive state. There may be a conscious effort in component societies for social integration which has for its purpose the increase of the aggregation of individuals, and the amalgamation of these individuals into a mass through matrimonial alliances or social assimilation. Sometimes through alliances of a general economic or social nature several tribes or nations have been united into one society. Efforts have thus been consciously made for the union of elements, which have finally yielded to complete social unity through the processes of socialization. The new group remains largely a component society. Each differentiated small social group within the society works for different aims, but each of these aims is complementary to the aims of the other groups. In this way society develops to the point where the social constitution becomes predominant over the social composition.

Conscious Integration. — The combination of smaller groups into larger ones and the consequent development of an integral society went on during an extended period. Early in the development such growth by the combination of groups was sympathetic or at most the result of the recognition of an affinity between the groups. Usually this was based on racial relationships. A time came, however, in the development of every society when it

[3] Morgan, *Ancient Society*, New York, 1878, Chap. V.

began to become conscious of itself. It then acted as a unit and strove to build itself into a greater society by its own conscious efforts.

Illustration of this change from unconscious, non-purposive to conscious, purposive integration is afforded by the growth of the Hebrew people by the sympathetic coalescence of the various tribes which had settled in Canaan, at first all more or less closely related by blood, and then a little later by their becoming possessed of a conscious desire to form a stronger union and select a king.[4] Similar examples might be multiplied. In fact the history of every important nation in existence to-day, as well as of those nations whose history is all that remains, supplies illustrations of this process. In different ways each sought to enlarge its territorial boundaries, to defend itself against foreign foes, and to regulate its internal affairs. It enlarged its population by absorbing other families and tribes. This was accomplished usually through conquest or treaty, or perchance by the accidental union of groups.

The So-called Social Organism. — By slow degrees there was developed what in the early history of sociology was known as the social organism, a social group made up of subgroups closely related, serving each its own purpose for which it was organized, but articulating with all others in coöperation for the accomplishment of common ends, and therefore forming a social whole. The term " social organism " is only an analogy to help the student to visualize this complex and invisible social reality called a society. It implies members or parts articulating with each other and forming a whole. But this articulation is psychological rather than physical in its nature. Its bonds of organization are common feelings, purposes, aims, and hopes. The articulate body is made up of men and women inspired and held by these purposes, feelings, and hopes. Individuals moving freely by their own volition are nevertheless formed into permanent groups that are perpetuated by a succession of individuals. Thus the group of people performing the banking service are essential to the continuation of the life of a modern society, just as are those who perform the service of exchanging or transporting goods. Those who are engaged in

[4] Samuel 8 : 4–6.

legislative halls, the police force, or the great body of religious teachers, are distinct groups that are working to carry out the activities of society as a whole. Individuals and groups are caught and molded to social purposes and ends by the complex of community interests much as the chemical elements composing the two cells which form the beginning of a new life are caught and built up into a new unity.

Social Organization. — But society is something more than a mere organism; it is an organization. It develops a social activity and exercises a social will in giving individuals their proper place and establishing the rights and privileges of groups, as well as of individuals. The individual man may be said to be a bio-psychic organism, but he is more, for he can organize his own mental and physical forces for a special purpose. The conscious mental effort of society exercised in organizing itself makes it a super-organism, an organization.

Differentiation of Organs or Parts. — After society has achieved a degree of unity it begins to differentiate or separate into new groups. This is noticed especially in the economic world, where it is marked by a division of labor. At first each individual tries to do everything for himself, then he does only a part, allowing others to do the rest in exchange for what he does for them. Soon there are the hunters, the house builders, the housekeepers, and later the manufacturers and traders. Agriculturists, bankers, transporters, etc., appear and perform separate services. So, too, the medicine man is at first priest and doctor combined; later these services become differentiated and a group of physicians and a group of priests appear. The same differentiation is observed in government, until the legislative, executive, and judicial systems are clearly marked off with all their subdivisions. Thus the interrelated functions are developed.

The Social Constitution. — By this term is meant the organization of a society as made up of interdependent groups of people, each of which groups has a different purpose and each of which therefore serves a different social need. Examples are the economic, educational, religious, and æsthetic groups of a population. Usually these groups are artificial in their origin. Each serves but

one social need, while a component society serves all the fundamental social needs necessary to the existence of the group. The constituent elements of society might be called social organs. If we observe society as it is and try to enumerate all the parts of society, we shall see what is meant by these interdependent groups called organs. Here, again, we must hold clearly in mind that the term " organs " is but a figure of speech to aid us in comprehending functions and relationships. According to Spencer, these constituent classes of society are as follows:

First, there is a large economic group which is called the sustaining group because it ministers directly to the physical sustenance of society.[5] It includes those branches of society engaged in producing all forms of goods for the satisfaction of human wants; those that are engaged in exchanging and transporting goods, as well as in the transforming industries.

In the second category we have the perpetuating groups, such as the family, whose primary service is to perpetuate the species, and all medical and sanitary societies which seek to preserve life. Then there is the communicating system, so essential in these days to the sustaining organs, including as it does all the methods of conveying knowledge, such as the telegraph, the telephone, and the printing press. Books, newspapers, and magazines are primarily means of communicating knowledge.

Very important are those groups which may be recognized as cultural, such as the church, educational institutions, scientific, literary, æsthetic, and ethical societies.

In making such classification a group is classified according to its most important action, although it might be classified under several other headings.

Finally, we must mention the highly interesting and essential group known as the regulating and protecting system.[6] Its chief value is found in the creation and maintenance of social order. If we take the United States as an example, its systems would include the international system which establishes the relationship between our nation and others, and maintains an independent national life;

[5] See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 498.
[6] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 519.

the legislative, judicial, and executive institutions of the national government and of the various state governments, the municipal government, the standing army, and the police system. In addition to these we have state education, of which the primary service is not culture, but state protection or social order.

In this connection should be mentioned voluntary association, which has played an important part in establishing social order and protecting groups of people. Among these are labor organizations, insurance companies, fraternal societies, benefit societies, and charity organizations.

Constituent Parts of Society. — The following analysis of the constituent parts of society may be of suggestive value if we remember that the classification is based on the most important function or special service of each organ, although a single organ may have other widely distributed functions.

I. The sustaining organs — economic.
   - Producing groups.
   - Extracting.
   - Transforming.
   - Transporting.
   - Exchanging.

II. The perpetuating groups.
   - The family.
   - Medical societies.
   - Sanitary societies.

III. The communicating systems (essential to economic groups).
   - (*a*) The printing press and its auxiliaries, books, newspapers, magazines, etc.
   - (*b*) The telephone.
   - (*c*) The telegraph and radio.
   - (*d*) The railways, tramways, motor vehicles, etc.

IV. The cultural groups.
   - The church.
   - Educational institutions.
   - Scientific societies.
   - Literary, æsthetic, and ethical societies.
   - Social clubs and societies.
   - Recreative societies.

V. The regulating and protective system.
   - International institutions.
   - The state.
     - Legislative institutions.
     - Judicial institutions.

Executive institutions.
Police system (broader than executive).
State education.
Voluntary associations.
Labor organizations.
Insurance companies.
Fraternal societies.
Benefit societies.
Charitable societies and institutions.
Political parties.

This analysis might be carried much further by the student, but it serves the present purpose in the form here presented.

Differentiation.[7] — This perpetual process of differentiation and multiplication of constituent groups is a mode of social evolution. Society grows by the development of a new activity and consequently of a new part. It shows its development in several ways; first, in the specialization of the regulating system in which there is a growth of new groups which have for their purpose the establishment of social order and the protection of citizens. This is followed by the specialization of industries in which each group performs a particular service. There is a wider division of labor which continually separates workers into groups. New industries are rapidly developed which add to the number of groups. As culture increases there is a continually growing number of individuals engaged in social activities, who extend their operations in many directions. Thus society — the social body, the social complex — grows by adding new forms and new functions, and also by the development of each special organ. Take, for instance, the service of exchange. How weak and imperfect it was at first, but now in its developed state it represents a large and powerful machine. Or consider, as an example of regulation, that the popular assembly was once a very weak body with few advisory powers, having rather a right of sanction to what had been done without power to change. Its power increased until in such countries as England and the United States the popular assembly is the most important legislative body.

Changes from Homogeneity to Heterogeneity. — This social differentiation gradually changes society from a homogeneous

[7] See Chap. XXIX.

body to a heterogeneous body, from a simple to a complex state, from an indefinite to a definite relationship. These are the essential characteristics of social evolution. The more carefully the functions of the various constituent groups are defined, and the more exact are their operations, the more perfect is the coöperation between these groups and the greater the social unity. Hence, as there is apparently no limit to this differentiation, society may be said never to be completed. It is enough to determine whether a society has a healthy growth and whether, as compared with other societies, it is making progress along the lines mentioned, viz., perfecting its functions and increasing their number. The test of completeness of social organization is the degree to which it promotes the welfare of the individual.

Each individual may fill many offices and may be a part of many organs, owing to the psychological nature of society. Thus, a very common citizen may be a member of the legislature (regulating), a member of the church (cultural), president of a bank (exchange), a member of a gas company (producing), a member of the board of regents of a state university (regulative), a member of an insurance company (protective), and a member of a lodge (protective), and thus he may be organized many times over because of the power to adapt the body and the mind to different services in the social organization.

The individual occupies a peculiar position in relation to the social body.[8] He is a part of the organism, but as soon as he dies another takes his place, or, to speak more definitely, performs the service to society which he has given up. Thus society represents a stream of individuals passing through life and out of it, pushing and crowding, coöperating with others for common ends, then departing and being replaced by others.

The Relation of the Individual to the Group. — This serves to explain the peculiar nature of society. In the biological organism each separate bioplast working in the cell builds up one part of the structure in its own locality, but does no more. The particles of the body may die, and be eliminated, and so may the bioplasts, but others take their places and the body is kept in form. But the

[8] See Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 169.

individual in society is not thus circumscribed as to his activity, hence he may form a part of many social groups. The analysis of society, then, shows that the individuals that compose it may pass from one organ to another on account of the numerous distinct services they may perform. Likewise, the social organization composed of a group of individuals may perform various distinct social services. Such facts as these make it evident that the organic conception of society is but an analogy, albeit a helpful one, especially for beginners in sociology. One must never forget, however, that the analogy between a biological organism and a social group is very imperfect and that society is primarily a psychical organization.

The Primary Groups. — As Cooley has pointed out, there are three groupings of people, whether in primitive or in modern societies, which have primary importance in socializing the individual. The first of these both in time and importance is the family. Durkheim has called the primitive family the "social protoplasm." [9] In it is to be found that primordial organization in which face-to-face contacts bring to bear the soeial pressures which mold the individual into a member of the society. Another is the play group of children. Here again face-to-face contact in unique fashion impresses upon the different individuals in the group the ideals and customs which make for organized social life. The third grouping of primary importance in the fashioning of individuals for social organization is the neighborhood meeting of the adults in personal contacts. Here intimate association molds the diverse individualities in the group into a social whole, or breaks them into separate groups on the basis of discovered differences — differences which would not have been found out except on the basis of close association.

The secondary groups are those which influence the individuals in less intimate ways. The members of a far-flung church, of a national labor organization, of a scientific society, the readers of a publication, and many other groups the members of which are influenced by other members of the group but not in such close and personal contact are illustrations.

[9] See Ward, *Pure Sociology*, New York, 1907, pp. 186, 199, 200.

Through these various groupings into which people fall, men are socialized, the diverse purposes of the individuals are realized, and the various organized ways of trying out social experiments in the life of a tribe or nation are brought to trial.

In early societies one sees the beginnings of our later differentiation in secret societies, in religious and play groups, in military groups, and even in the small groups based upon sex so well described by Jenks in his *The Bontoc Igorot* and by Webster in his book on *Primitive Secret Societies*.[10] In more developed societies the same thing is seen in the combination of men according to social, business, and political ties. Around all these and many other interests grow up a long line of other special social groups.

Social Relationships. — Neither individuals nor groups make up a society, however, if they are in isolation. To have society, social relationships are necessary. Individuals must be bound to each other in some sort of relations both mutual and friendly. Two people gripping each other in a death struggle for each other's life could not be described as a social group; nor could the mere fact that any number of people are grouped together give a basis for the assertion that here we have a society. However much internal dissension there may be, the predominant relations between the individuals and the small groups and cliques gathered together must be coöperative, in short, they must be social relations. The ties by which the various organs of an individual, or even the various parts of his brain, are connected are physical — nerve cells. In social relationships, however, in those attenuated, spiritual, but none the less real bonds by which individuals are held together in "the social body," there is almost no physical basis of interrelation — at least, the physical is reduced to a minimum. Language, glances of the eye, worked up into the complex products called traditions, customs, codes, institutions, fashions, ceremonies, play, and constitutions, are the means by which this interchange of mental stimulation takes place and by which individuals are bound together into a living whole. True, there are physical means of communication. By touch, by the glance of the eye,

[10] Jenks, *The Bontoc Igorot*, pp. 50, 53. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, pp. 1–19.

by gesture, and by language transmitted by word of mouth, by writing or by electrical means, the feelings, thoughts, and wishes of the one are conveyed to others. However, the intercommunication and the consequent forming of relationships are no less real than if the means of intercommunication were more material in their nature. Moreover, the existence of a social body, that is, of a number of people held together in relations of coördination and direct or indirect coöperation for certain definite ends, is just as real as the existence of a man's physical body. The main point to be held in mind to prevent confusion of thought is that the relationships which hold the individuals of a social group together are predominantly psychic in nature rather than physical or chemical or biological.[11] On the other hand, in a study of social organization it must be remembered that we are concerned both with the relationships which bind men together and the forms which the social organization may take.

Social Institutions. — Social relationships express themselves in what we call social institutions. The term " institutions " is but a name for certain ways in which social relationships bind men together. We see men acting in certain ways and from certain motives under the influence of definite forces. They are connected with each other in various relations. We say when they associate together in a certain way that we have one kind of social structure, and when they unite together in another way and from different motives, we call their social relationships by another name. What we really see is human beings associating together in various ways, acting under common influences, moved by similar motives. Only in our thought do we see a social institution. It is a concept of relationships.

These social structures assume various shapes. Again we use a term to express an immaterial relationship. They are forms only in our thought. We could call them " kinds " or " types " of structure. They are subordinate divisions of institutions, such as types of family or forms of property.

Types of Social Organization. — The classification of the types of society given in Chapter I, based on the dominant characteris-

[11] Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 140–142.

tics of different kinds of group association indicates a variety of social organization. The classification of organization types is rendered difficult because of the variation of objectives and of the means of reaching them. First under consideration are the universal and constant purposes of organization based upon general human nature and the primary objects of association. The impulse for food, safety, and the perpetuation of the species soon passes from the individual attitude to the group effort and organization becomes necessary to protect the individual and then the group for the sake of the individual and the survival of the group as such. So far the objectives or purposes of organization are the same for all societies. The second grouping of organizations, while it includes general objectives, is based on the variation from the general norm. A society with a dominant character brought about by its mores, customs and institutions, and special environmental conditions, organizes to secure for its own people certain objectives suggested by its own life situation. As societies differ as to the character of the problems they face so do the types of the organizations they devise to solve the problems. Thus, polyandry grows up in a country so poor in natural resources that each man cannot afford to have his own individual wife; polygamy in a society in which a numerous progeny is desirable for war, for work, or for prestige.

Numerous attempts have been made to classify the types of social organizations. Thus Spencer in his *Principles of Sociology* gives much space to study of social structure under the title of "Institutions." He has a classification of what he calls social types and constitutions. It is a double classification. He classifies societies as simple, compound, doubly compound, and trebly compound. Secondarily he classifies societies as militant or industrial, etc., according to their predominant activity. This attempt at classification would seem to indicate that, owing to the number of variables and their over-lapping in different societies no scientific classification is possible. Yet the attempt is valuable in pointing out the variations in social structures. Another classification has been proposed between sanctioned and unsanctioned forms or organization. As the terms used to deter-

mine the classification are relative and indefinable owing to the variations of group activities the classification as such is insufficient because the unsanctioned social order might include two distinctively different types such as those that promote social welfare and those that are antisocial in their character.

Professor Giddings suggests several classifications. One of these is based on the different forms of component and constituent societies which we have already noticed. Another is based on psychological methods of association under categories "of presence" and "in activity"; and still another on the differences of instinctive and rational societies. (See Chap. I.) Ross has suggested a classification of associational forms naming them in the order of predominating mental characteristics. In this he recognized the relative difference of those governed by impulse and feeling and those governed by deliberative action. Here is a clear distinction between the unorganized mob and the self-controlled mass meeting, and between the latter and the deliberative assembly. Also he indicates the motives of the organization governed by tradition, law, and dogmatic authority. The merit of this classification is that it is psychological following the order of genetic development of mental characteristics. It is sociological by reason of its classification according to increasing social efficiency of organization.

The difficulty of classification of forms of social organization is especially emphasized in the above outlines. Not one of these attempts is satisfactory even to the writer that proposes it. All are more or less artificial and unconventional. Their chief value is in showing the complexity of social organization, and the confusion arising in attempting to separate types of societies from types of organization. They may suggest to the investigator, that in the study of social organization a comparison of types of social organization as found in primitive societies and in civilized societies may be more fruitful than any attempt to fit them into any preconceived evolutionary scheme. About all we can say up to the present time is that social organization is the result of the reaction of a group to a given life situation in the attempt to adjust the group attitude to a problem to be solved. The problem may be

that of settling differences between individuals or between groups, or between the group and its physical environment. So far as we can see at present about the only other generalization we can make as to the development of social organization is that in primitive societies there was a maximum of hit-and-miss guess work as to what method of organization to meet a given situation was best, while in modern societies with an increase of knowledge there is a slightly greater tendency to devise organization to solve a certain problem in the light of experience as to the comparative value of different methods. However, it is a question whether modern society outside of a few fields, such as business, where there were no hard and fast customs which fit the situation created by the industrial revolution, really is more rational than primitive societies. The folkways and mores created the first institutions, and gave form to social organization. They still are very powerful in many fields of social organization. Witness the difficulty of getting new institutions, like a rational criminal procedure, or probation for offenders, established in our social organization. How hard it is in countries where prisons of a certain type have become established to introduce a different type. New experiments in prison affairs seemingly have to begin where there are no precedents — no "cake of custom." Increased knowledge, new specialized objectives, consequent changing attitudes of mind, all tend to make new forms of social organization and new methods of control.

READING ASSIGNMENTS

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LYND, ROBERT S. and HELEN M. *Middletown.*
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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. How does a social structure differ from a biological structure? Give an example of each.

2. What is the difference between an aggregation of human beings and a society? Give examples.

3. Supposing that the people settled along the Atlantic coast before the American Revolution could be described as an aggregation and the same people fifty years later an integrated society, what was the essential difference?

4. Trace the development of social structures in your own community from the days when a people was settled there with a tribal organization to the present, naming all the changes which have taken place both in number and kinds of structure.

5. Illustrate what is meant by the process of integration in social matters.

6. Describe the social composition of the people in your town.

7. Describe the social constitution of the population in your village, block, or township.

8. Take the following groups and carefully analyze the social interests and influences which cause the individual members of them to enter into social relationships: a picnic party, a debating society, a church, a bank corporation.

9. Make a list of the names of the social structures represented in your own community and classify according to a suitable and, if necessary, an original scheme.

CHAPTER X

GENESIS AND LIFE OF THE FAMILY

The Family as a Social Unit. — The family frequently has been called a social unit because it is the smallest organized group of individuals and because it is the most constant factor among varying social organizations. It is an essential part of modern social life. In it the elements of the larger social life occur during the history of society in such unique measure as to make it *par excellence* the means of training for social order.

Up to a very recent period everywhere, and even yet where the industrial revolution has not come with the introduction of machine industry, the family was producer of wealth, to a degree also the distributing center for the goods made in the home, and in turn was the chief social agency concerned with the consumption of goods. The rights of property and person are learned and practiced in the family. Self-restraint, obedience, and service are taught, and each member knows by experience his relation to others and recognizes duties to be fulfilled and rights to be enjoyed. In the family, religion, morality, and general culture make their earliest and most lasting impressions. It matters not what form of general social order prevails, whether it be the loosely bound horde, the definitely organized patriarchal group, or the civil state, the family is a constant center from which issue influences tending at once to stimulate and to perpetuate social order.

The Primitive Family. — It is difficult to determine the beginnings of the family. So far as historical records are concerned, it has always existed in some form. Moreover, among the lowest types of human beings and also among the higher apes, family relationships exist. Doubtless natural selection secured a more or less definite form of family life among some birds and among

the higher mammals.[1] In the lower stages of social development the survival value of the coöperation of both parents in the rearing of the young insured its establishment and continuance.

Probably, like all other social institutions, it has had a slow and irregular development. The natural hypothesis for the earliest relation of the sexes is a state of promiscuity. Yet there are no living tribes in which a complete state of promiscuity actually exists nor is there any historical record of such a state.[2] In the tribes that approach most nearly to this state, pairing for indefinite periods occurs. Under such circumstances family organization lacks permanency, and family relationships are indefinite. Among all tribes there are occasions when the regularity of sexual relations in the family is disturbed. It seems, however, that such irregularity may have come about in the transition from an instinctive control of sex relations to control by the developing reason of man. Without a broad basis of human experience it is not surprising if the strong passions of primitive man without the steadying control of the inhibitory instincts of animals sometimes led to practices which we now see to have been socially injurious.[3]

As the rearing of children is the central function of family life, the form of family organization has always been modified to suit the conditions of ordered life. Hence, in the development of human society a great variety of matrimonial institutions has appeared and we observe that the modern monogamic family with its established home relations is a result of an evolution. So important for social development are the changes in family life that some have estimated the progress of civilization by its development.

The Metronymic Family. — Two chief systems of tracing descent are found in the history of society. They are the metronymic and the patronymic. In the former, descent is traced through mothers; in the latter, descent is traeed through fathers. Until the appearance of Bachofen's great work, *Das Mutterrecht*, in 1861, it was generally held that the patriarchal form familiar to us in

[1] Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*, Chap. XIX.
[2] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Secs. 291–296.
[3] For detailed discussion of this point with many illustrations from tribal peoples see Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, Vol. I, Chap. IV.

the Biblical records and in the classic literature of antiquity was the original form of family. He found evidence, as he thought, of an early period in human society when women rather than men dominated the family. His researches were supplemented by McLennan in 1876 and by Morgan in 1877. The latter based his conclusions upon an extensive study of the American Indian tribes. McLennan and Morgan, however, were not interested so much as Bachofen in proving the existence of a matriarchate, — the dominance of the mother. But all the evidence they found pointed toward metronymy, or tracing descent through the mother, — quite a different thing from the matriarchate. Scholars generally agree now that the terms " matriarchate " and " patriarchate " are not of importance. Not the system of control, but the system of tracing descent matters. Hence, rather than the term " matriarchate " for this state of family life the term " metronymic," or maternal, family is preferred. In this form of family a child does not belong to the kindred of his father as in our patronymic form of the family, but to the kindred of his mother. On the other hand, control of the family rests not with the mother, but with the mother's male kindred, although the women exercise much greater influence in the affairs of the group than under the patriarchal form of family.

The Patronymic Family. — The patronymic form of family, on the other hand, is characterized by tracing the descent of children through the father and following the kindred of the father. This type of family developed the patriarchate or rule of the family by the father. It is illustrated in the classic family of antiquity and the family among the early Hebrews. This type of family will be illustrated more fully in another section.

Genesis of These Forms of the Family. — The condition which gave rise to a metronymic form of family probably was not promiscuous sex relations among primitive peoples, as Morgan tried to show, but the fact that maternity was much more easily recognized than paternity.[4] Moreover, the attachment of the child to the mother during infancy made the tracing of relationships through the mother a most natural procedure. In addition to

[4] Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 150.

this was the fact that in all metronymic families the husband and father left his own kindred and went to live with his wife. She remained with her kindred. Where mates were selected from outside the kindred, the husbands, of course, were not of the same kin as the group into which they went. Many times, perhaps no two of the husbands of the women in that group were akin. Hence, in times when the social bond was kinship, control over the children naturally remained with the group in which they were born. Even more natural was it that they should be held to be akin to that group.

Once established, the practice of tracing kinship through the mother continued long after the fact of paternity was recognized. In fact, to break down the metronymic system it was necessary that new and powerful motives should operate.

The development of a pastoral mode of life was an important economic influence in bringing about this change. To follow the flock the family had to separate from other groups. Moreover, the labor of as many as possible was desirable to look after the herds. The man was not obliged to be absent so long from the home. Regularity of relations took the place of the irregularity entailed by a hunting economy. The wife was no longer indispensable as family provider because of the more dependable source of food in the flock. Moreover, the labor of sons in tending the flock became more valuable.

War was another influence which broke down the metronymic family. Women were captured in war and of course were then under the control of their husbands. In fact, being spoils of war, they were now personal property. Children born to them were also the property of the captor. A modification of this plan is to be found in wife purchase. Similar results in relationships, however, were reached as in wife capture.

The dominance of the male once established, religion entered in as a mighty force to uphold it. The worship of ancestors was probably not unknown in the metronymic family. This is suggested by the worship of female divinities. In the patronymic family, however, ancestor worship gathered into a focus of mighty power all the potentialities of male self-aggrandizement. It

debased woman, and gave rein to all the aggressive propensities of the male. Sons had been desired from the economic point of view as workers and to feed the flock; from the social point of view, they were valuable as fighters; now they were desired intensely in order to carry on the worship of the ancestral spirits. The woman was accursed who did not bear sons. She was not only useless to the group, but was hated by the gods. Barrenness was the greatest curse that could befall a woman. Only less terrible was her fate who bore in her sorrow only females. The unchaste wife was not only a criminal in the eyes of the family and the group, but was a sinner in the sight of the gods. While ancestor worship survived, death was the only possible fate of the adulteress. One great thing it accomplished, however, albeit at great cost, — it established female wedded chastity.

The Early Forms of Marriage. — Family life existed before marriage ceremonies. Family life man has in common with the brutes. Marriage is a social institution strictly limited to human kind. It has been doubted whether certain tribes possess any positive marriage ceremonies; yet it is certain that among many of the lower tribes existing now, society tacitly approves very simple ceremonies, and every society thus far studied, however low in culture, regulates the family relationships. Marriage begins when a more or less formal assent must be secured by the groups most intimately concerned, as, for example, the families of the two persons concerned.

How marriage sprang up out of a situation in which man and woman cohabited as they pleased can only be conjectured. Did the habit of society interfering with one of the most powerful instincts grow up by reason of the fact that sons and daughters were looked upon as possessions which could not be taken away without consent? Or did it originate with the strong man imposing his dominating habit as a general law for all men of his tribe in their dealings with women? Or, was it the fruit of male jealousy? Or, again, did it arise, as Ward suggested, "to prevent incessant strife among men for the possession and retention of women" — the conscious necessity of intertribal peace for social survival — after man had become conscious of the need of

a more permanent and satisfactory form than ephemeral marriage? [5]

Certain authors, like McLennan, have attempted to show the evolution of marriage from a state of promiscuity to the modern monogamic marriage. While such a regular order of development cannot be established, yet all the forms of marriage from temporary pairing to monogamy have been found frequently co-existing in human society. Many of the lower tribes living to-day have very curious family relationships and forms of marriage entirely different from our own, yet it is difficult to assume that all mankind has passed regularly through all these forms of marriage as Spencer seemed to assume in his *Principles of Sociology*. However, if we examine primitive society, we shall find instances of marriage with very little ceremony and, in some cases, a condition approaching promiscuity. At least societies are found where people on occasion mingle rather freely though not without social regulation of their relations. On the other hand, among some of the groups of human beings lowest in the scale of culture, we find arrangements for the care of the child by the group.[6] There are other evidences of the union of a pair for a given time, until the child is weaned or until he reaches the age of independence of his mother. Another type of marriage permits the man to live with the woman at his convenience, giving him the right to choose a new mate whenever he pleases. Often, however, this right is subject to rather strict limitations by the wife's relatives.[7] Also polygyny and polyandry have been practiced by many tribes or nations often contemporaneously with monogamy. Under certain customs men had the right of choosing more than one wife; under others women had more than one husband. In some instances a group of brothers married a group of sisters. Then in the process of development the system of concubinage sprang up. Natural selection and the growth of ethical sentiments have finally sanctioned the marriage of one man to one woman for life, — a form of marriage which we find persisting along with the others from

[5] Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 617.

[6] Howard, review of Malinowski, "The Family among the Australian Aborigines," in *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1914, pp. 670, 671.

[7] Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 443–447.

first to last. While it may not be possible to show that all humanity passed regularly through these various stages of matrimonial life, still it is true that the modern home life has been the result of an evolution, and that there is a wide difference between primitive and modern marriage.[8]

We may thus summarize the various forms of marriage: *A pairing arrangement* of short duration is perhaps the simplest form of family relationships. Such an arrangement is to be found among the Mincopis of the Andaman Islands. The father remains with the mother until the child is weaned. Relations lasting somewhat longer, but still temporary, have been observed among the Australian Aborigines, some of the Indians of Brazil, and the natives of northern Greenland.[9]

Group marriage of a rather peculiar kind has been reported from the Hawaiian Islands. When first discovered by Captain Cook there were found there families made up of a group of brothers married to a group of sisters. Each man was the husband of every woman and each woman was the wife of every man in the family. A similar situation seems to exist among the Todas of India to-day.[10]

Polyandry, or the family relation in which one woman has more than one husband, has been described most carefully by travelers in Thibet and a section of India. In these two places two distinct types of polyandry have been observed, one in which the husbands are brothers, the other in which the men are unrelated. One or other of these forms with many variations has been observed elsewhere. Giddings has collected testimony showing a similar state of things in Ceylon, although much intermixed with the Thibetan form of polyandry and with polygyny.[11]

Polygyny is a better name than polygamy for that form of the family in which one man has several wives. Polygyny means many wives, while polygamy means many marriages. Polygyny is a term used in contrast with polyandry. In polygyny

[8] Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, Chaps. I–II. Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*, Vol. I, Chaps. I–III.

[9] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 155, and authorities cited there.

[10] Giddings, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

[11] *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 443–445.

sometimes the wives are of equal rank; often, however, there is one principal wife and several subordinate wives known as concubines.

Monogamy is the term used to designate that form of family life in which one man and one woman form family relations for life, or until separated by social sanctions. This form has tended to displace the other forms in societies advanced in culture and capable of conscious consideration of the effects of the various forms of family relationships as well as in the less developed societies where economic conditions have made it impossible for a man to support more than one wife.

While for purposes of clearness we have set forth these various types of family as isolated phenomena, in actual life they generally exist side by side. Thus, polyandry often is found in bleak and inhospitable regions where men have difficulty in supporting each a family and where the economic conditions have made women of small economic value so that female infants are often killed. Sometimes, however, it probably arose from religious motives. Side by side with it often exist polygyny and monogamy, as in Ceylon, and even in Thibet. Polygyny also is never the only form in any society. It would be impossible to have it universal since the world over, so far as we know, more males are born than females. Usually the rich practice it while the poor are monogamous or polyandrous.

Conditions of Primitive Family Life. — In primitive society the food supply was limited and the protection against the climate through clothing and houses was meager, and only a few primitive industries were carried on by hand. Machinery and power derived from the forces of nature were not developed. The political organization was not well developed. Even where the beginnings of social order appeared, there were no politics and no state as we know them to-day. Religion, in many instances, was an unorganized superstition without an ethical element. The form of family under such circumstances was conditioned by its adaptation to promote survival, by economic conditions and by tradition and custom. Its sanctions were either instinctive, superstitious, or economic.

The Monogamic Family. — The evidence shows that monogamy exists among all races and peoples of every stage of culture. The monogamic family has always been one of the cherished institutions. It has been complicated, however, by concubinage, either with or without social approval. The home life consequent upon the union of one pair for life exercised a salutary influence on the development of the character of civilized people. The little family group among the Aryans and Semites, for example, had its own religious life, its own social advantages, giving protection and care to the young and old alike. The family group was enlarged both by natural increase and by adoption. There was a tendency for grown-up children to remain within the family circle. Hence, this ancient organization represented a large group of relatives compactly organized, and handing down the patterns of life approved by the group.

The Patriarchal Family. — A peculiar form of the ancient family has become known as the patriarchal. It appears characteristic of many peoples but is most familiar to us among the Semites and Aryans. It represents the leadership of the eldest male member of the group. He was at the head of the family or group of families representing all the relatives by blood, marriage, or adoption. Holding it in trust, he virtually owned all the property of the whole family of which he was the supreme ruler. In some societies he had the power of life or death over each member. In others, even in primitive societies, among the Australian Aborigines, for example, as Malinowski points out, it is limited by the blood vengeance of the woman's relatives.[12] He was priest, judge, king, military leader, lawmaker, and chief executive of all social affairs. This family was not ruled by law or decree so much as by custom. Each member was born under status, not under law. Indeed, the patriarchal leader himself was bound by the customs of his fathers. Yet essentially there must have been a slow development of customs. Law and the state and positive institutions never have risen, except after migration and war have brought diverse peoples into close contact when

[12] Howard in review of Malinowski, "The Family among the Australian Aborigines," in *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1914, p. 671.

relationships had to be regulated not by custom but by new arrangements.

The Influence of Religion on Family Life.[13] — So close was the relation of religion to early family life that some authors have made it the foundation of the family. They are wrong, for the family rests primarily upon a biological rather than a religious basis. Yet in each stage of social evolution religion has strengthened the ties of the family and added to its power. In the development of matrimonial institutions religion has exercised an important influence. This is most clearly observed in the patriarchal family. Among the Aryan people we find an especially good illustration of the effect of ancestor worship. It tended to strengthen kinship, to give it unity, dignity, and power. Each family group had its private family altar and family worship, to which no stranger could be admitted. Each family group worshiped its patronym or hero, the eldest male member, the founder of the race. Libations were poured to his departed spirit, and prayers were uttered in his name. This custom established the unity of the family groups and developed their power to resist enemies in the struggle for existence.

Association, too, came to be limited by religion. Those without the religious pale were considered unworthy of association, much less of close union. This was an incident of the integration of the family life. Intensity of feeling and narrowness often go together. Thus the Hebrew scorned the Gentile; the Greek and the Roman, the barbarian; the patrician, the plebeian. The religious life, especially after tribal organization had been well developed, had much to do with the development of separate racial characteristics. It aided in the process of group unification. It made more apparent similarity within the group by making more apparent the difference between members of the group and those outside it. In the period when kinship was giving way to mental and moral likeness as the social bond, religion came to be the chief maker of groups.[14]

[13] See Chap. XVI.

[14] For a concrete illustration of the operation of this principle in a group, see Gillin, *The Dunkers, A Sociological Interpretation*, pp. 107, 108, 151, 152.

The Psychical Influences in Family Organization. — The development of the sentiment of love within the family has had enormous consequences in the creation and preservation of social order. The propagation of the race has become the foundation of all the finer sentiments of human affection; the home and the family have fostered and developed love in the human race. While it cannot be said that the family and the home are the only bases for altruistic sentiments and coöperation, the highest developments of altruism have owed more to the family and the home than to any other influence. Remove the sentiments arising out of this idea and the fabric of society would not stand the strain of the savage instincts of mankind. The family relationships have brought to their present development the harmony of feeling, thought, and will which enables people to associate for innumerable purposes. The art of living together profitably and harmoniously has its foundation in the love sentiment brought about by family unity.[15]

The Economic Basis of Family Life. — As already observed, the family represents an early producing unit of society. In the definitely organized families of ancient times the product of the chase and the spontaneous products of the soil were brought to the homes to be held in common and to be distributed among the members of the household. Later, in the pastoral and agricultural periods, arose a family ownership of property. Lands, herds, and flocks belonged to the household, or expanded family. The house and all the more directly personal goods and chattels belonged to the small family group or else to the individual members of the group. In every instance the home became an economic center. Although the income of a modern family generally flows through an individual who is the head of the family, others working faithfully in the preservation of that which is acquired and in its proper use, the family is not so economically united as it once was. The economic unity of the family is well illustrated, too, in Colonial times in America, when the weaving, spinning, and the making of garments were performed in the home and when, indeed, nearly

[15] Drummond, *Ascent of Man*, Chaps. VII–IX. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 610–613.

all of the implements about the house and farm were of home manufacture. The early Colonial family showed to a large extent the character of the primitive home before division of labor and power of manufacture had come into use. But even to-day there are many articles of wealth produced every year in American homes. This is seldom reckoned in the estimate of the wealth-producing power of the community, although the product of home manufacture amounts to millions of dollars a year, not to mention the fact that in our present factory system usually most, if not all, the adult members of the family are at work and share in the production of the family income.

Economic Changes and Their Effects upon the Family. — The changes which have come into our economic life in the past fifty years have seriously affected family life. The increased earning capacity of women and the opportunities offered them to make their own living, by enabling them to be more independent, have impaired the old-time unity of the family group. Homes become places of domicile for individuals of the family, while each maintains his own share of the expenses and lives an independent economic life.

With the advent of factory life, however, and the consequent massing of laborers, the economic function of the home has become of steadily decreasing importance. Hence it has come to pass that millions of our women do their work outside the home. In mill, office, and shop they spend their days. Industry itself has well-nigh destroyed the economic basis of the home. It has made the woman who has remained in the home more dependent economically. Her services are narrowed to the biological function of bearing children and the social function of rearing them. If she leaves the house in order to contribute to the support of the family (fulfilling again her primordial economic duty), under the new conditions, her functions as bearer and rearer of children are sadly interfered with. Moreover, even as affecting the male members of the family, modern industry has had serious results upon the family and the home. Often it has taken the husband and father away so that he can no longer help to rear the family. He no longer as once is the important social factor in the family.

Once he worked in his shop in the home. There his children played, or, when old enough, worked with him. His presence was constantly a restraining and guiding influence. Now he works away from his home. Furthermore, the influence of the family and home upon the children has been much interfered with by the change from the domestic to the factory system of industry. Once the children contributed to the support of the family by working with their parents. Now, if they share in the economic burdens of the family, they must leave its fostering care. The home, after sixteen at latest, often becomes merely a boarding house. In 1920 in manufactures and mechanical pursuits alone, over 15 per cent of the wage earners of the United States were women over 10 years of age.[16] Of all persons engaged in gainful pursuits over 10 years of age in 1920, 20.4 per cent were women. In 1900 only 18.4 per cent of the women bread earners were engaged in work which took them out of their homes. 18.8 per cent of all the women of the United States in 1900 were engaged in gainful occupations other than agriculture. In the United States 21.1 per cent of the women 10 years of age and over were in gainful occupations in 1920. Illustrating the tendency of modern industry to take from the home the man as well as the woman, is the fact that in 1920 over 76 per cent of the males 10 years of age and over in the United States were engaged in occupations other than agriculture.

Effects of Other Social Changes upon the Home. — The school took out of the home for five days each week 64.3 per cent of the children between 5 and 20 years of age, in 1920.[17] Even play is often impossible in connection with the home in cities.

Moreover, the isolated family of former days has been undergoing serious changes in recent years. In 1890 in the United States 34.1 per cent of farm homes, 63.1 per cent of other homes, and 52.2 per cent of all homes were rented. In 1900 the percentages for each of these classes of homes were 35.6 per cent, 63.8 per cent, and 53.9 per cent. In 1910 the percentages showed that 37.2 per cent of farm homes, 61.6 per cent of other homes,

[16] *The World Almanac*, 1922, pp. 735, 736.
[17] *Fourteenth Census*, 1920, Vol. III, p. 15.

and 54.2 per cent of all homes were rented by the occupants, while in 1920 tenants held 38.1 per cent of the farms.[18] Thus, from 1890 to 1920 there was a steady increase in the number of rented farm homes. The increase in the number of other than farm homes which were rented went on from 1890 to 1900 but decreased in the decade between 1900 and 1910. The percentage of all homes in this country which are occupied by others than their owners has steadily risen. Increasingly we are losing that attachment to one spot which has helped to make the home a stable institution. Not only is there much truth in the maxim "three moves are as bad as a fire," but socially the constant moving which a rented house incurs is detrimental to family life. How much are the sentiments of loyalty to the home conneeted with constant attachment to one spot! Certainly, while mere physical contact with a pile of lumber or brick would not seem to engender the tender sentiments involved in love of home, yet in reality living in one spot, resulting in the sense of familiarity with a place, has something to do with the origin and strength of these sentiments. Pride of appearance, sense of ownership, and development of interest in family affairs have much better chance to develop when the family owns the home. Even more important are the results of frequent change of dwelling upon the friendships, which mean so much to developing children. While frequent moving necessitates the formation of new attachments, and so multiplies contacts with different personalities and enlarges social experience, it is a question whether such changes do not interfere with the production of a stable character.

This movement away from ownership of the home is especially remarkable in the large centers of population. In fifty cities of the United States in 1910 only one, Spokane, Washington, had less than half of its families living in rented houses. In thirty-nine of these cities fully three-fifths of the homes were rented, in sixteen of them more than three-fourths of the homes were rented. In New York City as a whole, nearly nine-tenths (88.3 per cent) of the homes were rented. In the Borough of Manhattan alone of

[18] *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 1910, Vol. I, p. 1295; *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 18.

that city, less than 3 per cent of the families owned their homes.[19] Practically the same situation prevailed in 1920.[20]

Liberalization of Thought and Its Effect upon Family Ideals. — Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that the tendency of the changes in the form of industry just discussed to bring about a change in the nature of the family has been supplemented by other influences. Once political opinions were formed in the home. Each man was of the same political party as his father. In America, however, during the last few years, there has grown up a spirit of independence in politics. The recent rise of the "mugwump," the "insurgent," and the "progressive" shows a growing independence in political opinion in our American life.

This same independence of thought about fundamentals has shown itself in religious matters. Within the past forty years there has taken place in the minds of religious people in the United States a "liberalization" of thought along theological lines which has manifested itself most markedly in the lessening of interdenominational strife and a growing tendency to emphasize common rather than mutually distinctive denominational doctrines. Yet, the individual freedom which made possible in this country such a number of religious sects as in no other country in the world has gone on multiplying sects in spite of the evident desire on the part of the older ones to get closer together. Both these tendencies have shown the freedom which has characterized our American life and thought. More than that, it is during the past forty years that the very foundations of belief have been put to question. There has occurred a veritable revolution in theological beliefs. The preaching of to-day is no more like that of a generation ago than the science of to-day is like that of the eighteenth century. Churches are revising their creeds, others, recognizing the far-reaching changes involved in the liberal tendency, are banning liberalism in theology. Individual judgment in religious matters has gone so far that many people think that the very foundations of faith are being undermined.

In the science also the most revolutionary changes have taken

[19] *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 1910, Vol. I, p. 1298.
[20] *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920, Vol. II, pp. 1284, 1288.

place in the past half century. Scarcely any opinion is held by scientists to-day which was the common teaching of science then. That is especially true of the biological sciences, but almost as true of the rest. Darwin gave an impetus to the scientific spirit which has not yet ended in its revolutionary results, but which already has swamped the old world of scientific notions. It has become the scientific attitude to treat with a critical spirit old theories as well as new ones. The critical spirit is the proper spirit of the scientific investigator. It is only by having an open mind that any progress is made in the discovery of new truth. During this time everything has been questioned. First it was " natural " science which fell under the light from the new point of view, and then every other phase of human life subject to investigation and speculation gradually fell under the spell of the spirit of doubt and inquiry. Once all was settled. Now much is still unsettled in spite of the work of more than fifty years.

Likewise, in education, great changes have come. Here, too, questions impossible a half century ago are being asked about our school system. The American school, for so many years the palladium of our liberties and the shibboleth of the orator, has fallen upon evil days. Once a sacred institution not to be questioned, but to be adored, now it is the football in the center of every educational scrimmage! Everywhere there is questioning and change in educational methods.

This same spirit is abroad in all spheres of life. Doubt of the old, and searchings for new foundations, are everywhere manifest. It has reached even the family. That institution which we once thought was created in the Garden of Eden is said by travelers to exist in quite different forms in other and more primitive countries. Careful study has made it probable that there have gradually developed various forms of the family. These have become known. It was easy to connect them with this questioning spirit of the age. These two influences, coupled with the change which has been going on in the economic basis of the family, and with the new freedom which has risen on the horizon of the weaker sex, have produced dire results for the sanctions of the family tie.

Furthermore, within the family itself, great changes have been

going on, as shown by the decreasing size of the family decade after decade. In all the United States the family has grown smaller and the number of persons for each dwelling less. The number of persons to a family in the three decades 1890 to 1920 decreased from 4.9 to 4.3, and from 1850 to 1920 from 5.6 to 4.3, while the number to a dwelling fell from 5.5 to 5.1. In certain parts of the country, especially in the large cities, however, the number per dwelling increased. For example, in New York City, Manhattan Borough, persons to a dwelling increased from 19.9 in 1890 to 30.2 in 1920,[21] pointing to an increase in the number of large apartment houses and to the presence of boarders. The isolated home in that city is fast losing ground. People are becoming cliff dwellers in tenement and apartment houses owned by others. And this is in New York City, where the presence of great numbers of the foreign born masks the prevailing tendency among American families. The number of members per family fell from 5.0 in 1880 to 4.3 in 1920.[22]

The Small or the Large Family. — From the standpoint of the family's welfare, there are two different and seemingly opposing sets of circumstances which should be faced. The smaller the size of the family, the better the care and the more money that can be spent on the children. That means better clothing, food, education carried further, and a better chance to get the higher-paid jobs. Moreover, it means better training in the home. The mother has more time and strength to lavish on each one. On the other hand, it is a question whether the child who is reared in the home with adults or with only one other child enjoys the same socializing influence which is the privilege of the child reared in a large family. The give and take of child democracy is often lacking in the small family. One has only to observe in rural

[21] *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 1910, Vol. I, p. 1289; *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920, Vol. II, pp. 1267, 1268.

[22] *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920, Vol. II, p. 1266. On the question of the reasons for the decrease of the size of the American family, see Commander, *The American Idea? passim.* A good brief survey of the facts concerning the decreasing size of the family in all civilized lands is to be found in Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, Boston and New York, 1912, Chap. V, "The Significance of a Falling Birth Rate." For a comprehensive discussion of the whole question with special reference to American conditions, see Ross, *Changing America*, Chaps. III–V; see also Ross, *Standing Room Only?* New York, 1927, Chaps. XIX–XXII.

districts the greater family affection manifested by the members of large families than that seen in families with few children. In this case, however, as in so many such, much depends on the conditions of life in the two kinds of families. Without a doubt, the child reared in the small needy family is better off than the children of a large family in similar circumstances. When they can all stay in the home, doubtless it is best for children to be reared in a large family. On the other hand, where there are so many that the older ones are driven to work in some shop or factory at the earliest possible age, huddled into small and ill-kept rooms called a home, forced to get their recreation and do their courting on the street, or at least outside the home, it is quite certain that the large family of children has no advantage over the only child.[23]

No doubt the present tendency towards small families has a direct connection with the changed attitude towards the home and especially towards the family. When there were available in the United States free farms, and where there was great need for men to people and subdue the wilderness, and either farming or the domestic system of manufacture was the method of making a living, a large family was an asset. Moreover, large families had the benefit of a religious sanction. "Children of the youth are a heritage from the Lord; Blessed is the man that hath his quiver full of them," was Scripture, and also good economics. Moreover, it accorded well with the habits of the European peasants who had peopled the Colonies. Without a doubt there has developed a conscious recognition of the economic and social advantages of the small family and deliberate limitation of the number of children by American families in the last half century.

The Marriage Rate and the Family. — In connection with the smaller number of children per family should be considered the striking fact that the marriage rate has increased in the United States in the last thirty years. In 1890 it was 316 per ten thousand of adult unmarried population and in 1900 it was 321. The United States did not stand alone in that tendency. It character-

[23] Breckenridge and Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home*, Chap. VII.

ized more than two-thirds of the leading countries of the world, according to statistics available in 1906.[24]

Various factors may contribute to the decrease in the size of the family. It may be due to the later age at which people marry, or to voluntary limitation of the family, or both. Or it may be due to increasing physiological inability to have children due to vice or other causes. Mayo-Smith gives some figures which seem to show that a thousand women of the age group from fifteen to twenty generally have more children than the same number from any other five-year period.[25] If, therefore, there are any customs which make for a later marriage by women, we should expect the number of children to become smaller per family. The reports of the last census, however, do not show any such postponement of marriage by the youth of the United States. Instead of that tendency, the figures show an increase from 1890 to 1920 in the proportion of married youths in the group from 15 to 19 years of age. A similar increase in percentage of married persons from 1890 to 1910 is to be seen in the age group, 20 to 24.[26] These facts directly contradict the assumption sometimes made in discussions on race suicide that the marriage rate has been decreasing in the United States.[27] On the contrary, in the fecund age classes at least, the marriage rate has been increasing. Therefore, the decrease in the size of the family must be due to other factors than postponement of marriage or cessation of marriage.

Decline in the Birth Rate. — The following table, however, shows unmistakably that from 1870 to 1920 there has been a relative decrease in the number of children in the United States.[28]

[24] *Marriage and Divorce*, Census Bulletin No. 96, 1908, p. 9. While the figures for the years previous to 1890 are not reliable, the census authorities computed on the basis of reports from those counties in which the returns were ostensibly complete, that the rate per 10,000 population in 1870 was 98, 91 in 1880, 91 in 1890, and 93 in 1900. In percentages the proportion of the population which had been married was 43.7 per cent in 1890, 44.8 per cent in 1900, and 47.1 per cent in 1910. *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 1910, Vol. I, p. 523.

[25] *Statistics and Sociology*, New York, 1904, p. 114.

[26] *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 1910, Vol. I, pp. 514, 515; *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920, Vol. II, pp. 394, 395.

[27] Emeriek, "A Negleeted Faetor in Race Suicide," in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XXV, pp. 638–655.

[28] Compiled from the *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 1910, Vol. I, p. 301; *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920, Vol. III, p. 16.

Age Period	Population						
	1920	1910	1900	1890	1880	1870	
Under 5 years	10.9	11.6	12.1	12.2	13.8	14.3	Percentage of total population
5 to 14 years	20.9	20.5	22.3	23.3	24.3	24.9	

The following table shows that the increasing limitation of number of children per family has characterized the urban to a greater extent than the rural population, although the tendency is clearly evident in both.[29]

Cities under 25,000 and Rural Districts

Percentage of Total Population

	1920	1910	1900	1890
Under 5 years	12.3	12.4	12.6	12.6
5 to 14 years	23.9	22.1	23.4	24.5
Cities of 25,000 to 100,000				
Under 5 years	9.3	9.7	10.0	10.2
5 to 14 years	16.8 [30]	17.1	18.8	19.4
Cities of 100,000 and Over				
Under 5 years		9.7	10.6	10.9
5 to 14 years		16.9	19.2	19.0

These figures make it probable that social factors rather than physiological have played the important part in the reduction of the birth rate. It is impossible to say what part of the lessened birth rate may be due to vice or a weakened stock. All sorts of

[29] *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, Vol. I, p. 432. In considering these figures one must not forget the large cities are the centers to which come the most of the immigrants, chiefly adults, whose large numbers would tend to lessen the percentage of children in those cities, nor, on the other hand, that the immigrant families are the most fecund in our population.

[30] The figures for 1920 in all these tables are taken from the *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920, Vol. III, p. 16. In this Census the urban population is not divided between cities of 2500 to 100,000 and cities of 100,000 and over, as in the 1910 census.

assumptions have been made, but so far we have no figures on which to base any very safe conclusions. It is said, for example, that 75 per cent of the special surgical operations on women and 80 per cent of all deaths due to inflammatory diseases peculiar to women are due to the results of venereal infection.[31] Dr. Prince A. Morrow estimates that 50 per cent of the women infected with venereal diseases are rendered sterile, and believes that a large proportion of the sterile marriages are such not from choice, but from incapacity. It has been argued, therefore, that the lessened fecundity of women is due to inability to bear children. Interesting though these suggestions are, there have been no careful investigations which enable us to be certain of the part which these physiological influences have had.[32]

Moreover, the question of the effect of certain poisons on the vigor of the children born of parents addicted to their use is unsettled. There is a general belief, however, held by many medical men that such poisons do tend to cause weakness of the offspring, if not sterility of the parents. These beliefs are based for the most part upon experiments on animals. Dr. Hodge found that cocker spaniels given a certain amount of alcohol each day showed a greater tendency to have deformed or weak progeny than a pair to which no alcohol was given. Out of 23 puppies born to the alcoholic pair, only 17.4 per cent were viable, while out of 45 puppies born to the non-alcoholic pair, 90.2 per cent were viable. Moreover, of the 23 puppies of the alcoholic pair, 8 were born deformed and 9 were born dead, while of the 45 non-alcoholic dogs only 4 were deformed and none were born dead. In connection with the published results of these experiments, Dr. Hodge published the results of an investigation by Demme on alcoholic and non-alcoholic families, showing similar results on human progeny.[33]

Certainly the experiment on the dogs under strict scientific control is significant. One cannot be so sure with reference to the families reported on by Demme. It must be added, moreover,

[31] Dr. Prince A. Morrow, "Social Diseases and the Family," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. III, p. 50.

[32] See Ross, "Western Civilization and the Birth Rate," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, pp. 607–617. Ely, *Evolution of Industrial Society*, pp. 164–168.

[33] Billings, *Physiological Aspects of the Liquor Problem*, Vol. I, pp. 373, 374.

that some recent investigations by Pearson and his students and assistants at the Galton Laboratory at the University of London have not shown any positive relationship between alcoholism and weakness in the children.[34]

Much more important, however, from some points of view, are the social influences which play upon woman to reduce her effective fecundity. By that term is meant her ability, not only to bring children into the world, but to give them that measure of vitality and care which will enable them to reach maturity. It is certain that the occupation of women in factories, especially married women, results in great infant mortality, and thus reduces their effective fecundity. A birth rate is of no consequence in the discussion of this matter. The important thing is not the number born, but the number reared to maturity. That is why the figures last given are of more importance than birth rates. Several studies have recently been reported bearing upon this problem. Dr. Rosalie S. Morton of New York City made an investigation in that city of the effect of work in stores, shops, and factories upon the health of women. She came to the conclusion on the basis of that investigation and of other investigations which she reviewed in her paper that " women may work in practically any field of modern industry, and not only retain but increase their standard of health. But they must be given hygienic and properly arranged buildings in which to work, and they and their employers taught the common sense of the laws of health." [35] Dr. George Reid, the county medical officer, Staffordshire, England, in reporting an investigation in six pottery towns in that county, showed that the deaths of children under one year of age born to " home mothers " was 146 per 1000 births, while of those born to mothers working in factories or away from home during the day the rate rose to 209. He also found that women working in lead works showed a much greater tendency to miscarriages and stillbirths.[36] Dr. John Robertson, health officer of Birmingham, England, in

[34] Elderton, *A First Study of the Influence of Parental Alcoholism on the Physique and Ability of the Offspring*, Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs, University of London.

[35] *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Washington, 1913, Vol. III, p. 941.

[36] *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Vol. III, pp. 945, 946.

an inquiry covering the women in one of the poorest sections of Birmingham, where the population was of very much the same status economically and socially and where just half the married women of child-bearing age worked outside the home, found that 52 per thousand of the women employed before confinement gave birth to children prematurely, in comparison with 38 per thousand of those who were not thus employed. Yet the mortality of infants of employed mothers was less than that of those who were not employed. Bad conditions of the infants a year old occurred in the proportion, however, of 57 in the case of the children of employed mothers to 63 among the children of unemployed mothers. He came to the conclusion, nevertheless, that unfavorable conditions growing out of poverty in the family were much more inimical to the welfare of the children of these people in that part of Birmingham than employment outside the home.[37] In America an investigation at Fall River, Massachusetts, showed that the proportion of deaths of the infants of working mothers in that city from diarrhea, enteritis, and gastritis — the diseases which caused more than two-thirds of the deaths — was over 80 per cent in excess of that of infants whose mothers remained at home.[38] Moreover, those homes where the women do not work are better kept, the men are more sober — though that may mean either that the men are sober on account of the good home, or that women of intemperate husbands work in order to eke out a living for the family — and the children are better cared for, are healthier, and the family ties are stronger.[39] Several recent studies by the United States Federal Children's Bureau have shown the high infant mortality rate when the mother is employed especially outside her home. In all these cases, however, the correlation of high infant death rate with employment of the mother is uncertain because in most cases when the mother works it means that the income of the father is insufficient to support

[37] *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Vol. III, pp. 949, 950.

[38] *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Vol. III, p. 336.

[39] *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Vol. III, p. 952. Cadbury, *et al.*, *Women's Work and Wages*, Chap. VIII. Breckenridge and Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home*, p. 96.

the family without her help; hence, the cause may be poverty in the home instead of the mother's employment. In any case the facts show that inadequate income reduced the effective fecundity of wives.[40]

It must not be forgotten, however, that the home from which the mother goes out to work does not stand alone in this story of family disorganization. Studies have been made which show that the comfortable home, with a mother who is not employed outside, furnished its quota of derelicts.[41] The spoiled child is to be found in such homes. Such homes are the fruits of the modern questioning of all things old already discussed. Even reverence for parents has not escaped question and as a result respect and reverence have given way to a rank individualism which has undermined the family at its very foundations.

Education of Women and the Size of the Family. — Several studies have been made which purport to prove that the education of women has had a very serious influence on the decrease of the birth rate among such women. It has been shown, however, that the real state of affairs is not that the natural fecundity of college women is less than that of women in the same social class who have not gone through college, but that fewer of the college women marry and so the average number of children for college women is unusually low. In fact, college women who marry seem to be as fecund as other women who have not had a college education.[42]

When all these things are said, however, there yet remains the most important consideration of all. The causes of the declining birth rate in this country and throughout the western world are twofold. People limit the birth rate voluntarily either because they do not want children or because they think they cannot afford to have them. Those who do not want them are the women and men who have social ambitions and plenty of money. Children are an interference with the social or business plans of the man

[40] See U. S. Children's Bureau, *Publications*, Infant Mortality Series, Nos. 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11.

[41] Breckenridge and Abbott, *op. cit.*, Chap. X.

[42] Emerick, "College Women and Race Suicide," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXIV, pp. 269–283.

and with the desire for selfish enjoyment of the woman. Such people cannot well do the things which they are wont to do or wish to do and have children. On the other hand, the working woman feels that she cannot have both children and a job. The job is essential. Therefore children are denied. That same motive actuates families of the middle class. Because of the style of living to which both the husband and wife are accustomed they feel that a family cannot be undertaken until such time as the business or profession has been established; therefore, the family is postponed, with the result that they have few children or none at all.

The Woman's Movement and the Size of the Family. — The woman's movement has had some effect probably in limiting the size of the family. Certain leaders have been loudly agitating for a limitation of the size of the family. Some have even gone so far as to urge that many women should not marry at all. Others have urged that a family should not have more than two children. This doctrine grows out of the doubts and questioning of the twentieth century. It has found an echo in the heart of many women. Why should they have children when so many more children will be borne in any case by the lower classes? Her children are not needed to keep up the population of the world. Of course, it is hardly necessary to point out that such argument bears only on quantitative needs of the world with reference to population. It does not touch the question of quality.

Physical Degeneracy and the Size of the Family. — Some students of the decline of the birth rate in American families have assumed that the reason for it is a supposed degeneracy or running out of the stock. It is argued by some that the preservation of the weaker individuals, both men and women, by reason of the measures taken by modern hygiene in lessening a selective death rate which would have weeded out many people with weak constitutions, has preserved a stock which naturally is relatively infertile. It is quite possible that the survival of the physiologically weak may lower the birth rate, although we know of no careful studies which throw light upon this question. The suggestion, however, is worthy of scientific investigation. The fact is certain

enough that in some states the native white stock has a birth rate that is insufficient to keep up the population. The primary causes, however, are probably such economic and social causes as have been reviewed, rather than any inherent constitutional defects analogous to those which cause individual decline.

Thus it becomes probable that the causes which have affected the family in the last century in the United States are largely social and economic in their nature. While physiological causes may have affected the birth rate to a certain extent, psychological causes and social considerations have played a much more important rôle. So far as we have reviewed the evidence, the chief change in the family is in its decreasing size, not in any tendency to marry less or at a later age, except in particular classes. We shall now see that there is another change not yet touched upon which has come about in the family — the increasing instability of the family as registered in the increasing number of divorces.

Social Function of the Family. — It is evident from the foregoing that the family represents the unit of social order. Within it people are trained for the larger social life. Not only are they schooled in the art of producing wealth and trained in the rights of property, but also in the duties and privileges of individuals in association. Here they receive the elements of religious training, for it is in the home that the beginnings of all forms of culture appear. Politically the family and the state are entirely separated so far as civil rights and duties are concerned, yet the home gives instruction in political life. It is here that questions of public policy are discussed and members of the family receive their early training in political opinion. It is in the family that the first ethical ideals are imparted, and socialization is begun. Modern child psychology is re-emphasizing and explaining in scientific terms the wisdom in the old adages, "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it," and "Give me a child until he is seven years old and you can have him all the rest of his life." From the very first moment of his existence the child is conditioned by his experiences. In the home the child receives his first conditioning. His responses made there

are likely to become fixed as habit patterns which determine his conduct through life. In spite of the many influences which have lessened its influence upon the child, it still stands as the primary social group in the process of creating a social being.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is meant by the matriarchate? The patriarchate? Metronymy? Patronymy?
2. Find the best chapter in the Bible describing a patronymic family.
3. What is the distinction made between the uses of the word "form" in the terms "forms of the family" and "forms of religion"?
4. What effects did the rise of ancestor worship have upon the strength of family life?
5. Note the changes in the family which have followed changes in economic conditions.
6. Show in what respects family life was changed when industry began to be carried on outside the home.
7. What are the results on the social development of children of moving once a year?
8. What bearing have the changes in the bases of the family life upon race suicide?
9. Point out the social advantages of a declining birth rate. The drawbacks.
10. If the birth rate is decreasing only in correspondence with the decreasing death rate, what are the social consequences of the declining birth rate?
11. What are the effects upon the family of vice and its physical consequences?

12. Show what influence the employment of women in industry has upon the death rate of children. Suggest some measures that might alleviate these evil results without taking women out of industry.

13. Show how higher education might have a restraining influence upon the birth rate.

14. Analyze some small community which you know with reference to the size of family in different classes, and account for any differences you may find.

CHAPTER XI

CHANGING LIFE OF THE MODERN FAMILY

Shifting of Family Attitudes. — The fundamental purposes of the family, namely, a place to rear and educate children, and a primary form of association, have not changed. Yet the methods of obtaining these results have been greatly modified in recent years by a changing attitude toward marriage and family life, and by the influence of changing social and economic environment. The family is not breaking down but passing through a change and readjustment. There is as much loyalty and affection in the family as ever. Perhaps there is less control through emotion and more through reason and common sense than at previous times in family life. There is less control by force and dogmatic authority and more by suggestion and toleration. The home with its books, magazines, victrola, and radio and its enlightened communication with the world around it, is a better place to rear and educate children than hitherto. The association of the members of the family in an open, frank, and tolerant coöperation is a great improvement on the rule or ruin method of unquestioned authority of parents and the conventions that made for bad self-expression to children. The repression method had to give way before the suggestive method of instruction in schools, and the intense sport and social activities outside the home. Inventions such as the bicycle, the automobile, the "movie," and the modern dance brought with them an expression of freedom of body and mind that may be treated with, but cannot be dethroned.

Following these, essentially, are the radical change in clothing, and the political and economic status of women. All together the changing status of the family is to be recognized and the changing attitude of mind toward family relationships is pronounced.

However, the excitables and the radicals obtain distorted views

of the changing family life and seem to feel (not think) that because divorces are increasing the family is breaking down and must give way to a new form of society or at least to an entirely reconstructed family life. Divorce is usually an index of evil and is only a real evil when it becomes a social habit. It may be a badge of liberty, an expression of freedom, an opportunity for individual endeavor, and possibly a real saviour of the family by causing society to emphasize new and better social ideals and to eliminate the social defects.

Increase of Divorces. — The remarkable decrease in the size of the families in Western civilization is one of the two most striking things about the modern family. The other is the great increase in the number of divorces during the last fifty years. Do these two features have anything in common? Is one cause and the other effect? Or are they both effects of a common cause? Do the facts indicate any absolute increase of unhappiness between husbands and wives, or do they merely testify that it has become easier for uncongenial partners to separate? Such are some of the questions which arise on the contemplation of divorce statistics.

Divorce figures do not show whether there is or is not more marital unhappiness now than in the days of our grandfathers; but they do testify to our greater willingness to seek legal recognition of our infelicity. From 1870 to 1900 divorces per 100,000 of population increased almost threefold in the United States.[1] The number in 1880 represented an increase of 30.1 per cent over the number in 1870, in 1890 an increase of 25.5 per cent over that of 1880, in 1900 an increase of 20.7 per cent over that of 1890. A refined divorce rate based upon the married population is even more significant. Thus the number of divorces granted per hundred thousand of married population grew as follows:

1870	81
1880	107
1890	148
1900	200
1906	231
1916	281
1922	330

[1] *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867–1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 17.

Thus, in 1870, there were $1\frac{1}{2}$ divorces, in 1880, there were 2 divorces, in 1890, there were 3, and in 1900, 4 divorces for each 1000 married couples in the United States, or, in relation to married population, the divorce rate was $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as great in 1900 as in 1870, and more than 3 times as great in 1922. More divorces were granted to the husband (34.2 per cent) from 1867 to 1886 than from 1887 to 1906 (33.4 per cent). More divorces (46.9 per cent) were granted to the husband in the South Atlantic group of states than any other group. The geographical divisions granting the smallest proportions of divorces to the husbands were the North Central with only 28.3 per cent, and the Western with but 27.7 per cent of the total number of divorces. It is probable that this difference between the North and the West, on the one hand, and the South on the other, is due to the greater freedom and economic independence enjoyed by women in the former groups. The women of the South probably are not so accustomed to the idea of earning their own living. It has been shown that divorced women more largely than any other class of women studied by the Census officials are following a gainful occupation. Divorces granted to husbands, therefore, are relatively less numerous in the industrial North and West than in the agricultural South. The increasing economic independence of women probably throws light also upon the slightly growing tendency of women to seek divorce as revealed in the divorces granted to husbands and wives respectively in the two periods 1867–1886 and 1887–1906.[2]

Distribution of Divorces. — (1) *Number of Years Married.* — The divorce rate seems to reach its maximum about the fifth year of married life. At the end of that year more than one-half of the separations have taken place. This would seem to indicate that the perilous period in the history of a family is in the first few years of wedlock. That is but natural. If the adjustment of relations cannot be made within that time, separation and divorce register the fact. Yet 3.1 per cent of the total number divorced from 1887 to 1906 had lived together 25 years or more. Moreover, the hazard is increased in the first five years by reason of the childless marriage.

[2] *Marriage and Divorce*, Bulletin No. 96, *Twelfth Census*, 1908, pp. 12, 13.

(2) *Families with and without Children.* — Divorces are much more common between couples without children than between those with two or three children. This may or may not indicate that there is more unhappiness in the childless home than in the home with children. It does indicate that people with children are less willing to permit the home to be broken up. Moreover, one of the very strong ties between husband and wife is lacking when there are no children. Selfishness thrives in the childless home. There are no helpless ones appealing constantly to the best in their parents — weakness appealing to strength, childhood to maturity, helplessness to ability, — teaching their parents to deal with each other in love and gentleness.[3]

(3) *Differences in Occupations.* — The Census Report shows that there is a great difference as to the frequency of divorce among those in different occupations. The following table gives the facts:

Husbands Divorced (1887–1906) for whom Occupation Was Reported		Married Males Having the Occupation Designated: Census of 1900
Agricultural pursuits	28.4%	39.4%
Professional service	5.5	3.9
Domestic and personal service	24.0	13.0
Trade and transportation	19.5	18.2
Manufacturing and mechanical pursuits	22.7	25.6

Certain occupations show an exceedingly high divorce rate. Thus, in 1900, divorced actors, professional showmen, etc., numbered one-sixth of the total number in such occupations married. Commercial travelers show a ratio of one divorced man to every nine commercial travelers married during the twenty years 1887–1906. Musicians, physicians, bartenders, and telephone and telegraph operators show almost as high a proportion — one to about every 24 married.[4] For farmers the ratio was 1 to 92 — a ratio much below the average.[5]

[3] In 1911 in Great Britain 36 per cent of the couples divorced were childless. — *Hazell's Annual*, 1914, p. 438.

[4] One must not forget, however, that it is possible that some of these occupations bear no causal relation to divorce; they are economic refuges for the divorcee, *e.g.*, telephone operator.

[5] *Marriage and Divorce*, Bulletin No. 96 of the *Twelfth Census of the United States*, 1908, pp. 10–27.

Some writers have held that the cities have a greater divorce rate than the country.[6] Dr. Lichtenberger has thrown doubt upon the credibility of that generalization. He has shown that there are many cities which have rates lower than the country districts.[7] Professor Ellwood, however, has suggested that where this is the case it is due to the presence of large numbers of Catholics and foreigners.[8] One would expect that the conditions of city life would affect the family stability unfavorably. The city is characterized by those nervous, dynamic conditions which have such an unsettling effect upon our institutions. This expectation is borne out by a comparison of the rates of counties containing cities with those of the state as a whole and also with those of counties having only small cities and rural counties.[9]

(4) *Difference in Divorce Rate between the Sexes.* — Two-thirds of all the divorces in the United States are granted to the wife. This may mean that the men are more liable to give occasion for divorce than women. As we shall see, the chief cause alleged by the men who apply for divorce is adultery of the wife.

(5) *Divorce in the United States Compared with Other Countries.* — The divorce rate is much higher in the United States than in any other country in the world except Japan. Switzerland's, which is the highest rate in Europe, compared with that of the United States is as 3 to 7.[10]

(6) *Geographic Distribution of Divorces in the United States.* — Certain sections of our country had a higher divorce rate than others. Thus, in 1926 the Pacific Division of states had a rate of almost four times that of the Middle Atlantic Division (236 to 67), and almost three times that of the South Atlantic (236 to 85). The East North Central States had a rate three and a third that of the Middle Atlantic (204 to 67), and the East South Central two and one-half that of the South Atlantic (202 to 85). In general it

[6] *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867–1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, pp. 18, 19. Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, Revised and Enlarged Edition, 1913, p. 142.

[7] *Divorce, A Study in Social Causation*, New York, 1909, pp. 81, 82.

[8] Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, Revised Edition, 1913, p. 142.

[9] *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867–1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 18.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

may be said that the rate increases as one goes westward. Perhaps it will be more significant if one observes that it increases as one goes from the sections of country settled by foreigners, many of whom are Catholics, to those sections in which one will find the characteristic American elements of the population, people who



AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF DIVORCES PER 100,000 MARRIED POPULATION, FOR STATES AND TERRITORIES: 1900

have become thoroughly Americanized, if they are not of the old American stock. Account should be taken also of variation in divorce laws in the various states. This will be more graphic in a map of the United States so printed as to show the differences and similarities in divorce rates in the various states in 1900.[11]

[11] *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867–1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 16.

Great changes have come about in the distribution of divorces among the several states as shown by the following maps indicating the distribution in 1870, 1880, and 1890. These maps should be compared with each other. It is apparent that in 1900 there



AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF DIVORCES PER 100,000 POPULATION, FOR STATES AND TERRITORIES: 1870 AND 1880

were but three sections with a number of divorces below 75 per 100,000 population. One of these is of the Atlantic seaboard states with the exception of New England and Florida. Another is composed of the two states Wisconsin and Minnesota, and the

third is the territory (then) of New Mexico. Moreover, by these maps the increase of divorce in this country is strikingly shown.[12]

Moreover, here are persistent divorce centers and areas that follow in a measure the well-established social habits. Thus New



AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF DIVORCES PER 100,000 POPULATION, FOR STATES AND TERRITORIES: 1890 AND 1900

York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, North Dakota, Delaware, Connecticut, and Wisconsin rank among the lowest divorce records, while Arizona, Missouri, Arkansas, Washington,

[12] *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867–1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 17.

California, Wyoming, Oklahoma, Texas, Oregon, and Nevada rank among the states having the highest divorce records.

Grounds of Divorce. — Almost 94 per cent of all the divorces granted from 1887 to 1906 were on grounds of five principal causes: adultery, cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, and neglect to provide. When these can be proved in so large a percentage of the causes in which divorce is granted, it is probable that there are many more cases in which these or other causes operated but which had not come to action for divorce or were not capable of proof.[13]

While the causes alleged in the petitions for divorce are not always the real ones, they throw some light nevertheless on the subject. Thus, the legal ground most frequently alleged was desertion, being the ground stated in 38.9 per cent of all the divorces granted from 1887 to 1906. It was alleged in the case of almost half of the divorces granted to men (49.4 per cent) and just about one-third of those granted to women (33.6 per cent). Of the divorces granted to husbands 28.7 per cent were on grounds of adultery of the wife and 10.5 per cent for cruelty by the wife. Of those granted to wives 27.5 per cent were for cruelty by the husband, and only 10 per cent for adultery by the husband — an almost exact reversal of relative proportions of these two grounds. Drunkenness as the sole ground was alleged in only 5.3 per cent of the cases granted to the wife and in but 1.1 per cent of those granted to the husband. It was the indirect cause in 13.8 per cent of the cases; in 4.7 per cent of the divorces granted to husbands and in 18.3 per cent of those granted to wives it was alleged as a contributory cause. Moreover, it was present as a contributory cause in 32.4 per cent of the cases in which the wife was granted a divorce on grounds of cruelty, and over one-fifth of the cases (21.2 per cent) of those granted on grounds of neglect to provide.

One point in this enumeration of causes needs a word. It would appear from the statements made above that adultery was a more common ground in divorces granted to men than to women. Of the divorces granted on this ground alone, 59.1 per cent of the offenses were committed by the wife and 40.9 per cent by the

[13] *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867–1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, pp. 22, 23.

husband. The probability is, however, that the women are no more guilty in this matter than the men, but that evidence is more easily secured against women guilty of this offense than against men. The double standard of morality makes the offense in the man more easily overlooked than in the woman, and the woman finds other grounds easier to prove.

It is also worthy of remark that adultery as a ground of divorce has been steadily decreasing since 1867 — a statistical fact regarding this moral delinquency which runs counter to popular belief. Thus the percentage of divorces granted for this cause has fallen as follows:

1867–1871	25.6%
1872–1876	20.7%
1877–1881	19.4%
1882–1886	19.2%
1887–1891	17.8%
1892–1896	17.3%
1897–1901	15.8%
1902–1906	15.3%
1924	10.1%

Cruelty as a cause, on the other hand, has nearly doubled from 1867 to 1906. Neglect to provide has risen during the same period from 1.7 per cent of the total causes to 3.8 per cent.[14] Whether there is an actual decrease in marital infidelity or whether adultery as a ground of divorce appears less frequently, because other causes are now grounds for divorce and therefore adultery need not be alleged, is a question concerning which no categorical answer can now be given, although the evidence favors the latter.

Causes of the Growth of Divorce. — These causes just discussed are legal grounds. They do not always indicate the real causes of divorce. Down beneath these lie those intangible but none the less real and influential psychological and social causes which bring forth this harvest of legally acknowledged broken vows. Many of the same influences which we reviewed in seeking to understand the decrease in the size of the family must be invoked in order to explain the phenomena of divorce. Possessing greater economic opportunities than the women of former generations,

[14] *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867–1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 26.

modern women refuse to be bound for the sake of livelihood by ties which have come to be galling.

(1) *Economic Causes Explain Divorce in Part.* — Poverty with its grinding toil and its strained relations between provider and housekeeper must be considered. On the other hand, there is wealth with its false demands for means to allay the ennui of an existence sated with the enjoyments of life. Moreover, while the marriage for money is perhaps less common than in some civilizations, there are of course marriages still to be found in which the monetary consideration is the real basis of the family. Sometimes such a consideration remains the basis and constitutes the chief reason for its continuance. Let, however, that consideration wane in its importance by reason of the loss of money, or from a growing appreciation of the falsity of such a bond for such intimate relations, and the breaking of the bond is quite certain to occur.

(2) *Changes in the Social Position of Women.* — Vastly more important are the changes which have come over the social and economic status of woman in the last fifty years. With her change in economic independence, she can now free herself from bonds which once had to be endured in order that she might escape starvation. Once the power of tradition which visited with social ostracism the woman who revolted from a life made hard by a mate who was in no sense a companion held her bound and prevented the legal breaking of a bond which no longer was backed by love. Mohammedan countries and the countries of Europe in which divorce is seldom permitted furnish plenty of evidence that there are other ways than divorce by which a woman may get rid of an undesirable husband.[15] Where the spirit of the woman was not of that desperate character, she suffered and lived a loveless life, a slave to a being she could not respect or love. Tradition has not yet been broken entirely. Many a woman still suffers and endures for the sake of the opinion of her relatives and friends or because of the attitude of her church towards divorce, or for the sake of her children. With woman's industrial enfranchisement,

[15] Lombroso, *Causes and Remedies of Crime*, English Translation, 1912, pp. 184, 185.

however, a great impetus has been given to divorce. With the breaking down of social tradition condemning divorce it will naturally grow in the absence of a better method of contracting marriages. With the increasing education of woman she is thinking upon the question of her relations to men. When she began to think, tradition's power began to break.

(3) *Mental Emancipation of Women.* — Out of an appeal to her reason has grown the emancipation of woman. The awakening rationality of the sex began to doubt the old sanctions. The doubts have raised questions which many women are not prepared to settle practically. One result, however, of this spirit of the age is woman's attempt to gain the ballot in England and America. A much more important effect, however, is woman's lessened respect for the traditional sanctions of an indissoluble marriage bond and hence an increase in divorce.[16] Woman's growing conviction that something is wrong with her lot in some cases was brought to expression by the movement for her emancipation. Political enfranchisement was the least of the burden she felt. She felt much more keenly her domestic bonds and therefore she desired the more intensely her emancipation from ties which she felt to be hateful.

Like all reformers, doubtless the advocates of woman's freedom have gone too far. To make their case perhaps the leaders had overstated her distress. Doubtless the agitation has stirred some excitable women to exaggerate their unhappiness. Reiterated declarations concerning women's "slavery" have without question worked as a suggestion to some who otherwise would never have thought of revolt against their position. Perhaps, therefore, since the agitation has quieted down we may reasonably anticipate a decline in divorce from this cause.

(4) *Irrational Methods of Choosing Mates.* — When one contemplates the irrational way in which matches are made one wonders, not that one marriage out of every nine ends in the divorce court, but that so few come to that conclusion. Two theories dominate in present-day thought as reflected in our mod-

[16] For an interesting discussion of the feminist movement in Germany, see Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, pp. 87–112.

ern novels centering about the tender passion. Either "marriages are made in heaven," or, according to the new theological version of that theory, people are intended for each other by that paganized, but none the less personal, something called Nature. The one is as metaphysical and as unscientific as the other. Both are prescientific statements of an actual situation less definitely determined, however, than the theories would make us believe. The elements of attraction between well-mated personalities have never been scientifically established. Sexual attraction rests partly on a physical basis. The popular belief is that people with unlike or complementary physical qualities attract each other, very much as the positive and negative poles of a magnet. Thus, light and dark, the slim and the stout, attract each other. Some sociologists think that the novel in one's experience attracts. Others think that each group of people forms an ideal of personal beauty corresponding to its degree of mental development and of civilization. Unquestionably this ideal, to a considerable extent, grows out of imitation of superiors in social status. However, the subject waits for more careful scientific study.

Moreover, certain mental and social qualities unquestionably affect the choice. Here, again, the principle of the attraction of the unlike has been invoked. Complementary temperaments attract each other, say the advocates of this theory. *A priori* such a thing is conceivable. Psychologically it is possible that the slightly novel mental characteristic might attract the attention and stir the interest of another, and lead to the development of love. A standard of mental qualities each of us possesses perhaps. What are its constituent elements and how these elements are selected and organized into an ideal has never been investigated.

The important point in this connection, however, is that choice of a mate is made ordinarily on an instinctive, or at least an irrational, basis. People choose marriage partners because they like them. Certain physical and mental qualities enter into the ideal of the loved one, without a doubt, but how often are those qualities clearly analyzed and considered in all their bearings upon the future of the home and family which may be established by

the two who are sexually attracted? How seldom is as much attention given by the parties to even the physical characteristics of each other as is given by stockbreeders to the physical qualities of the dams and sires of their herd! Such questions are seldom considered even by the envious critics of the couple, not to mention the couple themselves. All too frequently these two persons most interested in the matter do not ask themselves the question as to whether the other party to the contemplated contract is fitted to be the father or mother of their children. The attachment is formed on a romantic basis. The all-important question is, Do they love each other? not, Have they the qualities, physical and mental, which make them suited to each other and so make possible the continuance of romantic love? Romantic love's young dream will fade. Is the basis there for love between the mature man and woman after the romance has vanished? In too many cases those questions are not considered; hence divorce.

Proposed Remedies. — (1) *Are Uniform Divorce Laws a Remedy?* — Uniform divorce laws have been suggested as a partial remedy for the present evils. It is often said that divorce is made easy for all by the fact that one state has laws providing for easy divorce, although others may have stringent laws. Those who do not find it possible to obtain a divorce in one state go therefore into the state where divorce can be easily obtained. If, on the other hand, these people argue, all the states had uniform laws modeled on a strict basis, it would be impossible for those who desire an easy divorce to obtain it. The inference is that if divorce were impossible or difficult, then the evil would cease. Is that inference justified?

No one doubts that in certain cases the law may be a stimulus to morals. There are other cases, however, in which the law is a challenge to immorality. The question as to just how far a law may go and yet be a brace to the moral sense of the community rather than a red rag flaunted in the face of society has not been very carefully determined. It is probable that strict divorce laws would prevent some divorces, — those which now result from mere childish caprice or ephemeral discord. Would strict laws, however, prevent the separation of those parties who have dis-

covered between them an incompatibility which time could not overcome? Would it prevent the joyless life, and the frequent intrigues and faithlessness which history has shown can go on in spite of marriage bonds? Would it prevent the clandestine alliances and even poisonings, resort to which has been had in those countries and times in which divorce has been forbidden? If a mismating has occurred, such a proposal would not cure it, — in fact, it might even accentuate the differences. When two people are united in the bonds of marriage and cannot live together without the deepest unhappiness, is it not the best thing for them and for any children they may have to separate?

(2) *Stricter Regulation of Marriage.* — The much more important remedy for the divorce evil is a closer regulation of marriage. There are many good points to the banns. They are at least a recognition of the social character of marriage. They give opportunity for social regulation of a sort. If there is any real objection to the contemplated marriage, the banns give the opportunity to have such objections offered. Moreover, they put a check upon undue haste and give time for somewhat careful deliberation. On the other hand, the banns are not scientific in their nature. They do not put any emphasis upon such considerations as those suggested above. Based primarily upon religious conditions, they do not cover fundamental biological and mental and the wider social considerations. The religious banns are important for those in religious communions. It is of importance whether the people married are of the same religious persuasion, especially those of a zealous nature. The chief defects are that the banns are limited to religious people, they are based upon religious rather than social considerations, and the tests appealed to are not biological, mental, or sociological. In the absence of a more scientific method the banns of the church serve a splendid purpose for a limited part of the population who wish to get married.

(3) *Eugenic Marriage Laws*, as they are called, have been passed by several states. In general they require a certificate of sound health and freedom from disease, especially from venereal disease. Before them there were laws forbidding marriage between certain mental defectives, such as idiots or imbeciles, insane, and those

otherwise mentally diseased. The idea at the basis of these laws is most commendable. The practical difficulty with all measures so far proposed is in the lack of scientific methods of determining whether a person is unfit for marriage. As yet, in most states, unless the person is a manifest mental incompetent, he can get a license to wed. In some cases people who have been in insane asylums or other institutions for the mentally diseased or defective have had no trouble in securing the license. Until such time as public sentiment shall approve the introduction of careful examinations into both the physical and mental condition of people who intend to marry we shall have to be content to let the stream of human life be poisoned at its source, or have it controlled only by the rough methods which have been built out of a prescientific experience. In several states of the United States the law requires every person who applies for a license to marry to present a certificate from some reputable physician declaring that he has made a careful examination of the party named in the certificate and that such person is free from all venereal diseases. Great difficulty has been experienced in getting physicians who were willing to make such a declaration, especially in view of the fact that the law usually has set the price which should be charged by the physician for this examination, — a price for which the physician could not afford to make the most thorough examination known to medical science, the Wassermann test. Many physicians assert that even with the Wassermann test it cannot be known certainly that there is no disease of the kind intended to be discovered by the examination. The chief difficulty with this law is that the law requires an examination which for the common man is prohibitive in price if the regular price is charged, and which the conscientious physician cannot afford to make at the low price set in the law. As a result of these difficulties the attorney-general of Wisconsin has declared that the Wassermann test need not be applied, but that the physician may write the certificate after such examination as he can make for $3.00 — the price the law allows him to charge. That interpretation, of course, destroys much of the value of the law and opens the way for charlatans to make a business of granting certificates on easy terms. A simple change making it possible

for physicians to have the test made at the State Hygienic Laboratory, or at the State Psychiatric Institute, and providing the institution designated by law with the men and equipment necessary is the method by which the present difficulties have been obviated in Wisconsin. Still another method which might be adopted would be a requirement that the Wassermann test be made but the cost of it paid for by the county and the applicant jointly. Against this policy, however, is the objection that there would not be the certainty that the test would be properly made, while uniformity of test and thoroughness would be insured in either of the state institutions just named. This test for physical disease should be supplemented, however, by requirements that not only venereal diseases, but certain others, like tuberculosis, should be sought for, and that tests of mentality should also be given so that those who are slightly feeble minded should not be allowed to marry.

(4) *The Court of Domestic Relations.* — In a number of cities in the United States this novel and interesting kind of court has been established in the hope that thereby divorce may be diminished. It is based partly on the theory that many divorces are due to the fact that there is no disinterested party which has authority to review those differences which are not fundamental in a family where discord has risen and act as mediator between the two parties. The experience of this court has shown that many families on the verge of disruption can be saved by the exercise of wise counsel and kindly help.[17]

(5) *Raising the Social Ideals of Marriage Is Necessary.* — The measures just noticed, excellent as they are, merely touch the problem of divorce. They will make entrance into matrimony more deliberate, and by calling attention to some features which should be considered in selecting a mate will cause more careful thought on the whole question of fitness for such high responsibility. Vastly more important, however, are measures looking to the dissemination of information concerning the social responsibilities involved in the marriage relation and in the creation of a

[17] *Report of National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1911, pp. 408, 409. *Ibid.*, 1912, pp. 5, 259–262.

sentiment in favor of careful consideration of the physical and mental fitness of people for the high task of being the progenitors of the next generation. Let the taboo be lifted from this subject. People should consider these matters in the light of modern knowledge. At least, let it come to be the custom of men and women to ask themselves seriously whether they are mentally and physically fitted to be happy with the prospective partner and whether they are prepared to make the sacrifices involved in living intimately with another person for life so as to make that partnership endurable if not happy.

The state's chief concern with marriage is the question of the children. Where no children have been born to married persons, there is some doubt as to whether the state has a right to meddle with such intimate concerns as the family. Growing originally out of the state's concern for children as food for bullets or slaves for forced labor, the state has always exercised some care over the family by reason of its concern for the children. Now, with higher motives prompting the attitude, such as concern for men and women who shall be efficient citizens, strong in body and mind, adapted to the changing industrial and social conditions of our society, the state is interfering with the schooling and the working of the child. In the minds of many statesmen and social students the question is rising as to why the state should not go back one step farther and concern itself actively with the heredity of that child. Before such a program can be effective, however, the people must be educated up to the necessity of founding a family on the right biological basis. No less important is it that each individual be brought to an appreciation of the importance of considering psychological and social factors also in the choice of a mate. By the psychological factors are meant such things as the question of temperaments suitable to each other. Science will have to come to the aid of emotion in the selection of a temperamental mate. By the social considerations are meant such questions as social ideals, tastes, attitudes, and traditions. Unequal standards of living, or different ideals as to methods of bringing up children, are sometimes the entering wedges of divisive strife. Incompatible attitudes towards such things as amusements,

drinking customs, personal habits, and family customs sometimes mar the peace of the family. Above all these in importance are the ideals of what a family should be and what it is for. Ideals are products of social endeavor or of social neglect. If the ideals of the family relationship are wrong, they can be corrected by social action. Education, social ostracism, social emulation, can all be used to furnish ideals of family life. The press and the pulpit, the clubs and societies which address themselves to questions of public welfare, the schools and the family itself, are all instruments of the formation of family ideals. The schools to-day, so far as they touch the problem of the family, are concerned largely with the problem of food and clothing. Where is there one which deals with the much larger problem of social adjustments in the home? We teach our girls how to cook for a man and children, and how to manage a household. Why do we not teach them how to manage a home so as to secure peace and happiness, to make it an instrument of social betterment? The boys we teach less than the girls about homemaking. We have only begun to dabble at teaching the boy how to make a living. We have not even thought about teaching him how to make a life for himself and the woman he takes as his wife, and with whom he makes the most solemn covenant to "love, honor, and protect her, to cherish her in joy and sorrow, in health and sickness, in prosperity and adversity, to be faithful to her, and never to forsake her," — a task large enough in all conscience to warrant an intelligent, instructed assent, and one which is made only to be broken in spirit probably in more than one case out of ten. When one views all the factors carefully, it ceases to excite surprise that so many marriages find their way to the divorce court.

READING ASSIGNMENTS

Adler, Felix. *Marriage and Divorce*, Chap. I.
Cooley, Chas. H. *Social Organization*, Chap. XXXI.
Ellis, Havelock. *The Task of Social Hygiene*, Chaps. II–VI.
Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert. *Social Problems*, Part III.
Groves and Ogburn. *American Marriage and Family Relationships*, Chap. I–IX.
Mowrer, Ernest W. *Family Disorganization.*

OTHER REFERENCES

LICHTENBERGER, J. P. *Divorce: A Study in Social Causation.*
Special Reports of U. S. Census Office, *Marriage and Divorce, 1867–1906*, 2 vols., 1909, and Census Bulletin No. 96, 1908, and others.
WILCOX, WALTER F. *The Divorce Problem: A Study in Statistics.*

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What in your judgment has been the influence upon the divorce rate in America of the modern legal facilities for divorce?
2. Do you think that stricter divorce laws would solve the problem presented by divorce? Why?
3. Give your explanation of the fact that so large a proportion of the divorces occur in the first five years of married life. What bearing does this fact have upon the contention that stricter divorce laws will solve the problem?
4. State the psychology of the fact that children in the home prevent divorce.
5. Explain the differences in the divorce rate in different occupations.
6. Show that the differing geographic or physical conditions of various parts of the United States do not account for the differences in the divorce rates of these parts of the country.
7. Work out the statistics of divorce for your own state and account for the variations from the figures for the whole country. (*Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867–1906*, Washington, 1909.)
8. Explain the changes which have come over many of the states of the Union in their divorce rates during the past forty years.
9. Suggest ways in which the mathematical probability of divorce can be modified by social measures.
10. Show that the legal grounds of divorce may not be the real causes.
11. State the main features of a eugenic marriage law.
12. What do you think of the French plan which requires the consent of the parents to a marriage until a certain age has been reached? Does this unduly emphasize the interest of the family and the social idea? Should fathers and mothers have any control? Should they be notified and should it be required that, say, six months elapse after their protest before a marriage may take place?
13. Suggest a constructive program for marriage which would lessen the number of divorces.
14. Is the modern family becoming disorganized or is it merely changing to meet the demands of changing society?
15. What is meant by companionate marriage? Trial marriage?
16. Is there cause to fear that the family organization will give way to some other group organization?
17. What have you to say in response to this statement: There is as much love, loyalty, and justice in the home to-day as ever before in the history of family life?

CHAPTER XII

SOCIOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE STATE

The Nature of the State. — The state is the political organization of the individuals of a community for the common good. It is the expression of political life. Its purpose is the protection and preservation of the group, and, incidentally, of the individual. Primarily, the state represents a group of individuals, each having an organic relation to the whole, and the whole group to other groups and individuals, and having for its purpose the regulation of relationships affecting vitally the welfare of the group. Concern for the preservation of the group is the most general motive inspiring that regulation of individual and group life which is the beginning of government. That characteristic explains why both in primitive and in developed societies the group's regulations are limited to those designed to promote this aim. These regulations differ both as to stringency and as to scope in societies at different stages of development. Sometimes it may seem best to the governing authorities to exercise closer regulation of individual and group action than at others, for example, in times of war, or of such a crisis as famine or plague. In certain stages of social evolution, regulation by the governing authorities will extend to affairs which at other times are left to the regulation of the mores or to the individual interest.

Writers differ as to the essential characteristics of the state. Thus Bluntschli names seven characteristics: (1) a number of men; (2) a fixed territory; (3) unity; (4) distinction between rulers and subjects; (5) an organic nature; (6) the state is a moral and spiritual organism, it is a personality; (7) the state is masculine as contrasted with the church, which is feminine.[1]

[1] Bluntschli, *Theory of the State*, 1901, pp. 15–23.

Willoughby, on the other hand, says that the essential elements of a state are: (1) a community of people socially united; (2) a political machinery, termed a government, and administered by a corps of officials termed a magistracy; and (3) a body of rules or maxims, written or unwritten, determining the scope of this public authority, and the manner of its exercise.[2]

The state must be separated in mind from government, which is the organ through which the state expresses itself, the instrument by means of which the public will or judgment is executed. Whether the government is communistic, patriarchal, monarchical, or democratic, it is always a mere form of demonstrating the power of the state. As Giddings, following Burgess, has pointed out, there is a state behind the constitution and a state revealed in the constitution. The two are quite distinet. The former is composed of the people in a given geographic area speaking a common language and having common ideas as to the fundamental principles of rights and wrongs. The latter is the people expressing themselves in certain ways and defining and delegating certain powers which they wish to have exercised. The latter may be called the government. It is the subject of political science. The former is society in the general sense and is the subject matter of sociology.[3] On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish the state from any mere social aggregation whether it be called people, tribe, or nation.

Doubtlessly for the origin of the state behind the constitution we must go back to primitive social institutions. This state organizing itself for the purposes of social control in order to secure benefits which could not be obtained by individuals alone finds its basis in primitive man's consciousness of group needs and in his appreciation of the necessity of limiting individual desires for the sake of the group. Its development cannot always be traced through a definite succession of forms, but it is rather a psychological tendency working through all forms. This expression of group coöperation and control began with the primitive family; then

[2] Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*, p. 4.

[3] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1901, p. 35. Cf. Burgess, "The American Commonwealth," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 1, March, 1886, p. 13.

when families came together in hordes, relations became more complex both within and between families. For wherever there is concerted action for the common good, however faint, there are the beginnings of that condition of the social mind which is one of the conditions for the development of this form of the state. As will be explained later, the state in the sense of that term which involves sovereignty did not develop as a matter of history until war, migration, and conquest had given a conqueror the right to impose his will upon the people of a certain geographical area.[4]

The Origin of the State. — When men discuss the origin of the state, some mean the psychological motives which gave birth to the state, while others refer to the institutions out of which the state developed. Representative of the first class is Morley, when he says that society, by which he must be understood to mean the state, is grounded in " the acceptance of conditions which came into existence by the sociability inherent in man, and were developed by man's spontaneous search after convenience." [5]

Not ignoring the motives which gave rise to the state, but connecting those motives with the institutions in which they found their expression, are other writers, from among whom two representatives may be named. Wilson says, " Government must have had substantially the same early history among all progressive races. It must have begun in clearly defined family discipline." And, " What is known of the central nations of history reveals clearly the fact that social organization and, consequently, government (which is the visible form of social organization), originated in *kinship*. The original bond of union and the original sanction for magisterial authority were one and the same thing, namely, real or feigned blood-relationship." [6] Professor Commons looks to a different series of motives to explain the origin of the state. He says, " The state is the coercive institution of society. It is not an ideal entity, superimposed upon society, but is an accumulated series of compromises between social classes, each seeking to secure for themselves control over the institution of private prop-

[4] Ward, "Sociology and the State," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, p. 679 (March, 1910).

[5] Quoted by Wilson, *The State*, p. 13.

[6] *The State*, pp. 2, 3, 13.

erty." "The state is rather the creature and offspring of private property." [7] Yet the patriarchal family is one of the institutions in which sovereignty and so the state originated, because in that family only do you have the possession of women and children as private property.[8] Thus, according to the writers represented by Wilson the state originated in the relations and institutions of kinship, while according to those represented by Commons it grew out of the institution of private property.

The Ethnic State. — The primitive family, or the horde composed of several primitive family groups, was the primordial social group. Naturally out of these simple relationships grew the first attempt at group control. The individual's social relations were within the group; he was connected with his fellows by blood bonds real or fictitious. In that homogeneous social group we must place the beginnings of control which eventually expressed itself in political government. When the society was metronymic, the mother and her kindred regulated the group. Among tribes in which the patriarchal system prevailed, there was a much stronger organization, the family was more closely integrated, the governed and governing were more clearly separated, and control was much stricter.

In the establishment and maintenance of social order the family frequently performed in a primitive way all the essential duties of the state. As the family multiplied in numbers through adoption and natural increase until it became a great tribe under the direction of the patriarch and chief, it became neeessary to establish more elaborate methods of control. It became necessary for him to make certain rulings on new conditions that arose, as well as to carry out the practices and customs of the fathers, and then he became lawgiver. It was his custom also to pass judgment in order to settle the differences between members of the tribal family and thus he became the chief judge of the social group. Moreover, to the help of the patriarch as governor of the group, there was now added the force of the economic motive:

[7] "A Sociological View of Sovereignty," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, p. 683; Vol. VI, p. 88.

[8] Commons, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, pp. 3, 12.

he was not only the representative of the gods, but was actually the owner of the women and children and held in trust for the group its common possessions.[9] While later his authority became delegated to other officers, just as the power to legislate eventually passed from the head of the tribe or nation to a body of people selected for that purpose, in this early state of affairs the judicial, legislative, and executive powers of government were all vested in one man, the patriarch of the family. In him, therefore, rested whatever authority existed; and in him we find one historical origin of political control. Here, then, in these primitive kinship organizations we have basic groups, the raw material out of which the state could develop when the new elements of a settled abode and a conqueror enforcing obedience were added — elements introduced by immigration and wars of conquest.[10]

Race Conflict and Amalgamation. — But seldom if ever did a family expand into a tribe and the tribe into a civil unit without an intermixture of races. Once families or clans were well established and population increased, there began a struggle for existence. Tribal warfare brought about the extinction of some clans and the union of others. The union of the conquerors and the conquered occurred on the basis of the slavery of the latter. Sometimes, perhaps, assimilation of one group with another may have been attained by peaceful methods. Much more frequently, if not always, it was conquest that brought about the state. A conquered tribe was reduced to slavery, or at least to an inferior position in the conquering tribe. Then occurred the imposition of the will of the conqueror enforcing obedience by one method or another and later a compromise as to rights, duties, and privileges, and the regulation of the political status of the members of the united groups.[11] Athens and Rome, among the civilized nations, and the Iroquois, Hopi, Aztecs among the natural races, are examples of federated or united tribes. Many of these tribes passed through successive stages of union with others, each stage

[9] Cf. Commons, "A Sociological View of Sovereignty," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, p. 12. For the view that the state could not originate from the family, see Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*, p. 21.

[10] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 206–216.

[11] Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 357–374.

being followed by a period of integration. During these successive unions and amalgamations of racial stocks, the duty of the individual to the whole mass became more clearly defined. The growth of the state has been along the line of complete union of discordant racial elements, and full recognition of all classes.

The Differentiation of Political Organs and Functions. — In the development of these various forms of government there was a constant change in the titles and functions of officers and administrators. These changes varied according to the evolution of government itself. Kings were made by a social process no less definite than the processes of nature which developed the plants of the field or the trees of the forest. As it was but natural that the father of the family of a patriarchal society should be the one to lead and control, so it was again the natural outcome of this leadership, when the family expanded into a tribe of many groups of people, that the father or oldest male should be the leader. It was evident that when religion became involved in government the family which could show the longest lineage and therefore fix its relationship most nearly to the gods had the most power. Hence, it came about that the hereditary principle prevailed in the choosing of the ruler of the tribe. As government became more complex and as tribes became federated, one of these hereditary chiefs or leaders, who also had ability in war and government, became king, but the king could not bear his responsibilities without counselors, so it became customary for him to summon old men who were heads of the gentes, the eldest male members, to counsel with him in the proceedings of the primitive state. These counselors became the senate, an institution which remains to this day as one of the important powers of government in our modern system. Now, as the king could not do everything, gradually his advisers were called on to do more and more of the administrative work of the government. Beyond this the king had special officers to assist him in the leadership of war and administration of religion, and, indeed, in the administration of all the minor affairs of the state. And thus the king became, finally, the head of a group of administrative, executive, judicial, and legisla-

tive bodies, and the chief executive and head of a group of officers, as well as ruler of the people.

It was impossible for the king to act as judge to all his people in person and so he appointed people to represent him, and this custom developed into a law, and the officers that represented the king became more and more important until finally a judicial system was established in which grievous cases only were appealed to the king. But in the final development of government the king gave way to the supreme court as the final court of appeals.

Thus as the process of government became more complex and specialized, the people commanded greater and greater consideration. At first the power was given them to approve or disapprove what the senate or the king had decreed. Later they had the privilege of voting on measures introduced by others, and, finally, they gained the right of originating laws and passing them. Primarily this was carried on by the whole group of people, but later by representatives of the people chosen for this specific purpose of legislation. Thus was developed the popular assembly so powerful in Greece and Rome, and the main power in the modern government of England and America. Thus, the family with its traditions and customs and its ethnic government expanded until a state was formed with no reference to family relationship, but in which the individual sustained a direct relationship to the whole body. Thus from a king or patriarchal president, who held within his grasp all the powers of government, were gradually differentiated the various departments of government as they exist to-day.

Beginnings of the Federation of States. — The various changes that took place in the development of the state left some tendencies which were influential in the development of certain forms of government. The federation of tribes and families and local groups in the building of a state would seem to suggest a continuation of the federal idea in the union of states. The Greeks attempted this in the ancient leagues, like the Ætolian, the Achæan, and the Lycian. These were attempts to unite many of the Greek states into one federal group, but Greek federation failed because of the strong influences of local self-government and the

jealousies of states. In some respects it was unfortunate, for doubtless a united Greece would have been able to withstand the attacks of enemies. That federation was quite a natural step in the development of the state seems to be evident from the attempts, already mentioned, of the Iroquois Indians to federate, and of the Aztecs of Mexico, and others that might be cited as examples. Federation is only a process of closer integration of various elements. Wherever it has continued long, as in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States, the tendency has been to amalgamate the entire group of states into one national body. Integration in social and political development goes on constantly so far as the groups of individuals are concerned, while on the other hand, there is a constant differentiation of powers and functions and a constant change of conception of the relation of the individual to the state.

The Modern Social State. — The state is usually defined as a politically organized group occupying a specific territory. By politically organized we mean, of course, having a code of laws and a well-regulated government. It occupies a territory which belongs to it and which it assumes to defend against all others.

But in the modern state there is a growing tendency towards more complete democracy; hence, in this complex phase of its development we must consider it as a closely integrated collection of individuals and groups having widely different functions. The state to-day is a socially organized organic group with certain people chosen to control, while others agree to obey. But each individual has a distinctive place and performs a distinctive service. In the modern democracy the state cannot exist apart from the people, and the whole people are organized by mutual agreement, tacit or expressed, in industry, service, and self-control. In the evolution of the state from the family there have been represented all ideas of government, from the first bare life protection to the establishment of social order, and, in the final instance, to the conscious purpose of securing the social well-being of the whole people. So the state of to-day represents the conscious, living emanation of the multiple thoughts, sentiments, and will of the people concerning social order and social control, social

well-being, and the rights, privileges, and duties of individuals in their relations to one another and to the social group as a whole.

Democratic Idealism. — While the forms of democracy have advanced further in the United States than in any other nation, we are still idealists so far as its practical application is concerned. The people of the United States believe in democracy, talk democracy, and write about democracy, but find it difficult to work out their problems in the laboratory of human association. We have allowed jealousy and envy of individual rights and privileges to dominate zeal for social responsibility, and the industrialism and commercialism born in the free trade era of England have frequently led to individual and group autocracy in the business world. The natural freedom of the commercial world has been so easily disturbed by any coercive measure of the larger society that real democracy has been retarded by our business reactionaries and our industrial and political radicals. On the other hand, those observing the slowness of the recognition of industrial liberty and industrial justice have assumed that an industrial democracy could be built.

There are many desirable changes in social and political affairs to be made by the efficient people. A progressive democracy must admit that class hostility and race hatred have too large a place within it, and that while democracy should be concerned with the individual and the mass, it must also determine justice between groups.

Real democracy is something more than the expression of selfishness between individuals under the name of universal brotherhood. It seeks a higher ideal of justice and reaches out beyond the idea of economic gain. We are in need of much universal education, much tolerance of one another, and much practice in the arts of socialization before we can have a working democracy which corresponds to our ideals. The working out of democracy means the development of a public opinion on public questions and ideals.[12]

Social Evolution and the Theory of the State. — We have seen

[12] Lowell, A., *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, New York, 1913. Hall, A. B., *Popular Government*, New York, 1921.

how the state itself has its roots in the undifferentiated society of primitive peoples. Professor Commons says, "In primitive society sovereignty and its institution, the state, were blended homogeneously with all the other psychic motives and social institutions." [13] In form the state was a different thing in different stages of social development. Once the state and the family, or at least the kindred, were quite undifferentiated. To-day their spheres are clearly separate one from the other and their respective functions sharply differentiated. So the theory of the state has changed with the change in its form of organization. There has been an evolution of the theory of the state throughout the ages since men began to speculate concerning its nature and the reasons for its existence, with its power over the individuals subject to it. Had there been a political philosopher among the individuals composing a paleolithic horde during glacial times in Europe, doubtless his theory of the nature of the state, or what in some measure was the forerunner of what has come to be called by that name, would have been much different from the theory of our modern political philosophers. He had not the experiences in governmental matters which the last three thousand years have supplied on which to base his generalizations. The theory of the state possible when a king could say *L'état, c'est moi,* cannot possibly be the theory generally held when a majority of the people determine political issues. This is not to deny that political ideas persist from age to age and influence nations widely different in their political structure. Thus, Greece and Rome have contributed principles of government that have influenced all states organized since. The form of government affects the political theory held at the time, and on the other hand, the theory of the state influences the form of government. From the interplay of these two influences upon each other — society upon theory, and theory upon society — comes the development step by step which we see both in the forms of states and in the theory of the state.

The Evolutionary Theory. — The theorist asks, "What right have certain people who hold the power, to coerce others into

[13] "A Sociological View of Sovereignty," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, p. 3.

regulated action through the machinery of government?" That is really a social question and must be answered by the sociologist who seeks to interpret the state by considering it as the outgrowth of the same social forces as have produced the other social institutions such as marriage, church, and economic organization. Although the practical outcome of state theory is of great importance to the sociologist who seeks to furnish a program for political action, to him the theory of the state must be based not "in the constitution of things," but in the nature of society. Sociology helps to determine the position of the state as a conscious agency for the improvement of human society, demonstrating its powers and limiting its functions in accordance with the historical circumstances which have produced it, and its relation to certain needs of the people.

The sociologist views the state as a gradual development brought about by the attempt of men to live together harmoniously. The state was not the beginning of human society, but one of the later devices to procure social welfare through definite and clearly defined methods of political control. Considered historically, the elements of the state were founded not by the plan of God or man, nor by the agreement of a group of individuals to live together with equality and justice, but is a by-product of the attempt of individuals to adjust their differences and to promote their welfare. Primarily, no one intended to build a state, but it simply grew, incidentally, while men were attempting to satisfy their desires in other directions. Through a natural order, beginning with the family and extending through the gens and tribe, and finally emerging as the transition was made from custom to law, from status to political life, the state has slowly evolved. There is only a partial truth in each of the state theories advanced by philosophers, but these theories must be supplemented by the sociological theory of the gradual development of laws and of social control, brought about by the natural evolution of society in response to conditions, physical, economic, and social.

Yet there must be added to this the constant choice of society in the establishment of social order, in the adoption of forms of government, and in the creation of wise laws to protect and guard

human rights and privileges, as well as to impose social and political duties. This conscious choice of the social mind followed in order the unconscious growth of society. Any one who has read at all carefully the history of the struggle for civil liberty knows how out of the clash of opposing interests, principles of government which have been fundamental to our modern theories of the state were developed, such, for example, as the consent of the governed, or the principle of taxation only upon representation, or that of the voting of taxes only by the representatives of the people who pay them.

Nor must the formation of codes of laws as a means of producing social order be ignored. The expression of the best methods of government and the best laws for the control of man gave a great impulse toward the building of the state. No one can estimate the effect on social order of the publication of the first code of laws of a society. Yet the lawgivers did not make the state.

The Essential Functions of the State. — Recognizing that states continue to grow by enlarging their inherent powers and growing from without by adding to the number of functions, one may insist that there are certain characteristics and certain essential functions of a community to be observed before it can consistently be called a state. Adhering in part to the outline of Wilson,[14] the list of essential functions may be stated briefly as follows:

(1) *Social Order.* — Were people all well intentioned and willing to observe the Golden Rule in their treatment of one another, still it would be necessary for some authority to establish and preserve the order of their going, that confusion might be prevented. The idealistic anarchists are wrong in assuming that if every one was willing to do right, there would be no need of government. While the real order of society may not be founded on coercion, it remains true that the regulative power of government is essential in order that people may have an acknowledged universal guide to determine their proper place in the social world.

(2) *To Provide for the Protection of Person and Property from Violence and Robbery.* — In the most highly developed societies there are those who do not observe the rights of person or prop-

[14] *The State*, pp. 639–640.

erty. They do not hesitate to take that which belongs to another or to attack others and do them injury if they so desire. Hence, it is essential in every well-regulated community that such persons be restrained. Such protection is perhaps the most fundamental of the services of government; for the economic and social life of the people depends upon it. Without the faithful exercise of this function of government, all others will fail to give justice and promote the well-being of the community.

(3) *The Defining of Legal Relations between Man and Wife and between Parents and Children.* — While the family precedes the state in the order of development, it has surrendered, in a measure, to the state the general definition and regulation of rights of its members. The marriage relation, so largely an individual matter, becomes a general social question when results are considered. So far as these relationships affect the whole social order, they are regulated by the government. Likewise, the relation of children to parents is naturally a private one, but so far-reaching is this relationship in its effects on the social body that it must of necessity be regulated. While the state refrains from invasion of the sacred precincts of the home to regulate its internal affairs, yet so far as the rights of the individual permit, laws must be passed and executed for the establishment of social order in the home. The ignorance of many, the errors of judgment of others, and the mere viciousness of still others demand that the family life shall not be used as a means of working injury or injustice to any person; otherwise society might be destroyed by the corruption of the family, the fundamental social unit.

(4) *The Regulation of the Holding, Transmission, and Interchange of Property.* — One can imagine a community holding all property without any formal individual ownership. This has been practiced to a certain extent by some communities. The communists advocate this and the anarchists have denied the right of individual ownership. Proudhon, leader of one school of modern anarchists, claimed that "property is robbery," and that property holders were robbers because they had seized that which belonged to all and held it as individual property. But in community holding, it would be necessary to have the use of such

property regulated, and as the kinds and nature of possessions change, new laws must be instituted, from time to time, to avoid confusion and oppression. However, one of the bases of social life is the ownership of property. It has arisen through the practical needs of society and has been carefully defined and guarded by law. Even though it be conceded that the acquisition of property has resulted from the combined efforts of the members of the community, it is the acknowledged right of every one "to have and to hold" and the state must protect every one in this right. Consequently what an individual owns he may dispose of and the government again comes into its legitimate province in regulating the exchange of property, as well as the inheritance of property.

(5) *The Determination of Liability for Debt or Crime.* — After the fourth function the fifth follows as a necessary corollary. Otherwise, debts could be contracted and the persons contracting them could repudiate them. Without regulation, the business confidence would be so limited as to destroy the commerce and exchange of the nation. Indeed, those so disposed could practice confiscation and robbery without the restraint of government. So, too, as crime is a violation of law, individuals must be held responsible for it or otherwise no social order could be secured.

(6) *The Determination of Contract Rights between Individuals.* — Here we have again the enforced responsibility of an individual to his fellows. It would be impossible to have a well-regulated social order without it. While the stability of business rests to-day largely upon the voluntary honesty of individuals in their dealings with one another, the opportunity for the irresponsible to repudiate obligations incurred makes it highly necessary for the government to guarantee, by well-conceived laws, the enforcement of obligations. Differences of opinion might also cause great confusion as to what constituted a contract and how it should be fulfilled. Hence a general regulation is necessary, and the state alone can make such a regulation.

(7) *The Definition and Punishment of Crime.* — Without law or regulation by the state, society would imperfectly adjust itself to a social usage. Certain things would be recognized as against

the welfare of the community. There would naturally appear a consensus of social opinion which would determine what was right and what was wrong in society. But the law determines what is crime against society and demands a penalty for offenses. Originally the offense was only against the individual and it rested with the individual to settle with the offender. But it finally became the duty of the state to protect not only the individual, but also to protect itself, hence the offense is against society and the government must define the crime and institute the punishment therefor.

(8) *The Administration of Justice in Civil Causes.* — Disputes over rights of property and personal privileges are certain to arise in every community. The settlement of these contentions or disagreements must be made by some disinterested person. The state, being the only power that can operate independently of individual interest, becomes the natural judge and therefore the administrator of justice between all contending parties. It would be impossible to preserve social order or to establish social justice without such administration.

(9) *The Determination of the Political Duties, Privileges, and Relations of Citizens.* — What part the citizen shall take in the government depends upon the nature of the government instituted, but every state implies the governing and the governed. Sovereignty is the supreme authority of the state. Through its own will the state assumes and maintains the authority which may be expressed through king, parliament, or constitution. It is the sovereign will of the state that regulates political duties and privileges of citizens. In a republican form of government like our own, where it is assumed that people govern themselves through their representatives, the sovereign power rests, for the time being, in the constitution which is created by the people, that is, the people define through constitutions, laws, and authorized administration their own political rights, duties, and privileges. The right to vote, to hold office, the duty of taxation, and the duty to bear arms in defense of the country, and the political limitations and duties of officers, must all be established by the government through well-defined laws and regulations.

(10) *The State Must Preserve Its Life and Maintain Its Political Relationship with Foreign Powers.* — Every state stands as a unit in relation to other states and as such its individuality and independence must be maintained. Hence all intercourse with foreign powers must be conducted by the state. It must preserve the people from external danger or encroachment of other powers and must advance all the interests of the state in relation to foreign powers. It must see that the state's rights and privileges are maintained and that its eitizens and their property are protected when involved in international affairs.

In the most limited conception of the state, its government must possess at least the powers enumerated above, in order to maintain itself and perform all of the necessary functions of statehood. Not one of the above-enumerated functions could be left out without crippling the power of the state, and every modern state attempts to perform these functions in one way or another.

Optional Functions of the State. — While the above list represents the minimum requirements of statehood, there are no limits placed upon the action of a state provided it advance the interests of all the people and increase the well-being of the public. Hence it is that states vary in the number of things they attempt to do for the people. There are many optional functions which at least some states have assumed. The following is a partial list.

(1) *The Regulation of Trade and Industry.* — Most modern governments find this essential to the welfare of the state. In fact, all nations have regulated trade and commerce to a considerable extent. It becomes necessary for the government to coin money, to establish standards of weights and measures, and to regulate certain trades through license. In a larger way governments have regulated navigation and transportation and established tariffs for the regulation of industry and trade. This service of government increases in modern times. There is no limit to the action of the state in this matter except that of sound judgment and the possibilities of promotion of its own interest and the welfare of the people it represents. At various times in the history of the world states have gone too far in regulating industries, and at other times they have not gone far enough. The tariff, for

instance, may be used to build up one industry at the expense of others and to interfere with the foreign commerce of the nation to its own detriment. Possibilities of this kind indicate that laws for the regulation of trade should be instituted with the utmost care.

(2) *The Regulation of Labor.* — All modern nations have attempted to regulate labor to a greater or less extent. Whether it was slave labor or free and independent, states have found it necessary to establish laws regulating master and slave, employer and employee, and to define the rights of the laborer. In the present industrial era this function of the state has grown large. If one were to consider the legislation of the various states of the Union in recent times, he would observe that a large body of law had been created for the regulation of labor. Indeed, the greater part of the legislation in the United States in the last twenty years has been in relation to the industrial life, including labor. Political rights and privileges have, in the main, long since been settled, but rights, duties, and privileges of a growing industrial world must be settled in accordance with the existing conditions.

(3) *The State Management of Industry.* — Under this heading we have a large group of varied services of the state, such as the construction of roads, the ownership or management of railways or canals, the building of harbors and docks, the improvement of land by drainage or irrigation, and the dredging of rivers for internal communication. Included in this list is the protection of forests and of game and the stocking of rivers with fish.

There is also another group which varies a little from the maintenance of thoroughfares, that is, systems of communication. These include the postal, telegraph, telephone, and radio systems. The government may own and control all of these. As most governments have established their own postal system, there seems but little reason why the government should refrain from owning and managing the telegraph and telephone systems.

A third group is found in the ownership and distribution of public utilities. The distribution of water, of gas, and electricity by the government is among the important measures adopted by some municipalities.

(4) *Sanitation, Including the Regulation of Trades for Sanitary Purposes.* — This is neeessary to the soeial well-being of a eommunity, and the state has good reason for performing this serviee, for the health of a eommunity inereases its labor power, prevents pauperism and erime, and develops happiness and prosperity. The selfishness of individual interests would neglect sanitation and would lead to the spread of disease, therefore it is essential that the government take a hand in regulating the sanitation of the eommunity. It is a true saying that "publie health is publie wealth," and the eomfort and eonvenienee of individuals not only inerease wealth, but are essential to the general prosperity of the eommunity.

(5) *Education.* — Most states have mueh to do with publie education. They have either eneouraged it by granting privileges and subsidies or established and managed it on their own aeeount. It is generally eoneeded that in a free government in whieh the people take part it is necessary that edueation should be universal. The only way to make it universal is to provide for the maintenanee of sehools by the state. In our own eountry, while the state may edueate the individual for the individual's personal advantage, there is a deeper soeial foundation for edueation. The state exereises this funetion for the general defense and welfare of the people; through edueation it desires to make better eitizens, better equipped men to fill the professions and departments of life, in order that the interests of the state may be eonserved. While a state may exist without publie edueation, it is essential to the highest forms of the modern state.

(6) *The Care of the Poor and Incapable.*[15] — This funetion has been praetieed by states in varying degrees, but has never been considered universally necessary. In many instanees the poor and incapable have been left to their own resourees or to the tender mereies of individuals, or to private soeieties. The ehief instances of the state care of the poor is found in the aetion of England through its well-known Poor Laws. The English government sought to eare for everybody who needed help, and ehiefly through maladministration inereased the evil it sought to eure.

[15] See Chaps. XXXII, XXXVI.

It brought about a condition in which the poor were taxed into pauperism. Perhaps the people of the United States are more liberal in the care of the poor and incapable than any other nation. While we have thousands of private benevolent institutions caring for all classes of those who need help, nearly all the states of the Union have made provision for the welfare of dependents, defectives, and delinquents. It is even deemed necessary in modern times for the state to have a Board of Charities or a Board of Control to supervise these charitable institutions. While it is not the right of an incapable person to demand help of the state, it is deemed the duty of the state to help such person when his needs are discovered or made known to the state.

(7) *Laws Relating to the Manufacture, Sale, and Consumption of Certain Kinds of Food.* — These laws are sometimes called, very indefinitely, "sumptuary laws," but they can scarcely be recognized as such except in cases where they forbid consumption. The regulation of the liquor traffic, prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, has for its purpose the restriction of consumption, and the improvement of the moral and social condition of the people, but is not a direct sumptuary law. The inspection of food products, which tends to provide for pure foods, is not intended as a restriction on consumption. It seems wise for the state to regulate all matters of this kind which concern the health and permanent well-being of its citizens.

These are some of the more important optional functions of the state which governments, under some form or another, have undertaken, but they are very far from representing all that may be included in this class. Yet they show conclusively that there is variation in the conception of what a government should do, and variation in the method of procedure.

The Limits of the Powers of the State. — It would seem from the foregoing list of optional functions that there could be no law regulating what should be assumed by the state and what should be left to private action. This can be determined by the public will, which follows the changing condition of the people and the progress of the state. Under such circumstances it may be safely assumed that the state may do anything which conduces to the

highest well-being of the community. This, of course, is stated in a very broad way. In the United States, railroads, telephones, and the telegraph are owned and operated as private institutions, or at least by private corporations. Should it be deemed better for all the people that the state should own and manage these public utilities and the people should so decide, there is nothing to prevent their becoming essential state functions. There seems to be a tendency for the state to gain powers, and some think this will continue until the state owns and controls all the property and industries, and then we shall have a socialistic state. This, however, is not a necessary outcome of the increase in state powers, as the history of modern Germany shows. If in the past the state has been delinquent in exercising functions which legitimately belonged to it, or conditions have recently arisen which demand increased powers of the government, one need not jump to the conclusion that the state should own and eontrol all industries. The growth of governmental functions for the social welfare corresponds very closely with three great developments in the complexity of our social life: first, the increasing complexity of population and social relationships; second, the development of our industrial life in scope and intricacy; third, the evolution of a social consciousness, a public opinion based upon considerations of social welfare for the whole group, roused to counteraction by the abuses that cluster like fungi upon an antiquated social order.

The State from a Sociological Point of View. — The sociologist is concerned with the nature and function of the state, for in proposing any reform, he must know what can and what cannot be accomplished by the government. Many reformers have seemed to think that all it is necessary to do is to pass a law and the reform will be accomplished. But thousands of laws have been passed which have not succeeded in accomplishing the intentions of their promoters. Indeed, some havc been useless almost from the time of their passage. There are certain recognized normal tendencies in the development of society which must be considered before it can be determined what the state can do towards working a reform. It is found that acts of a state or government accomplish the purposes of their authors just in the proportion that the

lawmakers take into consideration the stage of social growth reached by the people. There is a social mind which acts consciously, and it may change the affairs of the body politic; there is an individual mind which wills the future action of the individual, but these may both fail unless their choice be founded on an appreciation of the existing state of the social mind developed by their group. An example of a sociological tendency which has a practical bearing upon the making of laws is that law formulated by Giddings that a society which has few interests, but has these harmoniously combined, will be conservative in its choices, while one which has varied interests, but which are not yet harmoniously combined, will be radical in its choices. It is apparent that a program of policies to be enacted into law which would suit the one situation would not suit the other. Another sociological law also formulated by Professor Giddings is often acted upon by the practical legislator. It is that social action is less likely to be impulsive as society gets into the habit of attaining its ends by indirect and complex means.[16] The man who wants sudden action upon a proposal which will not stand the test of careful thought and investigation always argues the urgency of action. On the other hand, he who wants to defeat such a measure moves its reference to a committee or its postponement. Which method shall be adopted and what shall be the nature of the law proposed to meet a certain situation will depend largely upon the stage reached in the development of the social mind by a people. Moreover, what powers the state shall be given by the people depends much on the stage of development reached by the people in their collective life. If the population making up the state is relatively homogeneous in blood, or ideals, a democracy like the old New England town meeting will perhaps give the best results. But, let the population be made up of people gathered together from all parts of the world, who have not yet learned to know and appreciate each other's ideals and customs, and the democracy of the New England town meeting becomes the tyrannical bossism of our great cities. Or, again, a law which will be obeyed in "prohibition" Iowa, whose people have long been in America and have

[16] Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 177–181.

adopted the Puritan ideals, will be broken in Wisconsin or Minnesota with their large foreign populations possessing other social customs and ideals. Yet as socialization brings all communities into more complete accord as to the principles and practices of ideal democracy, a common consensus of opinion appears and law and usage of all will conform more nearly to the ideal of democracy. Group activities of all kinds must become subservient to the welfare of all. As individual liberty becomes more and more expressive in the group, the greater democracy must demand the loyalty and obedience of the group. Hence, the state must determine justice between groups and demand that they, like the individual citizen, work in harmony for the general good. Sociology provides the foundations on which the political scientist may build his science of government, and the political philosopher his theory of the state.

Our modern democracies are representative governments. This is a wise provision whereby society provides for superior leadership and at the same time makes the leaders responsive to the will of the people. Democracy does not imply that all men are equally able to govern. There are and always will be differences in natural ability. The common man knows when government curbs his liberty and bears harshly upon him; he is not always able to devise means to relieve his distresses. Representative democracy provides the means by which he may delegate the superior person to find a way out of his distresses for him. It makes a place for the expert in government, yet gives the common man a check on the expert and provides a way whereby the needs of the common man may become vocal.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Distinguish between the state and society. Give an example.
2. Would you call the condition of society which existed in one of the pioneer Western communities in the early days of this country a state? Give reasons.
3. Were the Indian tribes which the white man found in this country at the time of its discovery a state, or states? Give reasons.
4. Describe the growth of political organs and functions in one of our new Western states. Why is the development of these functions in the United States not typical of the way in which they developed in, let us say, medieval Europe?
5. In what general ways does the modern social state differ from England, let us say, of the time of William the Norman?
6. Name and describe the two phases of the evolution of the state.
7. What interest has the sociologist in the theory of the state?
8. State the sociological theory of the origin of the state.
9. Name the essential functions of a state.
10. What are the sociological limitations upon the powers of the state?
11. What is the criterion by which it would be determined whether a certain thing should be done by the state or by private initiative?
12. Of what value to practical statecraft may sociology be? Why are some laws impossible to enforce? Give examples.
13. To what extent should the Federal Government assume control of the conduct of people in regard to problems that are essentially local in their origin, such as child welfare, the labor problem, and the liquor problem.

CHAPTER XIII

PROPERTY AND ORGANIZED SOCIETY

Society is an outcome of the " struggle for existence " with which Darwin and Wallace long ago made us familiar. In this " struggle for existence," as Giddings has pointed out, there are four elements: " (1) *the struggle to react,* to endure heat and cold and storm, to draw the next breath, to crawl the next yard, to hold out against fatigue and despair, to explore and analyze the situation; (2) *the struggle for subsistence* wherewith to repair the waste of reaction; (3) *the struggle for adaptation* by every organism to the objective conditions of its life, and (4) *the struggle for adjustment* by group-living individuals to one another." [1] The struggle for subsistence gave rise to what are now known as the economic activities of society.

In all stages of society from the primitive horde to civilized nations the struggle for subsistence is constantly affected by the other struggles mentioned. Man does not live his life in watertight compartments. He loves as well as hungers; he craves companionship as well as food and clothing; he plays, and his play affects all the other aspects of his behavior; he fears and worships, and his religion modifies his struggle for subsistence; he hates and fights, not only for food and the sources of food supply, but for social prestige. Thus, his cultural activities and his economic activities interweave and condition each other.

In these as in all other social activities man has developed an order, by which is meant that he has organized his relations to objective Nature and to his fellows in his wealth-getting and wealth-using activities in certain definite ways. Therefore, since his economic life is only a part of his total life activities, they must be studied as a part of man's social relations. Only so shall we be able to get a complete picture of social relations and processes.

[1] Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Human Society,* New York, 1922, p. 14.

In the remainder of this chapter we shall try to present a picture of the development of man's struggle for subsistence from primitive to civilized society. In the following chapter we shall study the effects of economic activities upon other phases of social life.

The Organization of Property in Primitive Society. — Let us look at the picture, first, of primitive societies in their struggle to get subsistence.[2] Consider a tribe of savage people, such as one of our Indian tribes, without many of the achievements of civilization. They know almost nothing of our science; they have few of our inventions, such as give us a degree of control over Nature. Except in a few favored parts of the earth, where Nature spontaneously provides them with subsistence, they have an incessant struggle to live. The powers of Nature are terrible forces with which they have to deal without our understanding of their nature and of how to bring them under serviceable control. Some of them — not all — have domesticated one or more animals, and have thus added a valuable ally and have secured a source of fairly well-controlled food supply. A few have begun the cultivation of some plants and so have stabilized to a degree a subsistence resource. They have invented some devices for hunting, trapping, and fishing, and thus have aided themselves in securing food and raiment. They have invented magical practices by which they believe that they can increase the supply of fish or buffalo, or whatever be the chief supply of food. For example, the Central Australians have certain magical ceremonies whereby they believe they increase the annual supply of witchetty-grubs, an important source of food. They perform certain ceremonies to increase the rain supply on which their crops depend. They have other ceremonies to protect them from the forces of Nature which produce sickness and death. Knowing little of the nature of these forces they personalize Nature, or invest it with strange, occult power, which they call *mana*, or *orenda*, and which they try to get control of by imita-

[2] The anthropologists and culture-historians have here put the sociologists under a debt of gratitude. One of the best recent discussions of property in primitive society is Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Chap. IX. For the economic situation among the Australian Aborigines see Malinowski, *The Family among the Australian Aborigines*, London, 1913, Chap. VIII.

tive magic, or which they propitiate by gifts. Taboos are established. They must not kill this animal or plant for fear something dreadful may happen to them. They must not do this or that in their social relations, because it will bring bad luck. So their conduct is circumscribed on all sides with rules and customs in which the young must be very carefully instructed. Before a hunt a buffalo dance must be held in which the fight with the buffalo is put in pantomime in order that the hunt may be successful. Before an attack upon a hostile tribe a war dance must be held in which the battle is enacted in pantomime so that they may be victorious.[3]

In short, while in many cases these actions do produce certain psychological states of mind which are productive of morale, and relieve the strain of the uncertainty of a critical situation, and while they are experiments with the forces of Nature, which often lead to discoveries and practices of value, primitive man lives in the midst of a hostile universe over which he has very limited control, and lives a very precarious existence. The struggle for existence is severe; the weaker die off; fear rules man's life and numbers such as we see in civilized life are impossible. Doubtless in primitive society man adjusts himself to these conditions, and he is comparatively happy. His adjustments to the physical and social environment are different from ours, but they are adapted to the state of his knowledge and the conditions of his existence.[4] Many of the problems he has, civilization has forgotten because it has brought various powers of Nature under control and because we have learned that natural events occur in definitely ascertained ways, which we call natural laws, rather than by personal caprice. Some of his problems still are ours, and we have others which did not so much concern him. Illustrative of the former are the problems of the lightning, the windstorm, earthquake, and flood; of the latter are those which have risen in consequence of the various kinds of economic division of labor, and the complexity of our economic life, such as financial difficulties, strikes, bankruptcies, and a living wage.

[3] Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, pp. 132–134.

[4] Carl Bucher, *Industrial Evolution*, quoted in Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*, p. 129.

With this picture in mind let us look at one aspect of economic life among peoples in different stages of social life. Let us select property, men's conceptions about it, and how among various peoples it has been treated in relation to social well-being.

Forms of Property in Primitive Society. — There is a general idea abroad among people that in primitive society property was owned in common. Certain students of society are prone to say that individual ownership of property is characteristic of advanced social evolution, while communal property is a mark of primitive society. They point to the fact that real estate is not owned in fee simple among primitive peoples as it is in the modern civilized societies. They also cite the communal ownership of ground in feudal society, and point out that in the development of society from medieval to modern times we have seen the development of individual ownership in unprecedented fashion. Let us see how much truth there is to this conception.

Even among primitive peoples there are several kinds of property — land and the things that live upon it, certain kinds of movable property, certain rights to intangible things and sometimes slaves. They also have certain notions governing the inheritance of property. As we shall see their definitions of these various kinds of property rights do not exactly agree with those familiar to us, but in a general way we may thus classify their different kinds of property.

(1) *Real Estate.* — Are land and the things attached to it owned in common in primitive society? While absolute common ownership of land in a tribe never is found any more than it is in the United States of America, there is the very definite conception among primitive peoples that the land within a given area belongs to the people of the tribe inhabiting and using it. That conception, however, does not necessarily indicate communal ownership any more than that the land within the confines of England or the United States belongs respectively to the peoples of those countries. The decisive matter is whether individuals in the group have control over certain parcels of ground within the group's area.

There is, however, something somewhat analogous to common

ownership among the families within the tribe. A group of relatives, as primitive peoples conceive of relatives, may own in common a piece of land and have the exclusive use of it. Where this group of blood relatives occupy a village, there exists common ownership of the land. Even in these cases, however, close study of their conceptions usually reveals the fact that this land owned by the group is parceled out among the individuals composing it, so that each individual has control over a particular piece.[5]

Even when the primitive people are hunters, communal ownership of the hunting grounds is not always the rule. It is the rule among some hunting tribes, as among the Plains Indians, the Maidu of California, and the Thompson Indians of British Columbia. Even among the last two of these tribes, however, it was qualified by the conception that if an individual of these tribes constructed a fence around a piece of land in which there were deer, or built a fishing station, he had the exclusive use of that land as against any other members of the tribe. Among some of the tribes of North America, such as some of the northeastern Algonquin tribes, individual families of the tribe were allotted certain parts of the tribal territory as their own individual possession. On the whole we may conclude with Lowie that " territorial rights were at most vested in a body of close blood-kindred through the father, never in a more inclusive body of real or putative kin, never in a larger political group." [6]. A similar situation prevailed among the Kariera of Australia and the Veddas of Ceylon — all hunting tribes. Therefore, we can say that so far as we have evidence, hunting tribes recognize at least family ownership of land, and often we find individual ownership.

Among shepherd peoples often nearly complete common ownership of the grazing lands obtains. However, many shepherd tribes rely in part upon agricultural products for their subsistence, and when that is the case, individual or family ownership is to be found in the patches where these products grow. Thus, among the Hottentots the land on which grew the *nara* gourds belonged to individual families. Also among the Kirgiz shepherds each family has undisputed possession of a wintering place, which is handed

[5] Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 206–210.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 213.

down by heredity in the family. Hence, in the summer the Kirgiz are communists and in the winter individualists. The Bible reflects a similar situation among the primitive Semites. When the herds of Lot and Abraham became so numerous that pressure upon the common pasture lands led to quarrels, they divided the region between them. Whether we look upon Lot and Abraham as individuals or as family names, there was not communal ownership of the land; at most there was ownership by the family.[7]

Among the agricultural tribes we find either individual ownership or ownership by blood relatives. Thus, when a Hopi Indian woman dies, her house descends to her daughters. It is not inherited by even her sib, or group of blood relatives. Among the Zuñi Indians there is individual or family ownership of fields, houses, and corrals. There is communal ownership of the unused fields belonging to the tribe. Among the Hidatsa Indians land was owned by the close blood kindred of the mother. In some South American tribes the land seems to have been owned by the tribe, as among the Ancient Peruvian Indians, although the evidence is not conclusive. In Africa, where feudalistic chieftainship often is found, as in Dahomey, the land belongs to the king, but the individual has the exclusive use of a particular parcel, as in medieval feudalism. In other African tribes the ownership is by a group of blood relatives, as among some of our Indian tribes. A wider survey of primitive peoples would show variations of all these systems, — communal ownership, family ownership, feudal ownership by chief, king, or noble, and individual ownership.

However, in some tribes, we have a conception of individual ownership which is strange to us. For example, in Fiji, the Banks Islands, and part of New Guinea we find the custom of allowing ownership to a man who has planted cocoanuts or other useful trees on another man's ground even if he has not first obtained the owner's consent. In reviewing the whole situation among primitive tribes Lowie says, "A review of the systems of land tenure described in the preceding pages establishes beyond doubt the reality of that primitive joint ownership which so strongly impressed Sir Henry Maine. But it is by no means a fact that the co-proprietors

[7] Gen. 13: 6–13.

always constitute a social unit of the same type. Communal ownership, apart from the general tribal area, we have encountered only in that highly special case where a father-sib is localized and thus becomes coextensive with the commune. Far more frequently proprietary privileges are shared by corporations of another type, groups of close blood-kindred, unilateral as among the Ewe, or bilateral as apparently among the Ifugao. That is to say, there is no communism in land so far as the territorial body goes but only within a strictly limited body of actual kindred. Further, joint ownership, while frequent, is not universal. We also find individual property rights as in the Torres Straits and in Rewa; nay, communism and individualism sometimes coexist, as in the case of the Kirgiz pastures. The burden of proof surely rests with those who believe in a universal stage of communal ownership antecedent to individual tenure of land. Let them advance evidence to show that land was once communally owned in the Torres Straits; that the Algonkians at some definite period failed to recognize the individual hunter's domain; that separate ownership was unknown to the Vedda of some specified period."[8]

(2) *Movable Property.* — Personal property rights to movables is much more extensive in all stages of social development than personal ownership of land. Even where woman has an inferior social status her right to certain personal possessions is much more likely to obtain than a right to lands and houses. For example, among the Ewe people of Africa, where the wife is bought by the husband, and is unable to inherit land, she is capable of holding in her own right such things as goats and poultry and the cotton which she has cultivated and picked, as is shown by the fact that these things are surrendered to her husband only for compensation. Among some tribes this personal ownership of articles extends also to young children.

However, among some primitive peoples this individual ownership is limited by the principle of "effective utilization," as Lowie calls it. That is, such things as houses, boats, and nets are looked upon as the joint property of an entire family, as among the Yukaghir. Of course, when in any tribe the status of slavery is

[8] Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 231.

found, the owner of the slave often owns not only his horticultural products, but also the articles which he personally uses.

Among some shepherd peoples even the cattle are owned by individuals, while the right to pasture lands is communal. This individual ownership of cattle is witnessed by the practice of individual brands with which the cattle are marked among the Chukchi, the Kirgiz, and the Masai. Among some, as the Masai, individual ownership, rather than family ownership, is the practice. For example, a Masai man will give some of his cattle to each of his wives to use, while the animals remain the property of the husband. When the wife has a son who has become old enough to care for them, the lad is given ownership of them, and then he and his mother must leave the father's kraal and keep their cattle separate from his. In general, we can say that movables are much more often individual possessions than is land.[9]

(3) *Intangible Property.* — In civilized society we have such property rights as patents and copyrights. This conception of property is not foreign to primitive societies. These rights extend to songs, magic formulas, local legends, certain kinds of carvings, personal names, visionary experiences, methods of making medical concoctions, and memberships in societies.

Sometimes such rights are held by a group, but often by an individual. Often these rights are transferable. Among the Nootka of British Columbia these rights are of two kinds, (1) those which are necessarily handed down from father to son, and (2) those which the father usually hands down to his son, but may not, if he thinks the son unworthy. Often the psychological root of ownership of such things lies in the religious responsibility resting upon the group or individual possessing them. In many cases, however, the object of their possession is individual gain.

A few examples will make concrete these primitive conceptions. A song which has been produced by a certain individual and has received popular approval may not be repeated by any one but the original producer. Among the Koryaks magic formulas for banishing diseases, exorcising evil spirits, luring game, and consecrating charms are the trade secrets of the elderly women and to divulge

[9] Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 233–235.

them is to destroy their efficacy. For saying the formula these women are paid. Among many of our American Indians the Medicine Men have monopolistic control over their "medicine." Among some of the tribes of the Eastern Torres Straits Islands certain carvings must not be copied without special leave from the originator.

These intangible forms of property may be bought and sold, and inherited by relatives. In selling such a right sometimes the owner disposes of the right absolutely, in other cases he only disposes of the right to share in it. The close parallel between the conception of such property rights in primitive and civilized societies is obvious.[10]

(4) *Slaves.* — Many primitive peoples possess slaves. Often they are booty of war; sometimes they are purchased.[11] Originating as a method of utilizing in an economic way the spoils of war which only provided more mouths to feed, slavery may be described as a primitive economic invention. Moreover, like war, out of which slavery grew, slavery was with all its awful costs a crude method of social development. It sweated idleness out of man and taught a portion of the people steady labor.[12] On the other hand, it placed labor in an inferior status, against which it has had to contend throughout the history of society.[13] Usually slavery is not found unless the tribe has a settled life and cultivates the ground, because unless the captives of war can be put at some useful occupation, they are killed, especially the men, while the women are often kept as secondary wives and made to assist in the labor of the household and the fields.

One must not get the idea, however, that slavery was an intolerable position among primitive peoples. We have much evidence that frequently they were adopted as members of the tribe or family and shared many of the privileges of the blood members.[14] Goldenweiser says that among the Indians of the northwest coast of America slaves live in the same houses with the other members

[10] Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 235–243; Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 137.
[11] Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 346; Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*, p. 124.
[12] Ely, *Studies in the Evolution of Industrial Society*, p. 48.
[13] Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, Bk. II, Chap. V.
[14] Ely, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

of the tribe, eat with them, hunt and make war with them. They are, however, debarred from the ceremonial prerogatives and lack the social prestige of the other members." [15]

Slaves are looked upon in many tribes as a form of property which may be purchased, sold, and inherited. Usually those which could be sold were foreigners captured in war or bought from other tribes. Members of the tribe might be pawned for debts, but were not ordinarily sold outside the tribe. Kind consideration for the slave who was a tribal member is characteristic of many primitive peoples.

(5) *Inheritance.* — As in most other matters among primitive peoples there are wide differences concerning inheritance of property. When, as among the Maidus, on the death of a person practically all his personal effects are destroyed, while the few that remain descend to the oldest son and other relatives, and his rights to fishing holes and deer-drives to the direct male descendants, the rules of inheritance are not so complicated as where such practices do not obtain.[16] Usually acquired possessions are not as subject to tribal custom in their disposition as inherited property. For example, among the Nootka Indians of British Columbia a father must transmit to his oldest son the family legends which have descended to him from his father, while a Plains Indian cannot transmit to his son the rights he acquired in a vision; the son must have the vision himself, or he must purchase the right from his own father.

Common sense among primitive men determined, as among us, that articles of dress and tools used only by women descend to daughters, and likewise usually those property rights which are the exclusive prerogatives of men descend from fathers to sons only. Hence, we find frequently the principle that a wife cannot inherit from a husband, since in primitive society property is more often than in civilized society articles of use, and interest and rent exist only in the merest embryological form. That also accounts for the converse principle in some tribes that a man cannot

[15] Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 55; see also Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, pp. 59–82.

[16] Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

inherit from his wife. Another fact enters in to prevent inheritance from husband to wife and vice versa, viz., that usually husband and wife belong to two different groups of blood relatives and therefore often the property of each descends to the relatives of each. All property is not inherited by blood group relatives, however; there are other principles which determine inheritance, such as sex-use, as noted above, and family ties. For example, the Crows inherit land according to relation through the mother, but sacred possessions are transmitted from father to son, or from brother to brother. The Hidatsas transmit gardens matrilineally and sacred bundles patrilineally.[17]

Primogeniture, which has played considerable part in civilized society, has enjoyed a small rôle among primitive peoples, although among the latter there are to be found customs which easily developed under changed conditions into that method of inheritance. Sometimes no difference on the basis of age is made between the children in the distribution of the possessions of the deceased, as among the Veddas and the Kandhs of Orissa. While the Ifugaos of the Philippines distribute the major part of the deceased's possessions to the first-born, the latter is merely trustee for the other heirs. On the other hand, primogeniture prevails among some primitive tribes, but is often limited by polygyny to the oldest son of the principal wife, as among the Masai, or by the custom that while the father's weapons are given to the oldest son, the other possessions are distributed equally among all the sons, as among the maritime Chukchi. Frequently a dying man may assign different portions of his possessions to his various sons according to his affections, as among the Kiyukus.

Among some primitive peoples we find a system of *collateral inheritance,* that is, by the brothers of the deceased to the exclusion of his children. All kinds of variations are to be found. Among the Thongas when a headman dies the oldest son of the principal wife is looked upon as the rightful heir to the headmanship, but he cannot take the office until all the deceased's younger brothers have exercised the office and died. Among the Arapahos and

[17] Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

Crows the greater part of the property is inherited by siblings to the dead man — that is, by the collateral relatives.

In certain parts of the world there is found among primitive people quite a different system of inheritance, that of *junior-right.* In this system the youngest rather than the oldest child, as in primogeniture, has the precedence in the inheritance. A survival of this system is to be found in what is known as " borough-english " in certain parts of England.

The system is found in parts of India, Siberia, and Greenland. Among the Badagas of India the older sons leave the parental home and set up establishments for themselves, the youngest supports his parents in their old age and inherits their property. Among the Todas of India junior-right is complicated with primogeniture, as it is also among the Nagas of Manipur. Among the latter in certain parts of their territories the youngest son inherits his father's house and the most valuable of his chattels. Among the Khasis junior-right is linked up with female predominance. The youngest daughter takes precedence in responsibility for performing the sacrificial rites to the ancestors, and inherits the house and its belongings and receives the larger portion of the family ornaments. At death she is followed by the next younger sister. Similarly among the Kirgiz of Siberia the youngest son gets his father's herds, the older sons having usually gone off to themselves and obtained land and herds. Among the Central Eskimos the eldest son living with his parents is the chief heir, which in many cases amounts to junior-right.[18]

Everywhere in primitive society these property customs are inchoate and less clear cut than the description we have just given would lead one to conclude. Often several practices exist in the same tribe more or less inconsistent with each other from our point of view. They vary with the other social practices in vogue, such as marriage customs, whether descent is traced through mothers or through fathers, whether the tribal organization is democratic or feudal, and according to the predominant form of industrial life — hunting, fishing, pastoral, or agricultural. Religious beliefs also affect these practices to a greater or less extent. Sometimes

[18] Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 251–254.

one form of property and its inheritance obtains with respect to one kind of property and another form with respect to another kind.

Property in Feudal Society. — We must remember that the transition from tribal to feudal and civilized society was a gradual process and that many customs current in the former carried over into the latter. That is as true of the conceptions of property as of other social institutions. In modern society, therefore, what we find is in part a survival of customs, some of which originated very early in social development, and some were new inventions made in the adjustment of life to new conditions of social organization. Moreover, we must remember that, as among primitive peoples, in feudal and modern society different procedures and customs obtained in different places and among different peoples. Hence, our description of property customs in feudal and modern societies can be only very general, to which one can find numerous variations. Since we have gone into primitive usage concerning property, in the following description only a very general picture will be presented of the changes introduced by the feudal relation.

Historic feudalism was a combination of a system of land tenure and a system of social relationship. So far as property was concerned it regulated land tenure and economic services. The lord had superior title to the land, but the vassal had actual possession of it and enjoyed the use of it, for which he gave to the lord certain products or certain services or both. The provisions differed widely in different parts of Europe and at different periods of time. But in general the vassal rendered to the lord a certain number of bushels of grain, entertained him and his retainers for a certain period, supplied him with certain products of the soil or with money on certain important occasions, like the marriage of the lord's daughter, and worked a number of days each week or each year on the lord's own land in return for the use of the lord's land and the protection he received from the latter.

However, in spite of the fact that when the lord died and his successor took possession of the estate, or when the vassal died and his son succeeded to his rights, the vassal had to pay certain sums known as reliefs, the rights of the vassal were inheritable by his sons.

From the standpoint of the lord not only were the lands held from him by his vassals a part of his estate, but, since the vassals could not leave the soil without the lord's permission, what they rendered to their lord may be considered a part of the property to be handed down by death to his heirs.[19]

Hence, in both primitive and feudal societies there are certain general principles concerning property, growing out of fundamental human nature operating upon natural environment and conditioned by the system of social organization. Such general principles are (1) a proprietary right in some things belongs to a tribe, or smaller blood group, like a clan or family; (2) a proprietary right to some things belongs to individuals; (3) the right to inherit the individual property-rights of deceased relatives is everywhere to be found, but with varying limitations and in different ways; (4) in feudal society, in contrast with tribal society, property-rights are determined much more by personal relations on an individual basis than by blood relationship.

Property in Modern Society. — Such are the backgrounds of the complex economic development of our day. The same categories of property and similar notions and customs about its inheritance are to be found. We still have property in land, movables, intangibles. Our ideas concerning some of these classes of property are more definite and we have slightly different arrangements concerning inheritance and alienation. The differences in these matters are almost as great in modern society as in primitive. The same human mind has been operating in all stages of social development. It has hit upon different expedients to solve a problem among the different peoples, in different times, and under varying conditions. Knowledge of the customs and laws obtaining in different nations is greater, communication is freer, but in both we see that borrowing has occurred. Much of what we have to-day we have inherited from the past, modifying it as circumstances demanded.

In addition to the fact that in modern society finer discrimina-

[19] The very interesting details concerning feudalism and the economic rights and duties it involved cannot be followed out here. Reference may be made to such books as Robinson, *History of Western Europe*, Chap. IX.; Cheyney, *Industrial and Social History of England*, Chap. II; Gibbins, *Industry in England*, Chap. IV.

tions have been made with reference to classes of property and more detailed consideration is given to its control, there is another characteristic difference. We have in modern society many more forms of ownership. We have ownership not only by the whole group — tribe or civil unit; by groups of relatives and siblings; by guilds and associations, as in medieval times; but we have an enormous growth of ownership by the legal personality known as the corporation. Growing out of the Industrial Revolution and the development of trade and commerce for a world market — in a sense the legitimate result of the great guilds of later medieval times, but more, of the perceived advantages of limited liability, corporate immortality, enormous concentration of capital, and minute division of labor — the corporations of modern industry are distinctly modern. As contrasted with the home industry of the medieval manor, or even of the guilds of medieval industrial centers, we have the large factories filled with machines which multiply a thousandfold the products of one man. Instead of the presents and barter of primitive tribes narrowly localized, we have money and systems of exchange which provide for world-wide trade. Instead of depending upon his own muscles for power or upon the capricious winds of the heavens modern man has harnessed the heat in coal and oil to move his goods, to turn his machinery, and to carry him to the ends of the earth. He has discovered the use of formerly useless chemical elements and physical properties, so that adjunct to the economic organizations in modern society there are great numbers of scientific and research bodies devoted to study upon which industry depends.

Hence, if one wishes to visualize the machinery by which our economic life is made possible, he must picture to himself, not only great factories and shops, enormous ships and railroads — in short, the material devices with which he carries on his economic life — but also the organized relationships, which are as truly devices for economic purposes as machines, by which modern industry is carried on. These various devices, material and spiritual, or social, are the things which mark off modern industrial society from the primitive or the medieval. How these things have affected our other social arrangements we shall see in the next chapter.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Name some social and economic conditions which have made it possible to accumulate more rapidly recently than in primitive society.
2. Why are the classes of wealth much the same in primitive as in civilized societies?
3. Why has there been such an increase in the intangible forms of wealth?
4. Why are modern societies characterized so much more by corporations than primitive societies in the control of wealth?
5. Explain the part played by barbaric feudalism in the transfer of the control of property from blood-bound groups to personal relationship groups.
6. Why is there more personal ownership of land in civilized than in primitive society?
7. What social factors have made modern different from primitive economic society?

CHAPTER XIV

SOCIAL RESULTS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Social Importance of Trade. — In the short run contact may mean conflict. Ultimately, however, contact leads to acquaintance, which is the first step towards tolerance and coöperation. Anything, therefore, which increases the number of human contacts in the long run increases sociability and friendliness. This is especially true of contacts which have for their avowed purpose the advantage of each person. Trade between different individuals in the same group and between different groups produces such contacts. Trade is of special importance between groups. Other bonds unite the individuals within a group. Intertribal commerce lays the foundation of intergroup relations. Beginning in a small way first, by the giving of presents and then by formal barter, exchange of goods has expanded with the growth of society to the present credit system. Barter, money, and credit are steps in the process of trade which represent successive steps of social development. Barter can occur only when one person or group has articles for which the other can offer an article or articles equal in value. Money, representing a common denominator of value, makes exchange easier and promotes wider social contacts. Credit is impossible until social organization has developed to a point where men and groups have confidence in each other. A credit system makes necessary close social relations.

Social Effects of Commerce. — What concern us most here are the social effects of commerce. Primarily it permits *diversified industries*. It allows each individual to follow a given occupation or to engage in the creation of a single commodity. Thus, a farmer can spend his energy in raising wheat, and, after saving enough of the product to supply his own needs, may exchange the rest for other kinds of food, clothing, implements, and furniture.

He does this in modern times by the use of money, that is, he sells the wheat and with the money obtained from it he buys the other necessary articles. This permits him to follow a single pursuit with efficiency.

But exchange has a greater social function, that of the *development of social intercourse* between individuals, groups, territories, and nations. This intercourse has much to do with the socialization of groups. It brings diversified food, adding many articles to the food supply, and thus it increases the power to support life. Intercourse adds likewise to variety of clothing, making all means of protection and adornment of the body supplied by nature and art available to each community. This conduces to the comfort of the race and contributes another element of emulation between individuals. Moreover, exchange permits adaptability of different clothing to requirements of occupation and climate, thus increasing man's working capacity.

Still more important, though less observable, is *exchange of ideas* which always follows exchange of material things. Commerce has always been a great stimulus to intellectual development. Ideas of social life and education are easily transferred from community to community and from nation to nation through the interchange of goods. The thoroughfares of commerce have always been highways of learning and courses of intellectual development and means of distributing inventions to the world. The caravans of the Orient brought culture from the East and disseminated it wherever their lines of travel passed. The Phœnicians, in their attempts to carry on commerce, brought to the Western world the practical arts of Asia. Perhaps no more striking example of the influence of commerce on ideas is known than the trade of the Italian cities with the Eastern countries. Like unto it was the influence of the Hanseatic League which extended trade to northern Europe.

The *moral and religious influences* of nations are extended through the channels of commerce. Indeed, sometimes this means is more effective in introducing new customs than that of direct missionary effort. The habits and customs of one people are taken up by another almost unconsciously as they communicate and

intermingle through trade. While the trader sometimes introduces whisky and vice and exploits the natives, he is also often the carrier of ethics or religion. How important commerce may be in supplying means whereby religious ideas and practices are spread may be seen by a study of the spread of the Christian religion in the first few centuries of its history throughout the Roman Empire. The traveling Christian artisan and peddler were the most numerous and successful early missionaries if we may trust the historians.[1] But religious doctrines alone will not develop civilization. If not followed by opening up backward countries to trade and communication with civilized nations, little progress will be made. This is as true with reference to missionary effort to-day in Asia and Africa as it was in the Roman Empire in the first Christian centuries. Missionaries have discovered that they must teach the arts of civilization, if they are to supplant pagan religions and that these arts must be followed by intercommunication with the civilizations of the world. All the missionary efforts in China will be of little avail if that nation refuses the arts of civilized life and closes her ports to the civilized nations of the world. Otherwise paganism will perpetually grow and recreate itself, overwhelming and destroying the milder influences of the Gospel. In accordance with this principle, railways and other highways of trade will be the best instructors of the inhabitants of the Philippines in the arts of civil life.

But trade also develops, on the one hand, *thrift* and, on the other, *cupidity and avarice,* for in a primitive land, where people have a surplus of one kind of goods and no means of exchange, there is no value attached to the goods and hence there can be no desire to accumulate or preserve. How often this has been illustrated by the growing of fruits and agricultural products in the development of the West! Oftentimes without a market, products of the soil have been rendered comparatively undesirable. With increased demand for articles created by the development of exchange, however, comes a desire for accumulation. This change in man's estimate of the value of things, out of the emulation between people in the same community, grows culture

[1] Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity,* Vol. I, p. 460, New York, 1904.

as well as jealousy and strife, new uses of wealth as well as miserliness.

While *tribal and national warfare* has risen on account of dissensions, jealousies, and desires for supremacy, conquest for plunder has been an ever potent cause of war. The history of the Hebrews records the conquest and the despoiling of the enemy. The Oriental despots in their warfare encouraged the work of plunder and robbery. Even the Roman Empire in its conquests of foreign nations never lost sight of the wealth that was to be obtained by conquest. Desire for plunder is often the cause of war to-day. The events leading up to the recent World War were motivated to a large degree by desire for commercial expansion.

On the other hand, the wish of the merchant and manufacturing classes has had an important bearing on the *peace movement.* For example, while some business men are desirous of war to protect their interests in Mexico at the present time, the great mass of the American people engaged in business are earnestly hoping that there may be no war. They realize by sad experience that war means the blocking of many of the regular avenues of trade. War results in the impairment of confidence in business conditions. It means loss of prospective profits. Moreover, increasingly the business men of all nations, except that class which is immediately interested in the production of munitions of war or any other class which may see a gain for their immediate interests, keenly realize that the business of the nation must bear the brunt of the cost of the war. The aftermath of the World War has emphasized these lessons.

Effects of Social Progress upon Methods of Trade. — No less important than the effects of exchange upon social progress are the results of changes in society upon the methods and ethics of trade. With the growth of complexity in the social structure the methods of exchange are altered. The simple exchange of various communities gives way to the intermediation of a fixed market under rigid rules and customs, as illustrated in the medieval markets and fairs. With the development of a social consciousness and unity of feelings and purposes there comes confidence and the

use of a common commodity as a medium of exchange, or money, and later the whole system of credit exchange.

Moreover, what began as presents to hostile groups for some ulterior advantage becomes with the growth of a code of morals and a sense of social obligations first a battle of wits and cunning and then an exchange for the advantage of both. In modern times a great change in the ethics of exchange has come about. In contrast with the medieval practices business ethics not so long ago began to frown upon misrepresentation of goods in the efforts to dispose of them, but left untouched the question of whether it was right to defraud the corporation or the foreigner. Then succeeded the policy of selling or trading a commodity upon its appearances. The horse was taken at his apparent value, the suit of clothes upon what it seemed to the buyer to be actually worth. Then there grew up the practice of merchants offering only the best goods, goods which they could personally recommend and guarantee, or else different grades, but with the difference in value made clear to the prospective purchaser. Once to profit by juggling the affairs of a corporation was not questioned; to steal a railway was a gentleman's business. To defraud the common people was the sign of business greatness. There has begun to grow up in our Western countries an abhorrence of graft. It has come to consciousness as the interrelations of our common social life have developed. Only as we have come to appreciate that "we are members one of another," and that if "one member suffers, all the members suffer with it" has there grown up a reaction against the plundering of others in devious and surreptitious ways. Within the last few years there has risen a belief that the man or combination of men who get control of the public streets for their own profit and without just compensation to the public, who "milk" a railway, who grab the public domain for the exploitation of the people and for the private advantage of this man or set of men are as bad as the man who sells at short weight or by short measure, as the farmer who puts the spoiled potatoes in the middle of the sack, the small apples in the middle of the barrel, the musty hay in the center of the load, or the merchant who sells inferior goods by misrepresentation. The term "thief" has come to be

applied to the man who gets control of water power, mineral resources, and franchise rights without due regard for the rights of the public almost as frequently as to him who steals a horse. This has come about partly because of economic reasons. It has been shown to be "poor business" to deceive. But supplementary to that motive for better business ethics is the ethical impulse and the social feeling of solidarity, as well as the dread of social reprobation, — a dread by no means of the least importance in influencing people to an ethical course of action.

The Use of Money to Facilitate Exchange. — Barter of commodities was an imperfect method of exchange before the use of money as a medium. Although the early forms of money were very crude and imperfect and the method of using it was but little above the old forms of barter, still, by degrees the system became perfected and money as an instrument of exchange greatly facilitated not only the accumulation of wealth, but also the progress of civilization. Instead of exchanging articles of all kinds, one well-known article, the value of which was well determined, was used to express the values of every other article. In the hunter-fisher stage cattle were used as money, and all values measured in terms of an ox or a part of an ox. Savage tribes have used shells or trinkets which became universally desirable. In the agricultural period frequently grains were used as a measure of value, but more and more people began to rely on metals as a medium of exchange. At first the baser metals were used, such as lead, iron, and copper. But finally, on account of their durability and universality, gold and silver became the chief money metals. The law of the creation of money is that an article must be, first, desirable, and, second, well known in the community where it is to be used, before it can become money. Then out of all the desirable and universally known articles those which are the most adaptable to the storage of value, those which are durable, easily divisible, portable, and not easily counterfeited, are chosen. They are not chosen by the order of kings or governors so much as by the consensus of normal use.

While money rapidly increased the progress in civil arts, it, too, finally became too clumsy for use in the larger transactions of

exchange. Then the credit system came into use and by means of it transactions could be made so easily as to transform the processes of trade and industry. The invention of credit was to trade and commerce what the inventions of steam and electricity were to the development of the industrial arts. Credit is the perfect machine of exchange. By its introduction the methods of doing business were greatly changed, and consequently the habits of society were likewise influenced.

These developments in the methods of exchange are cited here because they are made possible by the development of social unity and because they have greatly modified the organization and grouping of society. They have had vast influence on social order and social activities. Credit instruments could not displace money until society had developed its organization to the point where men had confidence in each other. Credit is based upon belief in one's fellows. Confidence is a social creation. It is inspired by acquaintance with others, by the multiplication of social bonds making strangers known to each other and making it next to impossible, because unprofitable and undesirable, to be dishonest. With the growth of social organization and the multiplication of social bonds in ever widening reaches confidence in fellowmen was inspired and credit instruments became possible.

Economic Development and the Growth of Social Classes. — Many new social groups have grown out of diversified occupations. Occupational division of labor produced groups with kindred social interests. While in primitive society there are to be found social classes based on sex, age, social status of superior and inferior in ability, leaders and led, religious and military groups, and in some societies even the beginnings of artistic and industrial groups, as commerce developed and industry grew occupational classes were added to these. The common interests of warriors bound them together in a comradeship of aims; likewise the slaves were made group conscious not only by status, but by common interests and hatreds generated by common occupations. With the Industrial Revolution came a remarkable realignment of individuals into occupational classes greatly multiplied in number. Leading to the development of great industrial cities the Industrial Revolu-

tion led to a sharper difference between dwellers in town and country. Professions multiplied as industry and trade developed. As wealth increased the difference between the rich and the poor became more accentuated. Employers in large factories no longer knew their individual employees. Consequently many new problems in social relations arose. Now the various occupational groups have become more self-conscious than they have been since the days of the medieval guilds. The results are seen in strikes and lockouts.

Extensive Exchange Dependent upon Transport. — Adam Smith observed that division of labor depended upon the extent of the market. The market is dependent upon transport. As articles of goods which are to be exchanged cannot all be produced in the same neighborhood or, indeed, in the same country, it becomes necessary to establish some means of transport before trading on any large scale can exist. Among primitive people the individual trader travels from tribe to tribe carrying his trinkets with him. In the trade of the Orient, great caravans were first used, by means of which goods were transported on the backs of camels from one country to another. After the introduction of navigation, goods were transported in ships across seas, along rivers, and over the ocean to different countries. Here a new social group of transporters came into existence, and as it became necessary to market the surplus goods in foreign countries the carriers represented a separate social and commercial group. Where there were no means of water communication, canals were built to carry goods through inland countries. The building of roads and highways also became necessary as a means of transporting goods for people. In modern life the great steamship companies formed for carrying people and goods across the ocean, and the great railway companies which transfer millions of persons and millions of tons of freight each year across the continent, represent the highest development of transport groups.

Perhaps there is no better illustration of the development of an economic social group than in the comparatively recent rise of the railway systems of the world. Here are great organized groups engaged in a specific work of carrying freight and human beings

from one place to another. So essential has the railway system of the nation become, that should they cease to operate for ten days, business would stagnate. Cut off railway communication from one of our large cities, and in thirty days people would starve for want of the necessaries of life. Not only has the transport system become essential to business and life but it represents one of the most compact and well-organized economic groups. A market is impossible on any extensive scale, such as we have in our large cities, without such a system.

These highways of commerce sometimes grew out of lines of transportation established to convey troops or for social purposes, sometimes were made with the economic motive primary. Whatever the motive the railroads, water shipping lines, and the roads are the channels along which flow the social influences. They are the arteries not only of trade but of culture. Without them new ideas and customs would not spread, social relationships with other peoples could not be established, and wider social groupings, such as states, would be impossible. Hence, the transportation and communication systems have been important means of social development.

Advertising and Trade. — No matter how perfect the transport system may be, exchange depends also on that important socio-economic instrument, advertising. A sufficiently strong demand must be created for the goods that people will pay the price necessary to secure their transportation to the place of exchange. Advertising creates a demand. It stirs the curiosity of people as to the goods advertised, and makes them see real or imagined merits in that particular consumption good. People get into the habit of using it, they are imitated by others, and thus the circle of demand widens, creating the fundamental basis for a market and exchange of commodities — desire for the goods — sufficiently intense to compete successfully in the judgment hall of the mind for first choice.

Advertising, however, is dependent upon the development of common tastes and habits, the close contact of people such that widespread emulation and imitation are possible. Sufficient plasticity of mind must exist to enable the advertiser to excite

new desires. Such conditions are possible only after people's experiences have been enriched by social contacts with other groups.

Property and Social Development. — Another important group of economic activities is that concerned with property. In the previous chapter we have seen how property developed. Here we must ask, What has property contributed to social development? It is indisputable that the growth of private property coincides with the enormous development of social organization and social relationships since the Industrial Revolution. On the medieval manor, when the peasants cultivated the land of the manor in strips which were in the hands of one peasant this year and of another next year, the soil was depleted, the yield decreased, and the whole social life remained poor and mean. When it became possible for each family to control a definite piece of land, or make and own a certain amount of goods, as under the system of domestic economy, or own and sail his own ship, certain social results appeared. Says Dr. Ely, "It is our motives which make the wheels of industry go round. We have a desire to acquire private property, and the desire, which is universal, leads to activity in acquisition, and this activity in acquisition leads to production because production for most men is the means of acquisition. We wish to satisfy our wants. Through production we can satisfy our wants because through it we reach property." [2]

Private property also gives a joy of possession. It adds to one's self-respect. It stimulates ambition. It develops social relations and reacts upon one's economic and social efficiency. It develops the personality. It cultivates carefulness in the use of property. It awakens the consciousness of the higher social needs. It stimulates emulation. It binds society together by concern for the protection of property. The desire to possess property under favorable conditions promotes fine character through the effort and self-denial necessary to acquire it.[3] It stimulates independence and allays the fear of dependency.

However, it is private ownership of property which has given

[2] *Property and Contract*, Vol. I, p. 298, New York, 1914.
[3] Ely, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 299–305.

us many of our social problems. Uncontrolled in the interest of all the people, private property is concentrated in the hands of a small portion of the population. Many people lack property and therefore lack independence. Lacking independence they are in danger of degenerating in the scale of well-being. In case of sickness or other calamity they become dependent upon others. This condition costs them self-respect, destroys morale, and often leads to pauperization of spirit. Those who lack property are denied the opportunity for personal development which accompanies ownership.

Moreover, the ownership of large amounts of property sometimes produces arrogance, oppression, social pride, indolence, waste, and extravagance.

What is the situation touching the distribution of property and income? Studies of the situation in Massachusetts and Wisconsin, the United Kingdom, France, and Prussia, have shown that in no one of them does a larger portion than two-fifths of the people possess any considerable amount of property. The middle class of owners, where ownership of property produces the greatest benefits, because the amount is sufficient to provide security but not enough to produce waste and extravagance, make up about one-fourth of the people of the United States, one-seventh of the population of France, and one-ninth of the population of the United Kingdom and Prussia. In the states mentioned one-half of the property is owned by one per eent of the families in Massachusetts, one and two-tenths per cent in Wisconsin, four-tenths of one per cent in the United Kingdom, eight-tenths of one per cent in France, and one and seven-tenths of one per cent in Prussia.[4] In these states King has estimated that sixty-five per cent of the people are poor, that the poorest two-thirds of the population own but five or six per cent of the wealth and four-fifths but ten per cent of the wealth.

When we consider income the situation is also bad. Fifty-one and a half per cent of the families of the United States, King estimates, received only 27.86 per cent of the total income, and the income of this half of the families was less than $800 per annum.[5]

[4] Ely, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 311–319.

[5] King, *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*, New York, 1915, pp. 80, 82, 228, 230, 231, 239, 246, 247. See also Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1921, pp. 89–96.

As the situation exists, therefore, in the countries of the Western world the advantages of the ownership of property are experienced by less than half of the people. On the one side of this middle class is to be found a great army of poor people who do not possess enough property or sufficient income to derive therefrom the benefits of ownership; on the other a small number of very rich who are denied the benefits of the ownership of a moderate amount of wealth and income.

The Improvement of Social Organization. — But on account of the increased diversity of life, there is great need of improved industrial and political methods. That is, the organization must become articulated as society becomes more complex. As a great and complicated machine may depend upon the service of one little cog, so the complex organization of society will depend for its successful operation upon one part or group of people, and just as the clumsy machinery of the past must be perpetually abandoned for better models, so the machinery of social order must continue to improve if it is to bear well the growing burdens of society. If, for instance, a group of people undertakes to furnish the coal necessary for the fuel of a nation, they must not fail, or manufactures will cease and people will freeze and starve. If a group undertakes to furnish the agricultural products necessary for the support of the nation, it will not do for them to remain idle for a year, for the people will perish. If the railways and their employees have difficulties which result in cessation of traffic, some method whereby such interruption shall cease must be devised in the interest of the people who depend on transportation for their existence and comfort. No *laissez-faire* theory can be allowed to stand in the way of social interference for the benefit of the public. Social organization must be devised to adjust such difficulties. Railway rates and service, control of natural resources like coal, oil, gas, and water are quasi-public matters. Social arrangements must be made which will protect the consumers of these products. If railway rates are such that the products of one part of the country, such as apples, for example, rot in the fields or on the trees, while in another part there are other products, for instance, grain, which can hardly be given away in that locality, it is evident

that there is maladjustment either in freight rates on those commodities, or the advertising agencies and methods have not yet created a desire intense enough in consumers to create an effective demand for them. More than this, there must be perfection of the social machinery within the group. That is, if a company undertakes to furnish artificial light for a community and through the imperfection of their manufacturing plant, or through the imperfect method of administration they fail to furnish light at a reasonable rate, the people will devise other methods. These are illustrations of the integration of society which must work simultaneously with differentiation, otherwise the social organization becomes defective and unwieldy.

Likewise the political machinery must continue to improve or antiquated methods of administration and laws would interfere with the progress of social and industrial life. The political life exists for the protection of all classes and groups of people. Should it fail to give protection or promote harmony of interests, it would seriously interfere with the production and distribution of wealth, and consequently with social order and social progress. For instance, the regulation of the government respecting the tariff may interfere with industries to such an extent as to prevent the normal industrial progress of the people. It is possible, also, for a nation to make arbitrary rulings or to neglect to make regulations in regard to the use of money and the methods of trade to the detriment of normal progress. Our tax laws must be adjusted to effect the wider diffusion of wealth and income. Inheritance laws may be adjusted to prevent concentration of wealth in families. The loan policies may influence the diffusion of ownership in the interest of all classes. The laws providing for the education of the masses and unlocking the gates of opportunity to the economically disadvantaged can help. The organization of industry under state and national laws can regulate ownership in the interests of all the people.[6]

Approved Modes of Acquiring Wealth. — In the improvement of the industrial system certain established modes for acquiring wealth are considered normal. Among these may be enumerated

[6] Ely, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 322–328.

the discovery of desirable articles, the adaptation of land to various services, the transformation of products of nature into useful articles, and, in fact, the furnishing of any desirable article obtained by legitimate effort, or by value given on account of service rendered. All society is organized to the end of mutual service, and he who performs a given service without interfering with the rights of his fellows is entitled to the reward of such service. It is only through this means of normal service that people should become wealthy.

Disapproved Modes of Acquiring Wealth. — In this connection it may be important to mention several antisocial modes of acquisition. Among these, gambling, robbery, theft, certain forms of speculation, the exploitation of the weak, catering to vicious cravings, fraudulent bankruptcy, and class legislation may be enumerated. In each instance the object is to obtain that which belongs to others by antisocial means, that is, without returning any service or value in exchange.

The robber who breaks into a house is not intending to increase the wealth or well-being of a community, but merely to get, by foul means, a share of the wealth already created. When two men play at the gaming table and one wins, the wealth of the community is neither increased nor diminished, nor is the community in any way served by the transaction. The men are not only non-producers in the transaction of gambling, but each is trying to take from the other what he possesses without giving anything in return. When speculation is carried beyond a certain limit, it is upon the same moral and economic basis as gambling or robbery. It seeks to exploit humanity and obtain by chance or foresight a portion of the wealth already created, without giving any return in value or service. When legislation is influenced to build a railway in a certain direction to benefit a few persons at the expense of many, or when the city council is influenced to perform a service for one at the expense of others, the general public is not served; it is exploited. In such cases the people's money is used for the benefit of a few. It is like collecting money from each of a group of individuals and giving it to one without any return.

Such methods are common where the political world first comes

in contact with the industrial and confuses it. The perfect adjustment of society will eliminate them. This is one of the difficulties of modern society, for while it is generally conceded that political and civil government should be carried on for the mutual benefit of all members of society, the theory that a man has a right to accumulate and use wealth as he pleases, regardless of the well-being of others, has permitted the perpetuation of ancient forms of piracy and brigandage under new forms of industrial life, which men excuse by calling them " business." Or, to take a more debatable example, a man or company buys up lands and does nothing but hold them until society by creating a demand for the products and services of these lands greatly increases their value. It must not be forgotten, of course, that by holding the lands from a period when they are only slightly in demand to a time when they are more in demand the speculator has given to them what is known in Economics as " time utility." That is, he has invested his money in them and is entitled to interest on that money. He took some risk, moreover, when he bought what no one else wanted, and therefore is entitled to a speculative profit for having taken that risk for the sake of society. In order that people should be induced to take such risks, the man who foresees what is going to happen must be more liberally rewarded than he who takes very little risk. However, after all these legitimate allowances are made, it is a question whether the unearned increment obtained by speculative investors should go to the investors entirely. Should not society which has created the value take a part of that increase in value? The same question arises with respect to other natural resources such as water power, timber, and mineral resources.

A similar principle is in question in the case of so-called " high finance " as seen in the manipulation of railway and industrial stocks and bonds by individuals who are shuffling the cards for their own advantage at the expense of the legitimate investor and of the public. The promoter and reorganizer undoubtedly are entitled to a rather large return for their services in bringing together capital for legitimate enterprises when the money is honestly used in industrial production. They are not, however, entitled to use such an opportunity to " milk " the enterprise for

the benefit of the insiders and to the detriment of the stockholders and the public dependent on that enterprise for their welfare. Public policy is against such a procedure, and the laws should make it impossible. That society has tolerated such antisocial policies is due partly to ignorance of the public concerning the evil, and partly to the indifference characteristic of American life concerning large public policies which involve the whole people of the United States and partly to the dominance of the economic doctrine of *laissez-faire*. The investigations which have been or are being carried on by the various states and the Federal government will dissipate the ignorance. American provincial indifference to national problems will disappear with the progress of social unification of the population of our large territory. A new theory of economics is rapidly displacing the old classical system, and when finally completed will be found to be an economics shot through and through with the social idea that economic conditions can be altered by human endeavor.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What inconvenience was there inherent in the exchange of commodities themselves, which was obviated by the introduction of money?
2. Show how exchange increases the value of an article.
3. Set out clearly the effects of exchange upon social life.
4. In what ways does social development affect exchange?

5. Trace the various steps in the development of exchange in the history of the United States.

6. What social classes exist in your community as a result of the organization of exchange?

7. Why is the mail order house able to compete with the local merchant for trade? Which of these reasons are economic and which are social in their nature?

8. What evils are to be seen in our economic and social life as a result of maladjustment in our organization of exchange?

9. Show that a strike is due to lack of adjustment of social machinery to prevent it.

10. Give illustrations from the history of the United States tending to show that development of ethical sentiments by a society makes certain businesses and some methods of doing business impossible.

11. What changes are just now under way in this country in methods of doing business due to the development of new social standards?

CHAPTER XV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS

The Nature of Ethics. — The nature of ethics seems simple enough until we begin to study its development. Ethics concerns those patterns of conduct which grow out of the association of man with his fellows, and which are approved by the group. It demarcates right and wrong and sets the question of duty by the approved standards of the community.

Each community has its own moral standards and its own moral code. In every society there may be many individual variations from these standards and from the recognized code. Primarily this code is unwritten, but because based on tradition has a power in social control of the greatest importance.

The recounting of the various moral systems of the world as set forth by the philosophers would be called the history of ethics. A history of ethical theory is quite a different matter. Ethical theories are attempted rationalizations of ethical standards. In this sense modern systems of ethics too often are based upon some philosophical principle with the purpose of giving morals an absolute or metaphysical foundation. Such an attempt leads to chaos. The ethics, with which we are here concerned, is a social science and has to do with the origin and development of moral practice. It treats of the various relationships of individuals in primitive society, the origin of altruism and its slow and painful development. While sociology has to do with the question of practical morals in all the various relationships of modern life, — in business, politics, or in purely social intercourse, vague in its nature, but none the less important for that, — it is also interested in the evolution of moral practice, for only as one understands how morals originated and developed does one obtain a clear conception of the structure and activities of modern society. It is through a study

of this phase of ethics that we can understand our moral standards and determine the moral status of a society.

The Social Importance of Ethics. — A study of the development of ethical standards is important to the student of sociology for several reasons. In the first place, ethical actions are socially conditioned, the people who act are involved in social relations, and their actions are described as ethical or non-ethical, or unethical, primarily according to their bearing on the welfare of others. We must study them, therefore, in order that as students of society we may see how such social institutions as ethical codes and standards came to be what they are to-day. As some one has said, we do not know anything save as we understand how it came to be. The student of social institutions is interested then in the origin and development of morals.

In the second place, the student of sociology is interested in ethics because of the moral questions which arise in connection with the problems of practical sociology. We talk sometimes about the ethics of individual conduct as if such an ethics is complete in itself. Is an ethics of any account which does not have for its basis the welfare of the group? And is not the ethies of individual conduct to a large degree determined by social considerations? Certainly the only important ethics for the student of sociology is social ethics. As such it possesses great importance, for our chief concern in any study apart from an understanding of the nature of the subject is its value toward the realization of a social ideal.

With the development of civilized society, the spread of education and the rapid changes in our social relationships, there has been an increasing demand for the application of ethical principles to public affairs. Old standards no longer fit the situation. We hear about business ethics and political ethics. Our papers and magazines are filled with discussions concerning the trust problem, the regulation of railways, the practices of those in charge of railways and industrial combinations. Those who in newspapers and elsewhere are writing seriously about these socio-economic problems are discussing the "right" and "wrong" of these new arrangements. What do these discussions signify except that men

have become conscious that the moral codes which fitted another set of conditions no longer serve to regulate our relationships? Ethical conduct is so essentially a part of all normal social activities that it furnishes the key for social progress. We cannot understand our social life and ideals at present unless we study the development of social ethics.

Again, a study of the social aspects of ethics is important because ethical customs, standards, and codes are very effective methods of social control.[1]

That the dawn of moral consciousness among any people depends on a crisis in their affairs the history of every group shows. For example, when the Hebrews settled in Canaan they had a code of moral standards based upon the group solidarity of a kinship organization developed in a pastoral economy of desert tribes. Every man in a blood-bound group was a brother of every other member. He was a potential enemy of the member of any other group. He was forced by his customs and traditions to be hospitable to any stranger within his tent. He must keep any kindred member who was in trouble. Within the group there were no classes based upon different methods of getting wealth or prestige. Through long ages relationships had been adjusted by a trial and error method until they worked smoothly. The regulation of these relationships had become customary and were handed down from generation to generation by tradition. They were given additional sanction by being conceived of as approved by the tribal god, Jehovah. Customary taboos had become his prohibitions.

However, when they moved into Canaan they found themselves face to face with people who had somewhat different moral codes and other gods. Moreover, the Hebrews gradually became settled agriculturists instead of nomadic shepherds. Jehovah was not an agricultural god. His place of abode had been Mt. Sinai. The land on which they settled was controlled by an agricultural divinity or divinities, Baal or the baalin. He required different rites of worship. The customs, moral as well as other, were different. The Hebrews gradually assimilated the moral patterns of the Canaanites. Such departure, however, from the old customs created

[1] Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XXVI.

a crisis which is reflected in the books of the Bible known as Judges, I, II Samuel, and I Kings. There the picture of the crisis is painted as consisting of "forsaking Jehovah," since these moral standards were looked upon as religious commands.

The height of the crisis was reached, however, when in the eighth century B.C. commerce was added to agriculture as an activity of the Hebrews. Here, then, another set of customs were met by the originally pastoral mores. Trade created a wealthy class. Rich and poor became class terms. The old brotherhood bonds of the desert and agricultural tribe were broken. Exploitation of some by other Hebrews took the place of mutual aid. Injustice between man and man became apparent. The old moral standards were threatened. Religion no longer was a supporter of social welfare, but became the ally of the extortionist, the bribe taker, and the exploiter. Such a crisis was reached that the ancient moral standards seemed threatened, and religion became a by-word and a scoffing. Fortunately in this crisis arose a few individual thinkers who saw what was needed. They are known to us as the Hebrew Prophets. Among those known to us from their writings are Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, and Jeremiah.[2] They were fundamentally social reformers on a religious and moral basis. They cried out against the rank economic and social injustices rampant in Israel. They re-interpreted the old moral codes in the light of the new situation. They re-interpreted their old religion so that it would meet the new social situation. God became in their words "a god of justice," One who loved righteousness. By justice they meant social justice, by righteousness they designated kindness for the widow, sympathy for the poor, right relations between man and man, observance of the sex taboos on which rested the solidarity of family life. Morals in their hands became an adaptation of the old mores to the new conditions of life. Out of that crisis developed a set of moral standards which through Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism have become of commanding influence for the Western World. These standards were modified through the centuries in response to new conditions.

[2] It will pay the student to read the writings of these prophets in the Bible. See also Cornill, *The Prophets of Israel.*

They illustrate through their whole later career, however, the way in which morals are conditioned by the social experiences of people.

Modern theories as to the psychological origin of moral sentiments range themselves in a general way into two groups. The earlier theories were based upon sympathy. The classic work on this subject is by Adam Smith, who is better known to the world because of his authorship of *The Wealth of Nations,* and by reason of the influence of that book has been called the father of political economy.[3] In the first two chapters of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* Smith points out that no matter how selfish a man may be there are evidently some principles in his nature which make it imperative that he interest himself in the happiness of others, and that a man's happiness is increased by the sympathy of his fellows. Man therefore desires the approval of his fellow men that he may enjoy greater pleasure himself, according to Smith. Morals, according to this view, are due to sympathy, which is almost instinctive in its nature. Smith was followed in much the same vein by Bain.[4] While sharing the same general view of the fundamental characteristic out of which ethical action grew, with that breadth of vision which characterized him in so remarkable a fashion, Darwin said that there were other elements which had to be taken into account if one would give the complete natural history of the moral sense. He criticized Smith and Bain for their contention that the basis of sympathy lay "in our strong retentiveness of former states of pain or pleasure." He urged that this theory does not explain why sympathy is excited in such immeasurably stronger degree by a beloved person than by one for whom we do not care. He believed that no matter how it originated, sympathy has now become an instinct. In man, sympathy, he believed with Professor Bain, has been supplemented by selfishness, experience, and imitation. It is much strengthened by habit, and has been increased by natural selection. He was not certain whether man's social characteristics are instinctive or whether they are the indirect result of other instincts and faculties like sympathy, reason,

[3] Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments,* Bohn edition, 1892, Chaps. I, II.
[4] Bain, *Mental and Moral Science,* 1868, pp. 244, 275–282.

experience, and a tendency to imitation, or to long-continued habit. We possess them, however gained, and they form, especially sympathy and habit, supplemented in man by reason, the basis of ethical action. The most important of all such characteristics, according to Darwin, is fear of the disapprobation, and desire of the approval of our companions. He added: "Actions are regarded by savages, and were probably so regarded by primeval man, as good or bad, solely as they affect in an obvious manner the welfare of the tribe — not that of the species, nor that of man as an individual member of the tribe. This conclusion agrees well with the belief that the so-called moral sense is aboriginally derived from the social instincts, for both relate at first exclusively to the community." [5] Thus, Darwin has added to sympathy habit, reason, and the influence of our fellows upon our actions. Furthermore, he made the fruitful suggestion that natural selection had something to do with the origin of these social characteristics.

The second group of theories is based upon habit or custom. These theories, to state them briefly and in general terms, proceed upon the assumption that the moral is the habitual for the group. Perhaps the leader of this school of thought is the great German scholar, Wundt. The habitual for the individual, when it becomes the customary for the group, and is sanctioned by tradition and superstitious reverence, becomes a social norm and thus obligatory. Darwin, as can be seen from an outline of his thought just presented, invoked habit to explain the origin of morals. He did not believe, however, that habit was the only factor.

Baldwin has stated succinctly the chief objection to the "habit" basis of morals in the words, "The theory of habit does not afford an adequate account of the sense we have, in our acutest ethical experiences, that what we ought to do may run counter to our habitual tendencies." [6] Another objection to this bald statement of the theory is that it does not account for reflective morality. Without a doubt, habit and custom play an important part in the genesis of morals; but their influence has its limitations.

[5] Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 1871, Vol. I, Chap. III.
[6] Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 1908, p. 46.

While these two groups include most of the theories which have been offered to explain the origin of morals, there are numerous variations. Westermarck postulates moral emotions as the basis of moral concepts which, he says, form the predicates of moral judgments. These moral emotions are akin to gratitude and revenge, and are essentially generalizations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth either indignation or approval.[7] Yet, to him "Society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness," and the first moral judgments expressed not the private emotions of the isolated individuals, but emotions which were felt by the community at large.[8] In general, therefore, it may be said that Westermarck bases moral conduct, so far as the individual is concerned, on the emotions, but these emotions in their genesis are socially conditioned.

Baldwin approaches the matter from the standpoint of genetic psychology. It is a part of the process which he has so happily denominated the "dialectic of personal growth." In the child and in the race the ethical sense develops, according to Baldwin, in the give-and-take of the conflict between the individual's own instinctive and habitual tendencies and the accommodations which he is constantly making by imitating an ideal, realized in some one who by the prestige of his character or his social position or his mental superiority is able to impress others. This other person gives him a conception of a socius, which awakes in him, in addition to his two other selves — those of habit and accommodation — that of obedience to a command. This other person supplies a law of social relations which lies above all individuals. This being, who with prestige lays down commands and receives obedience, himself obeys a law of action that puts restraints upon impulses which the child universalizing his own feelings and desires attributes to him. There, says Baldwin, you have the birth of moral ideals. When this has become a part of the child's mental furniture of a self, he gets into the habit of obeying the impulse to realize that ideal in his own personal characteristics by acting like the concrete personification of his ideal, and he may thus form the

[7] Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, 1908, Vol. II, p. 738.
[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 740.

habit of violating former habits, a fact which to Baldwin explains why morality often overrides an established habit.[9]

Generalizing upon these various theories from the standpoint of sociology, we can say that ethical conduct arises from the interplay of the individual's developing personality and the surrounding social conditions including social personalities. Baldwin's analysis is simply an explanation of the process by which a human being is socialized and so becomes an ethical person. It is an admirable interpretation of the mental adjustment through which the individual becomes a socius. The factors in the development of that moral personality are the individual mind with its inherited instincts and tendencies, whatever these may be, the physical conditions in the midst of which he lives, and, most important of all, perhaps, the social atmosphere of habits, customs, ideals, institutions, mores, and sanctions prevailing where he lives.

These moral codes, as Sumner has pointed out, are attempts to foster the welfare of the group. By the taboos imposed and the standards set, the group intends to select and perpetuate those patterns of conduct adapted to the social improvement of the people. However, since many of them originated in guess work, they are not always well adapted to those purposes especially in a changing world. How important this selection is in the advance of the race may be determined by considering the social choices. The ideals of life are determined by a process of exclusion of all those things which are considered improper and deleterious, and inclusion of those which are supposed to be of the highest advantage to the individual or the race.

If, however, these ethical ideals are born from the womb of society, how does it happen that they are higher ideals than the ideals possessed by many of the individuals composing that society? How can that be possible when it is a well-known principle of sociology that the group mind is more feeble than that of the average individual in the group? These perplexing questions have been best answered by Professor Ross. He says that the

[9] In the above is given a very brief interpretation of what Baldwin has worked out rather thoroughly. For the details see Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 1908, pp. 40–65.

ethical ideals of society are higher than those of individuals because of a conscious or unconscious hypocrisy on the part of individuals. Tom, Dick, and Harry are willing to give assent to ideals which are to govern others, but which, as they in their mental reservations believe, are not necessarily binding on themselves. They are unwilling to admit that they do not personally intend to be governed by such principles because they wish to be thought as high minded as any one. Yet, in their own practices they do not apply these principles. Thus the higher ethical principles become established by a consent that is based upon an unwillingness in most people to acknowledge to others their own inferior principles. How this unconscious hypocrisy works may be seen in the man who, hearing a moral ideal set forth, applies it to his neighbor or acquaintance, entirely forgetting that it is intended for him as well as for his neighbor. He assents to the ideal, but deflects its application from himself to another.[10]

This explanation accounts for the establishment in the traditions of society of a high moral ideal, but how shall we account for the origin of the higher ideal in the first place? Here the moral genius must be sought as the explanation. Out of the moral consciousness of some man or woman must come the fructifying ideal which will lift a race or a nation.[11] What spark set aflame that choice spirit with a new thought destined to lift a world, who can say? What challenge of physical environment to the soul of man stirred to inspiration his slumbering thought, — what desert solitude, or burning sky or awe-inspiring firmament or crashing storm? Or was it contact with perverse circumstance of life, — death of a loved one wringing the elemental emotions, or destiny turning the promise of joyous victory to the certainty of bitter defeat? Or, again, was it the strife of conflict with other human beings, perhaps depraved, immoral, flaunting the established decencies of society? Who can analyze the subtle influences which stir the soul of an Amos to that white heat of moral enthusiasm into which the dross of sensuality and perfunctory offerings to God are cast, to come forth again as an ideal new to the world, — the ideal of a God of social righteousness who desired justice rolling down like waters

[10] Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XXV.

[11] *Ibid.*, Chap. XXVI.

and righteousness like a mighty stream rather than burnt offerings, meal offerings, and peace offerings; rather than songs of praise and the music of viols?[12] Doubtless all these influences must be reckoned when the final explanation of the great man is made. But our task is to give due place to the moral genius who flings out his inspirations to our startled ears with a challenge and an appeal which demands attention and insures the assent of our inmost thought. Given the moral prophet and this tendency of humanity to assent to more than it is willing itself to practice; given convention and tradition; given the coöperation in things which arouse no conflict and which all can enjoy; and the development of morals has started which will go on towards perfection. The soul of the genius wrought upon by the influences of Nature and Man creates the ideal; the conscience of the individual ashamed to acknowledge his own preference for a lower standard sanctions it; and convention, sympathy, custom, and tradition establish it.

The Moral Evolution of Man. — But the standards of right, the ideals of man and society, and the social choices perpetually change in the progress of social life. There has been an evolution of morality. People feel differently and act differently towards each other from generation to generation. The notions of right and wrong change from time to time. There are varying standards of morality, not only in different races, but in the same race, from age to age. The morality of the Sioux Indians is far different from the morality of the French. In the former, in order to preserve the tribe, instruction is given in the art of killing, hence the young brave is not worthy of the esteem of his fellows until he wears one or more scalps in his belt. In the latter, legislation and civil justice backed by education and religion are the means of preservation, and the ideal type is the man of letters and diplomacy. If we were to follow, however, the history of the French people from the time of the Gauls to the present time, we should find a constantly changing standard of morality, and especially a constant change in moral practice. Whatever impulses or feelings may occur to determine the action of individuals there is always the social standard by which to make measurements. Cus-

[12] Amos 5 : 23.

toms are established, the unwritten moral code, always in evidence, congeals into traditional usage, and, more than this, the statute laws founded on custom and usage appear.

This is so evident that the influence of social environment on individual moral conduct is strongly marked. Whatever may be an individual's feelings of right or wrong, his actions are influenced by the ethical standard of the community, although in this there is a great difference between pure morality and conventionality. Many individuals act conventionally, while in their inmost feelings they are inclined to act otherwise. There are cases in which morality becomes conventionality, when certain moral acts of the individual coincide with the form of social action. A person may feel that so far as his own conscience is concerned, he may indulge in certain practices without injury to his life or character. But if this interferes with the conventional forms of society so as to cause a confusion of social order and otherwise affect the relations of his fellow men in a deleterious way, it may be considered immoral. For instance, if one in a church should decide for himself that he could rise in the congregation and ask the minister questions concerning his sermon, believing thereby that he could make clearer to the congregation the subject under discussion, it might be, so far as individual action is concerned, a perfectly moral act. But when we consider the effect on the congregation and upon the religious service, viewed from the standpoint of conventionality, evil results might follow. Hence in this case a violation of conventionality may be immoral conduct.

On the other hand, the conventional may become tinged with a moral quality. For example, in the course of ages it became conventional for civilized people to wear clothes which on most occasions cover most of the body. In the course of time this practice became a part of the moral code of society, so that if a person in our Western world goes with as little clothing as a savage, he is looked upon as an immoral person. So also with styles of dress. A new style comes in women's dress, which at first is looked upon as immoral because it violates the conventional. When closely analyzed, such feelings concerning these innovations are seen to be due to our conventional ideas upon the subject of exposure of the

person, for under certain circumstances, such as a formal social function, the exposure of much more of the person is considered perfectly proper. Let the custom of wearing clothes in a certain way become common, and any thought of immorality in connection with it will fade away. The conventional makes the moral in many cases.

Progress of Ethical Practice through Sympathy.— Doubtless the moral forces which arise from the inherent feelings of the individual have at least one source of their origin in the beginnings of sympathy of the mother for her offspring.[13] This sympathy extended from the mother to the immediate associates and relatives in the home, and finally extended to the members of the whole group who were permanently associated with one another. This widening range of sympathetic action finally extended to the whole social group located upon a given territory and united by bonds of social control. This represents the origin of patriotism, a love of the land, of its people, and of its institutions. And patriotism has given some of its best qualities to the relief of suffering man, no matter from what country or race he came. Altruism has extended until a universal sympathy for suffering is recognized. A flood in China or a famine in India, as well as a drought in Nebraska, or an earthquake in San Francisco, call out our compassion and help. There is to-day a world ethics which passes around the globe, although limited sadly among some nations, recognizing the rights and privileges of all and relieving the sufferings of many.

Egoism versus Altruism in Social Development. — The struggle for survival has always shadowed the individual existence and happiness of man. From the very beginning he has been obliged to struggle against the forces of nature for existence. His physical environment has to be subdued in order to permit him to exist. When he cannot subordinate natural forces to his own ends, he finds it necessary to adapt his life to meet their conditions. But

[13] Wallas has held that the altruistic feeling does not originate with mother love alone but with father love, with conscious desire for the safety and good of the loved person, from the sex relation of men and women, from the relations occurring during youth of brotherhood and sisterhood, and from the relation between adult males and children. See his *The Great Society*, Chapter IX.

in every instance it is only a method of struggle for mastery, for the purpose of survival, which characterizes his work. Truly, effort, — persistent effort, — has made man. Nor has his effort been confined to the mastery of the forces of nature; he struggles also with his fellows for supremacy. Indeed, frequently this struggle has been for life itself, few of the great mass being able to survive. Egoism has characterized man's early struggle, and his life has ever been influenced by it.

Side by side then have existed the struggle of man for his own existence and his struggle for the welfare of his fellows. Interest in the welfare and happiness of others in early society was limited largely to the in-group. With the widening of social bonds self-interest has been supplemented by social interest. Therefore, while we consider the evolution of man through his individual struggle for existence it must be remembered that his power to associate and to defend mutual human rights and interests has been the primary means of his mastery of the beasts of the fields and the powers of nature. Without this association man must have been overwhelmed and become an extinct species. Hence altruism has been a factor in the evolution of human society, and it now is as much a part of the general scheme of the struggle for existence as is egoism, and its course of development has been continuous from the minute beginnings of simple society to the complexity of modern life.

However, society as a whole sympathizes with the individual, for no man can suffer without the sympathy and attention of the group. No man's life is abused or destroyed without his cause being espoused by a large part of the community. This altruistic motive is interwoven with the entire social life. There must be a harmony of social and individual interests. On the one hand, the individual must meet all social requirements. On the other hand, society must give the individual opportunity for his own development and survival. The proper balancing of these two interests determines the lines along which our modern social practices run. The harmony of individual and social interests is the essential characteristic of a perfect society. The conflict, however, of our self-regarding impulses with social standards produces that

disharmony in many individuals so fruitful of unhappiness and so frequently resulting in personal disaster.

How a moral ideal develops out of the interaction of leading spirits and environing physical or social conditions is to be seen in the period when some great change comes over a people. It may be an economic change, like the Industrial Revolution in England or America, or the introduction of great numbers of continental immigrants into Puritan America, or the introduction of a new method of Biblical interpretation. There is first a period of hesitation. People know not how to adjust themselves ethically to the new situation. Children from the poorhouses of England were worked in the mills until Mrs. Browning and moralists like her set up a new moral ideal adapted to meet the needs of the changed conditions. Germans revolted against the temperance sentiment of the United States. The conflict of moral ideals occurs whenever peoples with different ideals mingle. Out of the turmoil there begins to appear an adjustment between two moral ideals which is neither the one nor the other. Out of the changing conditions of the present time there are emerging new social ideals of morality. The owners of factories are evolving a conscience as to hours of labor for their workers. Child labor is being tabooed. The labor of women is condemned under certain conditions of factory life. The morality of an honest day's work by the worker begins to appear.[14] Our morals have changed in the past forty years to meet the changed economic and social conditions. In international affairs the binding obligation of " a scrap of paper " is recognized by the conscience of an unprejudiced world opinion. Society, led by its choice spirits and in response to the goads of maladjustment felt everywhere, is constantly creating new moral ideals to express more perfectly its sense of relationships which will conduce to the happiness of the greatest number of its constituent individuals.

The Development of Justice. — Justice, like altruism, has its origin in sympathy. Primarily it is a feeling of suffering, pain, or pleasure that gives rise to a sentiment of justice. We believe

[14] During and after the World War the laborer's moral obligation to do an honest day's labor weakened, owing to unusual social and economic conditions.

a thing is right or wrong concerning ourselves, and the same feelings are extended to our fellows. We wish to measure them by the same rule by which we measure ourselves. If an individual perceives that an injustice is being done toward himself, a sentiment of resentment is aroused in him. If he observes the same injustice toward any one of his fellows, the same feeling of resentment is aroused. Thus, justice has its origin in fellow suffering. But in its more developed state it is an outcome of the passion for self-preservation, together with a perception that my preservation is involved in the preservation of my group. It is a question of giving each man his just dues, rights, and privileges, that all may be preserved thereby. While it may have its origin in sympathy, it was early influenced by the normal form of intellectual action. It was an attempt to regulate the practice of deception. The new standards grow out of a crisis due to changed conditions.

It is urged by Ward and conceded by others that deception is a normal mode of intellectual action. Self-preservation, the strongest instinct in the animal man, has been supported by the process of deception. As Ward says, "The ruse is the simplest form of deception, and this brings out the vital truth that in so far as mind deals with sentient beings deception is its essential nature." [15] This universal principle of all animal life is readily observed in the deception displayed by predatory animals in their attempts to catch their prey. The rabbit could outrun the fox, or by burrowing elude his pursuit, hence it is necessary for the fox to move stealthily and slyly upon his game. The cat could not catch the mouse, or the eagle his prey, without deception. Man in his attempt to fish and hunt practices the same ruse or deception, a little higher in order than that of the lower animals. He baits the hook to catch the fish, and drives the animals into snares. In this capacity he is a "predatory, carnivorous animal." The next step is the preservation of animals for service. In order to train them for domestic service, it is necessary to take them while young, and by food and proper training they may be led to work the will of man. In the management of man the same principle is discernible, for while slavery, to a certain extent, may have been the result of

[15] *Pure Sociology*, p. 484.

force, deception has been used as a means of establishing it. But in the later forms of society through priestcraft or monarchy or nobility a certain favored few, through the arts of deception, have made the many serve them. In the business world where competition has been strong, deception has flourished. While to-day business is regulated to a certain extent by laws, by the moral code, and a general sense of fairness, we still find men succeeding and growing wealthy at the expense of their fellows through the art of deception. The secret of the success of a great business enterprise has frequently been sharp practiee. It is not only by securing advantageous conditions and by controlling the resources of nature, but by bargaining secretly, by deceiving as to the amount of profits, and by many other similar means that many people win success in the world.

Nor is the deception frequently practiced in politics very different from this. It is a struggle, a warfare with all the rights and privileges of deceiving the enemy. To deceive this man, to dupe another, to take advantage of the opposing party, by foul means or fair, may insure success in modern as well as in ancient politics. In the higher forms of government, what more is war or diplomacy than a systematized and orderly method of deception? Likewise, in ordinary social contact, in order to preserve their individuality and to protect their personality, people deceive each other in small matters, and cultivate the art. To what extent this should be carried is an open question. Certain it is that as ethical standards become more fixed and more widely applied, and confidence and trust in each other increase, there are less need and less inducement to deceive. Were it otherwise, it were useless to comment on human progress. Nevertheless, there are those who preach against the art of deception and rule it out absolutely as a legitimate practice, the while they themselves, in one form or another, are constantly practicing it. The mother takes advantage of the simplicity of the child in order to control it for its good. The priest takes advantage of the ignorance of his parishioners or penitents to lead them in the right way. The lawyer tries to win his case though he may feel that he could have pleaded the other side of the case more easily. While justice has developed in the struggle of

individuals and groups for survival, the primitive method of reaching good results through deception gives way to fearless frankness as a method of ethical practice.

The Origin of Natural Justice. — Much has been said by political philosophers of a system of natural justice. A part of what they have said is true, but much is false and misleading, for there is no natural justice but the law of force. The so-called state of nature is merely a state of egoistic struggle for existence in which might makes right. The individual gets and keeps what he can, and the group follows the same method. Under natural justice there is no individual ownership of property except when a man is able to hold and possess goods or lands against all comers. This is natural justice.

That, however, is not what those who originally used the term meant. They conceived that somehow in the nature of things there existed an undiscovered ideal law of social relationships which was of universal application to all men. It was assumed to be the rational basis of all conduct. It was a *jus naturae*.[16] What they thought they might find in the *jus naturae* was a delusion. No such basis of moral conduct exists in nature, or anywhere outside their imagination. The concept was a part of the old metaphysic which postulated an unalterable ideal, the very image of perfection. Such a conception belongs to the day preceding the birth of the theory that all things are in a state of change. What is perfect to-day is imperfect to-morrow. *Perfect justice is perfect adjustment of relations between groups, between individuals and groups, and between individuals.* Let the adjustment be ever so perfect to-day, if a new invention be made, this perfect justice gives way to-morrow to injustice.

So long as relations between men are governed by social sanctions or social disapprovals, we call the code of these sanctions and disapprovals ethics or morals. When, however, the political organization undertakes to establish these relations with civil sanctions, then we have a legal code and a standard or code of justice. *In other words civil justice is ethical relations sanctioned by the state.* In the sense of unsocialized adjustment of differ-

[16] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, 1900, p. 330.

ences to the advantage of the strong, "natural" justice always exists until the conflict of interests has been adjusted and the strong has been curbed by the gentle but none the less effective methods of social control, in the interests of society.

Transition from Natural to Civil Justice. — The transition from natural to civil justice was very gradual. It came about primarily through the widening influences of sympathy. The growth of intelligence and all the social machinery previously discussed greatly aided. Correct conduct is obtained not by sympathy alone, but through regulation by the intelleet. The growing intelligence perceives the economic loss in changed economic or social circumstances of a long-standing injustice like slavery, or the degradation of woman. "Natural" justice regards not the sufferings of individuals nor the consequences of predatory activity. It is only through sympathy and intelligence applied to solve problems raised by social change that these can be observed. Not only the consideration of the consequence of actions, but the knowledge of what can be accomplished and what cannot, leads to restraint, to preservation of the group for the sake of preservation of the individual. For example, if it be observed that under a state of anarchy the social group is in danger of extinction, civil justice will prevail to regulate the rights and duties of the members of the community. This intelligence and appreciation of results gradually tries to restrict the acquisitive powers and bring about a social harmony. Out of the struggle for survival comes the establishment of civil law; out of the natural struggle of the savage for his own existence comes the civil regulation for the preservation and prosperity of the individual and society. Moreover, the development of social bonds, the refinement of feelings and tastes destroys the possibility of enjoyment of former activities and creates a demand for new satisfactions which can be satisfied only by the establishment of justice.

The Development of Civil Justice. — Once the individual relinquished his unrestricted right to do as he pleased, and depended upon the custom or law controlling the whole group for his guidance, civil justice grew rapidly. The moral judgments of the social group became crystallized into law, and soon the individual

had no rights except those that society chose to grant. The social group by intelligent regulation sought to benefit each individual throughout the whole community. Both ethical conduct and social justice, its product, are consciously designed by society to accomplish certain clearly perceived advantageous results. Thus, ethics and justice become the results of intelligent purpose applied to conflicts created by changed conditions.

On the other hand, there are many influences which retard the perfection of civil society through intelligence. For instance, while intelligence increases the knowledge of cause and effect, it also increases temptation because of the multiplication of desires and the increasing number of opportunities for a personal enjoyment. The growth of reason is accompanied by an atrophy of instinct. And reason is not by any means so reliable a guide in ordinary relations as instinct. Consequently, in new situations if the instincts have ceased to function while reason is deliberating, passion decides, and often the wrong choice is made. But equilibrium is maintained by the increased power to overcome temptation which intelligence brings. If increased sympathy or altruism appears, the restraint will be sufficient to improve the civil relations of individuals. However, it must be considered that neither immediate nor ultimate individual interests are always social interests. For an individual may seek his immediate salvation at the expense of the general welfare, but all may not do this without the destruction of society. Likewise, an economic or social group of any kind may be so interested in its own survival as to be insensible to the welfare of greater society and thus retard social progress.

On the other hand, in the long run, when each is seeking to conserve the best interests of the whole, individual interests will ultimately be protected. Yet, in the application of civil justice to society, survivals of the old customs constantly manifest themselves. For instance, there is a tendency to evade laws, both moral and civil, as the pressure of social usage increases and causes the morally weak to disobey the will of the majority. Thus the morally weak become criminals. Things that were formerly allowed are now forbidden because the complexity of social life necessitates the more exact regulation of individual conduct. This

causes the non-socially inclined to resist or evade the law. Hence in the development of society the line of criminality constantly rises to include more and more of those who in a previous stage of social evolution would not have been considered criminal.

However, there is less of the action of brute force than formerly and more resort to cunning. The struggle is for domination rather than for mere survival. Domination gradually becomes intellectual rather than physical. The mental struggle for supremacy goes on in spite of the repression of violent measures. This process is observed most frequently to-day in trade and commerce where competition in the acquisition of wealth is keen, where each man strives to get ahead of the other. Many of the practices of modern business are questionable when measured by the ethical standard of the time. It is only through a government seeking justice to all, which has formulated moral principles into laws, that individuals may be protected from the evils of this latter-day cunning.

Business Ethics. — The struggle between the old ethic and the new adapted to changed conditions is observed in the industrial relations of men. Fundamentally, the economic life founded on an individualistic struggle for the simple means of subsistence and ending in a struggle for wealth and its supremacy opens a large field of adjustment of moral standards to new problems. The ethics of the home, of the larger brotherhood, and of the social group was prominent before the importance of the possession of property made it the center of human activity.

To-day there are developing new ethical customs of business, a code of ethical honor among business men. To these correspond the recently enacted laws of the state, protecting property, guaranteeing rights of contract, and establishing corporate relationships. While the old ethics of trade are well exercised among business men who buy in the low market and sell in the high, the results of those old standards in a new situation are socially dubious. What the market will bear is a high sounding phrase, but is far different when Shylock wants his pound of flesh. But business is gradually adapting its practices to a new economic situation. That will happen as men come to see that overreaching is not only unethical, but is also in the long run and in the larger aspect poor business.

World Ethics. — Carrying out the impulses of one nation for safety and defense often leads to extreme group selfishness when nationality has developed so far as to come into contact with similar nationalities who are struggling for the control of territory, food-supply, and later, of trade and commerce. This group selfishness is analogous to the selfishness of the individual who seeks to advance himself irrespective of the rights and destinies of others. Even in Christian nations, in which the golden rule of business and comity is acknowledged as desirable, the relation of the nation to other nations is that of selfishness or merely survival of the fittest. Nearly all modern wars have been brought about because of the tremendous urge of this national selfishness.

While ethics between individuals and local communities may have reached a well-established code, in international relations this code is comparatively ill-defined and weak in practice. Just prior to the great European war philosophers were beginning to talk about a world ethics which recognized rights, justice, and fellowship between all nations of the world. Indeed, great progress had been made along these lines. A number of nations have been dwelling side by side in peace, settling such difficulties as arise between them by arbitration, much as we settle the difficulties between neighbors through courts of justice. On the face of affairs, it seemed that a great war could not reappear, but philosophers failed to understand the intensity of selfishness grounded in ancient traditions and nourished through years of hatred and strife among the nations of Europe. And when war broke with all its fury, this selfishness was quickly revealed. When peace settlements were attempted, it was found to be so deep seated that it was impossible to eradicate it. Notwithstanding this violent manifestation of non-ethical groups, it is true that many nations have been growing more considerate of the welfare of each other, not only on the basis of the preservation of the welfare of the group, but also because of the perception that the relations of nations as well as of individuals must be regulated by ideals of justice. Whatever struggles in the past have brought about new life and new activity of groups, it is evident that in the present day, there is no place for race prejudice, race hatred. The desire of any nation to

become dominant at the expense of all the others cannot be realized without serious detriment to itself. Then, due to the efforts of great teachers and diplomats, international trade, and international study, a growth of human sympathy has been developed everywhere, which leads one to consider more fully than ever before that all men are brethren and that one group cannot destroy another group without breaking the bonds of human brotherhood. National selfishness is the great evil that stands in the way of world ethics and universal peace.

But, after all, the practical application of ethical principles to all the affairs and relations of life, and the legal punishment of any lapse from these principles, in short, the establishment of justice, is the chief aim of government, and its duty will not be completed until it offers protection to all in the industrial world and represses the predatory habits of man in the acquisition of wealth. Industrial and international justice are as essential to the happiness of mankind as political justice, and at present of more vital consequence. For we live to-day in the last period of a great reform movement which began in the Renaissance, when the right of independent thought was declared. It continued in the Reformation, which secured freedom of religious belief. It led on to political revolution and political liberty. Now we are engaged in other phases of the struggle, those of industrial and international justice. With the settlement of these problems and with the development of new conditions it is probable that other problems will appear to challenge human ingenuity to attempt to adjust relationships.

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WILLIAMS, C. M. *Evolutionary Ethics*, Chaps. V, IX.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Of what importance to the student of sociology is the study of the origin and development of ethics?
2. Describe the origin and development of our ethical ideas regarding private property.
3. Explain the psychological process by which a boy attains the conception of obligation and responsibility.
4. Give an illustration of a moral ideal developing through custom.
5. What part does genius play in the development of morality?
6. Describe how primitive moralities and primitive ethical ideals are raised and refined; how they are enlarged so as to dominate new spheres.
7. Give an illustration showing how an ethical ideal may originate in sympathy.
8. Why was it that our fathers had no ethics upon the subject of trusts?
9. Explain the difference between the ethical ideals and practices of the eighteenth century and those of the twentieth century in America in the matter of sex morals. In what sense does society determine moral ideals?
10. What is the relation of morality and justice?
11. Explain the parts played by ruse and deception in the development of morality and justice.
12. Explain the hesitation in regard to the proper code of morality for the new woman; why some men feel no compunction in cheating a railway company or a corporation; why a corporation has no conscience.
13. What is the relation of a developing morality to the regulation of trusts, railroad rates, insurance rates, and such subjects?
14. Read Wallas, *The Great Society*, Chap. IX, and then show in what other feelings than mother love altruism may originate.
15. Recent changes in the standards of morality.
16. The relation of conventionality to morality.
17. Do the changes in the dress of women have an influence on moral practice?

CHAPTER XVI

THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION

The Influence of Religion on Social Development. — The importance of religion as a factor in social evolution, particularly in tribal organization and race differentiation, has been aeknowledged by nearly all students of sociology. Some have placed so much emphasis upon its importance as to lead to the conclusion that it is the primal influence in securing primitive soeial unity. Others have either ignored it or insisted that it has retarded social progress. Neither of these views is correct. While it has had a strong influence in cementing the social group, in bringing about its unity, and in developing social forms and social order, nevertheless it is not the fundamental factor of social organization in primitive society. On the other hand, it has been asserted that it retards the progress of social life and that it is possible for philosophers to devise some better agency than religious organization for the advancement of civilization. Whatever may be the degree of truth in these assertions, it must not be forgotten that the careful student of the historical growth of society will find religion an ever present factor, indeed a force that must be reckoned with everywhere. In this respect it works peculiarly, for, while, on the one hand it has favored differentiation between the races and has made for the independent growth of certain groups, on the other hand it has been a potent force in increasing the unity of the group; that is, it has brought the interior life of the group or tribe into harmonious unity. When we consider how strong religion has been in the primitive culture of early society, no one can deny its influence in early social control.

The Origin of Religion and Revelation. — The question of the origin of religion has no bearing upon the question of whether there was or was not a revelation by which man became conscious of

the will of God. The scientific and philosophical inquiry concerning the origin of religious sentiment, practices, and institutions is a matter quite apart from the inquiry which might be raised as to whether God has revealed His will to men. This chapter concerns itself solely with the natural history of the way in which the religious feelings, ideas, and practices arose in human society. Our questions are, What natural conditions in man's early history induced in him the religious attitude? What facts in the history of his mental development determined the form of his religious expression? What conditions in his physical and social environments shaped his early religious ideas and practices?

Historic Theories of the Origin of Religion. — The question of the natural origin of religion before the time of the English Deists was raised first by the Roman skeptical philosopher-poet, Lucretius, who in his *de Rerum Natura* characterized all belief in gods as an illusion and ascribed its genesis to fear. Hume, in 1755, in his *Natural History of Religion*, took essentially the position of Lucretius, saying that fear of the forces of nature led man to ascribe the phenomena of nature to powerful gods whom he hoped to bring to his side by proper attention such as would avail with persons.[1] Modern scholars have been influenced by these suggestions, yet not finding them adequate, have sought other natural explanations of the origin of religion.

Sir John Lubbock, in his *Origin of Civilization*, published in 1870, has given considerable evidence to show that primitive man personified nature and also that he worshiped the ghosts of ancestors. More than that, he indicated that the worship of the ghosts of ancestors often grew out of his worship of living beings.[2] Indeed, before that time Comte had a theory of animism. He said, "The theological period of humanity could begin no otherwise than by a complete and usually very durable state of pure fetishism, which allowed free exercise to the tendency of our nature by which man conceived of all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own with differences of their intensity." [3] In concluding his

[1] Morris Jastrow, Jr., *The Study of Religion*, 1902, pp. 173–175.
[2] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilization*, pp. 189, 133, 221, 222.
[3] *Positive Philosophy*, Martineau's translation, Vol. II, p. 186.

argument he said, "This fetishism is the basis of the theological philosophy, deifying every substance or phenomenon which attracts the attention of humanity and remaining traceable through all its transformations to the very last." [4]

Edward E. Tylor had a large influence upon the scholars of his time. He developed his theory most completely in his *Primitive Culture*. In a word, the theory is that primitive man attributed conscious life like his own to natural phenomena such as trees, stones, rivers, the sky, and the mountains. Seeking a cause for the phenomena that he saw about him, he began, according to Tylor, with the belief that each one was the action of some conscious personality. Knowing nothing about impersonal causes, he attributed to certain of the striking phenomena of nature a soul or spirit resembling his own. According to Tylor, out of this fact has grown religion. Tylor regarded this form of religion as the earliest type found among men, and traced its development from its inception to its survivals among civilized men. According to this theory, primitive man personified all nature with a spirit much like that which he and his fellows possessed.

The criticism made of this theory is that, while at a certain stage of culture *animism* is almost universal among primitive men, it is not necessarily the earliest form of religion. Anthropologists have learned that not all peoples with a backward civilization have Tylor's animistic conception. Before primitive men came to that state in their mental and social development when it seemed to them that all the world was teeming with active unseen spirits, they had a mere jumble of ideas concerning the mysterious in nature and man.

Giddings rightly says that all interpretations of religion which start from the assumption that either fetishism, animal worship, nature worship, or ancestor worship was the primitive form from which all later forms were derived, are destined to be overthrown. He adds that the earliest belief was a jumble of ideas and it was long before the different elements of religion were discriminated in those ideas. His suggestion that the primitive man first believed in a Great Dreadful, an impersonal power or something, before he

[4] *Positive Philosophy*, Martineau's translation, Vol. II, p. 189.

learned to identify it with a spirit form of any sort is worthy of consideration.[5]

Dr. King has suggested a term for the object of religious regard in this stage of man's development, which seems very much better. He denominates it more vaguely "The Mysterious Power." Probably the vagueness of the term corresponds very closely with the vagueness of the idea in the mind of primitive man who held in awe and fear that Something which he did not understand, but of which he was cognizant. Among the Algonquins of North America the term "Manitou" was the synonym for this Something. Many other people, among them the Japanese, have this same idea of a vague Something pervading the universe.[6]

After a certain stage had been reached, doubtless primitive man began to read into the universe his own experiences and feelings and thoughts. Then he began to personalize nature. Out of that animism arose. It was a crude philosophy and, at the same time, a crude religion.

Tylor's work on *Primitive Culture* appeared in 1871. In 1876 Spencer's first volume of *The Principles of Sociology* was published. In that volume he developed a theory of the origin of religion, as well as a theory of the origin of primitive man's notions concerning the universe. Spencer's theory of the origin of religion was somewhat different from that of Tylor. *Spencer traced all religious practices back to fear of the ghost of an ancestor.* He did not ignore Tylor's theory of animism; he supplemented it with his "ghost" theory. He laid the basis of his theory in the experiences of primitive men in sleep and dreams, echoes, shadows, reflections in the water, swoons, epilepsy, and death. These experiences Tylor had used as the basis for his doctrines of animism. Tylor had also

[5] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 249. See also Giddings, "Darwinism in the Theory of Soeial Evolution," *Popular Science Monthly*, July, 1909. To one word in that suggestion of Giddings exeeption must be taken, and that is the word *impersonal*. One finds it diffieult to understand how primitive man, before he has arrived at the mental and soeial development neeessary to have our ideas of the impersonal, eould eoneeive sueh an idea as our modern eonnotation of "impersonal" would imply. Rather, did he not feel a fear of the great, mysterious Something? Whether personal or impersonal probably did not oeeur to him to inquire. It was something which he did not understand, and of which therefore he had to beware.

[6] King, *The Development of Religion*, Chap. VI. See, also, Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, New York, 1922, Chaps. X and XI.

referred to the worship of ghosts. He had, however, not given it the primary place in the development of religion which it occupied in Spencer's opinion. According to Spencer, these experiences led primitive man to conclude that he was a double personality. Out of these and other experiences grew his belief in a life after death. He connected with this continuance of personality after death his fear of the dead ancestors. The ancestor revered in life was awe-inspiring in death. Any calamity which happened to the individual after the death of an ancestor was an indication of the latter's displeasure. He must be placated in death as he had been in life. Hence arose sacrifices to the dead.[7]

Spencer illustrated his theory with a wealth of material which indeed made it seem plausible. His chief difficulty came when he attempted to explain the worship of plants, animals, and other objects of nature. Here his theory became labored. He accepted the animistic conception formulated by Tylor, but, differing from Tylor, he held that the spirits inhabiting natural objects, such as mountains, springs, heavenly bodies, plants, and animals were conceived by primitive man in all cases to be the ghosts of dead ancestors. He gave definiteness and completeness of form to the animistic theory of the origin of religion by this suggestion.

But while the hypothesis is attractive, one feels that Spencer has failed to be convincing when he attempted to explain nature worship by the "ghost theory." On the other hand, every new piece of evidence obtainable makes it perfectly apparent that when a people once reaches a stage of social development in which either the mother group or the patriarchal family is the characteristic social organization, ancestor worship may arise in much the way Spencer has suggested.[8] This same evidence, however, indicates that among many primitive people existing to-day, as well as in certain historic peoples, religion existed before ancestor worship arose. For example, Sven Hedin's description of the present-day Thibetans, who are not ancestor worshipers, but fetish worshipers, makes it perfectly plain that religion does not always arise from the

[7] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Secs. 24–204.

[8] The worship of female divinities makes it probable that ancestor worship arose in metronymic societies as in patriarchal.

worship of ghosts of ancestors. Like Tylor's animistic theory, Spencer's " ghost theory " is incomplete. Moreover, it was overworked by Spencer.

Max Müller, not content either with Tylor's or with Spencer's suggestions, and approaching the problem not from the side of history but of ontology, proposed that the source of religion in the human heart is " the perception of the Infinite " aroused in man's mind by his experiences with the world about him. The steadfastness of nature in contrast with his own ephemeral existence and his sense of the power of nature in contrast with his own weakness, according to Müller, stirred this perception of the Infinite within his mind.[9]

Tiele, the Dutch philosopher of religion, is at one with Müller in searching for the origin of religion not in its historical beginnings, but in some spiritual fact in primitive man's life, — in some philosophical basis. This ontological basis he finds, not in Max Müller's theory of man's " apprehension of the Infinite," but in *the Infinite within man.* " The origin of religion consists in the fact that man *has* the Infinite within him, even before he is himself conscious of it, and whether he recognizes it or not." " It is man's original, unconscious, innate sense of infinity that gives rise to his first stammering utterances of that sense, and to all his beautiful dreams of the past and future. These utterances and these dreams may have long since passed away, but the sense of infinity from which they proceed remains a constant quantity. It is inherent in the human soul. It lies at the root of man's whole spiritual life." [10]

Both these scholars are dealing with a different phase of the origin of religion from that considered by Spencer and Tylor. Tylor, in seeking the origin of religion, was endeavoring to get a clear view of the natural history of religion. He emphasized the psychology of the experience only that he might explain the genesis of the religious attitude. His chief interest was not philosophical, but historical and anthropological. He sought to ascer-

[9] Hibbert Lectures, 1880, *On the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Religions of India*, p. 23; *Theosophy*, Gifford Lectures, Fourth Series, p. 480.

[10] Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Gifford Lectures, 1898, Vol. II, pp. 208, 209, 230, 233.

tain the earliest form of religion and to explain the way in which that form arose. His problem was quite different from that set themselves by the philosophers of religion such as Müller, Tiele, and more recently by Jastrow. For the morphological sociologist interested in the evolution of forms, Tylor and Spencer will have superior value. To the sociologist with his chief interest in the philosophy or the psychology of religion, the other method of approach will appeal more strongly.

Before leaving the history of the subject, two other writers more recent than any of these mentioned may be cited. One of these, Professor J. Mark Baldwin, approaches the subject of the origin of religion from the standpoint of psychological development; the other, Dr. King, views the origin of religion from the standpoint of group psychology with illustrations from anthropology and sociology.

In approaching the inquiry concerning the origin of religious sentiment, Baldwin asks, "How do these sentiments arise and develop in the process of the personal growth of a child?" In general, his answer is that these sentiments arise in the child from the reverence, love, devotion, trust, and dependence which he feels towards those with whom he is immediately associated.[11] Out of these attitudes towards persons grow his feelings and sentiments towards an ultimate religious ideal. According to Baldwin, the development of the religious sentiments follows the development of personality. In the development of the child's personality there is opened a facet that reflects other persons. In the interplay of his own personality and that of these other persons in his immediate environment there grows up what Baldwin calls "the ejective personality" or ideal. That is, as he looks upon these other persons, he tends to ascribe to them characteristics and qualities which perhaps they do not possess, but which he feels they should possess. He finds in them some elements of his ideal. He feels that somewhere there must be a personality which contains all of these elements and characteristics. Consequently, out of this feeling there gradually develops the ideal personality in his own thoughts. On the other hand, just as the real person whom he

[11] Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 1913, p. 337.

knows here in life manifests to him attitudes which he does not expect, and yet which, when they are manifested, appeal to him as something better than he has ever thought of, so he comes to feel that this ideal personality will manifest attitudes which he does not expect, and with which he is not prepared to cope. This gives him the sentiments of awe, reverence, and fear. In this way, says Baldwin, the two elements in the religious sentiment develop, — the feeling of dependency and the feeling of mystery. Both are the result of his contact and experience with other persons.

In this same process, or, as Baldwin calls it, "dialectic of personal growth," both in the child and, Baldwin thinks, also in the race, the struggle of the human spirit with physical environment also arouses both the religious sentiment and religious ideas.[12] Whether it be in the child, dreadful of the dark, or in the primitive man, awed by the majestic display of the storm, the trembling of the earthquake, or the belching smoke and fire of the volcano, there is the same consciousness of the awe-inspiring fact pressing itself in upon the mind and stirring both the feeling of dependence and the feeling of mystery. Here are the feelings out of which may develop religious ideas and religious practices. Both in the child and in the race, says Baldwin, this fearsome stage is characterized chiefly by the sense of mystery and awe, and lasts only so long as these feelings are predominant over thought. When the child, or the primitive man, begins to question the rationale of these and other strange phenomena, ideas arise which may be described as at once philosophical, scientific, and religious.

"What are these mighty forces in comparison with which I am such a pygmy?" think the child and the primitive man. "What is their nature; how may I deal with them?" The only cause that either can understand is a personal cause. Therefore, to primitive man, these phenomena must seem to be the effects of personal volitions like those of himself and of his fellows. Consequently, he reads into these phenomena of nature personality. His conception of this personality will be no different from his conception of other persons. He will interpret it largely in terms of activities and desires. The tumult of the heavens must denote

[12] Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 333–363.

anger, especially since he finds that out of the tumult come death and disaster. Strange, mysterious sounds which fill the woods and plains about him must also be caused by beings like himself and his fellows. He personalizes, therefore, every strange, unknown foree in nature which he identifies as the cause of some fear-inspiring phenomenon.

Dr. King approaches the problem from the standpoint of group psychology. He analyzes the evolution of the consciousness of value in the mind of primitive man. Briefly stated, his theory is that the consciousness of value seems to be closely associated with, if not conditioned by, the various active attitudes of persons or groups of persons associated with active life processes developing or modified by social life. Among these are included all complications of activity whether due to chance variations accumulated mechanically, or to conscious adaptation to situations of stress or conflict.[13] The religious attitude, according to King, is simply one phase of the result of the conseiousness of value, "a special development of the valuational attitude," as he puts it. Starting from the postulate that the social body has been at least an important factor in the process of the development of valuational attitudes, he argues that many of the so-called highest religious conceptions, like those of God, Freedom, and Immortality, owe their existence to the influence of the social group upon the simpler values. As the atmosphere of the social group was an important aid in the development of language, so social surroundings influenced the development of religion. In general, his theory is that religion grew out of certain activities in which the group was interested, those activities which cluster about the problems and crises which affect the group as a whole. In proof of this, he cites Robertson Smith, who says that the primitive family thought of its gods as caring only for the tribe and not for the individual. Moreover, only those values which have the sanction of the group would be of permanent value to the individual. In accordance with this theory, therefore, King argues that wherever the social organization of a group is loose and ill defined, there the idea of religion will be indefinite and vague. Furthermore, the religious

[13] King, *The Development of Religion*, p. 60.

values of the group and of the individuals supporting it will be very closely connected with the life activities of that group. In groups where the problem of securing food is of serious interest there the religious attitude will be connected with that activity, for example, with the fruiting of the date palm; or it is connected with a water course or a spring upon which the very existence of the group depends. He says, "We may hold that the religious aspects of a people's life are special differentiations of the social order which appear under certain favoring conditions."[14] At the close of harvest, moreover, or the end of a long winter, there is that intensity of feeling in the group that leads to certain functional activities. In the course of time these functional activities come to have religious value, because they bear upon the welfare of the group. Special customs, therefore, and habits of practical value to the welfare of the group often tend to establish themselves as religious practices. As an example he cites the connection of the care of milk with religious ritual among the Todas. He says that much of the dairy ritual among that people has grown up as a means of counteracting the danger involved in giving the sacred substance milk to peoples whom they regard as inferior beings. This same group, the Todas, have other ceremonies which are directly connected with seasons of stress or of emotional tension. They are distinctly social in character and they may be supposed, says King, to be the outcome of such psychological conditions rather than to have been caused by any original religious motive.

Summing up the discussion of certain of these religious features of the Todas and of the Semites, he says, "In other words, the fundamental expedients of the life process, because they are of necessity carried on by groups of people, naturally gained many accretions from these people's social and play impulses, and these accretions may become of almost more importance than the fundamental acts about which they gather even to the extent of obliterating them."[15] In other words, then, according to King, the accumulation of habits in various directions is one of the first steps in the evolution of religion. Now on the basis of this development of the consciousness of value in the minds of primitive men King

[14] King, *The Development of Religion*, p. 89. [15] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

builds his theory of " the Mysterious Power." Belief in this Mysterious Power he holds to be the real significance of the forms of worship as found among primitive men. He believes that savages conceived it as an impersonal force filling the universe of which they must beware. It was something which they did not understand, and against which they stood on guard, frightened, curious, and fascinated.[16]

In the early development of religion there is a confusion of magic, belief, and religious practices. Religion is a belief in a spiritual being whose characteristics are not clearly defined but subsequently is given an identity if not a personality. From a spirit of the air that comes and goes at will, whose movements are irregular and whose powers vary in kind and extent, there emerges an imaginary being whose powers and habits are defined and whose wishes and purposes are the mystery of nature forces, are connected more or less with the mystery of the spiritual being that has more direct contact with the personality of the group. Subsequently in the progress of religious belief religion and magic becomes separated, the former dependent upon the idea of the control of the mysterious all-powerful spiritual being, the latter on the mystery of the forces of nature and their manipulation, the medicine man becomes the interpreter and manipulator of the ceremonies that please the spiritual being and the magician the interpreter of natural forces. In many tribes there is a belief in a general power of nature called Mana by the Polynesians, Orenda by the central Algonkin, or Wakan by the Sioux. These concepts vary somewhat in their source, nature, and effect, but all represent a generalized idea of a universal force in nature that influences the conduct and destiny of man. This power may manifest itself in animal or plant life or indeed in the water or the air. The unusual things that happen to individuals are only manifest expressions of this force. The magician claims to interpret this force and in a measure to control it.

In summarizing the development of thought concerning the origin of religion up to the present time, we may note that beginning with Lucretius, followed by Hume, we have the general theory

[16] King, *The Development of Religion*, Chap. VI.

of fear, — *Primos in orbe deos fecit timor.* Tylor said that religion originated in fear of the spirit or spirits inhabiting all nature. Spencer specified the form of fear as the fear of the ghosts of ancestors. Baldwin adds the element of reverence developing in the process of growth by reason of the unexpected in other people. Giddings roots the origin of religion in awe of the Great Dreadful. King finds the origin in the psychological development of the consciousness of value growing out of the emotional stress connected with some crisis bearing upon survival. In this evolution of thought there have developed two distinct methods of approach, the one from the standpoint of anthropology, the other from the standpoint of psychology. The significance of King's contribution is that it combines both of these methods of approach and adds still another, namely, the social. These various methods of approach have helped greatly in tracing out the many ways in which religion has developed. We are certain of this, that religion developed from the interplay of the human mind and the external universe. The phenomena of the universe fall into two categories so far as they affect the human mind. The one is the world of unreasoning nature, and the other is the world of men.

The Origin of Religion. — Let us now synthesize the suggestions concerning the manner in which religious activities and ideas arose from man's struggle with the problems presented by this external universe. These problems are extremely complicated and their interrelations delicate. The human mind, struggling to find its way through the maze presented by the phenomena of nature, and the yet stranger and more intractable phenomena of human beings, creates the situation out of which grew religious practices, sentiments, and ideas. We may suggest, therefore, that in its origin religion pursued some such course as the following: Primitive man, face to face with nature with a mind not much above that of the animal, looked out upon this universe with its savage forces, and its savage men, and was afraid. What he was afraid of he did not define. Its nature was unknown. He feared because he did not understand the Great Dreadful which pressed itself upon him and demanded that he take some attitude towards it. How should he interpret it, how should he act towards it?

Even as an animal man had learned the meaning of superiority and inferiority, of prestige and submission. Some things, like his fellows, he had learned to understand. He had learned how to get on with his fellows. What more natural than that he should extend this method of understanding and of adjustment with his fellows to the natural phenomena around him which he did not understand, yet desired to propitiate? Therefore, he explained every strange, unknown thing in his experience by his own feelings and the feelings of his fellow men. He treated these unknown things in the same way in which he had been able to get on with his fellow men.

Moreover, man had the experience that the same methods which availed in securing the coöperation of his fellow men had secured the coöperation of animals. The process of domesticating certain of these animals had taught him that. His constant conflict with the wild animals about him even before domestication had begun taught him also that the minds of these animals were somewhat like the minds of the men with whom he had to deal. If, therefore, he could live with men and deal with animals by following certain principles, what more logical than to conclude that the same methods would avail in his endeavor to understand and to propitiate other equally incomprehensible things about him in the universe?

This attitude is preserved through man's whole life and all his activities. Without a conception of impersonal causation he necessarily personalized every real and supposed cause. If the thing that produces this result is a person, it must necessarily be a person like those he knows. It is a person of love and of hate, a strange, mysterious power with which he must deal in some way. If angry, this power must be placated. The only way that suggests itself is the method which placates human beings when angry. Hence all nature is conceived by man as being filled with spirits like himself. His own personality is no less a mystery to him than the phenomena and events of nature. He shouts; a voice mocks him from the hills or forests; he leans down over the pool to drink, and behold, out from its depths there looks up at him a face like his own or like that of his fellows who may be with him. He sleeps and dreams, and in those dreams he goes far away and performs

various actions. He awakes, behold, he is where he lay down to sleep. On other occasions he sleeps and walks about in his sleep until he strikes some object and awakes. Therefore, these dream experiences, he argues, in which he walks and talks are real experiences. How can this be? How can one both sleep and walk abroad at the same time? His only explanation is a conviction gathered from all these observations that he is a double personality. One of his selves remains, while he sleeps, and the other walks abroad. He has a spirit, therefore. This spirit, when he is awake, is his constant companion. When sleeping or in an ecstasy or a swoon, this double departs from his body and walks abroad. It is invisible; seek howsoever hard he may, he cannot find it; yet here is the incontestable evidence of its existence. It is a spirit more or less like this that inhabits all nature, he concludes. It is a person with personal characteristics like himself and his fellows. It loves, it hates, it has appetites and passions, it becomes angry, it desires gifts, it is subject to caprices like himself, therefore it is something of which to stand in awe and with which to come to terms.

Then there is the strange, mysterious fact of death. Every evidence we can gather from primitive peoples who have reached the stage when they reflect upon events at all shows their concern about death. Constantly in the midst of savage forces which civilization has either destroyed or shackled and tamed for the service of man, primitive man seldom died a natural death. When he did live to die such a death, it was a strange phenomenon and was to be explained by some occult means.[17] Usually he died before the evil days of old age had come when he could say he had no pleasure in them, while life was still sweet, and death seemed not a relief, but a calamity. Wild animals, or still wilder men, lay in wait for him at every turn. The natural, instinctive fear of death was ever upon him. When he thought of these things the question naturally arose, What is death? Where could he look for an answer but to other experiences which seem very like death? He slept and awoke. Sometimes a man was smitten in fight and lay unconscious for a time and revived again. Occasionally one fell

[17] Lubbock, *Origin of Civilization*, p. 133.

in a swoon or ecstasy and when he revived he told of the things he had seen and heard. Was not death like sleep, swoon, or ecstasy, except that the absence of the soul from the body was more prolonged? In death man's other self was alive elsewhere, seeing, enjoying, knowing, and with the same appetites and passions, likes and dislikes, as when present in the body.

Then some untoward event occurred which had no apparent cause. Some dead person must be displeased. When alive such a person had wreaked vengeance when offended; now dead, he had become angry and must be appeased in the same way as when living. Perhaps the dead man had been some great chief. If society had become strongly centralized and control was rigid, the person to be appeased was naturally supposed to be an ancestor, the natural ruler of the group. He was feared in death as much as he had been honored in life, — even more, because less was known about him when dead than when living, and therefore he was more mysterious and awful. Thus ancestor worship arose.

In these ways the first incongruous religious ideas struggled to expression. They are full of contradiction like the thoughts of primitive man or like the thoughts of the child who is just beginning to think. These ideas, like the sentiments and emotions aroused by his contact with the universe of things and men, are not clearly defined, but often are a jumble. They are, however, the first struggling efforts to relieve an unpleasant situation by activity of some sort, the first gleams of an explanation of the world in the midst of which man lives and the first blundering attempt at a method whereby he may bring it under his control. As already suggested, they are reflections of the social universe of which he was a part. Their patterns are to be found in his own soul and in the souls of those with whom he is in contact — the group of which he is a part. The gods that he makes for himself are like unto himself and his fellows, only greater, more powerful, more wise, and less understandable than they.

Summarizing the way in which *religious practices* arise, we may say that the practical results of this contact of primitive man with nature and men was the invention of religious practices. They begin with men. As a child grows and comes in contact with

other personalities, he learns to accommodate himself to them. By doing certain deeds he comes to terms with these personalities. He finds that certain things please them, while others displease them. Out of this perpetual surprise of experience, he learns what to do when he wishes the favor of the other person. On the basis of this experience he generalizes and adopts a code of practice which suits all persons. Now, believing as he does that natural phenomena are caused by persons, he will adopt the same practice in dealing with the spirit of the mountain or the spirit of the storm as he does in dealing with men. The beings who control these phenomena must be like the beings with which he is acquainted, therefore he adopts certain attitudes toward them, placates them by gifts, assuages their anger or pleases their vanity, and secures their favor by praise and prayer.

The Complexity of the Problem. — This survey has certainly made it apparent that the endeavor to find the origin of religion in some one simple fact such as the desire for union with the deity, as suggested by Ross, is like the quarrel as to whether man is material or spiritual. Light is thrown upon the way in which religious sentiments develop by a genetic study of their development in the child and in the race. The process is further illuminated by a psychological analysis of this sentiment into awe and reverence, feeling of dependence, affection, etc. The forms of religious practice and their accompanying sentiments found among various primitive people make it quite possible to reconstruct the early religious feelings, ideas, and practices, and to retrace essentially the paths along which they have developed. Are the religious ideas attributed to primitive man indefinite? Do they lack the transparency of meaning which we demand? They were the first crude efforts of mankind, it must be remembered, to come to an understanding of the universe. How often the thoughts of even the cultivated man, when they first struggle forth to birth, are vague and lack clearness. Animism is a philosophy of the world which very well fits the mental equipment of primitive man and his lack of that precious heritage of civilized man, the treasured-up discoveries of the ages of civilization. Ancestor worship is most natural after a certain mental development has been

reached, and certain social relationships, such as a strong family tie, have been established. Sacrifices to the ancestral spirits with all their social consequences, such as female infanticide, early marriage, and over-population, are natural and fitting rites when the center of social control is a dominating personality.

The Genius and the Origin of Religion. — In discussing religious origins, the far-seeing man must not be forgotten. We know that historic religions have owed very much to their "founders," those prophets and seers to whom was revealed the vision denied to their fellows. What would the Hebrew religion have been without the prophets Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah? What would Christianity have been without its Jesus, its Paul, its St. Augustine, its Cyprian, its Calixtus, its St. Francis of Assisi, its Wesley, its Luther, its Cardinal Newman, and Pope Leo XIII? Can you imagine the rise of Islam without Mohammed, or of Buddhism without Gautama? Doubtless the time was ripe in each case, the age was awaiting the man who saw the harvest ripening. But the man who among the thousands of those days thrust in the sickle to the golden grain — what would have happened without him? Without a doubt the age would have declined and passed on into another without a crisis and without the dramatic evolution which each of these leaders put in motion. The world would have waited for a leader.

Now, while the facts lie hidden in the dim mists of the prehistoric, is there much probability that the man of genius assumed an importance in social attention and leadership only after history had lifted the curtain from the unknown past? No, for out of those shadows of the prehistoric dim figures of leaders in those days appear in fables and myths which have survived. There is Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods and shared it with men, and for his high presumption was condemned to spend his eternities chained to the fastnesses of Asia Minor, with the eagle forever tearing at his vitals. Out of the shadows of Hebrew memories there flits for a moment the heroic figure of Tubal-Cain, the first worker in metals. These and a few others mentioned in folk legends show that in the morning of social development there existed the leader at least in the arts and religion. We must assume the

work of gifted individuals to explain the origin of religious ideas, emotions, and practices. They led the way and quickened the pace for whole peoples. Every people had its great men, but some had superior leaders in religion and their history was meteoric as compared with that of others. Israel is an example. In pre-prophetic times the religion of Israel was much like that of her neighbors — a compound of nature worship and ancestor worship, celebrated under every green tree and upon every high hill by a cult that was largely ceremony and in which was mingled much that from our point of view was sensual and unethical. She had her seers who were but little, if at all, removed from the medicine men of modern savage tribes. Her priests served for hire and supported the reigning house no matter what its sins. Into that religious world burst the prophet Amos, with a voice that was entirely new, with a message that scandalized the nation and that found no response at the time save in a few hearts. Followed by men like Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, he turned the whole current of religious life into new channels. Without the prophets of that time the teachings of Jesus and Paul, humanly speaking, would have been impossible. We hear that Israel had a genius for religion! If she had, it was born of the work of those eighth-century prophets and their followers, and fostered by the circumstances of her later history. It was a legitimate offspring of prophetic vision and national suffering. Similar men of lesser vision, but of greater significance, have appeared elsewhere. Who can deny that the animistic interpretation of the universe and the religious awe that accompanied it arose from keen-witted primitive men who saw better than their fellows? Or, again, what more natural than that with the change in the form of the family, some brooding savage should visualize the dead ancestor's spirit hovering near with good or ill intent as in life! The presumption, from all that we know of history, is that the great man, the religious genius, was there in the beginning as in the later development. In the religious genius may lie the connection between natural and revealed religion.

Given, therefore, untutored man, knowing only his relationships with his fellows, growing up in the midst of a nature which he did

not understand, but having some conception of social relationships and feeling an absolute necessity of understanding, and coming to terms with the world in which he lived, and, finally, given the superior person, the superior mind, we have the elements out of which could naturally grow that awe and reverence and, finally, that love, that make religion.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Of what social importance is the study of the origin of religion?
2. If possible, observe a little child and note carefully how its conceptions of religion originate and develop.
3. Converse with a half dozen children of different ages in the public schools or among your acquaintances, and ascertain and write down their conception of God. Notice what are the conceptions which seem to be derived from the teaching of others and what are those that they naturally reason out for themselves.
4. How does the conception of the Deists in regard to the origin of religion differ from that of modern scholars?
5. By introspection try to retrace the steps in the development of your own religious conceptions, apart from what you were taught by others.
6. Write out a clear definition of what Tylor meant by animism.
7. How did Herbert Spencer's theory of the origin of religion differ from Tylor's?
8. Try to ascertain the religious conceptions of a number of your friends or acquaintances among people of ordinary intelligence, but without any

advanced education. Which of these ideas can you trace as being survivals from primitive originals?

9. In what sense is religion a reflection of social usages and practices?

10. Note the religious ideas and practices current in some one church with which you are acquainted and estimate which of these are survivals from an earlier type of religion.

11. Make a list of the things that children fear in the dark. Explain why they fear these things.

CHAPTER XVII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

Having traced the origin of religion, let us sketch the large lines of its historic development. We have seen that religion arose in response of primitive man to the conditions of his environment. It was a means of explaining to him the mysteries of the universe of things and men. It was also the means he devised of bringing it under his control. The one gave him mythology; the other magic. Out of the one developed theology on the one hand and science on the other. Out of the other grew the practical measures of control over nature, which have resulted in applied science.

Fundamental Characteristics of Primitive Religions. — A recent student of primitive religions has named four characteristics of primitive religion.[1] These are: (1) *Animism.* — All nature is thought to be peopled with spirits of some kind. That gives him a world-view. This conception gives him an explanation of the phenomena he observes about him. Why do the objects of nature act as they do? Because, says the primitive man, spirits like those of men dwell in them. Of impersonal causation they know nothing. Of the nature of natural forces they are ignorant. Whether these spirits are conceived of as the ghosts of ancestors, as Spencer contends, or whether they are just spirits, which the primitive mind has not referred to a source, or are conceived of as *mana,* makes no difference here. Every phenomenon is produced by a spirit, animal or human, like those with which experience has made him acquainted. All primitive religions have this characteristic.

(2) *A Magical Faith.* — Based on human fears and desires the primitive man tries to control the objects of nature in his own interests. Experience has shown him that there are certain undesirable happenings, which, he believes, can be obviated by magical

[1] Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization,* New York, 1922, pp. 231–234.

practices. These undesirable events may be illustrated by what we call bad luck in hunting, diseases, misfortune in war, etc. There are certain other things which he desires. He wishes to have good luck in hunting, to be able to overcome an enemy, he wishes rain enough to make the fruits of the ground abundant, and he wishes health for himself and his group. These can be had, his faith tells him, by certain practices, which he or his ancestors have devised. These magical practices are a method of coming to terms with an order of nature little understood. It matters not that to us these practices seem to have no rhyme or reason. They are the results of uncontrolled experiments with nature by primitive man. They have either "worked," that is, after these practices have been performed the desired result has occurred, or else some one whom he respects has told him authoritatively that they will produce desired results. The *faith* that by some means he can gain his ends by certain acts is the important thing. That faith makes him credulous and energetic in following out any course of action traditionally favored. Moreover, any action in the face of a crisis of fear or desire is imperative. Certain actions become established by repetition, and these we call magical practices. All early religions have this characteristic.

(3) *A Faith in Superhuman Power.* — Some of the things done by the spirits inhabiting nature can be done by man; others cannot be matched by man's powers. His experience teaches him this, for does he not see manifestations of power which are beyond those possessed by himself or his fellows? Therefore, spirits have superhuman powers. This provides him with an explanation of the events of nature which his weak powers cannot duplicate and which his limited understanding cannot otherwise comprehend. If hostile, these powers are feared; if friendly, they must be brought to one's aid.

(4) *Religious Thrill.* — Fear and desires are powerful emotions. The will to understand and control is an imperative impulse. In certain crises these emotions are repressed. They demand action to satisfy the nervous organism of man. The will to understand, or at least have some kind of explanation made, is native to us all, the primitive and the civilized. The will to control the forces

inciting fear and those stimulating desire forces to expression some kind of action. Out of these psychological impulsions grow the mythologies, which serve as explanations, and the actions, which give us magic. "When you do not know what to do, do nothing," is not the counsel of fear and desire, but of that wisdom which results from long experience with the world. The tendency of the primitive man, as of the untaught child and man of civilized society, is rather to follow a course which might be summed up in, "When you do not know what to do, do *something*." Doing something releases the feeling of strain produced by the crisis. That release gives a thrill which is the reward of action. Hence, a mythology and a magical practice give the individual a thrill which confirms him in the conviction that it is good and right. The mythology, or story which explains, when once connected with a god, gives ultimately a theology; the ceremonialism of magical practices crystallizes the activities into fixed forms. Both stimulate the mystical emotional reaction.

Characteristics Surviving in the Development of Religion. — These characteristics survive, sometimes in modified form, in developed religions. Like the human body modern religion contains vestiges of its past. The animistic conception of the world survives not only in the superstitious beliefs of ignorant people concerning ghosts as explaining occurrences in nature, but also in the conception that God either performs miracles, or in the more refined conception of the immanence of God in nature. That such conceptions survive, or have developed from the animistic conception, is no impeachment of their value. A valuation of them is not attempted here; only a description.

In some modern religions the magical faith still remains. Prayer for rain, incantations to insure good luck in an enterprise, the wearing of amulets to protect against ill-luck or disease are to be found sanctioned by religion and also in common practice outside religious circles. The sound psychology in this magical faith is found sublimated in the highest types of prayer known to religion.

Faith in a superhuman power in the world remains limited, to be sure, as to the things it can do, but yet a potent belief in all

religions. The theistic conception of the Universe is based upon that faith. In some religions its limits are wider than in others. In some God can do anything; in others His powers are limited to psychological results in his worshipers. Even in the most highly developed ethical and social religions the belief exists that God is interested in the affairs of men and that His power is available to bring about results otherwise impossible.

The religious thrill is present in all, whether it be the result of a sense of help received in a material difficulty or of help in the solution of an ethical or social crisis. "Well done, thou good and faithful servant," heard in the consciousness of the worker for social justice is as sweet and thrilling as the conviction that God has helped to pay a debt or saved from impending death. Theology still plays its part in explaining the meaning of the world and life. Ceremonialism still satisfies the craving for action in connection with felt needs and crystallizes activities intended to obtain divine help into fixed forms as much as among the primitive savage. The explanation of how the ceremonialism operates may change, but the satisfaction produced by form and ceremony is as real to-day as ever.

Development of Religious Servants. — To-day the ministry is recognized as a profession. Those who minister in religious matters are set apart for that particular work. Such a condition is the result of a long period of development of which only the general lines can be set out here.

In many primitive societies, ancient and modern, quite different arrangements existed. Men in savage tribes are often their own priests. Among the nomadic Semites no priesthood had been developed. Each member of the tribe among the ancient Arabs visited the tribal sanctuary and made there his gifts of whatever sort was customary without intervention of priest. Each sacrificed the animal he sometimes brought, himself smeared the blood, which was the god's part of the sacrifice, on the sacred object, such as a stone pillar, and made his pilgrimages to the sacred places. Among these primitive Arabs the keepers of the sanctuary developed into soothsayers by reason of the fact that they kept the sacred lot and by it consulted the oracle for people. Out of this

function developed the seer.[2] The savage hearing an echo on rounding a bend in the river offers a sacrifice to the spirit, and the civilized man offers a prayer when he feels the need of divine assistance. Nevertheless, in spite of these similarities, there is a difference. In primitive societies often the priestly function is combined with that of head of the family, or the head of the wider group.[3] In civilized societies usually the functions of ruler, head of the family, and priest or minister have been differentiated.

The *medicine man* is known among most primitive peoples. An individual who has been able to impress his people with his superior knowledge of supernatural beings, and with his ability to bring the feared powers under control, he occupies a place of unique importance. Once recognized as having superior power, he assumed a monopoly of influence over the spirits. Owing to the fact that it was thought that disease was an affliction of an evil spirit, the person who managed the evil spirit was the only one who could cure the disease, and so the services of priest and doctor were united in one person, the medicine man. Later these functions became divided and the priest attended to the affairs of religious worship and the medicine man to the cure of disease. Sometimes the medicine man is a neurotic individual, as in northeastern Siberia and South America. Among the Australians he seems to be a normal individual with shrewdness and common sense. In common with ordinary people he can cause disease by magical practices, but he alone is gifted with the power to cure. In some tribes he performs also the services of seer and prophet.[4]

In the course of social development out of the functions of the medicine man develop those of exorcist, fortune teller, priest, either as head of the household religion, ruler-priest, or specialized ministrant of a god worshiped at a particular spot, such as a sanctuary or temple, and the prophet, such as Amos and Hosea.

While the course of development in Israel does not in all particulars parallel the development among other peoples, the source of information, the Bible, is familiar and accessible, and may

[2] *Encyclopedia Biblica*, Vol. III, Col. 3839.
[3] Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Part VI, Chaps. III, IV.
[4] Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, New York, 1922, pp. 38, 106, 214–224.

therefore be cited here as one type of change which has occurred in the character and number of religious servants. Only the very general lines in the development can be cited.

In I Samuel 9, 10, we have an account of the prophet Samuel. The asses of Saul's father had strayed away, and Saul, sent out by his father to find them, having failed, consulted Samuel as to where he should find them. He took with him a sum of money to pay Samuel for this service. The writer of the passage says that such a person was formerly called a *seer*. Samuel told him that the asses had been found, but took occasion to anoint Saul king of Israel. In this passage Samuel is represented as performing two different functions — those of fortune teller and those of political guide to the nation, such as were manifested by the later prophets of Israel. Here we have Samuel, who is described as a "man of God," in his capacity as seer telling fortunes. From descriptions of practices among other peoples it is clear that he performs a function which finds parallels in many primitive peoples.

In Chapter 10 of the same writing is found a description of a band of *prophets* whom Saul meets. From the description it is clear that this band of prophets was composed of men possessed by a frenzy. Saul was seized with the same frenzy and "prophesied" with them. Says Cornill, "In these prophets of the time of Saul, where we first meet them, we have the type of the original form which prophesying assumed on Canaanite soil; they are men after the manner of Mohammedan fakirs, or dancing and howling dervishes, who express their religious exaltation through their eccentric mode of life. . . ." [5]

In the course of the next few centuries, however, in the history of Israel, the prophets became quite different functionaries. The other side of the prophetic office manifested by Samuel developed. They became the spiritual and social statesmen of the nation. Amos represents the development in the conception of the prophetic office, when to make clear the difference between his own functions and those of the mantic prophets which survived even to his time, and whom he despised, he says, "I was no prophet, neither was I a prophet's son." [6]

[5] Cornill, *The Prophets of Israel*, Chicago, 1904, p. 13.

[6] Am. 7 : 14.

The *priesthood* underwent a similar development. In the passage referred to above there seems to have been a connection between the band of mantic prophets and the sacred high place.[7] Whether they were ministers at the high place or not the passage does not make clear. In the Book of Judges, Chapters 17, 18, there is a very old record, which reveals practices of worship and priesthood which are very primitive. A man, Micah by name, who dwelt in the hill country of Ephraim built a house for the gods, made an ephod and teraphim, probably images of the god,[8] and consecrated his son as a priest. A Levite from Bethlehem-Judah who came along to the house of Micah on a journey Micah hired to become his priest.

This episode shows clearly two steps in the differentiation of the priesthood into a special class. The man delegates the priestly function of his "god's house" first to his son, and then to a Levite, a member of a tribe which thus early in the history of Israel had come to be looked upon as having special priestly functions. In the course of time the priests only may perform religious functions at the sanctuaries. While in the earlier accounts of the family of Eli, who with his sons serve the sacred Ark at Shiloh,[9] there is no mention of their connection with the tribe of Levi, later the priests were thought of as Levites, and after the time of Solomon as sons of Zadok, *i.e.* a special class with increasingly specialized functions.[10]

What were the functions of the priests among the Hebrews? In the early period, represented by the narrative in Judges, 17 and 18, the priest had charge of the house of the god and consulted an oracle. Later he guarded the Ark, and when necessary carried it.[11] With the growth in importance of the sanctuary at Jerusalem, culminating under King Josiah [12] in the destruction of the local sanctuaries on high places, the priesthood developed a strength that came to an end only at the Exile, and revived again with the reëstablishment of the Temple, and continued to be a

[7] I Sam. 10 : 5. [8] Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, Extra Vol., p. 641, b.
[9] I Sam. 1 : 3, 9; 2 : 12; 4 : 4.
[10] Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, Vol. IV, Art. "Priests and Levites," and Extra Volume, Art., "Religion of Israel," pp. 648, 649.
[11] I Sam. 4 : 4; II Sam. 15 : 24, 29. [12] II K. 22, 23.

mighty force down to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A. D. Aside from the instance of Amaziah, the priest of the sanctuary at Bethel,[13] there is no evidence of political functions discharged by the priests. However, since the oracle was consulted about all manner of things, those of public interest as well as those of private concern, the priests became early judges and lawmakers through the decisions they rendered after consulting the sacred lot.[14] The Deuteronomic Code represents the priests' functions as having to do primarily with declaration of the divine will, and secondarily with ritual and sacrifice.[15]

Down to the Exile the priests were subservient to the kings, as the prophets were not. As the ritual became more complex, and sacrifices multiplied, they became more important, and their fees increased. It was this ritual service of the priests which excited the wrath of the great prophets. After the Exile, when the political organization of the Hebrews was finally destroyed, the priesthood became the center of the hopes of the future of Israel. From that time to Jesus the priests played a dominating part in the life of this people.

Among other peoples the development varied with the circumstances of national life.

Out of these functionaries have grown the minister of religion, the statesman, the educator, the physician, and the judge. Once the medicine man was all these and more. More skillful than others in legerdemain, ventriloquism, and in thought reading, he obtained great power over the people in every way. He was a master of sorcery at first, having power to help or injure those who sought his aid or to injure those against whom he directed his machinations. Later one by one his many functions were assumed by others. Priest and healer he long remained. Many survivals of his power still remain with us. Clairvoyance and fortune telling, as well as the nobler and entirely Christian act of intercessory prayer, are examples.

Conception of the Nature of the Gods. — The conception of the nature of the supernatural varies from the vague conception

[13] Am. 7 : 10. [14] *Encyclopedia Biblica*, Vol. III, Art. "Priest," Col. 3841, 3842.
[15] Deut. 33.

of the "Great Dreadful," sometimes called *mana* or *orenda*, found among very low savages, to the just and loving Father of Jesus. This development takes place in response to the varying experiences of different peoples. With the growth of social organization and activities primitive man developed his pantheon. When one group conquered another or amalgamated peacefully with another, there occurred also a coalescence of the religious notions. If it was a case of conquest, the gods of the conquerors were exalted above those of the conquered and the latter became lesser deities in the pantheon or were outlawed and became the gods of secret cults and sectarians. An example is furnished of the former case by what occurred when the Latins conquered the adjacent tribes, of the latter by the history of Israel on the establishment of the Davidic kingdom. Finally, wherever the development went on to completion one god stands out supreme. How closely it may come to be associated with the earthly ruler is shown by the fact that sacrifice to the genius of the emperor, not to Jupiter, was the supreme test to which persecuted Jews and Christians ultimately were forced to submit. In the case of the Hebrews, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the Exile and to a few choice spirits among the Exilic prophets, monotheism pure and simple developed. Among most other peoples the development never went beyond *henotheism*, or a belief that there was only one god for each nation, but that each nation had a different god.

Socrates and a few others in other advanced nations seem to have reached a conception of a universal Deity.[16] Thus, from the conception that all nature is peopled with awe-inspiring power there develops among some tribes the conception of many gods of special places and different functions, then one god for each tribe or nation, and finally one supreme God over all the earth. In his nature the divinity varies from something to be feared and to come to terms with by means of flattering praises or offerings to that of "God is a spirit; and they that worship must worship in spirit and truth." [17]

Religious Forms and Ceremonies. — In the early stages of religious development it was but natural for primitive man to

[16] See Plato, *The Republic*, Bk. III.

[17] John 4 : 24.

think that if these spirits had power to do so much for the destruction or salvation of man, they must be sought out and managed. Hence came the idea of manipulating or exorcising the spirits for man's welfare. Offerings were chosen and actions observed that were supposed to please the spirit. Food was given, ceremonies performed, and the conduct of the tribe modified to please these unseen powers.

Then it appeared that there were good spirits who had the preservation of the tribe in view, and others who desired its destruction. The former must be worshiped and praised for their goodness; the latter appeased by gifts and offerings and turned away from their intended destruction. Religious rites, though influenced to a certain extent by individuals of superior gifts and extraordinary shrewdness, developed independently of them, as a social institution. The fact of death had great influence upon the development of religious ceremonies. The belief in the continued journey of the spirit after death led to the practice of burial ceremonies, and this practice aided development of social order. The custom of placing clothing and implements in the grave for the departed spirit, and the bringing of food to the grave for its sustenance brought the members of a community to a common meeting place, gave them a common social ideal, and developed more or less a regular order of procedure.

Whether originating in reverence and awe for some striking natural object, animal, or some natural function closely connected with the survival of the group, like a symbolic fruit or the reproductive process and organs, or in reverence rendered to the spirit of a departed ancestor, the group's religious activities were centered about a common object by means of common interests and therefrom developed common feelings and actions in other than religious concerns. Gradually these customs brought about permanent religious services because of the connection which the controlling spirit had with these ordinances. The idea of fear on the one hand and of worship on the other arose in the attempt to favor the spirit. In the case of ancestor worship an appeal to the spirit or god for safety of the departed led to prayer and the attempt to please him in order to receive favors gave rise to worship, while the attempt

to manage an evil spirit led to necromancy. Sometimes the spirit of the mountain was identified with the spirit of a dead ancestor. Comparatively simple acts grew more and more into ceremony and were attended with increased pageantry. With the development of pomp and ceremonies in approaching the ruler and securing favors from him went growth in the richness of religious rites. The psychology of "the majesty that doth hedge a throne" has not yet been carefully worked out, but there is no doubt that very early in the history of social development the chief learned its practical value, how to create and enhance it in the eyes of his subjects, and the latter found ways of flattering the great by devising somewhat more elaborate forms of reverence and ever more extravagant terms of praise.

Sacred Places and Natural Phenomena. — Animism, or the belief that the spirit life manifested itself in natural phenomena, led to the supposition that all the various forces appearing in nature were in activity in response to the will of various spirits, and was one idea from which developed the theory of sacred places. The worship of the several forms of nature was merely a worship of the spirits that dwelt in these forms, for nature worship was nothing more than spirit worship localized in the various objects of nature. Sometimes it was localized in a high mountain or hill, again it was a lonely or majestic tree, in other cases in a rock standing out alone or of peculiar formation, and sometimes in an animal from which the tribe was supposed to be descended. First there developed clan sanctuaries, then a central sanctuary, and when the nation evolved there grew up the national sanctuary. There were also family sanctuaries connected with household worship. These meeting places were the foundations of the church or temple.

It is in accord with the habits of early man that Abraham, when he came out of Haran to Bethel, erected an altar of stones and placed thereon the burnt offering. It was a "house of God" whither he came to commune with the spirit of God and to worship him. When he returned out of Egypt he came to this place to meet God. Gradually the stone or tree was replaced by a tent sheltering some sacred casket containing sacred objects, and then

an immovable chapel or temple located over or beside a sacred stone or spring or other holy object. Perhaps the best illustrations furnished by historic peoples of this evolution of the sacred place with all that it meant for the development of rite and ceremony, as well as of ideas of deity, are to be found in the evolution of the sanctuary in ancient Israel and in Rome. The people of Israel, who as clansmen worshiped on every high hill and under every green tree, under the influence of the priests of the royal chapel and then of the eighth-century prophets came finally to concentrate their worship in the national sanctuary at Jerusalem so that ultimately sacrifice was permitted only there. The development among the Roman people is almost as clear and instructive. This primitive worship was at first merely an attempt to please God in order to receive his favor, or to appease his wrath in order to prevent the destruction of the tribe. Later it developed into worship, through prayer and appeal for strength and aid, not only for the individual, but for the tribe and nation. Primitive people prayed to their gods to give them victory in war, bountiful harvests, and prosperity in every way. Even yet most prayers have such " practical " ends in view. With the development, however, of an appreciation of the relation of religion to ethical conduct, less emphasis has been laid on the attainment of " material " benefits and more on character growth.

Religion Reflects Social Development. — In the simple tribal life of the Semitic nomads each rock, tree, and spring possessed its jinn or spirit. Mythology enabled them to account for every act of the tribe by reference to the deeds of ancestral spirits and every phenomenon of nature as produced by some spiritual being. The origin of the earth and the universe were thus accounted for. This developed numberless gods with different powers, capabilities, and services.[18] Numerous stories or myths concerning the actions of gods and their relations to mankind arose. These stories occupied the minds and influenced not only the beliefs but the actions of men. With the settlement of the Hebrew tribes in Canaan, there

[18] In the temple of Kali in Calcutta I saw numerous images, each representing a god devoted to a particular function. One, an elephant god, I was told was the god of business success.

developed a syncretism and the Hebrews took over Canaanitish sanctuaries, beliefs, and gods. Religious beliefs and religious ceremonies grow more complex with the development of social relationships and complexity of social organization. When a strong central government was imposed upon the separate, independent tribes, there grew up a national religion at Jerusalem, the capital, and the local sanctuaries were finally banned. With the appearance of the Assyrian world empire and their subsequent experiences in the Exile, the Hebrew leaders conceived of their god, Jahweh, as a universal god. The Hebrews did not have a notion that their god was a universal god until after the Chaldean empire had swept over the then known world subduing all peoples known to them and subjecting all other gods to the Chaldean gods. Universal empire prepared the way in their thought to that of a universal god. That that god should be theirs rather than the Chaldean's was but a natural reaction to the deliverance from threatened destruction under Sennacherib. The terror of the experience which resulted in the carrying off of the Northern Tribes into captivity, drove the Southern Tribes to centralize their religion at Jerusalem, strengthen it in every way, organize it more thoroughly, drive out the local cults, and raise the concept of Jahweh from that of a tribal god, or even a national divinity to that of a universal God. The Exile in 586 B.C. selected for death or assimilation among the Babylonian population all those of weak faith, squeezed all the idolatry out of those that returned, and further clarified their conception of the nature of Jahweh. Their assertion that in spite of their inferior social, economic, and political position Jahweh is a universal god who will bring all nations to the feet of the Jews was simply compensation for their disappointment. That terrible experience and those following for five hundred years fastened that conviction the more firmly in their minds.

Did space permit the same thing could be shown for the history of the Christian church. Social experience is reflected in the changes in theology, in social organization and in ceremonies in the church. The simple group organization of the primitive churches gave way to the hierarchical organization after the church

was tolerated under Constantine. Conflict with heretics gave rise to the creeds which were aimed at shutting out those who were Hellenizing Christian doctrine too rapidly. The exigencies of keeping the organization intact led to a rapid concentration of power in the hands of the bishop of Rome. The mysteries of the Greek and Roman *collegia* were assimilated to the Christian rites. These changed the whole concept of the nature of the simple ceremonies of baptism, the Lord's Supper characteristic of the early church. The assumption of sovereignty by the church was a response to the decay of civil government on the breakdown of the Roman Empire. In short, the whole development of the church from the days of Jesus to the present reflects the social changes going on around the church. The old desert religious conceptions suffered under the rise of a new agriculture and then a new commercialism. Out of the tragic social injustices in Hebrew society consequent on these changes and the national tragedy consummated in the Babylonian Exile the ethical religion of Judaism was born. To the prophets of the eighth century Israel owed the development of an ethical religion. It was they who declared that Jahweh, their God, was more pleased with them for restoring the pledge to the poor, ceasing oppression, doing justice with loving-kindness, and walking in humbleness than for giving their first-born to redeem their transgressions, the fruit of their bodies for the sin of their souls. With an assurance that carried conviction and an insistence which brooked no gainsaying, Amos urged Jahweh's ethical claims with, "Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs; for I will not hear the melody of thy viols. But let justice roll down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream."[19] The same conviction inspired Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah.[20] Growing out of the insistence of these prophets and their followers we have the development of the legal-ethical religion of the Hebrew, in which the duty of individuals one to another finally is formally stated in the law of the nation. Growing out of the prophetic Hebrew religion has come a humanitarian, ethical religion in which the law of love prevails.

[19] Amos 5: 23, 24.

[20] See Hos. 2: 11, 4: 1–3, 10: 12; Is. 1: 10–17; Mic. 3: 9–12, 6: 6–8.

Religion as a Socializing Agency. — Every primitive culture is closely interwoven with religious beliefs. Associated with every time of crisis in the life of primitive man, religion has been a most important spur to mental and physical activity. In the attempt of the individual to understand the phenomena of an unknown world, religion became a positive neeessity. Imagine an individual suddenly brought into contaet with the aetivities and appearances of natural life without any knowledge or experience or instruction. The effects are startling and appalling: he sees the flash of lightning, he hears the thunder, observes the storm and the destructiveness of the roaring torrent, the change of seasons, the movement of the heavenly bodies, the growth of plants and animals, and all the manifestations of sun and air and moisture, and yet he understands not one of all these phenomena. The moment his mind begins to inquire, his childish nature is satisfied by attributing these activities to the doings of an unseen power, a spirit, a god. The beginnings of speculation as to the nature of the universe which has its fruitage in modern science, originated in primitive religion. And so in the childhood of the race religion served a similar purpose to that of science in the more developed social life of the present. It is poor food for the mind of the fully developed man, but it was a fitting food to the ignorant, superstitious creature of primitive times. It provided a working hypothesis to his groping mind and thus introduced order into the chaos of his thought.

Moreover, religion bound the energies of the savage which were being expended in antisocial ways, on the one hand, and on the other loosed those energies in activities, mental and physical, which ministered to the welfare of the group. For example, by causing him to act in a crisis religion spurred him to a series of experiments with nature which has not yet been exhausted. While the hypothesis with which it supplied man has been modified many times, by proceeding upon it he laid in experience the basis of a better. It provided him, furthermore, a foundation upon which he began his significant attempts to alter the environment for the welfare of his group and himself, and to bend other men to his will, not by physical force, but by spiritual devices.

While from the modern standpoint it enthralled him in activities which later impeded his progress, in his early history it gave spur to his otherwise undeveloped tendencies to help his fellows. The feelings, thoughts, and activities of primitive people clustered around religious life. The well-established customs of primitive society were all founded on religion. While we may consider much of this religious belief false, and, in many instances, degrading, nevertheless, it called forth feeling and mental action in the struggle for existence and for social solidarity.

What has been the influence of religion in the development of social organization?[21] Religion has always been connected with social order. In the control of families, tribes, groups, and even nations, religion has played an important part. Religion has lent a powerful sanction to virtue and morality, for it has regulated the relationships of individuals in the home in the interest of order. Long before politics and civil law could be established, religion had made customs that preserved the equilibrium of the social group. It has always fostered a vague belief in immortality. Whether in its crude form as held by the primitive savage or in its perfected state, it has had more or less influence in the control of human society. In its early form it inspired fear and thus controlled social action, while in its later development the idea of immortality inspires hope and faith and courage,— important elements in the development of man. Again, it has strengthened patriotic feeling on account of its local character. The religion of the family developed family pride and glory, relating ancestors to gods. When the tribes expanded into a nation the god of the nation led the hosts in battle, preserved their lives and integrity. And thus religion became an inspiration to patriotic life. In upholding the central authority of the head of the family social order was developed. There was established on one side the governing class, on the other the governed. Thus people learned to rule and to obey, to command and to serve.

The Antisocial Results of Religion. — On the other hand, religion has at times been a coercive weapon of reaction, and has

[21] See Ward, *Dynamic Sociology* Vol. II, p. 279.

opposed social developments which had for their aim the betterment of society. What aspirations of earnest souls struggling to express a newly discovered truth has it not tried to crush! How often have religious institutions been found on the side of reaction in the struggle for freedom! Even in ancient Israel, as Cornill[22] has remarked, the outcome of the Prophetic religion was to crush the free spirit of the common people and to bind upon them the rites and ideas of the religion of the narrow party of Jerusalem. It paved the way for the priestly domination of the following centuries, and had a share in preparing for the narrow spirit of the Pharisee. In early Christian times ecclesiasticism crushed the free spirit of the Montanist, drove into ecclesiastical exile that early forerunner of untrammeled thought, the Gnostic, under the leadership of such men as Cyprian and Calixtus narrowed the church to a sect, and bound it with the hard bonds of a party domination. It throttled free inquiry in the Middle Ages, making independent thinking a heresy, and laid the foundation of a revolt which has rent the world into hundreds of warring factions. It forced Galileo to recant his carefully established convictions that the earth moves round the sun, retarded the development of science, threw water upon the flaming aspirations of scholars, and stifled the democratic longings of the common people. Clothed with the garments of ecclesiasticism in more recent times men have anathematized such truth seekers as Darwin and Huxley and belittled God's records written in the rocks and in the bodies of animals and men. Too often through its well-meaning but benighted representatives, religion has mocked the findings of careful and conscientious scholars, stood with the representatives of arrant wrong against those who in love of the truth have battled for the rights of the people. Nevertheless, such an attitude represents but one side of the work of religion, the conservative side. Even that side is needed in society, as a stabilizing force.

One must never forget, moreover, that some of the mightiest revolutions have been inspired by religious innovators. The Hebrew prophets, Jesus and Paul, Mohammed and Buddha, — who shall say of them and of the movements they inspired that

[22] *The Prophets of Israel*, 1904, pp. 83–90.

they did not give the race a great impetus toward progressive development?

Why Has Religion Survived? — Science has superseded religion as an explanation of the nature of the universe. Its magical practices to control Nature have given place to applied science. Crowded out of its old place as a natural philosophy, and compelled to give up its early claims as a method of bringing the hostile forces of Nature and men under control, what is there left for religion?

As a scientific explanation of the universe religion has lost its old dominion. As a philosophy giving meaning to the universe and to the social relations it has only begun to come into its own. Its chief function has ever been, not explanation, but action. It has been a faith primarily, having only enough mythology attached to give an excuse to the rational faculty for the action. Therefore, it has survived, because it has provided man with a working hypothesis on which to adjust himself to the universe and the world of Nature to him. It is the expression of man's faith that there is a way whereby he can bring under his control and for his purposes the forces about him. That faith has released for experiment the energies paralyzed by fear and doubt. Oftentimes the means used were not adapted to his purposes, but the drive of religious faith was still there to find another and better way. Through the ages from primitive to civilized man, religion — the belief that there is a power more powerful, wiser, and sometimes kinder than himself — has at once kindled the will to overcome difficulties and has thus aided in survival. Such belief had what the biologists call "survival value." Since the man who believed survived, religion survived. Historically religion has produced what has come to be called in these latter days "morale." It gave the fighting edge to life.

Will religion continue to give an advantage in the struggle for existence? It all depends on whether present-day religion is as well adapted to make modern man adjust himself to the circumstances of his world as primitive religion was to the primitive man. If he believes as earnestly as the savage that the ideals he has can be realized, that belief will help him to realize them. To-day man may not need religion to enable him to be successful in raising

crops or securing food supply, but he certainly needs a faith, which may be described as "assurance of things hoped for" and "a conviction of things not seen," to enable him to wax valiant in the fight against organized wrong intrenched in hoary institutions. Only such faith has made the world in which we live better than that in which our fathers lived. It alone can command the energy to bring about a social order wherein increasingly "dwelleth righteousness."

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Trace the development of religious ideas, religious practices, and changes in the organization of some one denomination or religion with which you are acquainted.

2. What changes, if any, have you observed occurring in the nature of the public meetings in the church which you attended in childhood?

3. What part did the Hebrew prophets of the eighth century B.C. play in the development of the Hebrew religion?

4. In what respects does the medicine man differ from the modern minister of religion? How does he differ from the physician?

5. Trace the development of prayer from its origin in flattery to a superior to its highest form known to-day.

6. What survivals from ancestor worship may be found in religious ideas to-day?

7. Trace the evolution of the sacred place into the church.

8. Why are some people afraid to go into a dark church at night?

9. Show how religion has affected human progress both as a favoring influence and as a hindrance to progress. Give concrete historic instances.

10. State the ways in which religion is a help to social progress at the present time. In which it is a hindrance.

11. What steps could the churches of your town take to hasten social progress? What problems could the church be most useful in attacking with the hope of solving?

PART THREE

SOCIALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL

CHAPTER XVIII

SOCIALIZATION

By the term socialization we mean two things: (1) the change by which the individual member of society becomes a functioning part of the group, acting according to its standards, conforming to its *mores,* subject to its traditions and feeling himself a part of it sufficiently to command the tolerance if not the admiration of his fellows; (2) the change by which a society is transformed from a simple, loosely organized to a highly organized group with its functions distributed between a large number of subordinate classes, and complex in its composition. These two processes go on hand in hand together. Usually they condition each other.

The Socialization of the Individual. — The process whereby the individual develops from a babe with only a physical organization responding to the stimuli about it in ways determined by the tendencies it has inherited, Baldwin has described as "the dialectic of personal growth." This whole process is dependent upon social relations. Were it not for the persons by whom it is surrounded, the child would never discover itself, and would never develop into a social personality. Very early in its life the child distinguishes its mother's or its nurse's touch in the dark. Its behavior towards these persons is very different from that toward impersonal things. This attitude indicates, says Baldwin, the child's sense of those qualities which distinguish persons. This is the "projective stage" in the development of the child's consciousness of self.

The next stage Baldwin calls the "subjective stage," by which is meant the child's consciousness of himself as a person different from other persons. He imitates other persons and through a comparison of the movements of other persons and himself he discovers a difference. The movements of his own body produce

sensations within him which are lacking when other persons move — certain strains, stresses, resistances, pains, pleasures, etc. Then with effort on his part the sense of cleavage between himself and others springs up.

In the course of his experience, however, the consciousness of all these feelings, stresses, pains, and pleasures, which are his own, he "ejects" to other persons. In other words, he can understand the others only as he assumes that they have the same feelings, etc., as he himself. They also are persons like himself.[1]

Now, let us see if we can analyze a little further the human relationships through which the individual by experience with other individuals enlarges his conception of the human world about him and adjusts himself to these relationships in a system of conduct which fits him for coöperation with his fellows in social life.

The child's first human relationships are with the immediate members of his family. First of all he learns about his parents. Here he experiences love, authority, direction, protection, example, and ideals. Every moment of his conscious life their conduct is acting upon his consciousness according to the capacity he possesses to appreciate its meaning. They are active stimuli to his nervous system. He reacts to this conduct by actions at first purely instinctive, but increasingly conscious. Habits form according to the treatment they give him and according to the reactions determined by his inherited capacity. As he grows older by imitation of actions presented by the parents, and as the result of their suggestions, he forms habits which affect his social life profoundly, more profoundly than he will recognize until many years after, if at all.

Moreover, in the family often there are other children. If brothers and sisters, they are of the same blood and have inherited with variations the same capacities. If they are adopted children and therefore not of the same blood, at least they are developing under the same social circumstances. Other children influence a child in his development in some ways more than his parents. For example, in the childhood recreational activities

[1] Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, New York, 1913, pp. 13–15.

of wholesome citizens studied some years ago in Cleveland it was found that, "As potent as the guidance of adults appears to be in determining the uses of spare time among children, vastly more influential are the playmates of the children, according to the testimony here offered."[2] Possibly the explanation of the superior weight of the influence of other children in habit formation may be due to similar interests, and methods of reaction due to like age. Other children in the home, whatever the psyehological explanation may be, furnish examples of reaction to the same conditions of authority, traditions, suggestions, and ideals of parents and others, which examples are imitated. Thus, socialization goes on by reason of contacts with other children. Moreover, the give and take in the adjustment of relationships with other children in the close and intimate associations of the home stimulate more numerous reactions and promote the formation of habits.

When the child becomes old enough to play with children from outside the home another set of stimuli operate upon him. Forced to adjust himself to an ever widening circle of personalities, reared under different conditions and with different habits and ideals, he learns, often slowly and painfully, to accommodate himself to ever more complex situations. In the struggle to dominate or be dominated by another he learns ways of adjusting himself to others. He is becoming socialized. When he starts to school, a still more complex situation arises. Here are still other children, and one or more strange adults. Their conduct excites reactions. To them he must learn to accommodate his actions, his words, and his ideas. He is becoming fitted for a larger and more difficult social world.

Then he gradually comes into contact with an increasing number of adults. The neighbors, with their various ways of talking, their different ideas, their habits of life; the grocer, the workman who comes to his home or its neighborhood, and a score of other people whom he meets in his play or upon the street or road either by himself or in company with his parents come into his life. Moreover, when he begins to read himself, or when others read to

[2] Gillin, *Wholesome Citizens and Spare Time*, Cleveland Foundation, Cleveland, Ohio, 1918, p. 41.

him, his contacts with the life of other people multiply. New ideas are presented, new forms of conduct in stories challenge his attention, his experience with people in action is widened through the stories he reads, and new ideals are suggested to which either consciously or unconsciously he reacts. His habits are being formed, his ideals accepted. He is becoming socialized.

Adolescence brings the youth a crisis which makes necessary new adjustments to life. The development of his physical organism brings him new feelings, new questions of conduct which must now be settled. Fears, hopes, and impulses are presented which are new to his experience. A whole new set of habits are now formed. Not only must he readjust himself to the opposite sex, but new attitudes towards other age classes — children, parents, old people — must be formed. A larger world of social relationships is stimulating him. He must come to terms with it in some way. All about him are suggestions in the sex, family, and business *mores* of his associates which form conduct patterns for him, which he may vary according to his own individual nature. It is in this stage of development that most failures in socialization manifest themselves.

If he continues his education in the schools, and if he comes in active contact with the church, he further learns to adjust himself to a wider circle of beings under more complex circumstances. The God of his childhood takes on new characteristics, and his religion is modified in accordance with his experience with men.

Then he marries. Again he is faced with a new series of accommodations in his own personal conduct. Consideration for the wishes of the partner is stirred by the emotion called "love." Selfish impulses are curbed by love's imperative; kindly conduct is prompted, and the joy of it realized, if never before, in the consideration given to the mate. Often the partner is one who has been raised in circumstances quite different from those of his own childhood and youth. The two have had different experiences. The habits, ideals, customs, and notions in the two families may have made them quite different in the two parties to marriage. If they succeed in adapting themselves to each other further social-

ization of both results. Failure of socialization here results in marital unhappiness and divorce.

Perhaps then there come children into the home. Again a new social situation is presented to both. This is true even though each may have had younger brothers and sisters in childhood and youth. These are their own, tied to them by new bonds, arousing in the parents new emotions. Parental responsibility is theirs. Helpless innocence appeals to them and opens up wells of feeling hitherto undreamed of. New adjustments in social conduct are necessary. Thus further socialization is accomplished.

Wife and children are new pledges to fortune. Youth and ambition stir the man to efforts for business or professional success; the woman to recognition of success as wife and mother, and often to consideration by the women of the community of activities outside the home. As the children grow up both parents are concerned with the success of the children. How they bow themselves to the drudgery of life that their children may be the fulfillment of their dreams! Again, they have learned to adapt their conduct to the accomplishment of their purposes. They learn to work with others in the enlarged responsibilities of family and civic life. They are still more socialized.

Here the process of socialization often ends. With coming age the mind, as well as the body, seems to lose its suppleness. Adjustments to new social situations become as difficult as to change habits of eating. The fossilization of age stops the process of socialization in many people. Habits, as well as arteries, harden and cannot bear the strain of new demands. However, sometimes one sees old people who possess a youthful outlook upon life. They remember the days of their youth and the pleasure they had in them. They smile at the enthusiasm of youth and enjoy the inexperience of childhood. They sympathize and encourage the younger, find an interest in the changing customs of the new day and somehow have faith that the golden age is in the hands of the young and vigorous, as it once was in theirs. A sane charity marks their conduct. They have succeeded in adjusting their lives even in old age to the ways of a new generation.

In these ways the individual is socialized, or adjusted to the conditions of social life. Thus he learns to coöperate with his fellows. By the give and take of social intercourse through imitation, following examples provided by those whom he admires and respects, by reacting from those whom he dislikes, by assimilating ideals suggested by word or action, by responding to responsibility placed upon him by the circumstances of life in connection with those he loves or for whom he feels an obligation he forms his ideals of conduct, habits of life, and becomes a part of the social life which surrounds him like an atmosphere.

The Processes of Group Socialization. — The processes by which society is changed from a simple, unorganized state to an organic, complex, heterogeneous body may be enumerated as aggregation, communication, association, coöperation, combination, and organization.[3] They are here named in order of their initial sequences. But for the purposes of analysis they are taken up in the order of their beginnings.

Aggregation. — By aggregation is meant the collection or massing of individuals, the coming together of the population. There are many causes for human aggregation, most of which are also common to animal societies.

First among these are the impelling forces of physical environment, discussed in an earlier chapter.[4] People gather together because of a warm climate and the repulsion of a cold one, or because of an abundant food supply, as illustrated by tribes of Indians who, during the fishing season on the Columbia River, assemble from the surrounding valleys and camp near the banks of the river, or by people who assemble where there are quantities of shellfish, or plenty of wild game, wild fruits, and berries. A supply of good water, forests sought for their protection, or shunned because their density diverts a migratory group, determine to a degree where aggregations of people shall occur. When pastoral and agricultural pursuits began, the tribes were obliged to seek the open glades. Sea coasts and mountains have proved

[3] See Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 13. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 395–414.

[4] See Chap. V.

barriers preventing the dispersion of the race and confining its habitation within limits.

But there were subjective influences as well that caused people to assemble. Foremost among these was the simple desire for companionship. Only preying animals like the lion and tiger spend a great deal of their lives alone. Feared by people and other animals, they are avoided as dangerous companions. Moreover, under certain conditions of food supply, only solitary animals can survive. Man is both carnivorous and herbivorous by nature, and therefore he had in the beginning larger resources for survival than other animals. Yet his preservation has not been due so much to fleetness of foot, or savageness of attack, as to coöperative ingenuity in enlisting the forces of nature to fight his enemies, and serve his need. The individual could not cope single-handed with his enemies, nor, indeed, could his mind be developed without association.

After the peaceful stage of early human society had passed into the age of conflict,[5] in which each group struggled with all others for survival, aggregation was increased by social pressure. Many of the smaller groups were forced to unite for the sake of protection. Social integration began and continued with increasing power throughout the entire process of socialization. The sexual instinct became a powerful force in the close relationships of the groups and caused a continuous and permanent association. The physical influences, also, creating individuals of the same type and temperament by natural selection, made the aggregation more compact and unified. The people of similar characteristics and desires were inclined to go the same way and to be influenced by like satisfactions.

Communication. — While aggregation could scarcely be separated from the development of communication, yet the development of communication naturally follows aggregation. Moreover, the expression of wants and desires by individuals to each other sets in motion psychical currents which are veritable social causes in the sense that they produce results in social phenomena. Through communication different individuals come

[5] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 199, 200.

to have like feelings and ideas, — the *sine qua non* of common activities. A group of people may be assembled at a fire or at a public meeting, or, indeed, in an open park without any effective influence upon each other until there is an interchange of feeling or thought through forms of communication. An expression of want or desire may unite people into a common organization. There is, then, a difference between the mere grouping of people together and intercommunication, for out of the latter comes the development of a common sentiment and a common intelligence. In modern life our special methods of communication are the human voice and such mechanical contrivances as the post, the telephone, and the telegraph. An adjunct to these is the press, and the radio. By means of these methods of communication millions of people may have the same knowledge, think the same thoughts, and perform the same deeds at the same time. There is nothing more powerful in binding a community together into one social body than this common knowledge and common thought brought about by rapid communication.

Communication always leads to the exchange of commodities, and the use of the same articles has a tendency to develop homogeneity of social life. Moreover, the practice of trading has a tendency to develop unity of sentiment among groups. Savage tribes always express social good feeling to other tribes or to foreigners by the exchange of articles of value. These may be mere trinkets or shells, bits of cloth, or weapons, but they establish good feeling between those who exchange the gifts. Wherever nations or tribes will not exchange commodities, there is little opportunity for social unity.

When tribes have reached the stage of development where communication is possible and desirable, they are ready to adopt the customs and habits of one another through imitation. This is done more or less unconsciously at first, then a later stage is reached when it is recognized as advantageous to adopt foreign customs. When once people adopt the same social custom, they become more alike from day to day, not only in their personal habits, but also in their larger social life. Likewise, the social position of those supposed to be nobly born was firmly established.

The development of leadership, which appeared in most striking manner in tribal and historic feudalism, gave a decided spur to what Mallock has called "the struggle for domination," and greatly hastened the growth of organization. Consider what motives leadership, based upon ability, enforcing the domination of others, brought to bear upon human endeavor — not only the motive of aristocratic prestige, but hope of the more substantial rewards of primitive wealth, ease, and sensuous enjoyment. These motives aroused with tenfold greater power the desire to emulate and surpass in achievement. They gave a decided impetus to the inventive spirit of man, to his capacity for organization, and to the modern spirit of cunning that reaps where others have sown. They gave direction to the latent energies of large numbers of men. They secured a development of the division of human labor and made each man more efficient in his social relationships. Men who were not spurred by them were forced to labor under the stern whip, not of natural need, but of fear of a directing mind. While this autocratic organization and direction had its dark side, it was a beneficent phase in the development of soeial coöperation, appearing dark only because it has so often survived into an age when it has ceased to be consonant with developed democracy. Out of it has grown the more humane and democratic organization of our day, and it may end in the more complete democracy of which the best minds of the present dream.

Conflict and Differentiation. — When people have gathered together in aggregates and have had intercourse together by the various methods of communication, a proeess of selection begins. Side by side with the development of social unity there is generally seen the growth of groups closely united in opposition to some important individual or another group. In the mixing of ideas and ideals in a new aggregation of people there is bound to be some clashing. Sometimes in the early days of a community this strife of groups within the neighborhood is so sharp that the development of a community spirit is very difficult and may be long delayed. Sometimes it takes a considerable lapse of time to heal the wounds made by such quarrels. Examples are to be seen in frontier and mountainous communities where communication

is interrupted and association is difficult. It appears, also, however, in communities sometimes by reason of close contact. People who might be on fairly friendly terms together if they were not brought into close association will on closer contact reveal essential differences. This serves the useful purpose of diversification of the mental and social ideas of their community. Before the end is reached in the process thus started there will be compromise and the amalgamation of the two ideals. Out of the conflict will come toleration and a new ideal with a broader outlook than would have been possible otherwise.

Moreover, in older communities there is constantly going on a process of differentiation growing up out of the fact that some people in that community go out of it and come back with new ideas. The young people go away to school, or to the neighboring city to business, sometimes to return with a stock of new ideas which start the process of social leavening of the community ideals. The same thing occurs when men go off to war. They return with new ideas and a new outlook. Again, it occurs when from any community there is an exodus to a new mining field or a new agricultural community, and for some reason the emigrants return to the home community. If the returning members of the community are aggressive, the old process of debate, the ranging of people on different sides, and the old conflict of ideas takes place all over again, but on a different plane.

Now out of this social differentiation which occurs constantly in all dynamic societies, there results social selection. Some tire of the conflict and move away. Some, because of it, are ready to listen to the call of opportunity elsewhere. The struggle for more culture or wealth leads them to choose permanently some other field for their endeavors. In their places others from elsewhere come into the old community. In the end a social ideal becomes established in the customs of the place; traditions are set forth as the criterion of conduct and opinion. Old age upholds old customs. Established wealth secures a large following. The result is that unless the newcomer and the iconoclast are very well intrenched in social prestige, or wealth, or unless they are unusually persistent, what is established will remain undisturbed and he will

go where his talent finds more congenial fields of endeavor. Nevertheless, the mingling of new ideas with old by reason of the change in the population is bound to continue in all places where ingress and egress are easy and where the economic opportunity is inviting. In this way variety is added to the stock of ideas and ideals of a community, culture becomes broader, the spirit of the community more tolerant, and personalities with the widest social interests are developed.

Association. — While the term "association" might in general apply to all acts of socialization, still there is a particular phase to which it properly belongs. People may be collected in a body and communicate with one another without having community of residence, but permanent association can scarcely take place without it. Community of residence leads to an association in which persons regard each other as permanent members, having acquired many social relationships as a result of habitual companionship. Among settled forms of association that of family relationship should be mentioned first. Here we have represented intimate relationship in thought, sentiment, and feeling, as well as practical coöperation in all forms of social life. This could not come about without more or less permanent association. This idea is exemplified in the fact that people closely related by blood or marriage frequently lose their interest in one another after years of separation, while perhaps their next-door neighbors may be taken into a close social relation because of their proximity. We have many evidences to show that the love and affection exhibited in the family life depend largely upon close association in the home.

Common religious belief, important in the establishment of social order and in the development of unity of thought and feeling, springs up through association. As religion is a social rather than a personal matter, it is doubtful whether any religious system would prevail for any length of time without community of worship. For example, it is observed that as soon as any group ceases to worship together, its religion declines. It is evident from this and other observations that religion is much more a social function than we are generally willing to admit. The church in

which exists a common sentiment thrives, but it declines when its members begin to hold diverse religious beliefs.

Gathered together in a common territory and living in close association, people naturally played together. With the stimulus of social games the process of socialization went rapidly on. We have but recently come to have a proper appreciation of the social value of recreation. Not all peoples have had educational systems, but all have had games. The process of socialization — that process whereby the many are welded together into a unity — goes on most effectively in play. Games connected by mimicry with the most important vicissitudes of savage life stir the deepest emotions. Such games are usually imitations of the critical moments in chase or battle and as such call forth the liveliest emotional stimulation. They relieve and relax the nervous organism and at the same time lift people out of the dead monotony of their humdrum lives. In the stir and emotional tension of such critical moments in games men throw off the reserve which usually separates them from each other as if by a wall. Their association becomes more intimate for the time being; they understand each other better. They are released from their narrowed selves and enjoy the expansion of personality which the emotional "spree" provided by the game affords. In the pleasure experienced during these games the basis of social coöperation is laid.[6]

Not only association in active games, but association around the camp fire at night in the groupal settlement, did much to solidify the feelings of the group. Stories were told and songs were sung recounting the deeds of famous heroes and mighty warriors, and group actions were set forth in the lyric dance. Moreover, household and community meals did much to cultivate that common feeling and idealism which makes possible coöperation. Among every primitive people of which we have any evidence feast days were very numerous and played an important part in the promotion of social unity. So ingrained in the very roots of the race is the habit of eating together and so

[6] See Gillin, "The Sociology of Recreation," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1914, Vol. XIX, pp. 825–834. Patrick, "The Philosophy of Recreation," *Popular Science Monthly*, June, 1914.

effectively does it, even in our highly artificial society, conduce to the cultivation of sociability, that no great project is launched, no occasion for securing coöperation among men, who to begin with may not be agreed upon a program, is complete without a dinner or luncheon or a banquet. With primitive men the feast counted even more in the development of a social mind.

Furthermore, in connection with games and feasting there was usually to be found another influence making for coöperation. Primitive man made such gatherings the occasion for breaking over the ordinarily accepted sex taboos which sexual jealousy had established. Wife lending and a promiscuity of sex relations prevailed at such times to a degree which was not tolerated at other times. This liberality, while abhorrent to our sense of the proprieties, was in the nature of a social release from the rigidity of established custom for the individuals and at the same time cultivated friendliness between those of the same sex who otherwise might not have been brought into social relations with each other. Moreover, as Giddings has pointed out, genetic relationships in consequence of these irregularities became complicated.[7] This at a time when blood relationships counted much in social relations made for social coöperation.

Coöperation. — Coöperation must have begun very soon after people began to assemble into groups. Unconsciously they acquired the habit of working together in procuring food and shelter. After social order was well established in the community, each individual seeking his own immediate interest was, in a measure, ministering to the welfare of all. It must have been very early in the development of group life, perhaps even before man had developed from the animal precursor, that individuals united in the hunt. Bands of animals like wolves hunt in packs. Even pelicans have been observed to fish in bands, some of them stationing themselves at riffles in the river, while others form a segment of a circle and drive the fish towards the riffles.[8] It seems certain that prehistoric man assisted the members of his group in capturing the larger animals upon which he lived. The bones of extinct

[7] *Principles of Sociology*, p. 261.
[8] Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid; A Factor in Evolution*, p. 23.

species of animals were found near the bones of prehistoric man recently exhumed in France; and it is more than probable that the cave dwellers of this period worked together to capture such animals as wild horses, cave bears, and mammoths.

Moreover, in the offense and defense of war primitive men found it necessary to work together. The strife which prevailed so universally in the age of conflict made it necessary for an individual to attach himself to a group and join with his fellows in defense, or perish. Community of interests in war essentially led to coöperation in other affairs. When the division of labor first appeared it was between the sexes, the women doing certain things and the men following different pursuits. Thus the immediate care of children, the care of the home, the preparation of the food, the making of the clothing, and frequently the building of the home fell to the lot of woman. On the other hand, men did most of the hunting, fishing, and fighting. But as industries became diversified, as new pursuits sprang up, there gradually appeared a more general division of labor. Some killed the game, and still others cooked it. Some carried water, some brought the timbers for the building of the home, while others completed the structure. Then came new occupations, such as the keeping of flocks and herds, and later, agricultural pursuits which caused people to divide into groups. These separate groups were all worked for the common good of the community. Our modern economic life, so complex and so universally organized, is but a result of the simple, unconscious coöperation of individuals in a community. There came a time, however, in primitive development, when groups were organized for a specific purpose, such as the building of highways, the carrying on of commerce, the making of tools and weapons, and there is some evidence that there were sometimes guilds of workers, such as arrowhead makers. Many of these methods find full expression in modern coöperation.

Combination. — Naturally, growing out of these coöperative activities combinations of groups developed in some cases. While conflicts sometimes arose in the occasional meetings mentioned above, on the whole the social feeling developed was such that

normally there grew up closer relations and ultimately a combination of the two or more groups concerned. Sometimes a combination of different groups, which had come into contact in friendly relations, was made permanent by an exchange of women begun in the festivities referred to above. Often an eponymous ancestor was invented to account for the fact of union.[9] The groups arising under such conditions coalesced into a group both larger and more closely organized. It is probable that in the earliest times before conflict was produced by pressure upon food supplies, many such simple groupings arose out of the sheer social enjoyment as well as the greater social protection afforded by large numbers.

The more important combinations, from the standpoint of social evolution, however, developed in quite another way. Such groups were the result of conflict. Whenever multiplication of the number of the population once reached the point where there was a pressure upon the food supplies, then migration had to begin either amicably or by force. Such numbers necessitated the conquest of other food supplies, the enslavement of the conquered and their subsequent amalgamation by degrees with the conquerors. This amalgamation commenced in the taking of the women of the conquered as wives and concubines of the conquerors and resulted in a class of half-breeds, who later became, first, slaves, then trusted inferiors, and then were admitted to all the privileges, forming thus a new race.[10] In this way all the great historic peoples were formed. A part of this great process is revealed to us when the curtain of history rises. It has been continuing ever since. There is no reason to suppose that it had not been going on for a long period anterior to the time when written records were made. In fact, all the ethnological and anthropological evidence we have points to such a process long continued before the historic races were formed. So intermixed had become the various peoples at the dawn of history that it is now almost impossible to say what

[9] As in the case of the two Hebrew groups, possibly clans, as Barton thinks, which later became the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh, the reputed descendants of the two sons of Joseph. Joshua 16, 17. See Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, p. 271; Gunkel, *Legends of Genesis*, pp. 18–23.

[10] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 202, 203. Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 272, 273; *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 473–480.

the human race, or races, were like which developed in the original home, or homes, of the race.[11]

Very much later in the development of social order came the combination of different groups by agreement for the establishment of government. For government, being a form of social order, is also a method of coöperation. It is easy to see that this combination must have been an implied or real contract for the protection of the whole group, for, through the process of integration, when distinct groups became united for either particular or general purposes, there must have been a tacit or formal agreement between them.

Organization. — Out of even the natural combination of groups on the basis of blood kinship and social sympathy there developed organization. An example may be seen in the organization of the tribes of the interior of Australia.[12] After conquest had taken place organization proceeded very rapidly. Organization must begin at once in order to determine the relations of the two groups, the conquerors and the conquered, and fix the status of each for the advantage of the former. This occurred piecemeal and rather slowly at first. However, gradually the organization was perfected, the adjustments went on in both legal and in customary relations, until finally there developed a complete social machinery for the regulation of the two groups. Sovereignty and obedience were established, formal institutions appeared and customs and ideals were modified to meet the changes consequent upon the amalgamation of the two peoples, until, if the process worked out to its logical social conclusion, democracy developed. Together with these more formal expressions of organization there went on at the same time the development of private voluntary organizations within each group, and that more subtle, but none the less real, organization of relationships, in the sense in which Cooley uses the term, which expresses itself in customs and social relationships in the more general sense of the term. In more recent

[11] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 230–239.

[12] Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, and *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*. Each of these works shows how complex may become the organization of groups which probably are not the result of migration and conquest, but of friendly contact.

periods, as government has grown into a system, organization has found its largest field in industry. In this field large bodies of men have combined to accomplish certain economic results. To a degree these developments have made socialization possible, for they have united large groups of people into a common economic life. Nevertheless, one must not shut his eyes to the fact that the modern system of industry which combines labor and capital in the productive process has also made for the formation of classes which are to a degree antagonistic to each other. The industrial conflicts which are a feature of our day are not without significance for social development. They also teach the members of each group organization of government and thus make them more efficient. That modern industry has solidified each of the various economic classes, the capitalists, the landowners, the entrepreneurs, and the laborers, once scattered and not conscious of their common interests and of the value of their united coöperation, is undeniable.

While organization was inevitable, brought about by all the processes enumerated above, its development also owed much to leaders. As soon as society divided itself into two groups, those who led and those who followed, or, as it might be more formally stated, those who governed and those who were governed, it had gone a long way toward permanent organization. The status of the individual in the home was determined, and also the relation of the slave to the master was recognized.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. To what extent does socialization depend upon original human nature?
2. What are the characters of the socialized personality?
3. Trace the steps by which a person becomes socialized.
4. What differences are there between the motives inducing primitive people to assemble in groups and those which induce people to gather into large groups to-day?
5. Trace the processes of socialization of groups of people migrating from the different countries and assembling in one neighborhood or territory.
6. In what ways is social unity advanced by the telephone, the neighborhood school, the church, a city club, or local grange?
7. Tabulate the various forms of coöperation in a neighborhood with which you are acquainted.
8. Point out the failures to coöperate and the group conflicts that arise in the same neighborhood.

CHAPTER XIX

SOCIALIZING FACTORS

Physical science has accustomed us to describe phenomena in terms of the conditions under which the phenomena appear. It has taught us that wherever there are effects of any kind in the physical world there must be factors producing them. The discovery of physical factors so simplified the difficulties of understanding the physical universe that we naturally ask in the presence of social phenomena, What conditions have produced these results? Some sociologists have used the term "forces" as a helpful analogy, but recognizing that when used with reference to social phenomena it is but an analogy, they have designated the conditioning factors of social phenomena as "social forces." By this term, they mean strictly speaking the forces which influence individuals in their social relations. Ward contended that the term should be applied only to those psychical products called desires, which influence men in their relations one with another.[1] It is worth while, however, to consider those influences also arising outside of man and society which modify social action. These forces which condition social processes, it has been held, should be clearly differentiated from the social forces. Baldwin has called these external factors "the socionomic forces," including in the meaning of this term, however, not only the influence of the physical environment, but also the influence of other groups.[2] With this understanding of the nature of these environing conditions we may properly discuss them here as socializing factors.

Classification of Socializing Factors. — Various classifications of social factors have been proposed. Some are based upon the

[1] Ward first called attention to the important place desire holds in social motivation and it is he who first worked the matter out carefully. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 33, 34, 103–110; cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. VII.

[2] Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 1913, pp. 484–491.

assumption that only those conditions within man's own being are socializing, while others include both man's innate capacities and the physical conditions about him which stimulate him to social action.[3]

The instincts of men occupy a primary place in the socializing process. These innate tendencies begin to function as soon as the child is born. Its first social relations grow out of these native characteristics. Whatever their number, and however much short of agreement are psychologists as to whether certain urges are instinctive, there is general agreement on a few instincts. These inborn capacities, constituting the original nature of man when he is born into the world, are the raw material of social relationships. In the words of McDougall, "The human mind has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are the essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action, whether individual or collective, and are the bases from which the character and will of individuals and of nations are gradually developed under the guidance of the intellectual faculties." [4]

These native endowments of instinct and urges give us many complex results, as they work out in reactions to the stimulation provided by the world about. Originated through endless ages of response of the organism to the conditions of life the instincts provide a method of reacting to situations between the individual and his physical and social environment which do not require the learning process. Since, however, it may be supposed that they were developed in response to certain situations provided by the external conditions, including other people, and remain established in our organism through natural selection, and furthermore since the determinants of man's social activities are limited rather narrowly by the conditions provided by the physical universe, both the psychical and physical conditions must be noticed.

In a text of this character, we shall include the physical factors in the belief that the student should have as comprehensive a

[3] Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, Chap. XII.

[4] *Social Psychology*, Boston, 1909, p. 19. See also Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. IV.

conception of the various forces which influence the formation and development of society as possible. The task is to set forth clearly the various influences which affect social life.[5] The difficulty is to get a classification which at once takes into account the subjective forces driving the individual to social action, and which at the same time makes room for a clear exposition of the functions they perform in society. With the practical purpose in view of making clear to the student the forces that coöperate in the building of society and with a keen appreciation of its many shortcomings, we venture to submit a classification which owes much to those which have preceded it.

I. *External Conditions of the Physical Environment*[6] *affecting man's impulses, feelings, thoughts, and actions.*

(*a*) Climate.
(*b*) Soil.
(*c*) Physical configuration, — mountains, valleys, watercourses, etc.
(*d*) Water supply.
(*e*) Flora.
(*f*) Fauna.

II. *External Social Factors affecting man as a social being.*

(*a*) Presence or absence of other groups.
(*b*) Attitude of other groups, — hostility or friendliness.

III. *Forces in Man's Psychical Nature.*

Instinctive in Origin
- (*a*) *Appetitive,* — hunger, thirst, and sex appetite.
- (*b*) *Hedonic,* — fear, aversion to pain, love of warmth, ease, and sensuous pleasure.

Instinctive-Social in Origin
- (*c*) *Egotic,* — ambition, shame, envy, pride, vanity, love of liberty, of power, and of glory.
- (*d*) *Affective,* — sympathy, sociability, love, hate, spite, jealousy, anger, revenge.
- (*e*) *Recreative,* — play impulses, desire for self-expression.

[5] Ellwood *op. cit.*, p. 280. The quarrel as to whether the physical conditions are social forces arises chiefly from the loose use of the word "social." Those who oppose the inclusion of physical conditions in the category of social forces use the term with reference to the way in which those forces originate. By "social forces" they mean forces which are social in their origin. The others mean those forces, whatever their origin, which are socializing in their effects, forces which produce social results; in other words, socializing forces. The term is used in the latter sense in this text, when used at all. The social forces are those which originate either in society or without it, which produce social results. The above scheme takes into consideration, however, that some socializing forces are social in their origin, while others are physical and still others biological. See Giddings, "The Measurement of Social Forces," *The Journal of Social Forces*, Vol. I (Nov. 1922), p. 3.

[6] Semple, *Influence of Geographic Conditions*, passim. See also Gen. 26 : 12–22.

Instinctive-Cultural in Origin

(*f*) *Religious,* — desire for relationship with the Unknown either through ecstasy or through relations of patronage and submission.

(*g*) *Ethical,* — love of fair play, sense of justice.

(*h*) *Æsthetic,* — desire for enjoyment of the pleasures of perception, or the beautiful.

(*i*) *Intellectual,* — curiosity, love of knowing, learning, and teaching.

IV. *Interests growing out of combinations of human desires in large part socially conditioned and directed towards the objects presented by physical stimuli and the external social factors.*

(*a*) The economic interests, — directed towards securing wealth.

(*b*) The political interests, — looking towards protection in the exercise of complete, individual self-expression.

(*c*) The religious interests, — looking toward alliance with the Unknown for release, protection, or advantage.

(*d*) The intellectual interests, — yearnings for diversified experience, for interpretation of the mysterious, release from fear, and control through understanding.

(*e*) The welfare interests, — centering on measures intended to conserve the group and contribute to its welfare.[7]

Natural Conditions That Influence Society. — In an earlier chapter of this book, certain physical conditions which affect society have been treated at length, and in the previous chapter, those which condition the formation of social aggregates have been mentioned. The factors dealt with before were water, food, topographical features, and climate.[8]

In addition to water, food, and climate, the natural resources of the earth, such as forests, mines, water power, and means of transportation, have been important influences in causing people to settle on a certain territory. Consequently these resources have been instrumental in the development of social order. Upon the whole, the direction taken by the social life, the forms of industry, and to some extent the nature of the social bonds and even the forms of thought are conditioned by the physical surroundings. The ancient Greek owed something of his character to the climatic conditions of the little peninsula on which he lived. The small

[7] This classification is built upon that of Ross, with the addition of certain factors which he does not place in independent classes, preferring to include them in certain of his wider categories. For example, under III the religious desire is not so simple as he would indicate. This necessitates a change in the content of the religious interests. Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology,* pp. 169–181.

[8] See Chap. VI and Chap. XVIII.

fertile valleys, the soft air, influenced by proximity to the sea, the sunny skies, together with the semitropical vegetation, lent a charm to his life and influenced his character. Likewise, the valley of the Nile, where the river overflows the desert, made Egypt, and largely determined the Egyptian character as well. The Sphinx and the Pyramids could not have existed in Greece, Italy, or Switzerland. India with its lofty mountains, extensive plains, great rivers, fearful storms, and terrible droughts which parched the vegetation, causing famines and pestilences, has had a vast influence on the character and the mind of the native. It was a land of fear and "a land of regrets." Indian philosophy, literature, and the Indian gods, creations of the mind of this people, depended largely for their character on physical environment.[9] So it might be shown that the freedom-loving Swiss owes something to his mountain home, that the Scotch character is influenced by the climate, and that even the American character as well owes much to sunshine and ozone, to mountain and plain, and the diversified resources of the nation. The result of this influence is that people subjected to the same physical environment to a degree tend to become similar in type of mind and character, to develop similar reactions to stimuli and to develop similar ideas and institutions.

Again, the physical influences on life and character in the creation of like temperaments and the inspiration of the same desires have made people alike and caused them to go in the same way, and thus have established social order. Racial characteristics have been developed largely by differences of environment. It may be assumed in our present state of knowledge that the physical influences had a fair share through selection in weeding out those unsuited to a particular climate, soil, and topography in determining the racial differences both in inborn capacity and social customs.

The Influence of the Social Environment. — Even more important in conditioning the development of society are the other social

[9] See Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, p. 29. George Adam Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 29, and Chaps. II, III. Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia*, pp. 106–132. Mill, *International Geography*, Chaps. VIII and IX. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 405–424. Ward, R. De C., *Climate*, Chap. VIII. Whitbeck, "Religion and Environment," *The Geographical Review*, April, 1918.

groups with which an aggregate of people come into contact. If the contact is not hostile in its nature, there is interchange of goods, ideas, and customs, pleasurable communication and imitation of one by the other. In most cases, however, contact with another group has meant conflict. Therefore, hostile groups have much the same effect as the unfriendly desert or wilderness and hostile beasts, except that greater intellectual efforts are excited in the attempt to outwit them. The presence of an enemy demands close organization on the part of the group, submission to the war-leader, and gives rise to the beginnings of government and division of labor. Moreover, hostility often begets reaction against the ideas, customs, and institutions of the enemy, except such of them as appear to be really necessary to survival. The latter are borrowed — but usually are made to appear as an invention. The presence of other groups determines in what directions the group shall develop, where it shall settle, and to a degree the forms of its industry, and its ideals of a social personality. The gods of the enemy are said to be demons, their ethics perverse, their culture barbaric, and their social customs degrading. All opposition affects the direction which the social forces shall take and to a degree the ways in which they shall express themselves.

Individual Desires Instinctive in Origin. — Those social forces that arise from individual desires operating in social relations are considered by some to be the real social forces, — forces originating in the social organism, as well as operating upon it.[10]

(*a*) *Appetitive Desires.* — Primary among these in order of action is the desire to satisfy *hunger*. The attempt to satisfy hunger caused people to work together in obtaining food. This simple act has had tremendous results in the development of social and economic life. So important is this that were it not for the impelling force of hunger, at least half of the industries would suddenly disappear.

(*b*) *Hedonic Desires.* — Not less fundamental than the desire to appease hunger is the *sexual appetite*. This is a true animal instinct, universal in all, and powerful in its influence in the

[10] They are a part of what Ross calls the "natural" desires, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 169.

development of social order. Although primarily an animal instinct, it gives rise to all the love sentiments and the refined sexual relationships which lie at the foundation of the home. Only a physical passion in its primary aspects, it may become a generalized sentiment stimulating the whole emotional life of man.

The sexual appetite is the method of nature for the perpetuation of the species, but the reproductive forces become varied and widely differentiated from the original purpose. While the home is primarily for the production and rearing of children, it has given rise to the family, and has formed the basis of the gens and the historical foundation of states. The sociological importance of children extends beyond the mere perpetuation of the race. They form the center of many social activities and generate emotional reactions of the greatest social importance. The socializing influence of children upon an adult we have already discussed. In addition consider the educational devices invented by savages to insure the proper development of their children in the traditions and customs of their tribes. Nor does this influence decline in the progress of civilization, but grows greater, generation after generation, until to-day the child stands at the center of civilization. For him we work and save, we sacrifice and struggle, that he may be better developed than his ancestors and that he may have opportunities equal to his abilities. Consider the schools we build, and the other institutions we devise and support for children. In some of our states as much as half of the taxes are devoted to the educational system. As true as in Isaiah's day "A little child shall lead them." Reflect also upon the codes we invent which place limits upon our egoistic impulses for the sake of the children. The ideal society is always in the future, and men spend their lives largely for future generations. It is this careful preparation for those who follow that causes much of the increasing industrial activity of each succeeding generation, and generates all sorts of social organization.

Moreover, the effect of the love sentiment on the individual — the love of husband and wife, of father and mother, of family and home — is great, making man a new creature of sympathy and coöperation. The social life improves just to the extent that

the love sentiment extends beyond mere physical passion and beeomes diffused through the entire being as a dynamic of widely varied activities.[11]

Therc is also a decp signifieanee in the gradual changing of the eharacteristics of individuals through the operation of sexual seleetion. The differentiation of raees has been influenced by this change. The social as well as the physical characteristies probably have been varied by the foree of selective mating. After eonfliet had made the warrior the admired man, the women, so far as they exereised a choiee, selected as a mate the man who was most warlike, or the most battle searred. In times of peace other ideals of virility eame to dominate, and the women selected mates more or less aeeording to these newer ideals. Thus, with the passing of war as an oeeupation and the eoming of industry and the arts of peaee the fathers of the families were ehosen in accordanee with peaeeful, industrious, and home-loving characteristies. Thus was laid the biologieal basis whereby the love forces expanded beyond the family and extended to the larger soeial world. The parental love whieh is the souree of sympathy for others extends at first to the kindred and establishes a unity of the group. When the family expands into the tribe, while there is primarily a unity arising through the demands of proteetion, the love of kindred still dominates and expands until it becomes a patriotie sentiment for the raee. When the tribe has a permanent loeation, this sentiment extends to the land. So that the love of family, of home, of tribe and people, and of the land of birth makes the universal sentiment of patriotism. While this restraint never dies out in normal national life, it frequently is transformed into humanitarianism extending to all members of the human race regardless of geographic and national boundaries.

Next to this in importanee among the hedonic desires is the avoidanee of pain, fear of enemies, love of warmth, ease, and sensuous pleasure. These desires lead men to build homes, devise shelter in cave and tree and house, to make elothing, and to eoöperate together for purposes of defense against a common enemy. The desire for shelter and for protection of the body

[11] Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 157, 179, 180.

has been very important in the development of social unity. It has caused the introduction of artificial heat, with all of its mechanical devices; by the demand for fuel it created the great industry of coal mining. It has grouped people together under the same roof, necessitating social order, resulting in an increased sociability on the one hand, and on the other it has separated them into households and made the household the unit of early social groups. The social activities of the home led to the establishment of the rights of property, and a development of the family life with the consequent great growth of social tradition, example, and suggestion. Its influence is observed in the development of language, in the creation of special communication, and in the beginnings of economic and social life. It has been far-reaching in its direct consequences, for the attempt to secure protection from cold has led to the development of architecture and home decorations. In coöperating against a common enemy man learned to widen his sympathies and to work with fellow man.

Individual Desires: Instinctive-Social in Origin. — (*c*) *The egotic desires* are directed towards the satisfaction of self-centered interests also, but in contrast with the appetitive and hedonic desires, the egotic draw their intensity from their social value. In a world where there was no one else but a lone individual, a Crusoe, these desires would never arise. They have their origin in the emulation, ambition, envy, pride, vanity, love of liberty, of power, and of glory, which are possible only in the presence of others. We prize certain things only because they give us distinction in comparison with the possessions of others. Much of the value of clothing comes from the feeling of superiority to others which its possession confers. Clothing of the body originated in the desire for ornament, but this soon came to be supplemented by the wish to protect the person against cold, storm, or heat. Later the need of clothing was felt through the sense of modesty, arising from conformity to what had become conventional and to which had been attached a sex taboo. To-day, while the idea of protecting the body from the influence of climate is primary in importance, much more attention and time are devoted to the artistic effect of clothing and to ornamentation than to the utili-

tarian results. While a coarse garment costing but a few dollars would sufficiently protect the wearer against wind and storm, there is worn in the place of it an artistic gown which costs hundreds of dollars. While the extent of ornamentation is somewhat dependent upon economic and social station, some of the poorer classes of humanity wearing the simplest garments, the richer people only dressing in silks, satins, and laces and wearing costly jewels, yet, to a certain degree, the ornamental motive still survives everywhere. The savage began by scarifying, tattooing, or painting the body. Then he inserted various articles, such as coarse ornaments of shells, bones, or stones into various parts of his person — his nose, his lips, or his ears. The first garments woven from leaves or the bark of trees were inartistic; later these were colored with some degree of artistic effect, or cut in fanciful shapes. No matter how poor people may be to-day, the desire for adornment is very strong, and they will frequently spend much more time on the trimmings and decorations of the garment than on the original cost of the garment itself. A man may wear a thirty-dollar suit of clothes, but a hundred-dollar diamond ring. Thomas has classified human wishes under four heads: (1) The desire for new experience; (2) the desire for security; (3) the desire for response; and (4) the desire for recognition.[12] In our classification they belong here. On this basis he interprets the girl who fails to fit into the social patterns which form the social heritage. However, they may help us to understand the problem of human behavior, normal as well as abnormal.

(*d*) *Affective Desires.* — The affective desires, rooted partly in the same soil of craving for social superiority as the egotic, differ from the latter in that they terminate upon others, instead of upon one's self. They include sympathy, sociability, love, hate, spite, jealousy, anger, and revenge. Primarily the desire for sociability is a causal force in society building. There is an individual satisfaction, a pleasure in mere association. Whatever dispute there may be concerning the social qualities of man, it must be assumed that he has always had a desire for companionship, and while range of association may have been comparatively

[12] *The Unadjusted Girl*, Boston, 1927, Chap. I.

narrow in primitive society, it has always existed and it widens with the development of civilization. The desire for sociability has led man to seek after pleasure and to strive for position in order to reach a desired standard of social life. This striving has had great influence in the arrangement of people in groups.

Originally growing out of sympathy, the craving for companionship develops a number of derivative desires. On the one hand the cravings for love, esteem, and the approval of sympathetic souls, and on the other the desire to vent upon despicable or hostile individuals a feeling of spite, jealousy, anger, hate, and revenge grows out of the craving for sympathy from one's fellows. As the desire for sociability develops association and coöperation, so the wish to vent the feelings of anger, spite, etc., upon others leads to the formation of classes, and to social differentiation, which lends variety to social groups and stimulates the making of devices for social control and coöperation, and thus tends in the end to promote conscious socialization. Out of the desire for sociability develops a special phase of it, viz., the desire for the approval of our fellows, — what Giddings and Thomas call "desire for recognition." [13]

While it is difficult to estimate to what extent the desire for the approval of our fellows influences our lives, we know that it is one of the strongest motives of human action. Take away the recognition of our actions by our fellow men from our life, and it is reduced to a dull monotony without charm or object of existence. Granting, even, that man does all things because he desires to do them or because he thinks they are right and ought to be done, yet we shall find a source of this desire and of this "ought" in the approval or disapproval of others. How this is exemplified in every simple act of life! One scarcely buys a garment or toils at any occupation, or pursues any course of life without thinking how others will look upon it. Perhaps this influence is most strikingly observed in the choice of companions and associates. A man seeks the companionship of those who approve his conduct rather than those who disapprove it. Or, having chosen associates whose life and character he admires and who satisfy his desire

[13] Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 98.

for companionship, he will seek to do that which is approved by them.

In the choice of a course of life or profession, social approval or disapproval is also important. The struggle for wealth is greatly modified by the approbation of our fellows. Men follow literary pursuits because they wish to meet with the approval of the community. A striving after political preferment is often to be explained by the fact that man desires to be before the public eye and receive the admiration and plaudits of the state or nation. It is true that this desire is more powerful in some people than in others, but for that very reason it has a decisive influence in determining the life course of the individual and in segregating people into groups. There is no greater evidence that man has a social nature and that he is a social being in sympathy with his social life and surroundings than the fact that he borrows ideals from others and allows his own ideals to be modified by those current in his group.

(*e*) *Recreative Desires.* — The play impulse occupies a larger place in the list of socializing factors than we have been accustomed to admit. The desire roots itself physically in the pleasure derived from the stimulation of unused muscles and nerves; biologically in the fact that multiplication of activities gives a larger number of trials at adaptation to the conditions of the environment, thus improving the chances of survival; psychologically in the emotional response to all activities, whether they be old and familiar in the experience of the race, and hence restful to the organism, or novel, providing intenser reaction by reason of diversity of satisfaction and rest from the weariness induced by the habitual overwork of other muscles and nerves. The factor, however, which gives the desire to play its greatest scope and intensity is that play is not solitary, but social. Consider the play of a Crusoe, — how limited would be its diversity, how dwarfed the emotional returns to the player! As a matter of fact, play has developed in groups. Only in groups does it get its compelling and socially useful intensity. The presence of the other players greatly stimulates the activity and increases the pleasure experienced. Add to that the presence of the spectators and the stress

of the emotional tension induced by the desire for their approval and fear of their disapproval. Complete the machinery for the stimulation of nervous effort with rhythmic yells and calls, the pulsations of stirring music, the massing of banners with shibboleths concentrating the hopes and fears of a whole community, and you have an emotional result to which no individual effort could possibly approach. A person may have an alcoholic "spree" all by himself, but an emotional "spree" such as can be experienced at a football game or a boat race requires a crowd.[14]

Who that has ever played or witnessed games can doubt that the recreative desires have a specific and powerful socializing effect? Releasing the pent-up emotions and the stress and strain of vocational effort, breaking up the monotony of life incident to close confinement to a task, and stimulating the age-long impulses to active physical or mental activity, play opens up the fountains of human nature and gives opportunity to the passion for self-expression in pleasant contact with one's fellows in the delightful land of make-believe, where the actual failures of life are forgotten in the successes of the game, and where all things become possible. Moreover, with the stimulation of the emotions it makes possible relationships which, under different circumstances, could not be formed. It provides that fellowship which builds attachments bridging over into the serious business of life, and which lies at the basis of democracy. It breaks down the reserve by which we shut ourselves off from each other for self-defense in the ordinary business relationships of life. By stirring the emotions it lifts us over national and cultural barriers and levels for us race prejudices. From primitive times down to the present play has developed sociability and paved the way for understandings and covenants. It breaks down "the middle wall of partition" between the "Greek and Barbarian," Irish and German, Italian and American, as may be seen by a visit to any municipal playground in any of our large cities.

[14] See Professor G. T. W. Patrick, "The Psychology of Football," *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XIV, pp. 114–117; "The Psychology of Relaxation," *Popular Science Monthly*, June, 1914. Gillin, "The Sociology of Recreation," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX, No. 6, May, 1914; Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1921, pp. 592–594.

Moreover, labor apart from that which is necessary to secure the wherewithal to satisfy the simplest natural wants historically began in play. Says Bücher, "Labor among primitive peoples is something very ill-defined. The further we follow it back, the more closely it approaches in form and substance to *play*." He points out that the taming of animals by the primitive man begins with those which he keeps for his amusement. He says, further, "All regularly sustained activity finally takes on a rhythmic form and becomes fused with music and song in an indivisible whole." It is in play that technical skill is developed, according to this author. Even among the more highly developed primitive peoples when work and play begin to be differentiated from each other the dance still precedes or follows important pieces of work, like war, the hunt, and the harvest. He concludes with these striking words, which show how even economic wants are based in developed society upon social functions: "But even our wants, considered from an economic point of view, exist only in very small part naturally; it is only in the matter of bodily nourishment that our consumption is a necessity of nature; all else is the product of civilization, the result of the free creative activity of the human mind." [15]

Surviving among many peoples to this day are labor songs, significant testimony to the part which rhythmic play has had in the development of industrious activity. In ancient times these labor songs alleviated the labor of the toiler. Aristophanes quotes one of these songs,[16] the song of a miller, thus:

> "Grind, grind, my good mill, grind;
> Pittacus turns a mill as we all find.
> Grind, grind, my good mill, grind,
> This miller-king, oh, he's the man to my mind."

It is said that negro laborers laying rails on a railroad in West Virginia chanted a song as they worked together in moving and placing the rails. Sven Hedin, the Asiatic traveler, says that the Thibetan boatman, as he rowed him across Lake Amchoktso,

[15] Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, translated by Wickett. New York, 1912, pp. 27–29.

[16] Aristophanes, *Clouds* (Everyman's Library), footnote, p. 168.

cried out "in time with the oars, 'Shubasa, ys aferin, bismillah, ya barkadiallah' — to cite only a few words of his inexhaustible repertoire." He heard the workmen who stir the tea in the giant caldrons in the monastery at Shigatse, Thibet, singing a rhythmical song.[17] Kidd describes the Kaffirs at Cape Town, South Africa, seemingly a lazy lot, when called to their work of moving railway rails from one heap to another, thus: "The natives all advance in a well-dressed line to the first rail, and then begin to chant a droning tune. At a certain note in the song all twenty natives stoop down and take hold of the rail, chanting as they stoop. When this is done they continue the chant, and, at another note, all raise the rail with great merriment and fun. They then continue the chant, and, at another note, all raise their right feet, and when the chant comes to the next period they advance one step and laugh again. Continuing the chant, they lift their left leg this time, raise it high in the air, laugh, chant, and take a step forward. When they have moved the rail to the new position they chant till they come to a certain phrase or 'Motif' in their Wagnerian song, and with a yell and a volley of sound, drop the rail into its place, and then look at one another and laugh." [18]

Individual Desires: Instinctive-Cultural in Origin. — (*f*) *Religious Desires.* — Having in mind the sectarianism of the last four centuries one might think that religion is essentially a divisive factor. Like all the other desires of which mention has been made, the religious desires under certain circumstances inspire division and make for social differentiation. It must not be forgotten, however, that social differentiation is as important in the development of society as social unification. Nevertheless, on the whole the desires which find satisfaction in religion have played an important part in the development of social unity.

By the religious desires is meant the craving for intimate relationship with the Unknown either through ecstasy or by means of rites of propitiation and submission. These relations have for

[17] *Trans-Himalaya*, Vol. I, p. 362; Vol. II, pp. 38, 115, 124, 126.

[18] Kidd, *The Essential Kaffir*, p. 395. For the origin of the labor song, see Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 615–617. The author himself has witnessed a gang of negro laborers moving rails on the campus of the University of North Carolina doing the work to the accompaniment of a singsong direction by the negro boss.

their end release from the limitations of human weakness and ignorance through the help of the Unknown.

The desires which give us the religious interests affect almost every phase of man's life, especially during the early stages of social development. At first religion provides a means of defense against the unknown and dreadful powers of the Universe. With the growth of groupal life religion becomes a means of group defense against its enemies. Then public worship develops. Bound up with man's economic interests through his endeavors to bring his god to his aid in wresting a subsistence from grudging nature, religion instituted feasts and the rites of communion. As soon as children became an asset either to the group or to the individual, the god was looked to for defense against childlessness. Hence, the religious feasts became sexual orgies, continued long after the belief which gave rise to them was forgotten, and after a quickened ethical conscience had begun to condemn such practices.[19]

Moreover, with the rise of ancestor worship, and the increased importance which that belief gave to sons, religion became a stay of the family and of the authority of the father, thus strengthening social control through another avenue, the family, in addition to that through the group.

After ethics and religion had joined hands, the latter supplied new and powerful sanctions to conduct. On the other hand, ethics transformed religion from being the instrument whereby the gods were made to minister to the lust and greed of men into an instrument of socialized personality. Not blessings in basket and store, but "clean hands and a pure heart," now became the subject of prayer. Finally in such men as Socrates, Amos, Jesus, and Paul, religion became a socializing influence which moved them to sacrifice themselves in the interest of the state, and of humanity. It still remains one of the most potent sources of inspiration for lofty deeds, for quiet endurance of hard conditions, and for tasks at once heroic and seemingly hopeless, as the part it played in the World War and in the war-swept nations since shows.

[19] Cf. I Sam. 1 : 1–20 with Am. 2 : 7, 8.

(*g*) *Ethical Desires.* — Growing out of group sanctions and developing in the individual through the "dialectic of personal growth," as already explained, the ethical desires remain an important factor in socialization. From the standpoint of society the ethical desires, expressing themselves chiefly as a passion for justice and a curbing of the egoistic impulses, make for social solidarity and stability of social relationships. They supply those less sordid motives which contribute to the perfection of social relationships. Ideals of service to others, of unselfish cooperation, and of abstract idealism in social relationships take the place of the greed of gain, fear of enemies, and of "looking out for number one." Joined with religion the ethical desires give to religion such content as is implied in "the Kingdom of God," an ideal society. They cut through the other social forces and modify them. For example, the ethical desires curb the appetitive both by curbing hunger and love and by placing strict limits on the craving for wealth, that complex of appetitive and egotic desires. They triumph over the hedonic desires for the soft enjoyments of the senses, and send men out into adventures of daring which can be accomplished only by overcoming fear and aversion to pain. They turn play into "fair play," without which the recreative desires would find but poor satisfaction. They changed ancient religion into something different from a cheap form of life insurance, and transform modern religion from a spiritual "fire escape" into a mighty engine of social regeneration through a purging of the choked springs of human endeavor for social righteousness. They redeem the æsthetic desires from the curse of aristocratic snobbery by making art unconsciously minister to the solution of the deep problems of social relationships, for example, the saving of childhood and motherhood, the stimulation of sympathy for the poor and the vicious. Who that has ever looked upon the picture of a Madonna and Child has gone away with the same ideal of motherhood and the same feeling about childhood? Who can read Hood's *Song of the Shirt,* or Mrs. Browning's *Cry of the Children,* and fail to feel sympathy for the overworked seamstress and for the poor children driven to work in the factories in order that Greed might have its dividends?

Finally, the ethical desires have mellowed the keen enjoyment of the exercise of the intellect with the tender feelings of sympathy and given them value and proportion.

(*h*) *Æsthetic Desires.* — Ward has shown how the æsthetic desires are grounded in animal life where they are real biotic forces working through selection and heredity.[20] There they manifest themselves in love of glorious plumage, of beautiful flowers, of sweet perfume, and of attractive fruits. The significance of beauty lay originally in the survival advantage which it conferred upon its possessors whether in plant or animal. Then the æsthetic desires became ideals with all connection lost with their utilitarian origin. As ideals working their way out into all realms of human life they became social, or what Ward calls "sociogenetic," forces. We say that an ideal concerning a form of government or a plan of education is beautiful. We thus testify that we have carried the æsthetic over into the intellectual and the practical realms of life.

The æsthetic desires among primitive men are largely what they are among animals, a means whereby sexual selection secures a race suited to meet the conditions of survival. Their satisfaction led to an increase of the slowly diminishing birth rate of the *genus homo* as compared with that of most of the lower animals. With a dawning reason, however, mankind undertook to assist the slow and devious ways of nature. Hence arose the cuttings, paintings, and ornamentations of primitive peoples. Hence arose clothing with all its benefits and drawbacks. As soon as there arose artificial methods of stimulating the love of the beautiful by such means as those just mentioned, great impetus was given to man's inventive powers. When one thinks of the amount of pain suffered by the people of every age in order to satisfy their cravings for what to them is beautiful, the mighty power of this set of desires becomes apparent. And when one remembers that this ideal of beauty is backed by two such sanctions as the appeal of the novel and the weight of the customary combined, one is prepared to appreciate its force as a socializing agency.

Beginning with personal beauty, the craving for satisfaction

[20] *Pure Sociology*, p. 433.

was stimulated by what it fed upon. It could not stop with the personal. It must extend to all other things with which man came into contact. The boat in which he worked or played must be adorned. The cave or the hut in which he dwelt, the weapons and tools, however crude, all felt the touch of his creative imagination and of his passion to realize in wood and stone, in color and form, his ideals of beauty. Moreover, often his religion gave the *motif* for his ideals of the beautiful, and thus two powerful desires found at once satisfaction in his creations.

From the standpoint of social achievement two results appeared, — each man's intellect was stimulated and directed toward distinctively individual creative effort, whereas the group ideals were unified. And so two seemingly incompatible results were obtained from the attempt to satisfy his æsthetic desires, — tremendous growth of the activity of his intellect with corresponding increase of independent practical activity and at the same time a new growth of social activities in which he was forced to conform to the manners of his neighbors.

Who can enumerate the social results of the attempts of man to satisfy these cravings? What cathedrals and temples have risen at the behest of these dominant desires! The architecture of cities, the pictures of a thousand galleries, the music of unnumbered symphonies, the literature of all the nations, in short, art in all its forms would not be even a name without the magic potency of the originally sexually conditioned æsthetic desires. The rhythm of the millions of looms that weave the beautiful fabrics with which our bodies are clothed would never have been heard. We all would still be cave dwellers or animals of arboreal habits living for the day without knowledge of the beauties of nature or care for them.

(*i*) *Intellectual Desires.* — If our interpretation of the origin of religion presented in a previous chapter is correct, it throws light also upon the development of intellect. Primitive man in the presence of forces which he did not understand first feared instinctively, then acted impulsively, and, after the danger was past, thought. As an animal he may not have been able to do the last. As a man his developing mind was not content that danger

no longer threatened. It first asked, What was it? and then, Why was it? His first "guesses at the riddle of existence" we have already referred to in connection with the development of religion. His religion was shot through and through with a rude philosophy and adumbrations of science. He answered these questions of his developing curiosity in the only way possible to him, in terms of personality. In a way analogous to the nascent curiosity of the growing child and especially like the gormandizing interest in facts manifested by the pubescent youth the primitive man who had developed to the animistic stage of culture hungered and thirsted for knowledge of this world in which he at last had come to have an intellectual interest. It gave him pleasure to guess at what all these phenomena meant which his observation had collected. He found a joy now not only in getting away from the danger which nature held, but in explaining in his way its mystery.

Once a single individual had reached the stage of finding his curiosity satisfied by an explanation which he had himself created in his own mind, he was marked as a superior man. Long before that stage was reached the medicine man, who acted as though he knew what to do in a crisis, had appeared upon the scene and because of his superior magic had secured the prestige which comes in every age to the man who does not hesitate when all others falter, but decides quickly, grasps the oars, and pulls the sinking boat to safety. In a crisis which demanded action of some kind, to relieve the emotional tension of inaction and hesitation, he acted and secured such release. Probably it was the same man, although that is not certain, who offered the first explanation to awakening curiosity about the phenomena of this puzzling old world. At that stage any explanation served, as in the case of the awakening intellect of the child. The hungering souls about him were glad for any solution.

Since intellectual efforts brought their own reward at such a time, a great spur was thereby given to all struggling human intellects apart from the joy which such creation gave to its author. With a certain type of mind the pleasure experienced from such feats added to the range of enjoyments, — none too many, — of

primitive man, and added a refinement of pleasure not to be found in the satisfaction of any other of his desires. This pleasure consisted in part of the rich emotional reaction following the resolution of his own bewildered mind. Where before had been confusion was now order; where had been uncertainty now was the clear, peaceful confidence of infallible truth. In part the pleasure consisted of the joy he experienced in resolving the uncertainties and confusion of others who had been in a like state of bewilderment with its emotional stress. His explanation was the trigger which released the spring of intellectual interest long held back. In this case, however, his pleasure came to him through the representative reconstruction of his own previous emotional stress of uncertainty and his own release. Again the satisfaction of his desires gave him pleasure and at the same time brought him social prestige.

Moreover, every development of his mind which such exercises accomplished made for survival. Man's intellect gave him dominion over nature, over "the fish of the sea, the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." [21] Not only could he outwit them in the contest for survival, but he was enabled to capture them and by domestication subject them to his service. He now perceived more clearly advantageous relationships. Natural selection was supplemented and accelerated by rational selection. Now he could shorten cuts in his development by his own will. Conscious rather than sympathetic social relationships became possible. Inventions in coöperation and social organization now arose with all the social and economic results which have followed intellectual activity in the history of mankind. Every other desire of man was now modified by reason of its being made the subject of rational thought. The gods in the heavens above or in the earth beneath and in the forest and mountain now changed their characters. Ethics and æsthetics now underwent transformations revolutionary in their nature. Reason took the place of instinct, at first to the detriment of mankind in many ways, but in the end to its advantage, bringing every instinct and appetite under the control of rationalized social standards.

[21] Gen. 1 : 28.

Out of these various desires, partly individual and partly social in origin, grew by the formations of complexes of desires of various kinds certain great interests. They are the economic or wealth interests, the health interests, the political interests, the religious interests, and the intellectual interests.

The Economic Interests. — Compounded of certain appetitive, hedonic, egotic, and affective desires the wealth interests are among the most important that influence social life. As before related, we have passed from the struggle for mere existence to the struggle for wealth. Men desire wealth for the power or comfort it will bring them in the use of material goods. There are all degrees of desire for wealth and its uses. In some instances it amounts to pure avarice, the hoarding and worshiping of gold. In others it is a desire to satisfy the pleasures of the fleeting hour. Between these two extremes there are all degrees and varieties of desire. In most instances wealth is wanted for what it will do, that is, for what it will give in pleasure or profit to the one who possesses it. It brings means of learning, of gratifying æsthetic taste, of travel, of satisfying the appetite for food or drink, of possessing the works of art and industry; and, perhaps most important of all from the social point of view, it furnishes the means whereby is gained social prestige. For it men toil and make sacrifices and temporarily deny themselves privileges and pleasures. For it men organize themselves into companies and shape their social life to meet the demands of the wealth-getting process. It is a marvelous social force modifying all the social processes of man.

The Political Interests. — Under certain conditions political organization originated in the opportunity it offered to man's desire for economic gain.[22] Historically not only the hope of gain, but also the fear of enemies, did much to bring government into being. Then there combined with these two the ambition of the masterful leader with his love of power and display. Thus greed, fear, ambition, and vanity all combined to provide those interests which we call political.

More recently the state is coming to be looked upon as the

[22] Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 267–269; cf. Ross, *The Foundations of Sociology*, p. 175.

socialized means whereby the power of the few and rich may be curbed in the interests of the many. The state is the guarantee to the common man as well as to the powerful that he shall have opportunity for the richest possible self-expression. It is the ideal not only of a benevolent but of a wise and rational father who presides over his growing and therefore immature and selfish children in order to see that they develop a socialized personality in the interest of the common good.

What stupendous results these interests have wrought in human history! The social organization, which in the early period of social development became so all-inclusive that it engulfed for the first time tribes and races entirely diverse, cast a spell over the imagination of man which he has never escaped. The very bigness of it has made even the lust for empire of social significance in the development of society. Rooted in the love of booty and in the ambition of the leader, the passion for empire has drawn men together into closer social bonds, started the process of race amalgamation by the violent but effective methods of tyranny and oppression, and has tended towards the socialization of the world by developing a consciousness of kind among men as men. In the struggle for domination which characterized the nation-building age social organization has been perfected and men have learned how to conform to one another even though by compulsion.

How the idea of the state as a social organization has affected all social organization! The idea of world dominion which found expression in the Roman Empire survived long after the Empire itself had forever vanished, and this idea gave shape to that loose confederation of states known as the Holy Roman Empire, which Voltaire characterized as neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.[23] Long before that, however, the idea had taken possession of the western Christian church and had begun to transform it into an organization modeled upon the earlier Roman Empire. Furthermore, the subtle influence of its glory on some of the modern European states is to be seen in the corrupted names of Czar and Kaiser, by which these states have paid tribute to the magic name of its rulers, the Cæsars. In so doing, however, both the modern

[23] Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, 1904, p. 216.

nations of Europe and the medieval church but followed the earlier example of the Jewish and Christian churches. Even after return from the Exile the Jews could not forget that they were descendants of those who once knew a Hebrew kingdom. Even though based upon the democracy of the family concept the new ideal society of Jesus was a kingdom. On the other hand, in this republic, the United States, what voluntary organizations apart from certain religious denominations are not organized in theory at least upon the representative republican basis?

If that is true of the influence of the form of political institutions, how much more true is it of the spirit. There was no real basis in the Roman Empire for a democracy of men, and for that reason, the simple democracy formed by Jesus and the early disciples could not continue out in the Roman world. Consider the difference, for example, between the theory of equality of the sexes held by St. Paul and his actual practice in the face of views held by the members of his churches.[24] The Gentile Christians had no basis in experience for such a democracy as the theory demanded, and therefore in the course of three centuries the church in the thought of Augustine became "the City of God," instead of a brotherhood, and the city which was the prototype of the church was not Jerusalem, but Rome.[25] The close analogy between the type of government in an early New England church and in the town meeting has often been remarked. More often than we think, unless we stop to consider, the political interests have influenced our social forms and our essential social spirit.

The Religious Interests. — Developing from the desire of the soul for alliance with the Unknown in order to secure protection, advantage, or release from the uncertainties of life, religion has played a great rôle in social development. While religious organizations took their form from the type of current political organization, religion in turn exerted an influence upon the social structure

[24] Cf. Gal. 3 : 28 and 1 Cor. 11 : 3–12.

[25] See Augustine, *The City of God*, *passim*. On the influence of political structures and ideals upon the Christian Church, see Sohm, *Outlines of Church History*, translation by Sinclair, New York, 1901, pp. 44–48. Moeller, *History of the Christian Church*, translation by Rutherford, New York, 1898, Vol. I, pp. 315–319. Hatch, *The Organization of the Early Christian Churches*, London, 1882, pp. 213–222.

and the social ideals. Fear and ambition, chiefly, the affective, recreative, and religious desires, secondarily, combine to form that group of social interests known as the religious interests.

As a method whereby the safety and preservation of the group were insured, religious rites and ceremonies contributed to the formation of habits of coöperation. Once a priesthood had grown up, the basis of an organization was laid, which, with its political connections, its control of the supernatural sanctions, and its alliance with the ruler of the group, greatly increased submission to a leading spirit and led on to social unity. Worship at a common shrine stimulated common feelings and the generation of common sentiments. The first great artistic impulse finding permanent expression was aroused by religion. Temples and shrines growing out of graves perhaps were the world's first architecture. As has been indicated before, religion and philosophy to begin with were undifferentiated.

The influence of religion has varied at different times in the history of society. In its origin it was the child of the doubt, and of mystery born of a crisis, of hope deferred, and of oppression. The human soul refused to believe that it was destined for defeat either at the hands of men or the forces of nature. Religion has continued to be the handmaid of those whose lot it has been to sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, and of those who had no helper. Its gods have been the helpers summoned by the unconquered human spirit, against the enemy and against those powers of nature which were seen to be hostile. Religion has ever been exercised because it "giveth power to the faint." As an instrument armed with which the natural powers of men may prove equal to a need or crisis it has survived. Otherwise how has it happened that, if religion is a useless thing, if it plays no part in the means whereby survival is secured, it has itself survived the shock of skepticism, the changes of form made necessary by the vicissitudes of social and intellectual readjustments throughout the ages? More and more religion has ceased to be a philosophy of the Universe. It ceases to be what it was to primitive man, a means whereby he thought to understand a puzzling world.

Science reigns over that sphere. Does religion remain only a means whereby the things science has not yet conquered may be explained? If so, is it not doomed to extinction? Is it merely a confession of the limitations of the human intellect in the presence of unsolved mysteries of life, death, and the Universe? Does it remain merely a limbo of the unexplained? If it is merely that, its task is nearly done, for philosophy and science have not labored in vain.

On the other hand, is its usefulness limited to the softening of the rigors of continued human oppression? Is it only a solace of the downtrodden in the place of social justice? Is it merely an angel of hope pointing a wistful finger from earth to heaven? If so, again, its task is nearly done. If it is only a poor substitute for social adjustment, what will happen to it when social justice shall have taken the place of oppression, when no longer hungry children shall cry for bread, and naked bodies shiver from cold, and when the oppressed of all nations shall have found a way to have their wants satisfied here on earth? True, that glorious state of affairs does not seem to be imminent, but there are those — and they are not a few — who labor in the faith that such a state of things is possible. But when that state comes, where, then, will be the place for religion?

Let us begin by accepting all that science has to teach — certainly scientific people can do no less. Let us confess that religion — the faith that there is "a power that makes for righteousness not ourselves" in the world — is merely the result of man's experience with the world. Even so, can we not say at least that man believes that good will triumph over evil because such a belief has made him better able to survive? Let us say that man believes in a God because such belief has made him better able to bear "the buffetings of outrageous fortune," better able to survive in a world of brutal and sometimes hostile forces by calling out the exertion of his best efforts in this struggle, by making him invoke not only the coöperation of the higher powers of his nature, but also the help of his fellows, and that he believes this because through natural selection those who had not that faith, who had not the belief that unlocked the hidden resources of their souls

and released the unknown powers of their beings, were exterminated as a general type.[26]

Then the question arises, Why has the world as constituted selected that attitude rather than the irreligious? What is it in the nature of things which makes faith a better characteristic from the standpoint of survival than doubt, belief better than skepticism, confidence that righteousness is stronger than wrong better than the contrary belief, a belief in the possibility of progress better than a philosophy of despair? Why does not the Universe, if it is a chaos of blind forces, governed by the law of chance distribution, implant in man by the process of natural selection a working belief that the dominating power of the world is bad rather than good, that progress is impossible, that faith is vain and that all is vanity? Why has such a postulate never produced a conquering people? Pessimism has won no victories. Why? Perhaps that is a question we cannot answer at this time. It may, however, be suggestive to observe that the nature of man is such that a belief that something better than he has now reached is possible has made him that irresistible, ever struggling being who has become to a degree lord of the world. Religious faith may be a delusion, but if so, it is a beneficent one. It has made the common man struggle on when there was no earthly hope, it has stirred his flagging energies even by admitting that only heaven was left to him, making him a fighting, struggling being to the very end, in the face of despair and of certain death.[27]

When faith has ceased to hold out for him any hope of material advantage, it has inspired in him the hope of a nobler personality. After social adjustment of happy chance has made him independent of the help of the gods for material blessings, religion has held out to him the hope of a clean heart and an unselfish life and called him to the useful and inspiring work of building a character. Religion has at least the advantage that it has proved to be a working philosophy of life. Moreover, it has drawn together into coöperation by means of the two most powerful social motives,

[26] James, "The Powers of Men," *American Magazine*, Nov., 1907, Vol. 65, pp. 56–65.

[27] Cf. Ps. 94, Job 13 : 15 with Plato, *The Republic*, Bk. I.

compelling fear and deathless hope, men who could not be moved by conscience and who possessed no ability to secure their survival alone. Without it what would society be? What victories it has won in spurring on the tired spirit!

The Intellectual Interests. — Modern social life demonstrates over and over again that knowledge is useful in every department of life and therefore must be attained if man is to reach what is called "success." Acquaintance with the world surrounding man, both physical and social, is absolutely necessary to the attainment of the desired end of life. But there is a love of knowledge for its own sake which causes people to spend hours of toil and sacrifice and which yields to them great happiness and pleasure. These two ideas, namely, the desire of knowledge for practical purposes and the love of learning, have caused the building of our universities and colleges and the creation of our literature as well as the accumulation of scientific knowledge, all of which are powerful in influencing our social life.

What social achievements have resulted from the intellectual interests? The insatiable curiosity of man has stopped at no difficulty in the way of understanding. He differs from other animals not only in the depth and range of his emotions, the wideness of his sympathy and in his capacity to enjoy and suffer, but also in his passion to understand and utilize. The mysteries of the Universe to a degree puzzle the primitive man. Childlike he solves these riddles at first by the attribution of personality to the objects and phenomena of nature. As social experience broadens and deepens, and as intelligence develops, some men can no longer be satisfied. Their restless spirits cannot be quieted by the answers given. They perceive facts which the theory of a personalized nature does not fit. They postulate impersonal causes to explain these facts. Thus the Greek metaphysicians asserted that out of certain elements, such as fire and water, all things came into being. Others began to analyze human personality, and gave us the trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit. Others, among them Socrates and Aristotle, inquired about human relationships.

From these beginnings what has developed? The intellect of

man looking out upon the heavens at night no longer sees there the forms of animals, but countless systems of stars with their satellites, measures the distances of the stars from us in terms of light-years, ascertains their constituent elements with the spectroscope, and sees in the formerly chaotic expanse an ordered Universe. Modern science has dissolved the elements of the Greeks into simpler elements and discovered many others. The very secrets of the heavens above and of the earth beneath, of the body and mind of man himself are being searched out and made to yield the story of their past history to satisfy man's insistent questions of What and Why.

As a corollary of his passion to understand is man's practical interest in putting to use what he has learned. He came to understand, and then to use what he had learned. As a consequence the lightning, which he once feared, has become his servant. His knowledge of body and mind he is applying to education, health, politics, and social relations in the interest of better social adjustments.

Besides this there are many wants arising from the activity of the intellect which are far reaching in their influence on the social life.

Welfare Interests. — Numerous desires, some of them belonging to the class we have called instinctive as to origin, like the fear of pain, desire for food, fear of enemies, and others belonging to the group, denominated instinctive-social in origin, such as the desire for sympathy and sociability, love and hate, and the desire for self-expression, and still others from the last group in our classification, the instinctive-cultural group, like the religious and the ethical desires, combine to form what may be called the welfare interests of society. These interests modify the social activities in many ways, not only in modern civilization, but to a less extent also in all social groups as soon as the leaders of the group come to see, if only in a dim way, the bearing of these interests on the welfare of the community.

An important group of welfare interests is the health interests, which very early are recognized as of vital concern to the community. The preservation of the body, its protection from cold

and heat and other detrimental climatic effects, occupies the attention of man to a considerable extent. The desire to increase physical well-being becomes not only an individual, but also a social, function. It develops all forms of housing and clothing and city building which pertain to the health of the community. Sanitation and sanitary societies, the art of medicine and medical societies, are all based upon this desire for health. It has a vast influence, too, on the advancement of knowledge and causes scientific investigation and the development of scientific societies. In our educational institutions it develops athletic sports, and provides systems of physical exercise in the gymnasium. It lies at the basis of the eugenics movement. In these and many other ways these interests cause the development of social activities.

Akin in many ways is the group of moral interests which serve to satisfy a desire for righteousness. They are based upon ideals of human conduct. People are influenced in their conduct in the satisfaction of this desire. It becomes a social force and as such enters into social ideals, thus furnishing a standard of action. It helps to determine social choices and social aims, and leads the community toward what is conceived to be a standard of excellence.

Yet another group of interests which may be classed here are the educational interests. They lie partly in the realm of intellectual interests, but serve also the general welfare. When education is looked at from the social point of view rather than from that of individual culture, there is then seen to be a basis for making education a social matter. The welfare of the group politically depends on the development of the citizens of the country. Economic prosperity of the group demands that the educational process take into consideration the vocational needs of the youth of society. It is coming to be held by many that even the moral development of society must be attended to in part by the school system. Thus, our educational interests are welfare interests and play an important rôle in giving shape to social ideals and social structures.

Conscious Social Effort. — Besides the forces of physical nature and those arising from individual desires, society as a unit exercises a conscious influence in causing its own development. There has

always been a social pressure causing aggregation, combination, and organization. While there is no "transcendent *ego*" called the social mind, the members of a community slowly learn to feel, think, will, and act together. This unity of feeling and action was at first an unconscious force impelling society to do certain things, to observe customs, law, and order. In the beginning there was no conscious concerted action to build society according to certain ideals or cause it to move in a certain direction. But, impelled by the influences of physical nature and by the effort of each individual to satisfy his own desires, society developed, became more and more settled in habit and custom, and acted increasingly as a unit. Finally, as customs became more regular and more universally observed, there developed a public sentiment which the individual was obliged to follow or else be denounced as working against the whole community. As this social judgment became more clearly defined, and the sentiment became more clearly expressed, public action was manifested so that the whole community observed the same habits and customs, and unconsciously acted together for the advancement of the whole social body. There sprang up an unwritten code of ceremonies, forms, and customs that was rigidly adhered to as a natural expression of social unity and coöperation. Also the economic conditions forced people through a certain course or along certain lines of conduct and modified all of the crude social activities of the group. Habituated to act together, there finally arose a customary social choice whereby all members of the group who became subjected to the same conditions of life went the same way. That is, they made the same choices regarding self-preservation and social order, and observed the customs of their predecessors. In all this there was no formal attempt to regulate or reconstruct society.

The process by which a group of social interests developed from the instinctive to socially conscious stage is illustrated by the welfare interests discussed above. At first concern for the general welfare was probably unconscious, or what Sumner has called the "folkways." Probably this concern grew up unconsciously by a process of natural selection. Rather early, however, the cleverest minds began to perceive the advantage of taking thought

about certain measures for the welfare of the whole group. At first such minds were few in number, and often they perceived its importance only in a dim fashion. Perhaps some of these now clearly perceived interests were but chance discoveries from activities inspired by superstitions arising from activities in the face of a crisis. Gradually, however, out of the jumble of actions and ceremonies thus arising there were selected by the growing intelligence of man certain ideals and activities which were perceived to have survival value. That is the beginning of social consciousness, or what Sumner has called the "mores." The social mind then recognized itself and its power to modify and control social action. The telic idea of progress then appeared. Public opinion found expression in public decrees and laws for the order of social conduct. Social aims were made clear and the will of society was invoked to accomplish them. As public law became the organized force of public opinion, society was made subservient to a coercive rule of action. The government now became the active agent for the enforcement of the will of the community. Gradually the question of the well-being of society became the goal of conscious social effort. Behind the government that was instituted to enforce the law or public judgment was the standing army to support it. Society was determined to direct its own course even though it might be necessary to use physical force to accomplish its purposes.

Besides this organized social force that exercises social control arose many minor expressions of social order, such as private and voluntary organizations of religious societies, labor organizations, and fraternal orders, whose purposes are to impel society in a chosen direction. Public education also became a positive force in improving the types of liberty and in perpetuating the institutions of the state, while the religious organization had its societies for the propagation of doctrines and its educational institutions for the promotion and perpetuation of belief. Thus, to use Ward's term, society became "telic."

As the forces of society became more exact they showed a tendency to return to more or less automatic social action. Organic society became to a certain degree a self-acting body, moving forward with its own momentum. Hence conscious effort was

always limited in what it might do to change or modify social action. The social structure has been built and cannot be rebuilt in a day though society should will it. A law may be passed by the representatives of the people, but if it is not in accordance with the existing social forces or the accepted standards of society, it will become useless and obsolete. Those who set out to reform society in accordance with a formula soon find they can do very little against the tide of social opinion or the underlying forces of social growth, because all reforms consist in the slow evolution of society and are dependent upon the action of constant social forces and well-established social laws.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is the difference between a physical force and a socializing force?
2. Classify the socializing forces, *i.e.*, the forces which cause people to coöperate together in their social relationships, in a small community of say 500 people. Estimate the importance of each of these forces in that community. If possible make a better classification than any of those proposed, but be prepared to defend your classification against those given in the text.
3. What social factor or factors give rise to the formation of a bank? A woman's club? A literary society? A political party? A farmers' marketing coöperative association? An art society? A sewing society?
4. What social factors, if any, may be cited to account for a decreasing birth rate?
5. The relation of socializing forces to social forces?
6. The newspaper as a socializing agency?
7. The rôle of institutions in consolidating society?
8. The social rôle of leadership?

CHAPTER XX

THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL MECHANICS OF SOCIALIZATION

The Creation of the Individual. — The youth of fourteen has characters derived from the hereditary traits born in him, developed through environmental stimuli, and trained through direction of others. Primarily his traits and instincts have appeared as he has developed through germinal, embryonic, and infantile periods. As an individual being, his whole general function is development. This comes about through intrinsic stimuli accompanied by extrinsic stimuli. The former arise from inherent forces, the latter from environmental. Of the latter, there are many kinds, such as physical surroundings of animate and inanimate life. The outside world makes it possible to develop what nature has planted within him. The cortex of the brain is the center of a highly developed nervous system, and makes possible primary instincts which appear as needed in the development and growth of the individual. These may be modified by the stimuli of environment and develop into habits, and may be directed in subsequent life by intelligence which arises from knowledge and experience, and may be trained by the direction of others. The fully developed personality gradually appears through the contact with others, the social environment being the most powerful stimulus in its development. From others, the individual obtains the fullest consciousness of self. While he can function alone as a physio-psychic unit, he cannot function as a fully developed social being without contact with others. It is the interaction of individuals that gives them power to function as social beings. This interaction is socio-psychological in nature. But while the individual is thus growing, he is building society itself. For if he is created by social stimuli, the response to

these in turn stimulates society and determines its life and character.

Personality. — Much study with divers opinions regarding the relation of individuality to personality has occurred in recent years. The conclusions reached have served to emphasize the distinction between the individual as a biological entity and the personality which represents the sum total of expressions of quality, character, habits, and modes of life. The former is a counting of heads, the latter an estimate of traits. The individual is possessed of inherited characters which furnish the basis of the development of personality through experience. The analysts have carried their speculations and classifications so far as to assume different personalities as expressed in diverse environments. Thus the social personality, religious personality, business personality, etc. It would seem more logical to consider personality as an integrated entity that expresses itself with great diversity in its adaptation to different environments. To speak of a social personality is to express the attitude of mind toward a status or condition. This attitude toward personality is an echo of the social self theory when the number of selves are multiplied by variety of functions. The approach to the study of personality from the functional, behavior, and structural viewpoints finds much in common in the actual experience of life. But the individual cannot be eliminated unless the cortex of the brain can be disposed of, nor can the primary instincts be ignored unless some better recognized substitute may replace them. The study of personality has brought about its sociological importance, and it may be said has led to a high grade of mental gymnastics, with new nomenclatures as vaulting poles.

Relation of the Individual to the Group. — The individual finds expression of life through group activity. In it he moves and has his being. Within certain limits he may function as a physio-psychic unit. But no fullness of life may be experienced except through the group. It helps make him what he is and gives him an opportunity to express his life. Isolated, he knows little, experiences little, and has little consciousness of his true existence. As a member of the family from infancy on he has abundant

opportunity for stimulus and response. He early learns to see himself reflected in the actions, habits, and opinions of others. In the larger groups of society he finds a wider and fuller expression of life, whether at work or play or during lesson hours. Contact with his fellows gives opportunity for the completion of his personality. Only in this way may his natural mental and physical traits find full development and expression. Group patterns of conduct set the limits to his individual impulses, curb the expression of his natural desires, shape his activities, stimulate some of his impulses, and repress others. Group ideals, such as courage, obedience, sympathy, hate, fair play, play upon him during his whole development. To these he responds favorably or unfavorably. They bring him to conformity or stir him to rebellion. But he cannot ignore them. They, together with his inherent traits, make him what he is, saint or sinner, good citizen or criminal.

On the other hand, by interaction with his associates he in turn helps to build the characters of other members of the group. If he is possessed of aggressive traits he either bends the group attitudes and established patterns of conduct toward his conception of what they should be, or he dashes himself to pieces against them. Which will be the result depends upon his other innate characteristics, such as tact and persuasiveness, or the lack of them, and upon the toughness of the patterns and the open-mindedness or stubbornness of those who support the established order. Illustrations might be cited in abundance. Consider Jesus and Socrates. The tragedies of human life grow out of the situation just described. Also the developments of society find their explanation there.

The Social Group. — The group is composed of a number of individuals consciously associated with a common purpose. It acts as a self-conscious unit in relation to similar units. Its distinguishing marks are its purposes and differentiated functions. As such it assumes a more or less independent and self-sufficient entity. Its character and functions may change through the coöperation and interstimulation of its members, but its relation to other groups brings into play other stimuli and responses which change its character and growth. The growth of groups is influ-

enced primarily by conflict and interaction and finally by coöperation. Group relationships become as essential to the expression of normal social life as to individuals in their reactions.

Psychic Processes. — In coöperation, coördination, or organized effort of any kind, the socio-psychological processes hold men together. The action of a community as a whole through approved patterns of conduct, mores, ideals, standards and codes, is a force whose effects we can observe and describe. The patterns set by society are an expression of this social force. These moulds manifest themselves in providing stimuli to the activities of the individual. We may call them social patterns compounded of custom, tradition, feeling, intelligence, and will organized into approved forms of activity for the individual. The feelings, intelligence, and will of a member of society have never been able to overcome these sources of individual and social action. The individual may modify them, but not break them with impunity. Centered in the individual, they are universal and continuous in their manifestation. Whether reason and intelligence will eventually dominate them is a conjecture. Certain it is that in the present state of progress, they are stronger in human civilization than intelligence as a determining power.

Feeling. — The emotional rather than the rational element expresses itself in all these established norms of conduct. In the feelings of a community concerning its own life, the emotional element is strong, but it is in the relations of one society to another that social emotion is most clearly manifested; for, in its contact with other groups, a community has a double reaction. Baldwin has pointed out, from the psychological, and Ross and Tarde from the ethical and social point of view, the important function of "opposition" or reaction against the idea of another or that of a group of strangers.[1]

By forcing definition and stimulating an interest in points of contrast, such opposition clears thought. Then, too, a reaction of this sort greatly stimulates the feelings; for, strangely enough,

[1] Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 5th ed., pp. 236–244. Ross, *Social Control*, p. 72. Cf. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, "Social Opposition."

hate of others generates affection for one's own fellows and gives rise to that racial feeling which is such a persistent force in the social affairs of men. As a matter of fact, the chief cause of conflicts between two people is a difference in feeling about matters in which both are interested, but from different points of view. Thus contact always stimulates emotion, but what emotion is stirred — whether it be that of sympathy and fellowship or that of hate — depends upon likeness or unlikeness, identity, or difference of interests. Yet not only is it true that opposition clears the thought and stimulates the feelings of two groups; the very feeling of one group toward another has great influence on this second group. And the reaction from the feelings of different groups or tribes brings about a reciprocal relationship which modifies the conduct of both.

Since, therefore, feeling is the driving force among the psychical elements affecting social life, we must not be surprised to find that social activities are more often affected by the feelings than by careful deliberation. Moreover, as we shall see, the will is more closely allied to the feelings than to the intellect. And finally, the very fact that social activity is *social* provides the circumstances in which feeling may dominate over reason. Now it is a well-known fact that the action of groups of people, unless they are carefully organized to prevent mob-action, is less moral, less rational, than the actions of individuals who are not carried along by a crowd. In that social activity which is spontaneous or instinctive, therefore, the element of feeling is quite certain to predominate. Thus it is that the emotional element prevails in their united action, when people are brought together in a large, heterogeneous mass, since their united action depends more upon feeling than upon reason or judgment.

Feeling, however, as Ward has so well demonstrated, is essential to normal social action;[2] it is the great motive power which sends society forward toward a given end. Without feeling, there could be, in truth, no positive work for social well-being. And if it is sympathy for one another that is the chief contributor to the betterment of a community, hatred to others has been only less

[2] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chaps. VI, VII.

powerful in producing social activity and developing social co-operation and organization. Was it not, for example, hatred of her oppressors that made a unity out of the few gathered remnants of exiled Israel? It is this "ethical dualism," as Professor Ross styles it, which, striving at the same time to promote sympathy for the members of a group and hatred for its enemy, has had so much to do with the development of social consciousness and the creation of social sentiment. Thus, while we honor reason, knowledge, and judgment, and realize that no well-ordered society can exist without the proper exercise of each, still we must not ignore that emotional side of life which gives us both good and bad impulses. Without these impulses, reason and judgment would have little cause to act. Without feeling, there is not — there never has been — any social unity.

Beliefs. — In its relation to social activity, social feeling manifests itself in two ways: through certain beliefs and through tradition. Beliefs have an emotional foundation. Let us first take up the consideration of individual beliefs. A boy hears other boys telling about their exploits in swimming or fighting — desirable achievements to the listening boy. Soon feeling within himself untried capabilities, the boy ventures to believe that he, too, can do these desirable things, and acting upon the courage engendered by this belief, he tries. Sometimes he succeeds. Then is his desire achieved; his belief justified. And his consequent satisfaction generates in him such an emotional state as will serve to create in him, when the occasion arrives, the belief that he can do other desirable things. What is true of a boy is true of a man. Because of experiences which began in early boyhood, he has believed in himself; and acting upon what he has believed, he has often succeeded. And as a result of action which accomplishes what he desires and what he believes himself capable of doing, he experiences a fine emotion. Sometimes, however, he loses confidence in himself because, at times, he did not succeed in accomplishing what he believed possible to himself. Then he may develop an inferiority complex which may foredoom him to failure or for which he may compensate by antisocial conduct such as lying, stealing, etc., or by de-

veloping activities along other lines of a socially approved nature.

In much the same way, social beliefs, such as a belief in the "manifest destiny" of a people, or the coming greatness of the "fatherland," are developed by groups of men. These beliefs grow by precept upon precept, by shibboleths, and by the other vague symbols of deep emotion; they grow until they sweep a whole nation or a whole race into the range of their profound emotional appeals. They call to their aid feelings based on reverence for the past or aroused by glorious hopes for the future. They appeal to emotions belonging to the historic activities of the past; they lure men to war by suggesting glory, plunder, perhaps undying fame. Finally, it is social emotions, stirred to reality in some such ways, that develop into those impelling forces which we call the "spirit" of a country, forces which so often enable a tyrant or a puppet king to hoodwink the common people and anæsthetize them with the specious argument of those who must get others to fight their battles for them: "*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*" And how often is the name of God upon the lips of the militarist! It is no accident, as Giddings has pointed out, that an age of militarism is ever an age of strong beliefs.

Traditions. — Closely allied with belief, as a means whereby emotion is intensified in its expression, is tradition and reverence for authority. Because of the necessity of social order, tradition and reverence have a secure foundation in the emotions. Tradition has all the glamour of the illusively distant past, in which, somewhere, the golden age lies buried. And only as we return to something approaching the ideals of the past, so we say, shall we ever have a civilization worth while. The norms of conduct, of social relations, were established in that long ago by wise men, who are never to return to this earth. In their words lies authority; and it is tradition that preserves those words for us. "The greatness that once was Rome" lays its dead hand upon the living present and offers certain guidance; and in sharp contrast to the vices of the leaders of to-day are the vague virtues of the dead. But coupled with man's reverence for the mysterious is his natural wish for the certainty which only

dogmatic assertion can supply. In his restless struggle with new forces and new situations he finds great release from the strain of attention, in a return to the attitude of submission to authority. What emotions, then, do tradition and authority call forth? They arouse awe for the authoritative and aged; they give peace to the struggling and wearied spirit, for, with the release from doubt, most powerful inhibitor of action, comes the certainty of faith and the emotions which action, in the face of uncertainty, always brings. And what more than these feelings of confident certainty can be desired? Yes, there is something more — the certainty of critically tested truth, the joy of victory through struggle. But these only the heroic soul can know.

The reverence for authority is, in fact, one of the prime influences in the development of concerted social action. A member of a community who knows a given subject and has a reputation for authority can influence the whole community by the expression of his judgment. But the influence of authority is not confined to an individual; it sometimes exerts its influence from certain parts of a community. Thus, in the states of the Federal Union, the opinion of people from certain regions in regard to the choice of a President, the decision of a court, or the passing of a law, would have much greater weight than that of others. While the way in which tradition, authority, and custom affect social ideals and institutions will be treated in the chapter on social control, it should be observed at this point that this trinity of influences are products of man's mind struggling with the problem of how to secure psychical and social adjustments in a community composed of "men of many minds." The reverence for the traditional and the customary, to be found so universally in early society, is, as Bagehot has remarked, "the cement of society" which holds it together.[3] Even science, with its well-earned reputation to give the exact truth, has a strong influence on the community; speaks for it with the authority of knowledge.

Knowledge. — Knowledge is the foundation of the directive power of the mind. It furnished the material for the selective

[3] *Physics and Politics*, International Scientific Series, New York, 1898, pp. 184, 185.

process of individual and social selection. Through the process of reflection it also becomes the controlling agency of feeling, the dynamic social agent. The contemplation of facts has a tendency to calm impulsive social action, provided all the varied conditions are brought into view. Contemplation has this tranquilizing effect because, by allowing all sides of a question to be considered, by calmly facing consequences, it inhibits activity, the natural expression of emotion; and feeling cools quickly, once its outflow in activity has been interrupted. Important as feeling is, therefore, it is sometimes a dangerous social agent when unchecked; knowledge and calm deliberation are, indeed, essential to the concerted action of the various parts of society.

Social knowledge is dependent upon communication for its dissemination throughout the social group. If the community is so sparsely settled as to render individuals, or even small groups, isolated in their life, there can be no concerted social activity of the whole group. Indeed, many of the difficulties of socialization are due simply to a lack of understanding; we cannot, therefore, estimate the power of universal knowledge in the development of common thought. The influence of the telegraph has often been commented upon. That a message can now be flashed around the world in nine and one-half minutes, giving the happenings of the Orient to the Occident almost as soon as they occur, and causing people to think the same thoughts at the same time, is of inestimable value in making social knowledge universal. Not less remarkable is the influence of the telephone, and the wireless telegraph and telephone which spread knowledge of all kinds so thoroughly that anything which goes on in a community may quickly be known by every one. Through the influence of these great inventions, together with the postal system and the printing press, every one in a community may receive the same information at the same hour; and to a large extent each individual is forming the same judgment about any important movement. Moreover, in such methods of communication as the telegraph, telephone, and newspaper, the stimulation of personal contact — especially the mass stimulation of the crowd — is lacking. Each member of a community receives the information

and can calmly consider it. But these agencies of communication may serve also as means of one-sided propaganda. The information service of the various countries engaged in the Great War, and modern advertising show this to be true. These means of communication, then, give an opportunity for the rapid formation of social judgments and provide machinery for the integration of the social will.

Before the time of modern inventions, however, when new and sparsely settled communities had little or no communication with each other, things were different. It took months, sometimes even years, to communicate with the distant parts of a community. And when such conditions prevailed, there could be no common social knowledge.[4] But since the introduction of the rural free delivery system, the telephone, and the radio, the farming communities of the West are responding to a new life. These new methods of communication increase the size of the social group which may now share the same opinions and feelings — that is, they enlarge the social mind — and make the common sentiments more unified and possibly rational than they could otherwise have been. Much still remains to be done to perfect the machinery whereby the North and the South, the East and the West, shall have the same mind; yet that possibility is much nearer to-day than ever before. And increased travel, made possible by cheap railroad fares and the automobile and motor cycle, and the increase in student migrations from one section of the country to another, will gradually supply the personal contact which the newspaper cannot supply.

The effect of this widespread knowledge, in the interaction and reaction of the individuals of a social group, is very great. Let the radio market report say that wheat has advanced five cents a bushel, and many a farmer will start for the market to dispose of his surplus grain. Acting independently of others, the individual may forget that others are possibly doing what he is; but if, perchance, each farmer should stop to think that others may be

[4] For an illustration of the social effects of this isolation upon a religious denomination see Gillin, *The Dunkers — A Sociological Interpretation*, New York, 1906, pp. 159, 160, 164–166.

influenced by the same idea, he would remember that the sudden rushing to market of so much grain would cause the price to fall. Again, if a farmer acquires a new quality of seed, a new method of cultivating the soil, or a new machine, his neighbor will desire to have the same knowledge and the same advantage; and what he acquires will soon be desired by yet another. In this way does knowledge, passing from one to another, influence the whole group. For its dissemination broadens the consciousness of kind; and the realization that all possess the same knowledge stimulates not only individual action, but also the action of the group. Widespread knowledge of a thing is, therefore, most important in the establishment of a social judgment, the starting point of rational social action.

Intelligence. — The importance of knowledge as a basis of social action is determined by the method of its use through the means of a discriminating intelligence. There is a great difference between the things known and the capacity for the knowing or between knowledge and the intellect. The intellect represents the selective and directive processes in the use of knowledge. Through the dynamic power of the feelings social action may occur and knowledge may come to their support. But only a primitive social state could exist without rational selection. Conklin says "when we consider the great mass of irrational and emotional mankind, we are impressed with the thought that the race as a whole is just emerging from unreason and that instinct and emotion are still the masters of life." [5] Intelligent behavior of the individual or of the group comes only after experience, but no well-formed society can exist without it. Only through man's superior intelligence could society exist superior to the instinctive societies of other animals.

Social Will. — Social will arises primarily out of social feeling. It is an expression of choice, combined with persistent desire to accomplish a given object. If "the will is the active expression of the soul's meaning," the social will is an assertion of the determination of society to perform certain actions, in which it believes. And wherever there is a general determination — instinctive,

[5] E. G. Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, p. 66.

dimly conscious, or clearly conscious — to promote the interests of society at large, to avoid evil influences, and to adopt the forms of progress believed to be necessary to advance the social life, we have an expression of the social will. In the primal movements of society, will asserted itself as a result of a blind impulse; but in modern society, while still dominated by uncritical beliefs, it is guided by some knowledge, and finds expression in a thousand ways through public law and public opinion. Sometimes, even now, however, the social will, incited to action by mob stimulation, results in mob action — rushing to its object in a blind fury, and as swiftly dissolving when the fury is past. But science has made it more and more possible for the social will to turn the whole force of society toward the accomplishment of a great social end, for the scientific spirit has introduced patient search for facts before a decision is reached, diligent and careful consideration of these facts, and deliberate purpose formed only upon the findings. This tendency so far has expressed itself chiefly in material civilization because science can be applied there more easily than in social affairs. Thus the whole rational mental process of each individual has a chance to act. The whole tendency of civilization is, in fact, to impose upon action such checks as will make for deliberation, for the curbing of unrestrained feeling by careful thought. To take one kind of example, assemblies have devised safeguards against the results of mob psychology like the parliamentary devices of motions to table, to adjourn, to refer matters to a committee, and to require several readings of a bill — and on different days — before its final passage. The sole purpose of these various devices is to secure deliberation, in order that the social will, instead of being stimulated by uncontrolled feeling, may be directed by deliberate thought and calm judgment. A beginning has also been made in education through measurement of results of different methods and in certain lines of business and of political action.

The Influence of Psychical Factors. — The psychical forces thus are the essential bonds of union and those to which we must look for all of our higher social culture. The conservation of these psychic forces and their proper direction are of the utmost impor-

tance. Professors Small and Vincent have pointed out that at a given moment in any community, psychical force is a fixed quantity.[6] That is, if we take a static view of the relationships of society in all of its varied parts, we observe that there is only a certain amount of power being exerted; and if this energy is directed at one point, it will be withdrawn from another. If social attention is concentrated on war, commerce and culture must be neglected; if it is centered on money getting, the spiritual interests must suffer. The physicist's principle of the conservation of energy and the transmutation of power can therefore be applied to the psychical forces of society. These writers further maintain that psychical energy cannot long be concentrated on a single object. As this theory has been demonstrated to be true of the individual mind, it is probably true of the social mind. Yesterday tuberculosis, to-day the vice problem, and to-morrow infant mortality absorbs the popular attention. At any rate, in the history of social life we find a constant succession of centralization and decentralization of this social energy. If it flows steadily in one direction for a given time, it is not long before the ebb tide sets in; and while it is thus centered in one point temporarily, it is withdrawn from other points. There is a possibility, too, that the moral energy of man is subjected to these same laws of constant quantity and of centralization. It would be well, therefore, if reformers and legislators would devise more methods to cure a trouble while interest is aroused. If the movement can be institutionalized with a large enough constituency to support it, after the popular enthusiasm wanes, the social emotion aroused will not be in vain.

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[6] Small and Vincent, *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 332.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Make a list of the social feelings which operate to produce social action in your community. Which one, if any, is predominant?
2. Name three instances in the history of the United States of social action in each of which feeling, rather than thoughtful consideration, led to the action.
3. Cite four cases of social action by a nation in which reason predominated.
4. Show, by citing and analyzing, an instance in which belief stirred strong emotions and led to social action.
5. What type of leader appears when the mental condition of a people is such that it is moved by feeling rather than by reason?
6. Cite an instance showing how tradition or reverence for authority stirred deep feelings and incited social action.
7. What effect upon the quality of the social mind will the coming of large numbers of immigrants have upon a country? That is, will it tend to be moved more by feelings than by reason, or *vice versa?*
8. What bearing would the development of social centers used as places for the discussion of public questions probably have upon the character of the social mind and upon social action?
9. What is the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic stimuli?
10. Is there a difference between individuality and personality? If so, what?

CHAPTER XXI

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Primary Results of Association. — The previous chapters have explained the development of social processes and the relation of individual action to group action. It now remains to consider what is known of the behavior of groups. While it is difficult to trace the development of group activity from primitive times to the present, we have around us all stages of social development and social activity that have occurred in the whole historical process of human evolution. The primary instincts, emotions, and habits are as much in evidence to-day as ever they were; the main difference being shown in social variation and the control by a wide diffusion of attitudes, behavior patterns, and ideas (stereotypes) which have prestige and group approval. Along with the differentiation has proceeded a greater specialization of the group and a more pronounced coöperation of groups for a common purpose. It may be said that along these lines proceeds all human progress.

Society has grown because of association; for it was the coming together of people that made it possible for society to exist. One of the primary results of this association is "inter-stimulation and response," as Giddings calls it, between the various individuals of the group. Whenever there exists such reciprocal influence of one mind upon another, whether the minds agree or not, then you have the conditions antecedent to the formation of the social mind.[1] The end of the process is the development of sufficiently similar feeling, thinking, and willing, on the part of these associated individuals, to enable them to continue their association. With this growing likeness, however, there always develops

[1] Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 330, 331.

mental differentiation — the rise of new thoughts, feelings, and volitions.[2]

As the result of this associative process there develop the in-group or " we " feeling, and the out-group feeling. Hence arise those groupings of individuals which give rise to conflict and association. Hence develop also the sifting of individuals into groups of like individuals and the formation of classes and castes into which any given society is broken up. From the contact of these differing groups come the codes and standards of conduct imposed on the individual in his relations with his fellows in his own group as contrasted with those set up for his behavior towards the individuals of another group. Also from the contact of unlike groups come that process of borrowing from the culture of another group, and the further strengthening of attitudes and codes held by each group through the rationalization of those codes and attitudes on the basis of hatred and hostility. For example, how much of the mythology of the Hebrews was borrowed from the Babylonians with whom they came in contact previous to, during, and following the Exile? How much from the Canaanites among whom they settled as desert tribes? On the other hand, how much of their post-Exilic narrowness was due to the hostility generated by their treatment by Assyrian, Babylonian, Egyptian, Persian, Greek, and Roman following the destruction of their nation, when their culture came into direct and hostile contact with other civilizations?

Types of Social Groups. — As the result of interacting personalities in aggregates of people, and of interacting groups upon each other there develops a great variety of social groups. Reference to a few fundamental types will be sufficient to indicate the nature of this aspect of collective behavior. Sighele, the French social psychologist, has made one of the most penetrating analyses of these various types of social groups. He follows Le Bon in dividing groups into two general classes, heterogeneous and homogeneous crowds. He dislikes Le Bon's use of the term "crowd " as a term to designate all kinds of human groups, but

[2] Cf. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 67, 68; *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 184–185; with Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 4.

retains the term because it indicates the first stage of the social groups which is the source of all the others. If we remember that Sighele uses the term "crowd" to indicate a social group, we may then adapt his analysis to our purpose of pointing out the typical kinds of groups to which the associative process gives rise.

Heterogeneous groups he divides into three classes which we may designate as follows: (1) Chance or occasional groups, (2) groups gathered together with a common aim or from a common custom, and (3) groups with a common responsibility. Of these he says:

"The heterogeneous crowd is composed of *tout le monde*, of people like you, like me, like the first passer-by. *Chance* unites these individuals physically, the *occasion* unites them psychologically; they do not know each other, and after the moment when they find themselves together, they may never see each other again. To use a metaphor, it is a psychological meteor, of the most unforeseen, ephemeral, and transitory kind.

"On this accidental and fortuitous foundation are formed here and there other crowds, always heterogeneous, but with a certain character of stability or, at least, of periodicity. The audience at a theater, the members of a club, of a literary or social gathering, constitute also a crowd but a different crowd from that of the street. The members of these groups know each other a little; they have, if not a common aim, at least a common custom. They are nevertheless 'anonymous crowds,' as Le Bon calls them, because they do not have within themselves the nucleus of organization.

"Proceeding further, we find crowds still heterogeneous, but not so anonymous — juries, for example, and assemblies. These small crowds experience a new sentiment, unknown to anonymous crowds, that of responsibility which may at times give to their actions a different orientation. Then the parliamentary crowds are to be distinguished from the others because, as Tarde observes with his habitual penetration, they are double crowds: they represent a majority in conflict with one or more minorities, which safeguards them in most cases from unanimity, the most menacing danger which faces crowds."[3]

Homogeneous groups Sighele divides into the following types: (1) The sect, (2) the caste, (3) the class, and (4) the state, or nation. He characterizes each of these as follows:

"We come now to homogeneous crowds, of which the first type is the sect. Here are found again individuals differing in birth, in education, in profession, in social status, but united and, indeed, voluntarily cemented

[3] Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 201–220.

by an extremely strong bond, a common faith and ideal. Faith, religious, scientific, or political, rapidly creates a communion of sentiments capable of giving to those who possess it a high degree of homogeneity and power. History records the deeds of the barbarians under the influence of Christianity, and the Arabs transformed into a sect by Mahomet. Because of their sectarian organization, a prediction may be made of what the future holds in store for the socialists.

"The sect is a crowd, picked out and permanent; the crowd is a transitory sect which has not chosen its members. The sect is a chronic kind of crowd; the crowd is an acute kind of sect. The crowd is composed of a multitude of grains of sand without cohesion; the sect is a block of marble which resists every effort. When a sentiment or an idea, having in itself a reason for existence, slips into the crowd, its members soon crystallize and form a sect. The sect is then the first crystallization of every doctrine. From the confused and amorphous state in which it manifests itself to the crowd, every idea is predestined to define itself in the more specific form of the sect, to become later a party, a school, or a church — scientific, political, or religious.

"Any faith, whether it be Islamism, Buddhism, Christianity, patriotism, socialism, anarchy, cannot but pass through this sectarian phase. It is the first step, the point where the human group in leaving the twilight zone of the anonymous and mobile crowd raises itself to a definition and to an integration which then may lead up to the highest and most perfect human group, the nation.

"If the sect is composed of individuals united by a common idea and aim, in spite of diversity of birth, education, and social status, the caste unites, on the contrary, those who could have — and who have sometimes — diverse ideas and aspirations, but who are brought together through identity of profession. The sect corresponds to the community of faith, the caste to the community of professional ideas. The sect is a *spontaneous* association; the caste is, in many ways, a *forced* association. After having chosen a profession — let it be priest, soldier, magistrate — a man belongs necessarily to a caste. A person, on the contrary, does not necessarily belong to a sect. And when one belongs to a caste — be he the most independent man in the world — he is more or less under the influence of that which is called *esprit de corps*.

"The caste represents the highest degree of organization to which the homogeneous crowd is susceptible. It is composed of individuals who by their tastes, their education, birth, and social status, resemble each other in the fundamental types of conduct and mores. There are even certain castes, the military and sacerdotal, for example, in which the members at last so resemble one another in appearance and bearing that no disguise can conceal the nature of their profession.

"The caste offers to its members ideas already molded, rules of conduct already approved; it relieves them, in short, of the fatigue of thinking with their own brains. When the caste to which an individual belongs is known, all that is necessary is to press a button of his mental mechanism to release a series of opinions and of phrases already made which are identical in every individual of the same caste.

"This harmonious collectivity, powerful and eminently conservative, is the most salient analogy which the nations of the Occident present to that of India. In India the caste is determined by birth, and it is distinguished by a characteristic trait; the persons of one caste can live with, eat with, and marry only individuals of the same caste.

"In Europe it is not only birth, but circumstances and education which determine the entrance of an individual into a caste; to marry, to frequent, to invite to the same table only people of the same caste, exists practically in Europe as in India. In Europe the above-mentioned prescriptions are founded on convention, but they are none the less observed. We all live in a confined circle, where we find our friends, our guests, our sons- and daughters-in-law.

"Misalliances are assuredly possible in Europe; they are impossible in India. But if there religion prohibits them, with us public opinion and convention render them very rare. And at bottom the analogy is complete.

"The class is superior to the caste in extent. If the psychological bond of the sect is community of faith, and that of the caste community of profession, the psychological bond of the class is community of interests.

"Less precise in its limits, more diffuse and less compact than the caste or the sect, the class represents today the veritable crowd in a dynamic state, which can in a moment's time descend from that place and become statically a crowd. And it is from the sociological standpoint the most terrible kind of crowd; it is that which today has taken a bellicose attitude, and which by its attitude and precepts prepares the brutal blows of mobs.

"We speak of the 'conflict of the classes,' and from the theoretical point of view and in the normal and peaceful life that signifies only a contest of ideas by legal means. Always depending upon the occasion, the audacity of one or many men, the character of the situation, the conflict of the classes is transformed into something more material and more violent — into revolt or into revolution.

"Finally we arrive at the state (nation). Tocqueville said that the classes which compose society form so many distinct nations. They are the greatest collectivities before coming to the nation, the state.

"This is the most perfect type of organization of the crowd, and the final and supreme type, if there is not another collectivity superior in number and extension, the collectivity formed by race." [4]

[4] Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 202–204.

Attention to two groupings of people, the crowd and the mob, which show response to very simple psychological stimuli in contrast to the multiple bonds which account for better integrated groups will throw light upon the way in which groups arise.

Characteristics of Group Behavior. — In asking ourselves how groups behave we must keep in mind two general classes of groups, (1) those which are in close physical proximity, and (2) other groups the members of which are not in each other's physical presence but are participants in common interests, feelings, attitudes, and patterns of conduct. Some of the earlier writers have denominated these two classes as " with presence " and " without presence." The former is illustrated by a crowd, mob, and audience; the latter by the group reached by a newspaper, a religious group, a political party, or a group of international bankers, or what may be called a public. Therefore we may classify the groups further into (1) crowds, (2) audiences, and (3) publics. The first two are characterized by being formed of people in close proximity to each other, the last by psychological ties and group patterns of feeling and conduct.

As Bentley has pointed out, those in close contiguity are integrated into a group by a variety of psychological and social methods. Aggregates of people gathered into a frontier mining camp may have as their only common interest search for gold. However, their past history, their common language, and more or less common patterns of social conduct imposed upon them by a common culture may play their parts in what happens in such aggregates. Bentley calls such groups a congregate. Another level of organization is illustrated by temporary or spontaneous gatherings of people brought together by a common curiosity, such as a circus, or interest in seeing or hearing a noted speaker. Again, we reach another level of human grouping in such cases as the gathering together of a vast mass of miners on strike or locked out, who gather in protest against working conditions or wages, or fugitives bound together by a common fear or dread who are fleeing from a fire, an earthquake, or a pestilence. Another level is reached when the group is composed of those who have been selected and primed by their previous experiences, such as frater-

nal, religious, or political gatherings. In such crowds as come face to face often organization proceeds upon what Bentley calls "polarization" due to leadership. The group becomes organized around the personality and ideas presented by this leader. The group divides into leader and led in varying degrees, but they become integrated into a closely organized group through this process of polarization around the leader. The result may be a mob or an audience.

The Crowd. — The crowd is an assemblage of people drawn together by a common interest. A crowd may be observed at an athletic event, a religious revival, or a political meeting. The character of the crowd is determined largely by the common interest which brought the people together. Sometimes they form into a crowd attracted by some strange or unusual event, such as a street accident, a fire, the appearance of an airplane, news on a bulletin board, or a street fight. Often there is more or less leadership by the promoters of the meeting and those conducting it. There are other evidences of tentative orderly movement and possibly the beginnings of organization. Yet after curiosity or desire is satisfied it dissolves never to meet again under the same auspices or similar conditions. It cannot be a society nor a completed social group. The whole movement is evanescent. The crowd is, to all purposes, a young, undeveloped society, in which, as in the young, undeveloped individual, curiosity and the emotional elements prevail. It may come to be ruled by an impulse as instinctively fierce and strong as the instinct of a savage beast. Or, a crowd may have its attention distracted from the object of attention which brought it together, and then it is ready to disperse and go about its business.

The Audience. — The audience, therefore, is a much more formal type of group than a crowd or a mob. We all go to hear a political speaker, let us say. We already have heard something about him. The advertising has tried to make him appear to be a great man, if he is comparatively unknown in the community. The people attend in a receptive mood. Possibly the whole setting of the hall, and preliminary matters are carefully attended to in order to get the audience into the proper frame of mind. Bands

or processions have preceded the hour of meeting. The hall is decorated. Dignitaries are upon the platform. The speaker is introduced with eulogies intended to put the audience into the proper frame of mind. The speaker then makes his entrance in such a way as to make the most of whatever prestige he and the occasion can command. Now let the leader have the proper understanding of an audience, the arts of the public leader, and notice how he begins in such a way as to play upon those emotional elements most common to the members of the audience, how he uses phrases, slogans, symbols, imagery familiar and accepted by almost everyone, how he gradually builds on these common patterns of thought and conduct and leads on to whatever object he has in mind. That process ends in knitting together closely a more or less heterogeneous audience into a group with intensified common feelings, and a determined common purpose, or else a unified sense of satisfaction with the entertainment given.[5]

The Mob. — A mob is a crowd in action towards a common purpose under an emotional impulse. If the emotions of the crowd are stirred by real or imaginary injustice, or by disappointment or indignation, it frequently follows a leader who appears at the psychological moment. All mobs, therefore, are dangerous elements in a community; and in spite of the fact that they sometimes act with precision and rapidly moving justice, they should be repressed because they do not represent a high order of social purpose and are very apt to be characterized by anti-social acts.

The mob has, it is true, a keen sense of justice and the courage to execute it; the rapidity with which it passes judgment on an outrage committed against individual or society proves its possession of these qualities. The evil of mob action consists in the method of procedure which the mob employs. If only, along with its desire to administer justice, it could substitute self-restraint for violence, and patience for impulse, it would accord to every offending individual the right to an impartial trial before the law. Thus, the tremendous social importance of feeling as a dynamic force can be judged by its work in a mob; but this mighty social

[5] See Young, *Source Book of Social Psychology*, New York, 1927, Chaps. XXII, XXIII.

impulse must be directed for the welfare of society, for, unrestrained by reason and calm judgment, it is an agency of destruction rather than of constructive social activity.

The mob is characterized by what have been called mental epidemics. History furnishes all kinds of illustrations. From the New Testament Scriptures flash out the lurid pictures of the mobs which demanded the crucifixion of Jesus, the mob which sought to kill Paul in Jerusalem, and the other which sought his blood in Ephesus when he had interfered with the profits of the makers of silver images of the goddess Diana.[6] Other illustrations are the Crusades of the Middle Ages for the rescue of the Holy Sepulchre from the Turks, the Flagellants, who whipped themselves with whips to show remorse for their sins, the witchcraft craze, which for a century and a half raged over western Europe, and towards the end of the period showed itself at Salem, Mass., the speculative crazes which have raged periodically from the tulip speculation in Holland in the seventeenth century to the stock market boom in the United States 1927–1929, through the Mississippi Bubble, the California and Klondike gold rushes, the Florida land boom, the South Africa diamond rush, and certain religious revivals, such as those held in Kentucky in the middle of the nineteenth century.[7]

These emotional outbreaks seem to depend partly on the emotional make-up of individuals, partly on the beliefs and social situations of the times when they occur, and upon the hypnotic suggestion of some leader. It would be very interesting for students to look into the history of one or more of these crazes in order to get a concrete picture of the whole situation out of which each one grew.

A Public. — As we have seen a public is a group of people who are not in close physical touch. It depends on methods of communication to secure its members. It is bound together by psychological bonds not dependent on the hypnosis of personal presence, but by the dissemination of ideas, sentiments, and

[6] Mk. 15 : 1–15; Acts 19 : 23–41; Acts 21 : 27–23 : 10.

[7] See Young, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXV, and Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals;* James, *Varieties of Religious Experience.*

standards through indirect means of communication like the press, radio, etc. A public, then, is usually a secondary group, *i.e.*, one not dependent on face-to-face contact. The bonds which tie the individuals composing a public are public sentiments, common attitudes, and what we sometimes call public opinion. Public opinion is a term, however, which is loosely used. It often includes what are really public sentiments, and uncritical attitudes handed down by tradition. If we hold in mind that what is usually meant by the term "public opinion" may include not only deliberate and critically tested judgments, but also unconsidered sentiments, attitudes, and beliefs which have been handed down by tradition, we can use the term "public opinion" as the characteristic state of mind of a public.

Moreover, a public is not necessarily of one "mind" on all matters. Frequently the larger public may be united only on one or a few concerns which have been under discussion. Within the larger group there may be smaller groups holding diverse views. Hence, there may be a number of publics as well as *a* public. For example, take the Republican party. There are various matters upon which most members of that party are in agreement. But there are high tariff Republicans and low tariff Republicans. So with the Democrats. There are dry and wet Democrats, but there are some things on which all Democrats agree in sentiments and opinion.

Furthermore, it has been pointed out by many writers that public opinion is always the result of differences which have been discussed. Young contends that those things on which a public agrees without discussion constitute folkways and mores, not public opinion. For illustration, consider the difference between the ideas and sentiments which make up the attitude most of us who are citizens of the United States hold towards the flag of this country as compared with the attitude of those of any other country towards the flag of the United States. Consider again the whole complex of sentiments and beliefs which we hold with respect to democracy as contrasted with a like complex concerning autocracy or sovietism by the citizens of countries governed under such systems. Or, again, think of the attitude towards manual

labor among our American university students as contrasted with the attitude of students in English universities. In practically all these cases you have folkways and mores rather than public opinion.

Again, it should be observed that public opinion is formed by certain definite mechanisms. Public opinion is not the result of a kind of conglomerate of the opinions of all the individuals composing a public, but is the generally accepted views of the many induced by the activities of the few. Leaders are here, as in an audience, the foci of the formation of public opinion. They polarize the group mind. In a public, however, their methods are somewhat different by reason of the fact that their contact with their public is indirect through the usual agencies of communication.

We must remember also that public opinion in the sense in which we are using the term, *i.e.*, to include sentiments and beliefs, is produced by a special technique called propaganda. The psychology of propaganda is analogous to that of advertising. Certain ideas are disseminated widely through the various means of communication as widely as possible. Formerly the machinery of dissemination was much narrower in range than at present. Think of what widening of a public took place when the newspaper became so widely read. Just recently the radio has given an immense expansion to the possibilities of forming the public mind through propaganda. Had the radio been developed as widely during the World War as it is now, how much easier it would have been to influence the thought and feelings of the people of the United States. With every increase in the facilities for the diffusion of propaganda the wider the public becomes. That very fact has its dangers as well as its advantages. Who can tell what nonsense can now be put over upon a public by skillful propagandists. The radio not only brings into your home the music of the best orchestras, but also whatever ideas any one may be skillful enough to present acceptably. These ideas may be true or erroneous. We should be warned that the only cure for false propaganda is widespread education so that every one may be as well informed as possible so that he can judge for himself what is true and what

is false. Since that is a very difficult task, and since propaganda may be made so plausible whether true or false, it is easy to see that we have difficulties ahead of us. But when have we not had? The newspaper, up to now the most powerful organ for the formation of public opinion, has been subject to all sorts of criticism for its powerful and often conscienceless activity in selfish and non-social propaganda. The only remedy suggested which promises much is raising the standards of journalism through the schools of journalism. " Free speech and free press " is one of the dogmas of our political constitution and is deeply ingrained in our public sentiments and even in our mores. Censorship carries too many menaces to freedom. So with the radio. We shall have to develop a public conscience as to radio responsibility, else it may be perverted to the subversion of our ideals. Up to date, however, we have no scientific measure of what should be our ideals, and what public opinion is good and what is bad.[8]

Another term, almost synonymous with public opinion as we have used it, is " the social mind." In order to connect the older terminology with the newer let us review briefly the discussion of the older term.

The Social Mind. — The social mind is something more than the sum of the combined minds of individuals in the group, because it has a dominant influence over all individual minds in the group. The popular expression for the result of the social mind is the moral sense of the community, public will, or public opinion. While there is no independent and greater mind which somehow includes the individual minds, there is a relationship between each separate individual which conditions his thinking, feeling, and willing, and frequently coerces him into a certain line of action by helping him to make up his " mind " through the pressure of prestige, appeals to well-established beliefs and sentiments, etc. This mind is brought into being by means of concerted action; and once having developed, and once having been organized, it adds to society's present volitions the fund of experimental knowledge, or of propaganda. This fund of " capitalized experience "

[8] For the whole subject of public opinion, and propaganda with excellent references see Young, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XXV–XXVII.

produces steadiness and constancy of the social mind, or gradually changes it. Because of the impressiveness of public opinion through its supposed universality we are likely to think of the social mind as something separate and apart. As Cooley remarks, however, there are not "two kinds of mind, the social and the individual mind. When we study the social mind, we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations, rather than on the narrower ones of ordinary psychology." [9]

Steps in the Formation of the Social Mind.[10] — The process by which the social mind is formed, or "made up," may now be analyzed more closely.

(1) *Stimulation and Response.* — The first step in the process is *stimulation*, of some sort, and *response* thereto by the individuals composing the group. Ever acting upon individuals and producing social as well as individual activity are stimuli from the physical world about, such as cold and heat, seasons and climate, day and night. Added to these are the stimuli provided by the presence and activities of other individuals, both those of the same group and those of other groups. Finally, there is the stimulation to mental and physical activity which is provided by the thoughts, ideals, and feelings of others.

(2) *Likeness and Differences Appear as a Result of Stimulation.* — All these stimuli excite some kind of response on the part of the stimulated individuals, some of whom will act alike, others not. While, therefore, by means of a similar response, there is formed a group of individuals who naturally act, feel, and think alike, there are, at the same time, some others who make a different response to the same stimulus. Sometimes all of these, though acting differently from the first group, form a second group, which, within itself, acts, feels, and thinks alike. Then there are, of course, still others who, in response to the given stimulus, will vary from both the groups described. It is this difference in the response which produces in society variation in the activities, feelings, and thoughts which make up the social mind. Thus types of mind and types of character are formed; and people

[9] Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 4.
[10] Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 124–185.

separate or combine according to these differences or resemblances. These different responses give us what Giddings has happily called "pluralistic behavior." [11]

(3) *Mutual Consciousness of Likeness and Difference.* — The social mind is not formed until the interrelations of the people in the group develop to the point where all become mutually conscious of the fact that some resemble others and some do not. This consciousness of likeness and unlikeness may not be shared to the same degree by all individuals in the group — it probably never is. Throughout the group, nevertheless, there is a consciousness — in this individual clear and certain, and in that dimly perceived — that certain ones in the group act, feel, and think alike, while certain others do not.[12]

This process in epitome may be actually observed to-day when boys come together who have not hitherto known each other. At first there is reserve and caution; each is closely observing the others. Then each makes up his mind provisionally that he likes certain of the group and that he dislikes others. The boy who is first to come to such a conclusion approaches another boy, perhaps, and proposes a game. If the other agrees to the proposal, differentiation of the group begins. In the process of play, the stratification proceeds even further, perhaps. Concurrently, however, there goes on a further sifting. New discoveries of likeness and difference are made, and new alignments occur, as new angles of personality are observed, and the primary antipathies are perhaps softened. A process of socialization, of growing likeness, sets in. More and more, through the give-and-take of social intercourse, similarities are discovered, great enough to warrant coöperation; and such adjustments are made that finally the members of the group can play together without a quarrel. The boys in like-minded groups have not only discovered and developed like tastes, feelings, ideals, and ambitions, but they have become conscious of the fact that they are alike. They end, perhaps, by reporting to their parents that they like the other boys. Again, there is a similar process in the development of the

[11] *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, New York, 1922, pp. 249–290.
[12] Cf. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, pp. 68, 69.

social mind whenever people from many different places gather together in a new country and begin to associate with one another.

(4) *A Common Purpose Develops.* — Once the group has become conscious of likenesses and differences, — the former greater than the latter, — once common sentiments, feelings, and thoughts are *consciously* held and enjoyed by members of the group, the dynamic condition of the development of the social mind has been reached. It is "made up" and ready for action. Common feelings and sentiments consciously held inevitably lead to common purposes directed toward certain ends. Public opinion has been formed; public feeling has been aroused; and now the public will can express itself.

We have not analyzed all the possible ways in which the "making up" of the social mind may be brought about. There is space only to suggest that it may occur as a result of an appeal to the intelligence by means of deliberate debate, covering a long period of time; or it may be precipitated suddenly by some event which stirs the common feelings, such as the blowing up of the *Maine* in Havana harbor, or the shooting of the Austrian crown prince. In the one case you have the expression of public opinion, in the other of public feeling.

The Readjustment of Society. — Just as the individual adapts himself to the conditions of nature and his social surroundings, so the social mind is ever alert to readjust society and adapt it to the requirements of nature and the will of the group. Thus while the social organization represents a close interdependence and a continuity of parts, still there is a constant readjusting of these parts to each other and of the whole to the natural environment. This adaptation is the chief function of the social mind. It finds expression in the common feeling, general will, public opinion, and moral sense of the people, as well as in formulated law and rules of action.

Formal Expressions of the Social Mind. — Everywhere we find evidences of this action of the social mind, whether we consider the whole national life or its important parts. There are public policies that become so well established that they are stronger in their influences than they would be if they were formu-

lated in public law, with penalties attached. There are policies of political parties which are expressions of the common thought and will of those parties. There are creeds of church organizations, there are types and ideals of society, which have been built up by means of a common expression of the social mind. The ideal of "liberty, equality, and fraternity," the ideal of "justice," and the ideal of "economic independence," are all products of the social mind, having the force of law without its sanctions. The estimate of social values and their arrangement in relative degrees of desirability are expressions of the social mind; they are the combined product of the community. And the notion of a common Bible, a common religion, or a common country gives rise to the universal sentiments or actions of individual minds. Thus does the social mind, through action and reaction, demonstrate its superiority to the individual.

The Making of Public Opinion. — Public opinion as an expression of the judgments of a group having common interests, common feelings, and thought springs up through ordinary social processes. But it can be developed by the dynamic force of education and propaganda. People must be aroused in their emotions to be led to feel alike, think alike and express a common judgment. Agitators may be immediately destructive, but agitation in itself is necessary, whether orderly or disorderly, in developing a common feeling. Also, before sound judgment may be expressed in public opinion a common thought must be engendered regarding ideals and a program necessary to reach them. Public opinion becomes thus the powerful weapon of human society, not only to keep the group in contact with its ideals, but also for the stimulation of action in its own preservation, and to develop lines of activity which lead to the service of individuals and the race.

Laws which express the ideals and judgment of the people are always preceded by the formation of public opinion, in fact, they are the judgment of public opinion. Moreover, laws cannot be administered or properly executed without support of public opinion. Public opinion is stimulated by education, where people are studying the same thing and reach a common judgment; by

the church and its proclamation of the gospel of a common feeling and thought, and by newspapers that disseminate knowledge and the interpretation thereof. These various agencies stimulate thought and action, which finally lead to a common judgment regarding matters of common concern and public welfare.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Make a table of the differences between the individual mind and the social mind. Make one of the similarities.

2. Explain what Ellwood means when he says that "The mental life of groups is unified only functionally." See Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 330.

3. Describe the steps by which the United States made up its mind to declare war on Spain; to build the Panama Canal; to revise the tariff.

4. Is the process by which we secure enough food to supply the needs of one hundred millions of people in this country the result of social consciousness? State your reasons.

5. Is the process by which we keep up our population a socially conscious one?

6. Is the process by which we defend our country from possible invasion, by building forts and battleships, and by training an army, a sign of social consciousness?

7. Analyze the steps by which a state "makes up" its mind to regulate railroad rates.

8. Observe a group of college students recently come together in a hall or rooming house, and analyze the steps in the development of a social mind among them.

9. What were the social processes which preceded the entry of the United States into the European war?
10. What is meant by the expression "The International Mind"?
11. Should social unity be standardized?
12. Does social unity limit individual liberty?
13. Can the process of mutual aid be applied to nations?
14. Cite instances in which public opinion on various matters of international concern was formed by skillful propaganda.
15. Bring in one clipping from a newspaper which illustrates skilful propaganda.

CHAPTER XXII

SOCIAL LAWS

To one accustomed to the use of the term "law" in physical sciences, a word of caution is necessary with respect to the term when it is used in sociology. By the term "social law" we mean *a statement of the relation which exists between social phenomena; between orders of social phenomena; or between social phenomena and other phenomena.*[1] This relation may be one of co-existence, one of sequence, or one of cause and effect. These laws, however, differ from the laws, for example, of physics in that they are less exact; for, since human beings possess some degree of choice, their actions are not so definitely determined as are those of atoms. While human beings react to given stimuli with more or less regularity, there is less certainty that all will act in the same way than there is in the case of atoms subjected to similar conditions. Moreover, one must remember that it is much more difficult to envisage all the conditions under which certain social developments occurred, to say nothing of the difficulty of controlling experiments with human beings in associated life. The biologist can experiment with guinea pigs and mice, but cannot shut up human beings under controlled conditions to see what happens when the conditions are varied. In human biology, therefore, he is subject to the same limitations as the sociologist. He must resort to the statistical method and rely upon a comparison of results in groups where the respective conditions have accidentally varied, but which cannot be definitely controlled. For example, the Mendelian law of heredity can be tested in plants and animals; it can only be inferred in human beings from wide observations covering a number

[1] Cf. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 73–81. Ward draws a distinction between "law" and "principle." A law, in his view, explains nothing, while a principle is an explanation. See *Pure Sociology*, p. 169.

of generations. Certainty in the latter case cannot be as great as if he could control the conditions and repeat the experiment again and again. So the sociologist can only infer from wide historical observation that under certain conditions certain regularities of human behavior occur. The statement of these regularities of occurrence we call laws, because they describe a tendency of behavior under the given conditions. It must be remembered that in sociology thus far these generalizations are tentative. Further information may modify them.

Laws of M. Tarde. — M. Tarde, in his work on *Social Laws*, has tried to show that the laws which describe the action of the social forces may be reduced to the following three great movements: "repetition, opposition, and adaptation." He proceeds to show that it is through the repetition of phenomena in a given group that the law or rule of action appears; that it is through opposition that comparison evolves; and, finally, that it is by the adaptation of ideas and ideals, customs, and traditions to others that homogeneity is brought about.

The scientist, no doubt, lays the foundation for a new truth when he discovers repetitions of the phenomena under consideration. He observes, for instance, a certain movement of the heavenly bodies. If it is not repeated, he can make no deductions; but if there is a series of repetitions, he discovers that the process is not accidental, but in accordance with certain laws. Again, the scientist is quick to observe in all organic life differences or oppositions; the struggle for existence presents a constant differentiation. Finally, in studying the adaptation of one part to another, the scientist takes the third step toward the formation of a new law. In the same way, the initial step in the formulation of social laws is the discovery of constantly recurring phenomena. At first glance society shows a heterogeneous mass of phenomena in which there appears little order; it is only by careful study and observation that an orderly arrangement and movement are discovered. But just as the whole universe at first seems to be a mass of unrelated objects and phenomena and subsequently yields to order and symmetry, so the whole mass of apparently unrelated social phenomena discloses an orderly arrangement to

the scientific mind. Thus, while no one can doubt the constancy of "repetition, opposition, and adaptation," there are, within these three great fundamental movements, more specific kinds of action, operating within more limited areas. Some of these will be briefly discussed.

Laws of Individual Choice. — The individual's choice of alternative actions depends partly on his hereditary make-up, and partly upon the values which his social experience has established in his mind. With these facts in mind, and further remembering that such values determine what he considers "the greatest return," and also "the least sacrifice" the first law of individual choice is as follows: *Each individual seeks the largest return for the least sacrifice.* What is meant by this is that whether we consider wealth-getting or wealth-using, religion or art, culture or learning, or, indeed, associated life in any of its various important phases, the individual is seeking what he considers his highest good or best interests so far as his powers or capacities will permit. The laborer seeks the highest wage he can command, or a lower wage with compensatory satisfactions; the professional man strives for the position that will yield him what he considers the greatest satisfaction for his efforts; and the business man enters the field which will most gratify his desires. The expression "largest return" includes, to be sure, a number of things; it involves physical health, mental development, material welfare, and social well-being, or on the other hand it may mean loafing, gambling, stealing, or even more serious anti-social conduct. But the truth is a universal one and manifests itself in all our activities.

Another of these laws is: *Each individual has a schedule of choices ranging from the most desirable objects to the least desirable.* This law, in economic life, serves as the basis for market valuation, and furnishes the opportunity for exchange. The demand schedule for articles of utility is manifested in the practical affairs of life; but the law operates with no less exactness in other departments of human activity, for individual motives vary in proportion to their valuations of the various objects of life. Of two men, both laying stress on the material objects of life, one may put food first and then clothing, books, works of art, and furni-

ture, while another may, under different circumstances, give the following order: books, works of art, food, furniture, and clothing. Again, others may make schedules like this: wealth, virtue, learning, public approbation, and leisure; or like this: virtue, learning, wealth, leisure, and public approbation.[2] Or, as in the previous law, may include a scale of values entirely reversed, such as would be found among hoboes.

This leads to another well-established principle; namely, that *Individual minds respond similarly to the same or like stimuli.*[3] This law rests upon the assumption of the universality of certain characteristics of the human mind. To it, however, there are certain exceptions, depending on individual differences. It would better be stated thus: *Individual minds of like constitution respond similarly to like stimuli.* It is not best to presume too much upon the constancy of human nature; for, while the stimulus of hunger or cold may in general affect individual minds in the same way, the actions resulting from these may be of entirely different nature. One may labor in order to reach given results, whereas another may steal to satisfy his wants. Or if a flood renders many people homeless, most of those not afflicted will respond, in one way or another, to a call for help; but there are, at times, some who will give no assistance whatever.

The Laws of Social Choice. — Similar to the laws of individual choice are the laws of social choice. There is, therefore, a schedule of social choices by means of which a group of people chooses its ideals and types and establishes the bases of social action.

According to Giddings, the most important ideals of social choice, in their relative order of influence, are as follows: (1) force or power, (2) utilitarian virtues, (3) integrity, and (4) self-realization.[4] That the public mind values force or power above all other things, seems, at first, to be untrue; but a little reflection on the judgments of society will convince one that such is the case. While the utilitarian virtues, that is, those having quality of usefulness, generally precede integrity in the schedule of the normal society, there are communities which choose integrity as a higher

[2] See Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 147.
[3] See Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 60.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

ideal. There can be no doubt that self-realization is properly the last in the category; for, while society recognizes the importance of the individual and his prosperity, his well-being as a direct aim is not uppermost in the social choices.

It may be inferred from the foregoing that whether the choices of a society are radical or conservative depends, in a large measure, upon the variety of interests of such a society and the degree of their harmonious combination. The society having a variety of interests will be radical in its choices, and the society that has harmonized its interests will be conservative. Hence it is that "*only the population that has many, varied, and harmonious interests is consistently progressive in its choices*";[5] for, where the radical and conservative elements are nearly balanced, society is likely to be freed, on the one hand, from impulsive action, and, on the other, from inertness. As a society undergoing change faces new conditions, it tends to set up certain social purposes or aims which it attempts to realize. Usually these are more or less crude guesses as to what is for the welfare of society. As the background for the formulation lies the complex of customs, traditions, and patterns of conduct which have grown up in the group's past experience. For example, when warriors are needed the welfare of the group is conceived to lie in any system which will produce as many boys as possible. Hence, polygamy or infanticide of female infants may be favored. Or, if changes come about that make a large family a heavy burden instead of an economic and social asset, the limitation of the size of the family may be looked upon as a desirable policy. This law may be stated as follows: *The greatest good to the greatest number, or social well-being, is the aim of social action.* This aim, according to Benjamin Kidd, looks to the future as well as to the present. In his *Western Civilization* Kidd has elaborated this idea under what he terms "Projected efficiency." He shows that in our attempts to realize the present we are living for future good; in building the social structure, we are looking always to the superstructure which is to be built in the future. Hence the greatest good to the greatest number must apply even to generations yet unborn. It is probable, however, that "projected

[5] See Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 181.

efficiency" — when it occurs at all — is largely an unconscious by-product of society's effort to survive under the difficulties of the here and now, due to an endowment of surplus energy in the individuals composing society.[6]

The Laws of Imitation. — M. Tarde has shown us how important, in the development of social life, is imitation. In the first few years of its life the child acquires nearly all of its habits, and a considerable part of its knowledge, by means of imitation, and it is the imitative child that makes the most rapid advancement. Among primitive races, too, the beginnings of civilization are marked by this influence; nor have we ever, for that matter, lost sight of it in the higher development of civil life. The customs and habits of a single people are soon imitated the world over; the spread of the industrial arts, the advancement of science and learning, and the use of modern appliances, all point to the importance of imitation in the practical affairs of life.

M. Tarde has given us two laws according to which imitations spread. The first one, "*In the absence of interferences, imitation spreads in geometrical progression,*" assumes that there must be social contact. If an individual imitates another, there are two sources for the spreading of the idea. If one individual imitates each of these, there are four sources, then sixteen, and so on in geometrical progression. In a large social group where many may imitate the one, imitation may proceed very rapidly; the psychology of the mob demonstrates the rapidity in which social action proceeds through imitation. This law is important in accounting for the rapid spread of news, the adoption of new customs, and changes in language.

The other important law is that "*Imitations are refracted by their media.*" The term, borrowed from physics, is very appropriate in its application. The individual who attempts to imitate his neighbor in walk, speech, dress, and personal habits will never exactly represent the original; the nation that attempts to use the civilization of another will yet find differences between itself and the original — differences for better or for worse. These

[6] Giddings, *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, New York, 1906, p. 416.

differences demonstrate that the individual or community that attempts to imitate has its own customs and ideals and will change what it borrows to suit its own accepted ideas or its own environment. If one hundred people, standing just close enough together for each to hear what his next neighbor says, should attempt, one after another, to recite a given passage, each one getting his version from the one who has last spoken, the passage would frequently become so changed as to be unrecognizable. In the same way, the degree to which the tales of the neighborhood enlarge or become distorted depends upon the character of the media through which they pass.[7]

The Law of Sympathy. — *The degree of sympathy increases as the resemblance increases.*[8] Sympathy is strongest among those groups that have many activities in common. For example, there is, in general, more sympathy of man for man than of man for the dumb animals. Common interests, common sentiments and feeling, draw people close together and increase their sympathy with one another. The races that have the same degree of culture develop a common interest and hence a common sympathy. And among individuals who associate on the same plane, or are engaged in the same pursuits, the bond of sympathy is much stronger than it is when differences in character, culture, or occupation are clearly recognized.

The Law of Conscious Resemblance. — *The consciousness of resemblance and of sympathy causes people to be mutually attracted.* The recognition that people are like ourselves in feeling, thought, tastes, and sympathies causes us to draw near them and to be attracted to them. To know that people feel as we feel and think as we think is the foundation of socialization. Giddings has named the principle "consciousness of kind." In his explanation he has attempted to show that consciousness of kind is the primal social *force* by which people are attracted to one another, and through which they become socialized. While we may object to its being called a primal social force, it is true that groups of people are joined in social union by sympathy and a recognition

[7] Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation* (translation by Elsie Clews Parsons).
[8] See Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 108.

of like-mindedness. Such consciousness of likeness rests upon organic similarity and a like cultural experience. And as the individual instinctively chooses his companions upon the recognition of some common thought or feeling, some material or social condition, so religious societies, fraternal orders, clubs, and social gatherings, are formed according to this law. Indeed, the stability of our nation depends upon the consciousness that we hold in common certain principles concerning the rights, duties, and privileges of citizens, the same ideals of freedom, liberty, and public order.

On the other hand, consciousness of kind implied a consciousness of difference. People of unlike nervous organization and of unlike cultural experience are upon contact conscious of being unlike. This consciousness of difference leads to the segregation of people into groups, leads to all kinds of conflict, from race conflicts, to class distinctions, attitudes of superiority and inferiority with all the cleavages which characterize society.

Laws of Impulsive Social Action. — "*Impulsive social action tends to extend and to intensify in a geometrical progression.*"[9] There is a similarity between this law and the first law of imitation. While imitation and impulsive social action may be widely different, they have a tendency to act at the same time and, to a large extent, in the same way. The social mind is made up of individual minds which think, feel, and will together. Impulsive social action, therefore, must occur from the instantaneous movements in the same way and for the same purpose, of the individuals of a group; but how rapidly these impulses may be transmitted from one to another through imitation cannot be measured. A glance of the eye, a movement of the hand, may communicate an impulse from one mind to another. The utterance of a single sentence may not only bring every mind to the same attitude, but it may cause the immediate action of all.

"*Impulsive social action, as a rule, varies inversely with the habit of attaining ends by indirect and complex means.*"[10] The

[9] See Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 176.
[10] Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 177.

more complex society becomes, the less it is subservient to impulsive action. The child has a simple and direct method, — action follows at once upon suggestion, — while the adult tends more often under ordinary circumstances to deliberate and arrives at a conclusion and attains results by a circuitous path. The society which has no deliberative assembly often will be stampeded into action by an impulsive individual; that society which has developed deliberative devices like parliamentary rules will give time for further reflection before its acts. Here, as elsewhere in social life, changes always move from a center in every direction; hence the ratio of change will be by squares. But it must be remembered that social forces seldom move in a straight line, but are always deflected by other forces.

Laws of Tradition. — Tradition has in primitive societies a great influence over the lives of men, and to some extent, it continues to exercise this influence; but as the world becomes scientific, the power of tradition declines. This phenomenon may be reduced to the following law: "*Tradition is authoritative and coercive in proportion as its subject matter consists of belief rather than of critically established knowledge.*"[11] It is a long road from tradition to critical history, but it is a very sure one in the destruction of the authority of tradition. Again, "*Tradition is authoritative and coercive in proportion to its antiquity.*"[12] The ancient good is that which appeals to the minds of people who are not ready or willing to submit to the régime of critical knowledge. Belief in traditions will not yield readily to the formal test of rational processes; but conceptions of things that happened last year are much more easily eradicated from the social mind than are those concerning things that happened thousands of years ago — conceptions which have received the sanction of many succeeding generations. The chief service of science to the modern world consists, therefore, in bringing people to accept things which can be demonstrated to be true either by rational deductions or by a formidable array of facts. Just as, in the words of the poet, "Time makes ancient good uncouth," science makes much of tradition valueless.

[11] Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 207. [12] *Ibid.*

The Law of the Development of Social Structures. — One phase of this law has been pointed out by both Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer.[13] As they stated the law, it ran something like this: *Whenever two societies conjugate, through a process of conquest of one by the other, a great and rapid evolution of structure succeeds.* This law needs very little elucidation; it is based upon historic induction. Famous examples of its working are to be found in the subjugation of the Canaanites by the Israelitish tribes and in the Norman Conquest of England. Always when victorious people face the question as to what they shall do in the new circumstances which a conquest has forced upon them, they at once begin to make some adjustment of relations between the conquered and themselves. In the first place, sovereignty is imposed, and the sovereign commands the conquered. It is not long, however, before questions of relationship must be enacted into law. At first the will of the conqueror, then later the will of the conquering people, regulates the life of the conquered. As the relationships become increasingly complex, more and more adjustments have to be made. The amalgamation of the two peoples, begun, as a rule, by the conquerors, who took the women of the conquered as wives and concubines, creates many difficulties — religious as well as industrial. At first the conquered are a servile class attached to the land; but when the half-breeds come to the age when work must be done by them, the early regulations become unsatisfactory, and adjustments must be modified. Moreover, the children of the conquerors by the women of the conquered usually follow the religion and language of the mothers. This fact necessitates regulations concerning the use of language and the practice of religion as between the two peoples. In all these ways, therefore, and for these and other obvious reasons, the social structure becomes increasingly complex.

But is not this law, as stated, only a part of a wider generalization? Not only in case of conquest do structures multiply and social regulation and institutions rapidly increase; but whenever there is a conflict between different cultures, or when

[13] Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf*, Secs. 34. 35. Ratzenhofer, *Sociologische Erkenntniss*, Chaps. XIII, XIV.

classes with widely different interests clash with each other, the same thing occurs. Witness the tremendous increase of social structure in Great Britain, in the days since the Industrial Revolution; yet there was no conquest as in the days of William the Norman and his successors. But conquest or no conquest, the last century has witnessed a most remarkable increase of social machinery for adjusting the relations between classes of Great Britain's population whose interests have come to be recognized as antithetical to each other as never before. Laborer and capitalist, and, to a less degree, landowner and tenant, have become class conscious. The one has endeavored to exploit the other as truly as ever Norman king or baron tried to exploit the conquered Saxons. But as a result, there has followed that remarkable series of laws and institutions which has, in the last century, made England the pioneer, in many ways, in the adjustment of social relations. Consider, too, the great increase of social machinery in this country — machinery for making possible what we call social justice. At first the railroads and every kind of industry were favored; the laborer and the public were given no rights by the law. Gradually the interests of the laboring and consuming classes became more and more prominent; and recently there has been great activity in remaking laws and institutions in the interests of these classes. Another illustration of the same sort, but in a different realm, is to be found in the growth of tenement-house regulation following upon the influx of great hordes of Europeans into our larger cities. Sanitary regulations are due, in part, at least, to an arousal of class consciousness by this contact with unfamiliar peoples. Can we not say, therefore, that *whenever two or more peoples, or class-conscious groups, come into contact with each other in one geographic unity, social structures and institutions will experience rapid development, provided one party struggles to dominate the others?*

The Law of Spiritual Development. — A law, formulated by Tiele and cited by Ross, points out the importance to mental and social progress, of the mental contact of people in different stages of development. Leaving out of account, then, the natural capabilities of men and peoples, we may say that *all development*

in spiritual matters depends on the stimulating effects of contact with a different stage of culture upon the self-consciousness of a people.[14] Illustrations of this law can be found in abundance. It has often been remarked that, as soon as the Civil War was over, a new spirit manifested itself in both the North and South, but especially in the North. The soldiers of the North had been living for a term of years in the South. There they had become acquainted with a slightly different culture and stage of social development; there they had found social institutions which had grown up out of slavery. To those who returned, therefore, the war was a liberal education. They had traveled and had observed new scenes; they had come in contact with new social and industrial situations and had had their minds stirred by contrasts. A similar thing happened after our recent war with Spain, and is happening since the World War. Travel over seas and among strange peoples, contact with new institutions, have had a most stimulating effect upon our people. Immigration has done the same thing. It is no accident that a country receiving a constant supply of new immigrants, provided they are not too dissimilar, comes to have a plastic mind. Our tolerance of European dances and foods, our interest in such European political and social experience as the various social insurance schemes, are due, in great part, to our acquaintance with European institutions, either through the immigrants or through our tourists and writers. Every one who has traveled appreciates how new scenes and new customs stir the mind and generate tolerance.

The Laws of Survival and Progress. — That law of survival which applies to the physical development of the individual animal structure we can extend to social institutions as follows: *Institutions arise to meet the needs generated by the circumstances of life surrounding the people which possesses them.* These institutions are social inventions to meet certain exigencies. The jury system, for example, arose after the Norman Conquest had destroyed the old tribal bonds, and made necessary the substitution of some piece of machinery to settle disputes other than the old folkmote. The sovereign state arose when a conquering people

[14] Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 239.

destroyed the social solidarity of the tribal assembly and made necessary machinery to deal with the relations between two or more different kindred.

The track of social evolution, on the other hand, is strewn with the ruins of social institutions that have lost their usefulness. When a society at a given stage of progress adopts certain customs, habits, or institutions, it retains these beyond the time when they contribute to survival; even after they are no longer useful, they are not cast off. The statute books are filled with laws once alive, now dead; the habits of life to-day are far different from those of centuries past; yet, old institutions, laws, customs, and patterns of conduct persist. This lag occurs in one or two correlative cultures such as material culture consisting of tools, land, machinery, etc., on the one hand and non-material culture such as methods of using tools or of exploiting resources, customs, beliefs, and philosophies on the other. Once we had too much forest in this country. The early settlers, therefore, adopted an exploitive policy with regard to the forests. However, with the increase of population and increased demand for forest products, and growing recognition of some of the evils in the way of disappearing forest reserves, denuded soils, choked-up streams, etc., it became apparent that the exploitive policy was bad. Then a new policy was broached, that of conservation. But the latter lagged behind the change in the material situation, *i.e.*, the relative abundance of forests. So with many other matters. The old form of the family has lagged behind the changes in economic conditions, the growth of the educational system, the growth of population especially in cities and many other material changes. The study of this set of facts has led to what may be called the law of cultural lag. It may be stated as follows: *When there is a rapid change in a culture of interdependent parts, and when the rate of change in the parts is unequal, there occurs a lag in the adaptive culture (i.e., the culture which is dependent on the other) which brings about social maladjustment.*

The increasing importance, in social progress, of the human mind is indicated by a law formulated by Ward. It is, in essence, that *the spontaneous progress which one finds in the more undeveloped*

societies gives way to telic or purposive progress, and individual telesis or direction of progress gives way, on the whole, to collective telesis. [15]

Other generalizations have been made by sociologists which describe how social phenomena behave, but these are sufficient to indicate how in associated life there are certain regularities which can be described. It must be remembered that these laws are not forces in any sense, but merely descriptions of how human beings behave in association. Under given conditions men tend to react in certain ways described by these laws. Their value consists in the fact that if one knows all the conditions he is able to foresee what is likely to happen. To the degree that the law states all the conditions, and to the degree that in a given case the observer knows all the facts he can predict what is likely to happen. The further refinement of these laws and the discovery of others depends on a wider analysis of social phenomena. That means the extension of social research.

READING ASSIGNMENTS

Ellwood, Chas. *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chap. XIII.
Folsom, Joseph K. *Culture and Social Progress*, Chaps. VI–XI.
Giddings, F. H. *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 400–419.
Ross, E. A. *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. III.
Tarde, Gabriel. *Social Laws.*

OTHER REFERENCES

Tarde, Gabriel. *The Laws of Imitation.*
Tozzer, A. M. *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, Chap. VI.
Ward, Lester F. *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, pp. 125–130.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is the difference, if any, between a physical law and a social law? See Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 43–48.

2. State the difference between a law and a principle in sociology. See Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 169 ff.; Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 74–81.

3. Read Ross, *Foundations*, pp. 43–44, and criticize the statement that each individual seeks the largest return for the least sacrifice.

[15] Cited by Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 64.

4. Of what value to the student of society is the law that each individual has a schedule of choices ranging from the most desirable objects to the least desirable?

5. Give an illustration of the law that individual minds respond in the same way to like stimuli. What is the importance of this law to the student of society?

6. What bearing upon the law of social preference has the fact that you can get more people out to see what promises to be a "good" prize fight or a football game than to hear the discussion of a welfare project?

7. If it is true that a society made up of diverse elements of population is likely to be radical in its choices, what are likely to be the social choices of a population like that on the East Side of New York?

8. The slit skirt first appeared on Fifth Avenue. Within a year or two a modified form of it might be seen, worn by the poor, on the street cars of Second Avenue. What social law does that fact illustrate?

9. In accordance with what law do deliberative societies forbid the passing of a law with one reading, or the passing, on the day it is proposed, of an amendment to an important instrument like a constitution?

10. What illumination does the law of the development of structures throw upon the fact that "grandfather clauses" occur only in the constitutions of the Southern States of the United States of America?

11. Formulate a law on Social Continuity, also one on Social Differentiation.

CHAPTER XXIII

SOCIAL CONTROL[1]

The Meaning of Social Control. — The orderly movement of society could not be brought about by accident or maintained without regulative forces; it is not an automatic machine which runs without directive agencies, or at the behest of the blind forces of a physical environment. Nor does it develop and function merely by reason of the unconscious social forces at work in its constituent members, each individual more or less blind to the social interests of the group and intent only upon his own selfish interests. Spencer has enumerated different constituent parts of society which he called the regulating organs. In his regulating system Spencer points out the necessity of this great social function of control. And in Ross's admirable book on *Social Control* there is a special and complete presentation of the subject.

The blind social forces do play a certain part in the control of society. Ward has designated the process by the happy term "synergy," or the working together of unconscious individual forces towards a common end.[2] But, although social control is sometimes automatic and unconscious, society is moved in part by conscious purpose; indeed, a directive agency plays an increasingly prominent part in society as social evolution proceeds. Thus while most of the elements of social control are to be found in the reactions of individual life, still we find that there must be a larger agency representing the social mass — that is, a social mind to give to society an orderly arrangement. Even if every individual loved his neighbor as himself and observed conscien-

[1] Professor Ross has made this field peculiarly his own. His book, *Social Control*, is the best contribution to the subject. For much of what is best in this chapter we are indebted to his brilliant work. See also Lumley, *Means of Social Control*, New York, 1925.

[2] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 171–184.

tiously the Golden Rule, there would still be necessity for a central controlling force to keep people in order; for each individual, moving, as he does, in a direction of his own, and seeking to satisfy his own particular wants, would constantly find himself in opposition to his fellows. If, for example, two well-intentioned people should desire to occupy the same land at the same time, the right of the matter might be a difficult question for individuals to decide; but the public mind, as embodied in the law and the courts, is prepared to settle the question. Take, for a moment, the figure of a procession.[3] Some one must tell individuals how and when to enter the procession, how to keep step with one another; some one must give them place, direction, and time of movement.

In its beginnings, at least, social control is largely negative; the people are taught that certain things are tabooed. And to the very last, social control remains — to a greater or less degree — a restraint. When population is widely scattered, as it was, for instance, in the pioneer settlements of the United States, the theory of public social regulation is that the best government is that in which there is the least government. With a growing population, however, the consequent multiplication of contacts, and the mingling of different nationalities and races, the questions requiring regulation increase; and, in the absence of common traditions, a common religion, the ties of kinship, and similar unofficial and spontaneous regulative agencies, such regulation must perforce be more largely public and official.

In social control there are two types of agencies. One type controls indirectly through agencies serving other social ends; the other consists of agencies and methods consciously devised for purposes of control. The church, for example, was instituted rather for culture than for control; but it became incidentally — and sometimes with conscious intent — a powerful agent of control. On the other hand, the king, the standing army, the police force, and the entire political government, are instituted for the purpose of control.

The Basis of Social Order. — The basis of social order is found in individual desires and actions and the reactions resulting there-

[3] Ross, *Social Control*, p. 1.

from. We have discussed elsewhere the power of sympathy; this power, by making an individual recognize the position of others, so modifies his actions toward his fellows that he hesitates to take a position which is positively detrimental to others. The desire for sociability is another controlling force; only non-social creatures can exist without some degree of social order. Carnivorous animals that hunt alone and desire to be alone have no need, of course, of a social order; but should they desire sociability and prepare to perpetuate it, they would have to change their method of life. So, too, in primitive human groups, sociability cannot exist without at least the beginning of social order. But in civilized society, while sociability plays, on the whole, a comparatively unimportant part, it does, in the minor associations of life, exert a wholesome restraint upon man's combative nature. The boss and his gang, the social club, the church, the playground, and the neighborhood, all testify to its power, even yet.[4]

The Sense of Justice. — From the individualistic standpoint, perhaps, one of the strongest influences for social control is that exerted by a sense of justice. Originating as it does in the sense of sympathy, it later develops positive characteristics of its own. And were there no other law-inducing influences, the sense of justice would be sufficient to establish some sort of social order.[5] Justice is, in fact, the fundamental principle in all good government and, for that matter, in all phases of normal social life. Even in the social give-and-take of the child, this sense of fair play develops naturally as the child begins to form a conception of self.[6] To a degree a sense of justice is to be found among the lowest tribes; but in the highly civilized nation, it is a full expression of the moral sense combined with the sense of power. What was an instinct in early childhood becomes later a strong controlling force. That is, a sense of justice exerts this influence when the members of a group are equals; but when there arise social classes, either by reason of conquest or exploitation, it fails. It is just these class differences, however, which, in the regulation of the class relationships, give rise to positive law, the formal expres-

[4] Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. III. [5] For a different view see *ibid.*, p. 34.
[6] Baldwin, *Ethical and Social Interpretations*, 1913, pp. 15–39.

sion of social control.[7] Modern democracies, it is true, have taught a great deal about equality and fraternity; but when one searches for the basis of their practical government, one finds — especially where there are diverse racial characteristics among the governed — that justice founded on positive regulation is the dominant controlling method. Fraternity and equality, as sentiments in the national life, may be of some service in developing friendly feeling; but justice is the only formal and well-established principle of social action. And just in proportion as modern governments emphasize the development and maintenance of justice among all members of the nation will they settle those difficulties which arise from the attempt to socialize different races in the same community.

The Resentment of Injustice. — The resentment of injustice, or the individual reaction, is also essential to the development of social order. Even after the law of natural justice expressed in " an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth " is softened by the sentiments of civil justice, the feeling of resentment against injustice plays an important part in social control. It is, indeed, that very resentment against injustice which has helped to make so many of our laws. Man encroaches, for example, upon the rights of his fellows; and knowing that we should resent such an injustice toward ourselves, we resent it for others because of our sympathy for them. If there were no resentment, there would be no strife; and without strife, the weak would perish because society took no notice of them.[8]

Thus, through the interplay of the activities of separate individuals, there is an opportunity to work out a natural order of society. And were no other agency to appear than the simple methods arising out of the normal activities of human society, there would still be established a social life with a more or less orderly arrangement.[9]

Control through Belief. — The agencies of social control now dominant are a development. Some of them did not exist among

[7] See Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. IV. This is a slight expansion of Ross's exposition with emphasis upon the historic development.

[8] *Ibid.*, Chap. V.

[9] *Ibid.*, Chap. VI.

men's first devices to regulate their relations to one another. Law and even public opinion developed late. Ceremony, custom, and superstitious beliefs were the first agencies working toward social control.

The belief in supernatural sanctions to conduct arose early. Legal and social sanctions are paralyzed sometimes by the superior power of the offender; they are expensive and, after all, only reach the outward deed; they do not control the motives of the heart.[10] But the chief reason, perhaps, for the development of supernatural sanctions is that, as has been indicated in a previous chapter,[11] when man reached the animistic stage of culture, religious practices became fundamental life activities. First the spirits inhabiting natural objects and later the gods or god of the tribe were interested in the doings, in the very life processes of the individuals of the group. Here was a tremendous force brought to bear upon the inadequately socialized impulses of men. Their belief in these gods, more potent, more wise than they, went to the very foundations of conduct and seriously modified the motives of primitive men.

These sanctions, as Professor Ross has pointed out, may be divided into *five classes*. The *elementary* belief controlling conduct is that there is a supernatural being, or beings, who follows men's doings, rewards the good, and punishes the bad. A *second* group of sanctions is to be found in the beliefs typified by the Hindu doctrine of transmigration of souls. The souls are reborn in this world — the bad into the bodies of animals or low caste men, the good into the bodies of Brahmins, Devas, or kings. Every motive of the Hindu is colored by the belief in these definite rewards for approved social conduct. A *third* kind of sanction rests upon the belief in an after life, spent, as the case may warrant, either in an everlasting heaven of delights or a perpetual hell of torture. One has only to read medieval theology or see medieval paintings to appreciate the strength of these sanctions in deterring certain classes of people from socially undesirable acts. A *fourth* type of sanction is dependent upon the penances exacted by ecclesiastics. The sinner's punishment does not wait for another

[10] Ross, *Social Control*, pp. 126, 127. [11] Chapter XV.

life; it begins here and now. He is banished from communion; he is avoided; he is denied confession, connubial rights, and the ordinary companionship of associates. These are punishments which make amends for evil conduct and in some unexplained way purify the soul from sin. The *fifth* type appears when the person to be controlled is bound by tender ties with deceased relatives or friends. The spirits of these loved ones look down from heaven and see the actions of those who remain on earth; the mother her erring, but beloved, boy or girl; the wife her husband; the child its parent, who is resisting the appeals of the church. Thus the love for the departed, combined with a belief that the deceased lives and knows and cares, constitutes a controlling force of great strength.

Control by Social Suggestion. — But control by means of legal penalties, social opinion, and belief in supernatural sanctions are not the only methods by which the wills of men have been brought into subjection. Sanctions are quite conscious in their operation and depend for much of their power upon the fear of consequences which they are able to instill. Social suggestion, though none the less effective, works much less in the open. Somewhat resembling hypnosis, social suggestion operates subconsciously, for the most part, because the individual, while awake and conscious of his acts, does not understand clearly from what motives he is performing them. His response to social suggestion, therefore, is mute, but eloquent, testimony to the strength of his social impulses. At all times we are doing things, when in the company of others, which we should not do when alone. This social atmosphere presses upon us with a force often unrecognized, but which really moves us almost whithersoever it listeth.

Social suggestion varies in its force with the bodily and mental condition of the person upon whom it operates; one who is fatigued, diseased, or nervously worn out is most readily controlled. It varies also with the prestige and authority of him who offers the suggestion; it varies with the mass or volume of suggestion, which wears down resistance by the sheer force of authority, or by means of the familiarity which reiteration brings; and finally it varies with the effectiveness of the social provisions designed to

prevent the entrance of conflicting suggestions into the mind of the individual.

Suggestion secures its results by a number of methods and devices, example being one of the important means. We elevate to a pedestal and crown with a wreath the man who displays desirable social qualities. We build shafts to the memory of the brave, the heroic, and the successful; we canonize the recluse and apotheosize the martyr. The glamour round their deeds stirs the emotions of the young and creates in them certain social desires; but in the interests of social welfare, the vices of these same heroes, martyrs, and saints are forgotten.

Faith in the unrealized potentialities of men is another method of social suggestion. Many are those who have courses of conduct suggested to them by some one who expected great things from them. How many of us would have acted quite differently had we not been challenged by some one's faith in us! The very secret of the power of the Gospel is to be found in its sublime faith in the universal capacity of men to achieve salvation from their weaker and baser selves. Prophet, apostle, and modern evangelist, as well as statesman, admiral, and king, well know the force of suggestion conveyed through an expression of faith in a man's ability to do the seemingly impossible. Again, social suggestion operates through the force of ideals conveyed by the written and the spoken word. Vicious reading matter is tabooed; descriptions of lewd, brutal, and criminal acts are forbidden; seditious speech or writing is suppressed. And not only is literature censored so that the noble idealism of youth may not too soon be shattered by acquaintance with the hard facts of life, but even conversation is directed in the interests of social purity. All these precautions are based upon the acknowledged truth that Vice

> "too often seen, familiar with its face,
> We first endure, then pity, then embrace."

The most striking example of suggestion for the control of men is to be found in that combination of all these various methods which we employ in our systems of education. By means of example, reiterated precept, stern discipline, the emotional stimu-

lation of play, and the rough-and-tumble democracy of the playground, and through faith in their capabilities expressed by one for whom they have either high regard or great fear, the plastic minds of the young are molded into a more or less uniform type.

Not less potent is the social suggestion exercised by custom and tradition — a molding process that is commenced long before a child begins his schooling. By reason of their connection with the home life, with all of the deepest and most lasting emotions, custom and tradition show a strength second to no other influence. How often the language learned and the habits formed in early childhood stick to one like burs from the forest jungle! Certainly if custom dominates in such socially insignificant matters, how much greater an influence has it on the matters affecting social policies and ideals! Moreover, the traditions handed down at the crisis-periods of human development — the period when the child hungers and thirsts for facts and explanations more even than for his more than welcome daily bread, and the period of adolescence with its house of dreams — exercise an influence, the potency of which can best be estimated on the religious side. Endowed with all the prestige of age these traditions are passed on from one generation to the next. And those customs and traditions having to do with social control are enforced by the conscious recognition of the wise that such customs and traditions constitute the very props of social order.[12]

Control by Social Religion. — After society reaches a certain stage of development, the legalistic foundations of religion give way. In the latter days of the Roman Empire the gods of Greece and Rome faded into myths. Their penalties no longer inspired fear; their rewards no longer tempted man to curb his selfish and antisocial desires. And legal religion, in many countries to-day, is undergoing the same process of decay; it has ceased to be the right hand of social control, and in increasing numbers men refuse to be curbed in their propensities by the fear of a god whose laws they desire to break.

In Rome, the period of decaying belief in the old gods and their sanctions was also the beginning of national decay. The stern

[12] Ross, *Social Control*, Chaps. XII–XV.

morality of the earlier days disappeared; in the higher circles of society the sanctity of the home and of family relationships vanished. One of the very reasons for the success of Christianity in the Roman Empire was the fact that it supplied a living faith in place of the dying faiths of the Romans. It supplied, it is true, a legal religion in the place of a legal religion; but it supplied more than that. Along with its legality there went the inconsistent but closely amalgamated element of fraternalism — a fraternalism which was already to be found in the various guilds and fraternities of the Empire, but which lacked, in these, the emotional content of fraternity under the Fatherhood of one God, really believed in.

The sense of brotherhood that came with the belief in a God who was represented as a merciful Father to his children gave to early Christianity a remarkable controlling power; for the wild natures of men were just released from the superstitious fear of gods who did not feel with them in their miseries. The one saving force in the Roman Empire, therefore, was the Christian church. That that church learned to rule from the Empire and changed its form in order that it might rule the more easily the disorganized masses of uncontrolled people within and without the confines of that ancient state only testifies to the ecclesiastical insight of its leaders; it only added the political prestige of Rome to the religious sanctions of conduct. And even after this ecclesiastical machinery had well-nigh choked the spiritual life of the church, she still remained a fraternity that gripped men with great power; she was still the instrument of a social religion; she still opened up the wells of emotion in the soul of men hungry for peace with the Infinite.

That, without adulteration of any sort, this social religion would have become an efficient method of social control cannot be proved from history; for, except in the isolated cases of individuals like St. Augustine, Luther, and St. Francis of Assisi, the experiment has never been tried. That, with a more completely developed social consciousness among men, a more highly socialized population, and the proclamation of such a religion by men earnest and sincere in their faith, it would meet the needs of men and prove an

efficient means of bringing the will of men into subjection to the social necessities of our day, is the belief of an increasing number of thoughtful souls in our generation. Is it, indeed, without significance that the struggling, downtrodden classes of to-day hail the name of Him who was the first to proclaim a social religion of brotherhood for all men under one common Father? [13]

Control by Personal Ideals. — In society men can lift themselves by their bootstraps. The ideals which prevail in a man's group have immense power to mold his animal and egoistic impulses as well as his coldly calculating intellectual processes. He is moved by the power of ideals which appeal to his self-respect or which are forced upon him by his class or party.

Thus we have, according to Ross, a separation of these personal ideals into two classes. There is the group-ideal of conduct, which may in time be made a personal ideal by each individual in the group; and there is the personal ideal which a man creates for himself out of regard for his self-respect, for the sake of his honor, or, if he does not realize his ideal, from the contemplation of his shame. It is the control of type which causes men in different classes to be governed by different ideals. For example, the minister might be guilty of conduct unbecoming a minister while doing what would be considered proper for the laborer or the policeman. It may even happen that a man's own ideals are much lower than those to which society holds him; but he is true to the higher ideals because of the consciousness that he is a member of a class which he must not disgrace. Custom and habit rule him. On the other hand, the man who is critical of self, who has escaped from an unthinking subservience to social custom or to class ideals, asks himself what kind of conduct he ought to require of himself in order to retain his own sense of moral and personal worth. He is coerced into a course of conduct, not by the opinion of others, but by his own judgment of what his conduct will mean to himself, and to society. His conscience is not determined by fear of the reprobation of his fellows or of his class, but by the sufferings which he will undergo from the whip of his own moral judgment. This personal ideal, it is true, may not control

[13] Cf. Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XVI.

as many people as does the fear of the disapprobation of their class; but the type and the personal ideal together exert enormous influence in the determination of men's conduct in society.[14]

Social Control by Ceremony. — Who among us, even in this democratic country and in this rationalistic age, has not felt the spell of ceremony? Every act of unusual significance is surrounded by mysterious rites, whether among the primitive savages of Australia or the highly civilized peoples of Europe or America. And it is not only the imagination of the child or of the ignorant man that is enthralled; ceremony stirs elementary emotions even in the souls of the cultivated, who understand its motive and have seen through its mystery, as if by the force of some dim memory of paths once trodden by innumerable ancestors. This mysterious and complicated series of unintelligible acts hushes into awe and reverence the wild surgings of elemental passion. And under the spell of these elementary emotions, the will is dominated by the insinuating suggestions of those in charge of the ceremony and the whole person is subjected to the influence of the presiding personality or group.

Ceremony gathers about our most sacred institutions and tinges them with an impressiveness they do not naturally possess and which they sorely need, if they are to withstand the shock of unrestrained human impulses and desires. Marriage, the institution which bridles for us one of the most ungovernable passions of man and brings it into subjection to the welfare of society; initiation among primitive folk into the responsibilities of manhood and womanhood; entrance into the church, or lodge, or business corporation; the disposition of the dead, that act by which man is reminded of his connection with other beings and with the supernatural sanctions which are attached to the dead — all these are occasions when it is important for the welfare of society that each onlooker be most impressively reminded that he has important social duties.[15]

Control by Means of Art. — By means of poetry, eloquence, painting, sculpture, music, and its various other forms, art has power to control man through the domination of his feelings.

[14] *Ibid.*, Chaps. XVII, XVIII.

[15] Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XIX.

When men must be quickly fused into a living unity, the emotions are always appealed to; and nothing moves the emotions like art. Take, for example, the Psalm-singing of Cromwell's Ironsides and the songs of the soldiers as they marched to the front in the World War. Art, moreover, arouses social sympathy. It is like play, which really began as an art; for, by exciting their emotions it loosens the restraints which separate men and it binds them together by a common feeling. Its appeal is universal; the sentiments which it arouses are common to all men. It is used in war, in religion, and in the establishment of a new order of things. Everywhere is the æsthetic sense exploited in the interests of society. Saints and heroes are painted with beatific countenances, while devils and their human disciples are given the most detestable forms. And whereas moral excellence is described in such æsthetic terms as to make the quality intelligible and desirable to all, antisocial conduct, on the other hand, is stigmatized by adjectives and pictured in colors which are associated with the undesirable things of everyday life.

There is still another way in which art fastens upon our common longings and converts them to social purposes. The soul oppressed with the pettiness, the brevity, and the insufficiency of life's endeavors is given hope for the fulfillment of its vast desires; for art points to the stability of the nation, the immutability of the group, and the mightiness of the human race. All may be fleeting, so far as the individual is concerned; but the lofty buildings, the vast territory, or the achievements of a state give to the individual a sense of security and permanence.

Another thing that art does for us is to glorify our social symbols. The flag becomes a thing of great beauty; and the splendor of precious metals and jewels is used to draw men's attention from the suffering and self-abnegation of the individual for the sake of the group. War, missions, and individual sacrifices for public service are all thus glorified. Again, art pictures the worker as the happiest of all men. He is "God's nobleman," the "bulwark of the state"; and his pains and deprivations are "heroic joys." The nation for which he is asked to die, or to live through days of painful toil, is a fair maiden or matron appealing to the deepest

and strongest feelings in man, the emotions stirred by thought of wife, sweetheart, or mother. Thus, national types like the Gibson girl in physical appearance spring up and moral types like that of Christian in *Pilgrim's Progress*.[16] Thus the artist fascinates our imaginations with new types of conduct to which we naturally may be alien and pictures saint and hero in such a way that they become models to which we are irresistibly drawn. Thus does art lure men on to the great and noble deeds from which they naturally recoil, yet which are so necessary for society's welfare.

Control through the Influence of Personal Suggestion. — Probably the first steps in social control were taken by dominant personalities. Leadership and submission are to be observed even in animal life. And although the influence of what we call personality is especially noticeable in primitive societies where the social structure, being much less developed, plays a subordinate part in social control, yet the influence of example is not to be despised, even among a people with the most highly evolved social structures. The great man to-day as always plays his part in society; although democracy has transformed him from a captain of armies to a captain of industry or a leader in education and thought, she still has need of him.

The conditions favoring the control of a group by a strong personality are, as stated by Professor Ross, great excitement, the aggregation of individuals in mobs and masses, and "times of alarm and stress." But the causes of his authority are to be found, in part, at least, in the natural qualities which the leader himself possesses. He has a fine physique, unusual mental qualities — for example, strength of will and imagination — an ecstatic temperament, eloquence, faith in himself and his cause, courage and persistence, coolness in excitement, generosity and love, or a number of these in combination. And the force of such qualities is supplemented by the admiration aroused in men by the social distinction which a leader has either inherited or achieved through his abilities.

In the natural development of leadership, now some of these

[16] Ross, *Social Control*, p. 276.

conditions and personal qualities count most and now others. In primitive societies, where control is by persons rather than by social institutions, the emphasis is upon natural ability. And in these early societies, control is based upon fear, trust, and either a selfish or a disinterested admiration. With the growth of disinterested admiration, there develops "a charm of persons" which seizes upon the very citadel of man's being — the imagination and the feelings.

And, just as in a society which is military in its organization conditions themselves are very favorable to the ascendancy of personal influence, so, too, does racial stratification favor hero-worship. Again, feudal relations, in which the conquered at least so far yield to the conquerors as to accept the inferior position, promote the power of personal suggestion. It is democracy, indeed, which is least favorable to the control of the many by a single leader. With the formation of social devices which make for the wide dissemination of culture, with the opening of the doors of opportunity to every capable man, there goes a lessening of those social conditions which give artificial emphasis to natural differences between men. Leadership now becomes preëminence of ability — a leadership which we shall never cease to need. For democracy in political, religious, industrial, and social life raises the dignity of the average man, develops to the utmost his responsibility, and therefore diminishes the value of prestige. Thus does democracy, in emphasizing the importance of the common man, destroy the bonds of the old social control and bring into operation other forces of quite a different character.

Can society always command the services of leaders for purposes of social control? The strong man, in seeking his own ends, may wish to control other men in the interest, not of society, but of himself. He often does so to the detriment of society. The "boss" is an example. Now, just what are the motives which lead the powerful personality to link himself with those tendencies which make for social control?

When he does so, it is because he is usually a man of remarkable mental discernment and sees that the issues of his own life are wrapped up in the larger issues of the group to which he

belongs. If he has noble enthusiasm and ambitions, if he loves power and achievement, he perceives, for one thing, that the objects and achievements of society are so much more worth while than anything which he might desire for his own selfish purposes. And, too, he realizes that, by controlling others in the interests of society, he can accomplish infinitely more than he ever could alone. The constituted authorities of State and Church, the ideals which possess the soul of a people, and the customs of unnumbered generations, yield slowly to any one man, be he never so powerful. If he oppose them, he can accomplish but little, but with them he can move the nation. Moreover, the comparative immortality of society impresses his imagination; his deeds, standing alone, will probably perish from the memory of men, but linked with the fortunes of the community, they are assured undying fame. And rare is the great leader who does not crave a share in the eternal character of the group's achievements. Hence, in degrees varying with both the character of the great man and the prevailing conditions of society, the influence of his personality is devoted to the interests of society. Moreover, the agencies of social control tend to eliminate the antisocial leader.[17]

Social Control through Intellectual Factors. — An appeal to the feelings is not the only method of controlling individuals; another way is to influence the reason and the will. This intellectual influence may be secured by offering enlightenment, by creating an illusion, or by influencing social valuations.

(1) A man is often influenced in his conduct by having the consequences of his acts presented to him; for considerations of prudence determine the actions of most of us. The social group, by disseminating information as to the physical consequences of personal habits and actions, for example, may control a man by showing him the effects of vice upon his own welfare and happiness. Thus the modern war against vice and the present health campaigns are both largely an appeal to a man's appreciation of his own welfare or the welfare of those with whom he is most intimately connected. Or society tries to bring home to the individual the psychical results of individual conduct. We

[17] Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XXI.

inform the individual that an action, repeated often enough, becomes a habit, that one kind of vice often drags another in its train, and that mental delinquency in one line brings certain other mental consequences in its train. We say, "Sow a thought and reap an act; sow an act and reap a habit; sow a habit and reap a character; sow a character and reap a destiny."

But besides showing a man the physical or psychical consequences upon himself, the organized agencies of social control may inform him of the social consequences of ill-advised conduct. From the reaction of individuals whose rights he has infringed, or from the reaction of society which, like a kind of superparent, cares for the interests of all its children by curbing the excessively egoistic conduct of some, he suffers loss of social esteem, the respect of his fellows, and the honor which society loves to bestow upon the deserving. These reactions are a means of teaching a man that his individual actions affect others than himself — a lesson but slowly learned by the best of us. This sense of social solidarity the group tries, at a very early stage, to develop in its members; and gradually each member learns to consider his own welfare in terms of the welfare of the community. Says Ross, "History records the reflections of the Elite upon the conduct of life, but neglects the forces that held in their humble social orbits the yeoman and the artisan. Yet it is safe to surmise that in all free communities there was an exudation of proverb and aphorism, gnome and parable, legend and moral tale, tending to bring about a canny adjustment of men to the requirements of life in common. That underground growth we call folklore was full of salty maxims and pithy counsels which gave shape to multitudes of obscure, unhorizoned lives."

In all these ways does enlightenment assist in that socializing process which we call social control. These methods have their drawbacks, it is true; for social morality and personal welfare are sometimes at variance. There is war, for example, or self-sacrifice to disease in order that the group may be saved; and, too, education does not always supply motives strong enough to control people of ordinary mental caliber; knowledge of the truth does not always induce that emotional impulse which constitutes

the motive power of action. On the whole, however, the more enlightened the people are, the better does this method of social control work; as society comes to the point in its intellectual development where reason rules, rather than fear or impulse, control by information becomes more effective. The method has the double advantage, therefore, that, as society becomes group conscious, enlightenment is increasingly effective and that, on the other hand, as enlightenment grows in influence, society becomes more conscious of itself and of its needs. Thus control becomes less and less a matter of instinct and sympathy and more a matter of rational consideration.

(2) Another device by which the judgment of the individual is swayed is illusion. When information and intelligence will not secure social control, some other method must be found. One of these is to employ deception and misrepresentation, to use half-truths and prejudices concerning, not only the supernatural realm of religion, but the everyday experiences of men. And because most people are neither strictly logical in their thinking nor scientific in their criticism of what purports to be truth, because men seldom are entirely free from prejudices of one sort or another, this method has considerable chance of success. A few examples will suffice to show how common and widespread are the illusions which still exercise control over men. The theory is still prevalent that the righteous will never be found forsaken, that his children will never need to beg bread. Originally, when there was a religious sanction for right conduct, such a theory had some significance; but as interpreted in modern times, it is pseudorational. In spite of our desire to make it the truth, we are forced to admit that this axiom of conduct does not always correspond with the hard facts of life. But our heroes of the drama, of song, of story, and of theology, all triumph. The worthy man succeeds; the mean man suffers. The soldier's widow and orphans will be bountifully cared for. And he who dies in the morning of his life gains fame and immortality.

"The brave
Die never. Being deathless, they but change
Their country's arms for more, their country's heart."[18]

[18] Bailey, P. J., *Festus*, V.

O, fortunata mors, quæ naturæ debita pro patria est potissimum reddita! [19] (Happy the death of him who pays the debt of nature for his country's sake.) On such illusions are built most of the superstructure of militarism.

Of a similar stripe are the political illusions of a group somewhat more developed than is the military society. The doctrine of the divine right of kings, so long dominant in history, and still surviving in certain nations, is a semireligious, semirational sanction with which to soothe nascent thinkers back into somnolent obedience. Nor does a democracy escape political illusions. Much of the solicitude for the people, much that is done in the name of political progress, is pure buncombe on the part of candidates. A study of the discussions for the last twenty years of the tariff question or the liquor problem, here in the United States, will show how the politicians seize upon certain phases of these questions in order to secure popular favor.

Another illusion that has worked in the interests of social control is asceticism, so often employed by the church to tame men. Whether Catholic or Puritanic, it finds its real explanation in its power to catch the imagination of men, appeal to their desire for release from the evils of a bad social order, and bring them into some semblance of social regularity and usefulness. Asceticism fits in with an economy of pain, as Patten puts it. Based on an illusion impossible save as pain-wrought ideals dominate men's minds, it pretends to be absolutely self-renouncing, when, as a matter of fact, it is only another form of selfishness; for it offers security and rest to the disturbed soul in the midst of the unrest of social disturbance.

But it is not only in militancy, politics, and certain stages of religion that illusion has been used to subdue the individual for the good of society. Illusion holds sway in industry as well. Do the anthracite coal workers strike for certain demands, they and the freezing or overcharged public are given to understand that there is such a thing as the divine right of coal barons. If workers demand collective bargaining, they are met with the almost unchallenged illusion of "freedom of contract" and the conten-

[19] Cicero, *Philippics*, IV, 12, 31.

tion that every man has a right to work. By such half-truths do the lords of industry endeavor to cudgel into submission the rising judgment of the workers. On the other hand, in a period of economic deflation, the workers contend for "a living wage" without reference to the economic conditions which determine wages. And any economic theories, once they have served the purpose of economic liberation, are repeatedly invoked in the interest of social control. Thus *laissez faire*, once the shibboleth of the English Industrial Revolution, is now seen to have been an illusion with which industry whipped into uniformity and reduced to control the social heterogeneity of the eighteenth century.

Even in education, half-truths survive and dominate the minds of men. What does it signify that the professors in some of our colleges and universities insist so strenuously on the recognition of an aristocracy of letters? Why do they accept with such alacrity and satisfaction the adulation and reverence of the multitudes? With the exception of those few who foster this attitude from purely selfish motives, they do it because such a view of education serves as a most excellent instrument for control of the multitudes.[20]

(3) The social valuations which are a man's social heritage are potent in swaying his judgment. Standards of conduct and ideals of character are created by society. And since these standards and ideals are intended to be applied to others than the makers of them, they are usually higher than those possessed by the leaders who make them. But their nature is such that men are willing to take them for their own.

These social valuations are placed on the things that make for group safety, such as courage, honesty, and faithfulness; they are given to the things which are coöperative in nature, such as play and sociability; they are given to music and art, to the love of money and women, to all things which do not consume strength or clash with the interests of others. By means of example, exhortation, suggestion, and the quoting of tradition and the citation of custom these valuations are crowded home upon the

[20] Cf. Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XXIII, for a somewhat different emphasis on details of the process. See also Lumley, "Slogans as a Means of Social Control," *Publications American Sociological Society*, Vol. XVI (1921), p. 121.

individual with almost irresistible power. And, yielding to this pressure, he makes his social choices in accordance with the valuations made by society, almost unconscious that they are being handed to him ready-made. By means of song and story they are suggested even to the child; they permeate our table conversation and the talk of the street; they are preached from pulpit and platform; they are embedded in the homely wisdom of proverb and epigram. Finally, they are enforced by the social sanctions of esteem, social distinction, and by the penalties of disfavor, disgrace, and blame. Strong, indeed, is the character who can rise above these social valuations — or subnormal in his mental processes.

There are many ways, therefore, in which the unstable, egoistic individual can be molded into some semblance of uniformity with his fellows and be made to follow lines of conduct compatible with the definite, common ends of social life. And be the appeal an emotional one — through belief, through social suggestion, through a social religion, through ceremonies, art, or the influence of dominating personalities — or be it an intellectual one, society controls the individual in the interests of the group, and transforms his variant impulses, his selfish desires, and his antisocial ambitions into social forces, or curbs them in the interests of social safety.

Means of Control Arising from Voluntary Association. — Many of the institutions which have been potent influences in the orderly arrangement and progress of society were created for specific purposes other than those of the establishment and regulation of social order. The church, for instance, has culture for its aim, the transformation of the individual from one mode of thought to another. But to carry out this purpose, it requires a great organization extending over all parts of the community and thus reducing to social order a large number of people. It is, therefore, one of the most powerful socializing influences that can be named. In the same way, although to a less degree than the church, have scientific societies, fraternal orders, and recreation societies of all sorts a socializing power.

Means of Control through Public Opinion and Law. — Public opinion is a means of control which supplements formal law and

government. On rather a moral than a legal basis, it moves with less exactness than law and government; and being more flexible in its nature, it is less definite in its immediate results. In the long run, however, its service in social control is of a highly important nature. It anticipates violations of the law and exerts its influence before as well as after a crime has been committed. Without president, secretary, or board of control to dictate its actions, and without any prerogative or legal sanction, it yet has the full force of public authority to act immediately and informally. Law is the formal means of control, by means of which people's lives are regulated, their rights, duties, and privileges defined, the offenses against individuals and society determined, and the punishments for violators provided. And the government, instituted for the enforcement of law, is able, by exercising a police control over the community, to maintain social order. Without the regulating power of the government it would be impossible to carry on any of the functions of society.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Name some individual characteristics which make social control necessary.
2. What social ends are in danger of defeat at the hands of individual activities which are not socially controlled?
3. What fundamental fact in society makes social control necessary?
4. Name, under the following classes, the agencies of social control in a community with which you are acquainted: (*a*) organized institutions for control; (*b*) institutions not organized specifically for control, but serving that purpose incidentally; (*c*) other agencies.

5. Show why social control is more necessary in a dense than in a sparse population; in times of war than in peace; in a mixed than in a homogeneous population; in a society stratified into classes than in one unstratified.

6. Suggest reasons for thinking that social control will become more necessary in America; that social control may become less necessary in America.

7. Name some means which are not now in use, but which were employed by society to control individuals in the Elizabethan age. Name some methods peculiar to our day.

8. Show how the "racketeers" control Chicago.

9. Show the processes of development of public opinion.

10. To what extent does public opinion control our cities?

11. To what extent do labor organizations attempt to control by force?

12. How do great corporate industries control society by force?

13. What changes in the mental attitude of European nations regarding control by force since the Great War?

14. Has there been a recent increase in imperialism in the United States government?

PART FOUR

SOCIAL IDEALS AND SOCIAL CONTROL

CHAPTER XXIV

THE AIMS OF SOCIETY

For long ages mankind developed social relations as the result of unconscious processes. This process Ward has called "synergy." Until man consciously set before his mind the evils of society, attempted to understand the causes of such conditions and then attempted so to arrange social institutions as to correct these evils, there was no conscious direction of social development. The taboos and mandates of primitive man were the first conscious experiments at social direction. Not based upon a real understanding of the nature of social relations and the conditions of improvement, often they were subversive of the aims he had in mind. Sociology attempts to ascertain not only the ends which serve social welfare, but to understand by scientific methods the ways in which these aims may be realized. By means of these ideals progress is possible.[1]

Social Ideals. — Social ideals are programs for the improvement of human association. It is a necessary outcome of its mode of evolution that society is perfect neither in structure nor in action; and because of the imperfect articulation of its parts, there is a tremendous waste of mental and physical energy in the adjustment of its relationships. Since education is frequently defective, legislation partial, and religion tainted with bigotry, hypocrisy, and superstition, absolute justice is unknown except in theory; perfect coöperation does not exist; and liberty frequently is but the opportunity for a man to enslave himself. Society, however, is never wanting in reformers who, seeing these defects, have attempted to adjust social arrangements to practical

[1] See Ward, *Applied Sociology*, Boston, 1906, Chaps. III, IV; *Pure Sociology*, New York, 1907, Chap. XX. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, New York, 1918, Chaps. VI, VII.

needs and to point out ideals of social action. And although his plans have not always solved the problems created by the changing conditions, the service of the idealist is most valuable in pointing out how far social practice falls short of ideal aims.

Revolutions, political upheavals, social agitation, and the propaganda of special systems or creeds all are backed by social ideals; for somewhere in the midst of the movement, or behind it, is a prophet or philosopher pointing out the defects and calling the group to adopt a new plan. But these very agitations and programs of reform raise such questions as the following: What is the purpose or aim of society? What conscious purpose should society set for itself, towards which its leaders are to direct the social development? There have been a number of answers to these questions.

The Greatest Good. — It has often been stated that the aim of society is to promote social well-being; and if we can reach a proper conclusion in regard to social well-being, we shall be satisfied with the statement as it stands. Now, granted that social well-being results from the most efficient exercise of the functions of society and the harmonious development of its members, it does not necessarily follow that social well-being means the largest amount of wealth, the greatest intellectual development, the most advanced religious thought, the best æsthetic culture, or the highest ethical practices. But possibly all of these in certain combinations are included in the idea. Stated in the most general terms social well-being has meant such adjustment of social arrangements to individual and group needs as enables the group to survive and function so that the individual may satisfy his needs to his greatest satisfaction compatible with a like satisfaction to his fellows.

If we accept the oft-quoted statement that "the aim of society is the greatest good to the greatest number," we are, until we define what constitutes the greatest good and the greatest number, still as far from the truth as before. The greatest number must, of necessity, apply to the future as well as to the present; for society is a continuous quantity perpetuating itself by the replacement of individuals as they disappear. As for the greatest

good, the term may mean physical well-being, happiness, usefulness, culture, or the wealth of a community; but no one of these things, taken singly, can insure the greatest good to society. Under certain conditions, moreover, the greatest good may mean one thing; and under other conditions, entirely different things may seem the desirable ones. At one time, for example, the greatest good for the greatest number will be gained by an extension of economic opportunity; at another, by political security; at still another, by advance in culture. And in obedience to this principle, the freedom of the individual will be curbed in the interests of group solidarity at such times, for instance, as in war; yet under other conditions, the individual will be permitted to express his individuality. In the ideal society, therefore, the term means all these things.

The Utilitarian Theory. — The doctrine that the object of moral conduct is to promote utility began with the Greek moralists, who identified utility with happiness. Since that time, as its different advocates have approached it from different points of view or considered it under varying conditions of society, the theory has undergone many changes. First it was considered merely from the standpoint of the individual, but later the idea was extended to include social utility. In its modern conception it is defined in terms of social progress. But as a perfect society cannot be considered apart from individual welfare, of what value is utility of any sort unless it increases the happiness of the individual and gives greater freedom of active service? If the utility theory is to be accepted, therefore, it must be considered as both individual and social.

Nature of Happiness. — If by the word happiness we mean the happiness of individuals that compose society, then the term, considered in its nobler sense of social adjustment, must rise above mere pleasure, as defined in the doctrine of hedonism. But since the keenest enjoyment of life must be one of the accompaniments of a perfect society, happiness which is based on contentment alone is not the true aim of society; for many of the non-progressive peoples who have scarcely entered the pale of civilization are far more contented with their lot than are the cultured

races who have the very highest degree of social development. If, however, in the idea of happiness we include a multiplicity of desires for a higher life and the means of satisfying them, we have an approximately correct expression of the aim of society.

Are the Aims of Society Fixed and Unchangeable? — In the discussion of social aims, we can find no fixed ideals of social life or structure to which we may conform. Society never becomes entirely conventionalized nor wholly stabilized; its growth is never completed. Since, therefore, so long as men will utilize the forces at hand, society will perpetually reproduce itself, the conscious aims of society change. If there is an equilibrium of social forces, if society is balanced in all of its parts, if the social organs are well developed and well articulated so as to afford each individual the greatest freedom and at the same time the largest opportunity possible, and if the whole is moving steadily toward more harmonious conditions, society is progressive. And this normal progress is all we can hope for or be sure of, and indeed, all that we really desire. Although it sometimes appears as if society has developed as the result of the play of fluid forces, history reveals that increasingly conscious purpose has modified its growth. There are many forces, it is true, which are seemingly more or less constant. But we must always be prepared for the shifting of these forces; for the bringing forth of new standards of law, government, morality, religion, and, indeed, life; and for society's constant adaptation to these various ideals or standards. Moreover, one of the most potent of these forces is the individual with initiative, who may turn the stream of social development into entirely new channels in a lifetime. When the keen-witted began to form ideals of social development, when these ideals became operative in the minds of enough forceful individuals, society became disturbed and new adjustments were made rapidly in the development of social life.

On the other hand, careful observation has taught us that often the ideals were the outgrowth of other changes which have come about in one or more of the various elements of the entire culture of a people. If the economic life changes, as in the Industrial

Revolution in England, maladjustments in many other phases of life appear. If conquest occurs with the imposition of one culture upon another, readjustments have to be made. The shoe pinches somewhere. Then new ideals of social arrangements appear as attempts of thoughtful minds to suggest ways in which the maladjustments consequent upon these changes may be remedied.

Changing Ideals of Society. — Therefore, while certain fundamental ideals of organized society remain the same in all ages, the immediate aims have varied greatly. There are usually one or more immediate, dominant ideals which serve as factors of control. In the United States the ideal of liberty has had a greater influence than any other factor in shaping the general character of society. How to realize this ideal was uncertain, hence social development in this country has been an irregular movement with relatively less fixity of tradition than in many older civilizations. Liberty with restraint as an ideal and jealousy of rights with fear of losing them have caused a plethora of conflicting and restrictive legislation in which authority threatens to dominate liberty.

In China and Japan, the family ideal; among the Hebrews, the ideal of the Kingdom of God; in Athens, individual independence; in Sparta, communism; in Rome, law and government; in the early Christian Church, reward after death; in feudal times, the control of land; in the rise of Monarchy, the divine right to rule, are illustrations of the dominant factors of control in different periods. Underlying all these are the fundamental impulses or drives of hunger, sex, and individual and group safety. The impact of these drives and ideals, always mixed up together, now one dominating, now another, have motivated methods of social control. To satisfy these ideals and urges men have devised various ways in which to bring individuals into conformity to the social aims thus originated.

The Immediate Social Aim. — Society's aims change with its development. Growing, as it did, out of primitive man's instinctive feeling, or conscious perception that association aided in his individual survival, it was society's early aim to survive as against competing groups. That aim remains dominant even

yet; the immediate aim of every society is survival. Who has ever heard of a state, a church, or a political party, which, after saying to itself, "Now my work is done; the purpose for which I was organized can be better served by my death than by my continuance," then proceeded to put itself out of existence?

But the determination of a society to survive as an organization depends for its strength upon how fully its component members believe that its continuance insures their welfare. This feeling, while of primary importance, is greatly strengthened by many others, which, having their origin in love of home, familiar institutions, customs, and ideals, it is to society's interest carefully to foster. Such, for example, is the tender sentiment for "the fatherland," for "the land of the free and the home of the brave." Society's first incentive, then, for providing for survival is the desire among its members for the undisturbed enjoyment of their particular mode of life, customs, ideals, and the realization of their national and individual ideals.

From the more strictly functional point of view, however, the purpose of society is to provide the objective conditions under which the individual may secure the most adequate self-expression — that is, to insure for him his most perfect adjustment to his social environment. These conditions Giddings has called the "proximate ends" of society. They include provisions, by the political system, for the security of life and property; they include provisions for insuring to each member equal political rights, equal justice before the law, equal economic opportunities, and similar cultural advantages.[2]

The Ultimate Aim of Society. — But the securing of these objective social conditions is not, after all, the ultimate social aim. The ultimate aim of society is the creation of social personality. Says Giddings: "In thus creating personality, society converts mere evolution into progress. Evolution is integration and differentiation; it is correlation and coördination; it is not necessarily a betterment of conscious existence. Evolution is also progress when each unit of the integrated mass or group be-

[2] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1900, pp. 356–360; *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, New York, 1922, p. 119.

comes an end as well as a means." [3] This social personality enables an individual to fit in perfectly with the objective conditions of existence, enables him to coöperate with others in so molding the social structure that the self-realization of each is assured. Society, therefore, gives the individual the guardianship of government. It does not aim, of course, to make all individuals equal; but it does aim, as far as the establishment of social order will permit, to give the same opportunity to all. Society may, indeed, go a step farther. It may furnish the individual with the means for self-improvement; it may offer him help and encouragement in his own redemption. Under such circumstances, society will not only promote justice among men; but by providing means for education and various forms of coöperative help, it will enable the individual to reach a high state of culture.

Nor must society neglect man's development through association. It is difficult to estimate the extent to which man draws his culture or development from others. His mental capacity, his material prosperity, his religion and his art, come largely from association. Thus while we are working to build up the individual by giving him room for action, we must not forget that we are also providing for his increased development by promoting various social activities.

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[3] Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 522, 523, 526–528; see also Giddings, *Sociology*, New York, 1909, pp. 42, 43.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Point out the aims of the following societies in your community: a church, a social club, a commercial club, a literary circle, a debating society, a political party. Point out the aims of the United States government.

2. Show how a government which did not help to increase the wealth of its citizens would be justly looked upon as inefficient.

3. Under what circumstances might its policies, while not increasing the wealth of the nation, yet increase the general welfare of society?

4. Suppose a society, like that of these United States, should pursue a policy which would deny to the poor the opportunities that it accords to the rich. Would its aim be the general welfare? Why? Suppose that it denied to the rich man the same opportunity to exercise his abilities that it affords to the poor man. Would it be advancing the general welfare? Why?

5. Show why our ideals of what a society should be lead us to oppose "graft" in government.

6. Indicate how the spending of such vast amounts of money on education contributes to the welfare of society.

7. What social aim is satisfied by public playgrounds and social centers?

8. Carefully examine the government of your village or city and indicate as clearly as possible just what social aims it is trying to realize.

9. Why, since they afford pleasure to some people, do gambling and vice not accord with the aims of society?

10. Cite two instances that show how social ideals rather than economic interests or physical environment dominate social development. (See the reference to Ellwood.)

11. How may the aim of a small group to create wealth by exploitation effect the larger aims of society of which it is a part?

12. How are the aims of society affected by change in fashions, by change in moral standards?

CHAPTER XXV

IDEALS OF GOVERNMENT

An Attempt to Realize a Perfect Social State through Government.—Many attempts have been made, through the machinery of practical government, to realize ideal social states. Hammurabi's Code reveals such an attempt. Most familiar to us, of those of antiquity, is the Jewish ideal commonwealth, in which lawgivers and priests sought to secure justice and equal rights for all members of the community, not only by establishing social control in public affairs, but by developing a code of laws which should severely regulate the moral life and the social life, to the very minutest details. It was, indeed, a theocratic commonwealth, with religion, politics, and social usage all combined in one system. While this ideal commonwealth, as set forth with special fullness in the later Jewish codes, was far in advance of what was actually realized by the Jews, because the Jewish people were dispersed and the dream of an ideal commonwealth was not realized, yet many of the principles set forth in these writings have had great influence upon legislation among all peoples where the Bible has been taken seriously. Especially good examples of this influence are Calvin's government of Geneva, Switzerland, and some of the legislation of the English Commonwealth of Cromwell.

The Athenian democracy represents another great attempt to institute justice through practical government. It sought to regulate all the political affairs of the community by laws instituted in the interests of the people. It is true that it was, to a certain extent, a government of classes; for the government did not include all the people. Nevertheless, the development of the civic state, with the power of the senate and with the privilege of the people to take part in the government, even if those privileges were comparatively limited, brought forth a new era in the develop-

ment of politics. To establish the principle that every free man had a right to be heard was a long way from the Oriental monarchy, where such rights were denied, except as it suited the whim of the Oriental prince. This declaration of human rights has since found its way into nearly all forms of government.

Again, the Roman Republic, based upon a control almost imperial in its nature, sought to work out the problem of harmony between the different grades of people, giving to all a fair representation in the government. The whole system failed, however, because of the ruling power of the senate, which through its aristocratic influence, sought to domineer over the so-called lower classes. Thus, while the Republic developed law, and familiarized men with the rights of government, it remained for the Empire to universalize this system of recognition of the individual wherever he was under the dominion of the imperial power. But just as the democracy had to give way before imperialism, so was imperialism finally overthrown; and the effort to establish the political and social rights of man came to naught.

So, too, the Swiss Federation, the United Netherlands, and the United States have attempted to work out ideal systems of government founded on freedom and equal rights. And the French nation, struggling for a century under the blighting influences of imperialism, injustice, and anarchy, finally, under the "third republic," managed, in a measure, to establish the rights of men. Judged by the way in which these schemes have overcome the definite evils against which they were constructive protests, they succeeded. The tyranny of the despot was displaced by popular control. However, the new vantage point gained by these political changes only revealed new evils in society and led men to formulate new aims — industrial liberty, the abolition of slavery, the enfranchisement of women, and social justice.

Ideals of Philosophers. — Besides these practical attempts to build up government through the influence of lawgivers, politicians, and statesmen, there have been attempts of philosophers, who, evincing a lack of faith in the power of the existing government to reform social evils, have set forth ideal systems of govern-

ment. The first great monument of this kind was Plato's *Republic*. It varied widely from the actual condition of the republic of Athens of his time; as in the case of all other utopias, it was written in a period of social unrest. The philosopher goes into details as to the regulation of all social and family relationships, and defines minutely the duties and privileges of all individuals who, in the scheme, are made subservient to the state. In his ideal society there were to be three groups of people: (1) the guardians, or rulers; (2) the soldiers or auxiliaries; and (3) the industrial and agricultural workers. Thus, there is specialization of function between the groups, but there is also specialization within each group. Each individual must be provided the opportunity to play his part in the whole process. Not all were to be educated; only those who were thought capable of becoming the rulers or guardians. They were the most generously endowed by nature. The philosophers thus were to be kings. He proposed a system of education and testing for these guardians the purpose of which was to ascertain whether they held of the utmost importance the highest interest of the state. They should have no property, but were to be paid a salary by the state, so that they will give undivided attention to the welfare of society. These guardians were to study all the children so as to find those who by nature are endowed with unusual ability so that they can be trained to become guardians, and so that each individual may be placed in the vocation for which his natural abilities fit him. The defective children on the other hand were to be put to death. Plato was a thoroughgoing negative eugenist. However, he was also a positive eugenist, for the guardians were to supervise marriages and only those were to be allowed which from the eugenic point of view seemed to warrant high-grade children.

Moreover, the guardians were to supervise economic affairs to the end that there should be neither wealth nor poverty. Each person was to be allowed a minimum amount of property. Any amount above the maximum is taken by the state in taxes. Education is depended upon to make men satisfied with the amount of wealth allowed.

The guardians also were censors of the people's morals.

Children were to be protected from indecent sights and sounds, reading matter and art were to be rigorously censored by the guardians. Crime was to be punished for the sake of reforming the criminal and for the protection of society. Education was to be freely available but not compulsory, and was to be supervised by the guardians. It was to be not a process of acquisition of knowledge but of development of the individual for social purposes.

Plato contemplated a state in which there were only between 5000 and 6000 families. His plans, therefore, are hardly adapted to a city of millions, to say nothing of a nation of a hundred millions. However, many of the ideals he proposed in his ideal "republic" are worthy of thought; some of them we are trying out to-day. But while Plato, apparently, thoroughly believed in the ideas set forth in his *Republic,* he probably had no hope that such a government would be instituted in his own time — perhaps none that it ever would. It is, in fact, this very idealism of Plato which is severely criticized by Aristotle, who, in his *Politics,* advances a theory of government founded upon the practices of the best governments that history had up to that time known.[1]

Then there are certain of the Old Testament Prophets who set forth, in considerable detail, their dreams of the ideal social state. All through the denunciations of Amos runs an ideal which involves social justice to the poor and helpless classes;[2] and Isaiah, in his statesmanlike duties of counseling the King of Judah and his task of upbraiding the rulers of his time, finds opportunity to set forth changes which, in his opinion, would make Judah and Jerusalem an ideal community under the special favor of God.[3] Yet while many others of these Hebrew counselors of the nation suggested changes which would secure the favor of Jehovah, the condition *sine qua non* of national life, it remained for Ezekiel and the Post-Exilic prophets and writers, no longer embarrassed by an actually existing Hebrew state, to set forth in detail their ideals of a state to be based upon theocratic principles.[4]

[1] See Loos, *Studies in the Politics of Aristotle and the Republic of Plato,* Iowa City, 1899.

[2] Am. 2 : 6–12; 5 : 7, 10–13.

[3] Isa. 28 : 14–22; 32 : 1–8.

[4] See especially Isa., Chaps. 40–66; Zeph. 3 : 8–20; Ezek., Chaps. 37–48.

Scattered all through Ezekiel's prophecy are many passages outlining his ideas of the nature of the restored Hebrew state; and in chapters thirty-seven to forty-eight he presents a unified picture of the whole. Moreover, from the book of Daniel to the Revelation, the apocalyptists simply reveled in pictures of the Kingdom of God to be realized here on earth.[5]

But besides Plato and the reformers of both the Old and the New Testament, there are writers from the last years of the Roman Empire, from the Middle Ages, and from the early modern period, who have advanced theories and plans of government. Among these are St. Augustine, with his *City of God;* Campanella, with his *City of the Sun;* Thomas More, with his *Utopia;* Bacon, with his *Atlantis;* and in more modern times Cabet, with his *Icaria,* and Bellamy, with his *Looking Backward.* Each of these pictured a perfect government where human wants ceased to be troublesome, and where harmony, happiness, justice, and love prevailed. If these utopias accomplished nothing more, they at least pointed out, by way of contrast, the evils of existing governments.

The Advocates of Socialistic Theories. — Of a slightly different character were the ideals of certain French communists and socialists of the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth centuries. Babœuf and his followers desired to abolish private property and to establish equality and fraternity by organizing a state of pure communism; and for this purpose they organized, in 1796, a band of equals, who attempted to overthrow the state. Maintaining that the aim of society was the happiness of all, and that happiness depended on equality, they emphasized governmental ideals chiefly as a means for securing absolute economic equality.

Cabet, while he believed in pure communism, thought that the transition should be gradual, that people, by organizing communistic societies at will, could thus slowly transform the whole community into a fraternity. He was perhaps the first and greatest communist of France and Icaria the most ideal community ever proposed. Saint-Simon, on the other hand, was a socialist who held that the natural inequality between men

[5] Zech., Chaps. 1–6; Dan., Chaps. 7–12; Rev., Chaps. 11, 21 : 1–22 : 5.

should be the basis of association. Rejecting the idea of the community of goods, he advocated that all should be rewarded according to their capacity and that this capacity should be estimated according to works. And Fourier, though holding doctrines similar to those of Saint-Simon, considered the benefit of humanity the highest aim of each individual. Among other things there were, according to his theory, certain natural rights belonging to each individual, which entitled him to the protection and care of the whole community.

Modern Socialism. — As compared with the earlier theories, modern socialism has more particular reference to economic production and distribution. Karl Marx, a social democrat and one of the earlier advocates of socialistic production, insisted on the political organization of industry. He emphasized the great service of labor in production and maintained that because of the excessive demands of capital, labor did not receive a fair share of the product. Social democracy, of which Marx may be called the founder, includes, among other theories, the collective ownership of land and capital, the abolition of competitive industry, and, consequently, the social production of wealth. And while Karl Marx was advocating social democracy in Germany, Louis Blanc was founding state socialism in France. Opposing equality, he set forth a system of distributive justice, by which, after each had labored according to his abilities, he was to receive a reward in proportion, not to capacity or product, but to his need.

Modern so-called scientific socialism, while in its results at least it may involve many of the early doctrines, centers on collective ownership of the agents of production, and associate management of industry. It is opposed to the competitive system and private ownership of the means of production; and although different exponents of the theory vary as to the extent to which it should be carried and the manner of its application, its objective is distribution of income. Dr. Ely's excellent definition expresses the general spirit of "scientific" socialism: "Socialism is that contemplated system of industrial society which proposes the abolition of private property, in the great material instruments of production, and the substitution therefor of collective property; and

advocates the collective management of production, together with the distribution of social income by society, and private property in the larger proportion of this social income." [6]

Modern socialism has developed many varieties. In a broad way these varieties may be divided into three classes: (1) those which are essentially Marxian in that they hold that the natural evolution of a capitalistic society leads to socialism without revolution; (2) those who believe that the evolutionary processes should be aided by the revolution of the proletariat; and (3) the British Socialists, once called Fabian Socialists, because they did not believe in revolution as a method, but held that the public should take over private enterprises one by one, first in the municipalities, then in the nation. The Labor Party in Great Britain has absorbed these socialists, and twice recently has been in power in that country. Russian sovietism is an example of Marxian socialism by revolution. It represents domination by the proletariat.

At the present time, probably due to the grave economic and social unrest consequent upon the World War, socialism is more aggressive than ever. It overwhelmed the Czarist régime in Russia, for a time was in charge of the government of Austria, threatened to swallow Italy, actually took charge in Germany, has been twice in power in Great Britain, threatened China, and in many other countries is an important political power. In many countries many of the private enterprises are being taken over by the government, and run supposedly in the interest of all the people instead of for private profit.

Modern Socialistic Experiments. — Various groups of people have attempted to carry out experiments in government for the benefit of human society; and there have been many individuals who have organized themselves into societies for the propagation of socialistic doctrines. These societies have been of three different kinds: anarchistic, socialistic, and communistic. The theoretical anarchist, believing that modern government is a burden, maintains that, if it could be dissolved, men and women would form themselves into small groups which would conserve

[6] *Socialism and Social Reform*, p. 19

their interests by spontaneous social order. So far as discontent with present systems of government is concerned and with modern forms of social order, the anarchist's point of view is really the same as that of the socialist; but anarchism and socialism are widely different in their plans for the reorganization of society. While the anarchists hold that there is too much government and that it should be reduced to a minimum, the socialists insist that government could and should be greatly extended so as to cover all of the modern industrial operations. Thus, while the one party lays special stress on political ideals, the other has for its principal ideal a system of artificial economic distribution by which each receives according to his ability or, as in some instances, according to his need.

Then there are the communistic societies, all representing a species of socialism. They hold all property in common and advocate the absolute equality of all members of the community, so far as the rights of property and social life are concerned. Many of these societies have attempted practical experiments in government, such as the "Oneida Communists" of New York, the "Amana Society" and the "New Icaria" of Iowa, and the several Bellamy societies of California. These experiments have been of such a varied nature, extending from pure communism to pure industrial coöperation, that it is quite impossible to classify them, no two of them being exactly alike. The nearest that we can approach to a classification would be a division into these three: first, those whose chief principle was reward according to ability or service rendered; second, those which required service according to ability and gave rewards according to need; and finally, those that had industrial coöperation for their chief aim. But because, in part, of the impracticability of their plans, and, in part, because the people who have gone into them have been lacking in coöperative qualities, nearly all of these experiments have failed. Interest in them has given way to interest in State socialism just described.

There is still another group and one that belongs in a class by itself. The people of this group have advocated what is known as Christian socialism, by which they meant the making over of

the whole political and industrial systems and the general social system into a unified society, based upon the teachings of Christ. No particular experiments have been tried on this basis, though the propaganda has existed since the time of F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley. This too has failed to appeal to large numbers.

The coöperative communities have established two forms of coöperation. The one, known as distributive coöperation, has reference to the exchange and distribution of goods; and the other, called productive coöperation, looks after their production. Many of these coöperative communities have failed; but a few have succeeded. It took a long time to learn the coöperative art; and until it was learned, and until a group of coöperative people could be brought together, all such experiments proved failures. In England, distributive coöperation has now become a strong movement. It was successfully inaugurated by the Rochdale Pioneers in the year 1844; and there are, at present, hundreds of societies which do a large coöperative business. Productive coöperation, by far the more difficult to establish of the two, was begun on a small scale in England in about 1850; it has now reached quite extensive proportions and has become one of the solid institutions of the nation. The numerous and successful coöperative marketing associations for farm and dairy products in Denmark are types of distributive coöperation, as are the Grange and Farmers' Alliance in America, the California Fruit Growers' Association, and in the Middle West of the United States the more recent organizations for coöperative marketing of such products as cheese and potatoes. On the other hand, the coöperative companies of Minneapolis and the coöperative creameries and cheese factories in some of the dairy sections of the United States are good examples of productive coöperation. Finally, the system of profit sharing, so well illustrated for a time in the management of the Pillsbury Mills of Minneapolis, the Procter and Gamble Company of Cincinnati, the N. O. Nelson Company of St. Louis, and the Cash Register Company of Dayton, Ohio, and many other concerns, an attempt to promote a community of interests between employer and employee and bring about new social conditions of the laboring class, has come to be looked upon by

organized labor as a delusion and a snare. The labor unions in this and other countries, however, are working towards sharing in the control of labor conditions through agreements with the managers.

The Labor Movement and Political Idealism. — One cannot particularize in a paragraph as to the political ideals of trade unionism. In some countries the labor movement has been political in its aims and methods, while in others it has been non-political. In the same country at one time it has used political methods to gain its ends, and at another time it has eschewed such methods. In general, however, it may be said that the labor movement has never used political means, except to obtain certain definite economic and social ends; and then not by means of political organization within the ranks of labor. In other words, labor leaders have not been political idealists. When they have resorted to politics it has been for the same reason that in other circumstances they have resorted to class organization and have employed the strike and the boycott, viz., to secure better working conditions and higher wages. There has never been a labor party in the United States.

The British trade unions have employed political methods much more widely and have organized a political party. While there have been attempts by certain elements in the American unions to adopt political programs, for example, in their early history in this country a program for free schools and other measures of social welfare,[7] on the whole they have depended on action independent of politics to secure their ends. Says Dr. Perlman: "The limited potentialities of labor legislation together with the apparent hopelessness of labor party politics compelled the American labor movement to develop a sort of non-partisan political action with limited objectives thoroughly characteristic of American conditions."

Moreover, American labor has not been revolutionary, as it has been in Russia, and to a less extent in certain other countries. Summarizing the history of unionism in the United States Perl-

[7] Perlman, S., *History of Trade Unionism in the United States*, New York, 1922, pp. 14, 15.

man says: "Withal, then, trade unionism despite an occasional revolutionary facet and despite a revolutionary clamor especially on its fringes, is a conservative social force. . . . In fact the gains of trade unionism are to the worker on a par with private property to its owner." [8]

Individualism versus Socialism. — Individualism in politics, borrowed, for the most part, from the English system, has been so very strong in America that any innovation looking toward state control of industries or, indeed, toward a community of interests in any special way, has not been received with great favor. Always jealous of their individual liberty, the people have frequently objected to having their industrial affairs controlled by laws which would have been to their real and lasting benefit. As a matter of fact, the radical theories advanced by socialists have so threatened the individualistic system that people have been overcautious about the regulation of industries. We have seen, nevertheless, the gradual enlargement of the powers of the state in, for example, the management of railways, through the state railway commissions and the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission, and in the control of other great corporate industries by state industrial commissions. Thus, while the socialistic state is a long way off and probably will never be, in practice, what it is in theory, community of interests seems to be better understood and more desired by all classes of people than it ever was in the past; and the state now does infinitely more for the individual than at any previous period. Yet while the state is continually establishing general laws to control industries and to improve the general welfare of the community, the individual capitalist and manager grumbles at the destruction of individual liberty while the laborer complains that the state does too little for the protection of his class. Never before have we seen such public activity on behalf of the individual citizen. The food he eats, the milk he buys, the clothing he wears, are all carefully inspected to see that he gets only those products which have not been exposed to contamination by disease. The factories in which he works, the houses where he dwells, even the condition of his

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 111, 289, 303.

garbage can, are looked after in the interest of his health and efficiency. And not only is the schooling of his children provided for by a special board, but at public expense opportunities for his recreation are offered to him. These, however, are functions of regulation, chiefly under the police power of the state, rather than functions of economic production.

Ideals of Equality. — One of the important influences in modern social life has been the ideal of equality advanced by certain theorists. The Christian church has, with its doctrine of brotherhood, set forth this ideal; but it was politically expressed by the French and English political philosophers of the eighteenth century and those influenced by them. In the last century and a half the ideal has been in process of refinement. The ideal of equality to-day means not equality in native ability, but in opportunity. When equal opportunity is secured to every one to the resources, both natural and social, of a country, social justice is established. And the sooner this becomes the aim of society, the greater the progress that will be made; for such an ideal, we are sure, can be approximated in government. Above all is the extension of justice to industrial and social relations one of the pressing problems of modern society.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Read the reference to Ezekiel and then read More's *Utopia*. Write out your impressions of the difference between the two and the similarities.

2. As revealed in the Federal Constitution, what were the ideals which the fathers held for the government of the United States when the nation was founded?

3. How do these ideals differ from the ideals held by the English government at that time?

4. Show in what respects the ideals of government held by the framers of our Constitution have changed during the interval between 1786 and the present.

5. How has the agitation for industrial democracy affected governmental ideals in this country?

6. What ideal is back of the demand for Old Age Pensions, for Industrial Insurance? What ideals prompt the demand for the curbing of trusts, the regulation of railroads, the care of children, and the democratization of education?

7. Would a Socialistic government prevent the development of social classes? would it prevent the exploitation of the many by the few?

8. If the Federal Government of the United States were to own and control the hydro-electric power and distribute it equally among the citizens would that be a socialistic venture?

9. Have ideals of democracy in the United States changed in the last seventy-five years?

CHAPTER XXVI

CONTROL BY FORCE

The Ideal of Force in Government. — The authority of government is so well recognized and so ever present that it is common to accept it as the ideal of social order, or at least, as a force from which there is no escape and no appeal. Occasionally, it is true, the voice of the anarchist cries out against it and offers to substitute a new system of social order. To the average citizen, however, it is but natural that force should seem to be the essence of government and the cause of social order; for every law has its penalty, every government has its standing army, and every community its police. Even in our best forms of democracy, the final appeal of government is to force. And in the organization of campaigns and the control of government, indeed, the leaders of political parties rely upon coercion rather more than on coöperation — a coercion not much better at times than brigandage.

But while force is an essential element of government, it is not an ideal method of social control. The authority and power to enforce order must rest somewhere, or government is a failure; but the state cannot long exist when based upon force alone. The highest type of government brings the military and police into requisition as little as possible; for government is, after all, but a temporary restraint upon the actions of individuals until the real elements of social order can assert themselves. Hence it is that the law comes in direct contact with only a few, and the police force apprehends but a small number of the offenders of justice.

Origin of Control by Force. — The idea of control by force has an historic origin; for, in primitive society, where natural justice prevailed, the battle was always to the strong. Might made right; and that individual survived and succeeded who could

adjust his own affairs, defend himself and property, or, indeed, take the offensive to enlarge his personal power or his property rights. Naturally, he who could not, perished or became subordinate to him who possessed the greater force. And what was true of individuals was also true of tribes. Then, as social life became more complex, this power to survive passed into the power to rule. People became divided into those who governed and those who submitted to their domination, those who had obtained the superior position continuing to control by force those whom they had subdued in war, by strategy, or through necessity. As "war is the last argument of kings" so force should be the last argument of a stable group for social control. The use of force rather than of persuasion, moral pressure and education came into existence in human society only after war had resulted in the imposition of one group with its culture pattern upon another group with a different pattern. A crisis was produced in that case which could not wait upon the slower methods. Adjustments had to be made at once. Positive law then developed rapidly and conformity to legal adjustments was compelled by force or the fear of force.

In modern times in addition to war, the peaceful migration of vast numbers of alien peoples into lands occupied by people of another culture, the invention of new machinery with its influence on economic organization, the discovery of new knowledge and the consequent undermining of old customs and beliefs, and the changes consequent on the shifting of the relative proportions of population to natural resources and industrial organization have given rise to such crises in social relationships as to require drastic legislation backed by forceful authority. Labor legislation, health laws, and the thousand and one regulations imposed on us by government are evidences of our rapidly changing civilization. We cannot wait on the methods employed in a stable society.

Ancient Leadership. — Through physical vigor, unusual will power, or extraordinary resourcefulness, the individual became a leader. Tradition, prestige, and superstition increased his influence; religion and war were his servants. Gradually adding to his power, and assuming, in war, in the council, or in religious ceremony, to represent the interests of the tribe or clan, he

became king in fact before he was made so by custom or law. But while leading the people in the interests of the tribe, he was really creating a community of subjects. Not able to keep up a display of force and manage all the affairs of the tribal state himself, he associated with him, by making it to their interest to assist him, a large number of people who were interested in government and who worked together with him for the control of the tribe or nation. Thus, although theoretically the people assumed the right to choose their leader and king, the king practically arranged to have himself chosen.

The Rise of the Governing Class. — The step from feudal rule, founded on leadership and service, to aristocratic rule, founded on class distinction, was taken when conquerors imposed their will upon a conquered people. From the conquerors arose a governing class, known as an aristocracy, a class distinctly separate from the great mass of the people. As the ruling class, they were supposed to be better and nobler than others; and their claim to this supposed superiority and nobility they based on force. Having its origin in feudalism, where superior ability and native shrewdness counted for everything, this governing class established its authority by conquest, usually in some other region; and in every succeeding form of monarchy, either absolute or constitutional, such a governing class has continued to exist. After relations had become settled, however, there has been a development of other means of social order, such as custom, religion, justice, intelligence, industrial organization, altruism, freedom of speech, and freedom of meeting; thus control by force has become less essential, and the governing class more useless. But out of all the surviving nations, a few were at an early period so impregnated with imperialism and so dominated by the governing class as to be unable, even now, to rid themselves of the ancient ideals. It is true enough that dukes and grand dukes were once necessary to the king and of service to the people; but in the natural process of evolution a highly socialized and closely integrated society tends to eliminate archaic forms. For people do not exist for the sake of a governing class, nor yet for the government.

Why So Much Appeal to Force in Modern Society? — In modern society we have an unprecedented number of laws regulating men's actions. Why? There has been little conquest of a people by another. True. However, since the discovery of America, and especially since the Industrial Revolution in England beginning at the close of the eighteenth century, there have been such profound and rapid changes in the economic life and in the social customs, beliefs, and conduct patterns, such great changes in world-outlook and fundamental conceptions as to the nature of the world, such rapid changes of population and such mixture of people with different cultures, that the old sanctions of conduct are unable to control the social relations.

As a result we have on our statute books thousands of laws many of which interfere with the normal movements of society, and many more that are absolutely worthless. Investigation shows that we have about 2,400,000 laws in the United States of which 400,000 are obsolete and valueless, indeed, they are a hindrance to normal social control. The laws that seek to control specific normal action are the most easily evaded and hence the most difficult to enforce, largely because the assumption that the individual has an inherent right to determine for himself what is right and wrong. Authority properly administered develops habits and traditions of law observance, until the changing attitude of public opinion determines that such laws are unjust, then they fall into contempt. Fortunate if instead of disobeying such laws, the will of the people should be exerted to hasten their repeal, or modification to fit the needs of social order.

The Idea of Control in a Democracy. — Even in a pure democracy this element of force appears, at certain times, to control the public. However, in a democracy control by force is resorted to only to preserve social order, while the main reliance is upon ideas, ideals, common customs, and influential individuals. And in the nature of things, there must be some control by force for, because of a diversity of opinions and prejudices, otherwise our democracy would not always be able to carry out successfully the general will of the people. Indeed, so far as governmental mechanism is concerned, enlightened absolutism seems the surest

and most economical form of government; its plans to govern for the public it carries out with a will and authority which secure speedy results. Most democratic governments are, in contrast, wasteful governments. There is, in the first place, an immeasurable loss of power in the attempt to give every man a hearing or a part in the government. And, too, if we but turn our attention to the dilatory methods, the short-sighted business policies, of the common council of a city government, we are forced to admit that the democratic form of government has its drawbacks. Not only city councils, however, but even legislatures only too frequently fall short of doing what is for the advancement of the community. Above all, the people themselves are frequently so short-sighted that they do not know what is best for them; hence they are as liable to take the advice of a demagogue as of a statesman.

But most of the difficulties of self-government arise from imperfect socialization. Along with force must go education and the gradual building up of new customs and traditions as means of social control. Government is a great art which but few have learned well. Since successive groups of individuals take their turn at being law-makers, our legislative bodies are but schools for the practice of the untutored; and because any one may aspire to office and take his place as an administrative official, if he can but get the votes or receive the appointment, it frequently occurs that many are elected who are ill prepared for civil service. Yet, after all, the safeguard of self-government is the perpetual opportunity of the people to choose their own rulers and officers. The judgment of the people is seen, in the main, to be correct. And if through lack of care they have an imperfect and expensive government, they have, since the control rests ultimately with them, only themselves to censure for the burdens. To make social control what it should be, therefore, universal intelligence and a developed capacity for self-government should obtain.

The Social Will of Democracy. — When once aroused and in full action, the will of democracy is as intolerant and absolute as the power of the monarch. Its redeeming quality is that, although it acts intermittently and represents a series of mistakes, these are followed by corrections which point toward a

steady, if slow, progress. Its real success, therefore, depends upon educating the great majority of the people into an independent moral integrity which will enable them to live above the law. And when people have attained to this attitude, there is a species of social control which cannot be destroyed by the defects of governmental machinery nor the machinations of all of the demagogues, nor yet by the " hungry incapacity " of office seekers.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Read Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 357–359, and point out the difference between the power to compel obedience and the power to command obedience.

2. What survivals of control by force exist to-day in our government?

3. What proportion of men conform to a course of conduct conducive to the social welfare, from a fear of the force of the state?

4. In the origin of social control, what part does the use of force play?

5. Read Green's *Short History of the English People*, Chap. II, Sec. V, and note what part force played in the origin of Norman control in England.

6. Show how, following William's conquest, a governing class grew up in England.

7. Give illustrations, from the history of the United States, of control by force.

8. Why is there need for forceful control in a democracy?

9. Is there any social justification for the employment of troops in an industrial dispute, like that in Chicago in 1893, or in Colorado in 1913–1914?

10. Show how the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has invoked the use of force in moral action.

11. Show how increased dependence upon law has lessened individual responsibility in social control.

12. Has there been a revival of taboo in recent times as a means of social control?

13. To what extent do labor organizations attempt to control industry by authority?

14. How do great corporations attempt to control industrial society?

15. What changes in the mutual attitude of European nations, regarding the control by force, since the Great War?

16. Has there been a recent increase in "imperialism," in the United States government? Why?

CHAPTER XXVII

THE EDUCATIONAL METHOD

Force a Temporary Check on Insubordination. — Inasmuch as social order has been developed by slow degrees, control by force has, at times, been necessary as a temporary check upon insubordination; but as a crisis in a society passes it tends to be replaced by other agencies. Gradually the idea has grown that other forms of control are cheaper and more easily administered; and so other methods have followed. As soon as a certain degree of social order is secured by force, the educational method supplants force in securing social adjustment.

Self-Government Demands Cultural Unity. — We hear a great deal about the natural rights of self-government. Such discussion arises only where there is maladjustment in social relations. All so-called natural rights must, after all, yield to the social choices of the community; for no human being has the right to engage in practices detrimental either to himself or to others. Unfortunate, therefore, is the society that chooses popular government when its citizens have not a sufficient degree of cultural unity to make social control possible without force. As history shows us, every people that has succeeded in governing itself has had a rather high degree of cultural unity, and each group that has failed may, in large part, trace the cause of such failure to the lack of cultural cohesion of its people. As a matter of fact, where a few citizens are on a different cultural level either because of intelligence, wealth, customs or traditions, and are strong, while the great mass occupies a different cultural, the conditions fit an oligarchy rather than a democracy; and if such conditions obtain for long, the many will be forced to yield to the few. When, therefore, the rulers of a people are sufficiently wise to consider the best interests of their subjects, a strong central government, founded on force,

yields to its people larger immediate return of privilege and benefit than does any other form.

Accommodation of one cultural group to another through the development of customary and traditional sanctions or through intelligent assimilation of the culture of each by the other into a common culture requires time, as we may observe by noting what happens when an immigrant group settles among a people of a different culture. Our culture in the United States to-day is a compound of some elements of the immigrant peoples and some of the English settlers in this country. It is different from either. Such a process requires time. Educational methods are devised to hasten the process. Along with the formal educational methods march the age-old methods of social pressure, such as prestige, suggestion, ostracism, ridicule, and economic advantage. The educational system is one of the most effective modern inventories to accelerate the process.

Cultural Unity Must Be Improved by the General Education of All Members of Society. — If there is cultural disharmony, there are many publics and various public opinions; and the type of political and social life which develops is then undemocratic. It is, of course, possible for a community to maintain order on a low standard of social responsibility; but only that society will be progressive and self-controlled in which public opinion is permeated with a common social idealism. And notwithstanding that, in any community, public opinion may sometimes be created by a few of the more intelligent, the fact remains that unless the majority has sufficient cultural unity to understand the ideas of the leaders and make them its own, society will be controlled, not by public opinion, but by the opinions of a dominant few. For it is only when the members are in harmonious sympathy with one another that public opinion can receive full expression — a condition involving not only individual capacity, but a common background of ideals, customs, and traditions.

The Improvement of the Type of Government by Education. — As education becomes more general and is devoted to cultivating a conscience on social relations, the critical faculty of individuals, being stimulated, gradually formulates common ideals and aims.

But the development is, indeed, gradual; for even when people have determined what is right, they sometimes find it very difficult so to perfect the machinery of social control as to carry out their ideals. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in human experience that requires more foresight, ability, and harmonious social action than does the creation of new culture patterns for the government of a free people. And it is because the governmental machinery is so imperfect that self-government is both a wasteful and an expensive form of government. Each year our statute books show us new laws, useless or even detrimental to the best interests of the community. Then, while, on the one hand, our courts of justice are slow to reach their decisions, on the other, our rapid industrial development is constantly creating conditions that require new legislation and new judicial decrees. An enlightened absolutism, therefore, which could anticipate the future needs of the people and by its mandates secure them at once, might, at first thought, seem preferable to the present unenlightened control by political demagogue and selfish trickster. But since there is no way of making sure that an absolutism will be socially enlightened, we are forced to choose the patent evils of a democracy rather than fly to others that we know not of; and in a democratic form of government we can at least hope that a general diffusion of knowledge resulting in the formation of common aims and ideals will provide quickly that harmony of culture which enables us to dispense with force as a means of social control.

School Education and Control. — The knowledge children acquire in school and the training they receive in subordination to the school organization is an education in social control. While formal instruction may not provide much instruction in the principles and processes of social life, the school does provide training in social accommodation and produces assimilation of a common culture by many incidental activities. The close association of children of different culture background in the class room, on the playground, in discussion groups, in the open forum, in athletic organizations, in the boy scouts, in the Hi-Y, in debating societies, and other similar groups develops common responses by subjecting

them to similar conditions. The school thus assists in giving the individual his proper relation to the group.

In the transition from school activities in the subsequent life outside of the school there is a loss of continuity in social life. The individual struggle for position absorbs all available energy and few students take much interest in social matters and assume little responsibility for social welfare. As a result youth passes to middle life and with it comes a realization of the lack of knowledge of shifting social relations, and a feeling of being out of touch with life. On this foundation rests the need of adult education.

Adult Education and Social Control. — The great increase in adult education, through university extension, and other less formal methods, shows the extent and importance of after-school education. Education of this nature gives information, study, and reflection and in a measure keeps thousands of citizens in intelligent touch with scientific, social, political, and industrial affairs. But in this there is revealed the general lack of social organization to make use of the knowledge thus acquired. The use of education is a test of its value. A better coöperative activity would insure such social control that crime, disease, and vice would be lessened and obedience to law prevail. Also more good laws would be made and better government without waste and maladministration would be secured.

Attitudes toward Control. — The process of social order thus depends upon the kind and degree of coöperative effort. These in turn depend upon the attitude of society towards law, government, and community activity. Based on their attitudes toward social control people fall into four loosely defined classes.

1. There are those who place entire dependence on the law and its enforcement for the maintenance of social order. To them the law is a fetish. Make it severe. Obey or be punished. They are not much interested in affairs just outside of the law which may be more important than the law itself. Society must be controlled by force. If this extreme attitude were maintained by all it might be well so far as regulatory systems are concerned. Yet many would observe the letter of the law and perform many antisocial, even criminal acts outside of the law. Further,

such an attitude places an impossible task upon the legal machinery.

2. A much larger group are those who, representing the mainstay of social order, believe in liberty with restraint. Wise laws carefully observed because they are right and good for the social well-being are adhered to by this class. But they want liberty of action in obedience to law rather than police force in their execution. They refuse to depend upon law alone for social control, but demand education and the other non-legal methods already discussed as the chief stays of social order.

3. The third group are those who believe in law as an abstraction, or necessity, but are not interested in the sacrifice involved in its practical obedience. They believe in liberty without restraint. They want laws for the other fellow but they are careless about their obedience by themselves. They represent a product of liberty bordering on license and show a margin of loss in social control just as the third class show a margin of gain, or profit. In some respects they are more detrimental to social order than intentional criminals because they are not considered as a marginal class.

4. The so-called criminal classes that exhibit criminal intent or become professional criminals make up the fourth class. It is against this class that the police power, criminal law and criminal courts, prosecutor and judge, the jail and the penitentiary, and millions of money are directed for the protection of society. If the law and government were the great powers in social control that they are generally assumed to be, this class would disappear instead of increasing.

Nothing could better indicate the confusion in public opinion concerning policies to be followed in creating a harmonious society. We are not united on the methods to be employed in reaching such a degree of social unity as is necessary to provide strength and stability in the social structure. Only free discussion on the basis of carefully sifted information can provide the likeness of attitude and that wide conformity to common social purpose necessary for the stability of society, while guaranteeing the largest opportunity to the individual. Plainly the slower process of educational

training in school and in human experience, and the development of individual responsibility resulting from the less formal means of control provide for the ultimate safety of society and for the protection and liberty of individuals.

International Control. — With the growth of international communication the contacts of national and cultural groups have been multiplied. When peoples of different cultures were far apart, interests did not clash and consciousness of difference excited not disgust or hatred, but curiosity. Marco Polo's account of the Indians and Chinese excited no hostility. The Venetians to whom the report came only wondered at people who had such strange customs. International commerce and travel have made the Chinese and Indians our neighbors. Moreover, means of communication have brought them into our midst. They compete with our laborers, they enter our schools, they congest our cities with their slums. On the other hand, we exploit their resources, and their laborers, control their finances, set up factories and compete in their markets with our machine-made products, infringe on their national sovereignty with our imperialistic policies or our demand for extra-territoriality, and outrage their self-esteem by our superior airs. So with other nations. Each competes with others in a newly found world market. Each strives to secure control of sources of raw materials. Moreover, British, German, French, and American culture patterns clash in the narrowing world of international contacts. Hence, from every point nations have discovered differences which touch economic self-interest, national pride, and cultural self-esteem. Such is the world situation which has led to the demand for international control of social, economic, and political relations.

As these problems of international comity arose to consciousness, treaties between individual nations were signed. These treaties often were dictated by desire to combine against some other nation or group of nations. Then the attempt was made to formulate what was called international law. This was based upon precedents established by these treaties and upon customs which had grown up like the customary or common law regulating relations between individuals within a group. However, there

were no tribunals to administer and enforce either treaties or customary international law. That these measures were inadequate to prevent war was shown most strikingly by the World War. A treaty became "a scrap of paper." Long recognized customs broke down before the will to secure by force what could not be obtained by diplomacy. International chaos threatened. Civilization was imperiled.

Out of such a situation grew the attempt to devise some better methods of international control of recalcitrant groups. The League of Nations plan was invented as a new experiment. It depends upon frequent discussion, publicity concerning treaties, constant and patient investigation of conflicting claims, publication of the facts, and a waiting period to give time for cool deliberation. Its sanctions for enforcement of its decisions are the pressure of world opinion, economic boycott, and originally combined armed force. That its success is dependent upon the development of an informed world-wide public opinion is evident. Such an international consensus of opinion and of attitude depends on careful investigation of the facts in any given situation and international dissemination of those facts as well as the international development of peaceful ideals and of mutual accommodation. Whether the machinery exists or can be devised to cultivate "the international mind" still remains an uncertainty. Certainly it is the most stupendous task humanity has ever assumed. Using the term "educational" in a broad sense we may say that it is the world's greatest educational venture.

To What Extent Must All Laws Be Supported by Education or Training? — Through impulsive social action, or the imperfection of legislative machinery, it is possible to place upon the statute books laws which do not receive the support of the people whom they are intended to govern. In the first place, people may not have been prepared for them by sufficient preliminary discussion. Then, too, even after a new law has been enacted, the governmental machinery is often slow to come to its full support. During this period of lukewarm enforcement of the law, however, there is an educative process going on among the citizens; and if the law has sufficient backing from the courts,

the people may possibly become educated to its full and free support. But if the law is obnoxious to a large proportion of the people, a continual agitation will be kept up by the dissatisfied ones until the law is repealed by their representatives. The recently enacted Federal income tax law and our Federal laws on prohibition are cases in point. If, however, these laws can be kept on the statute books long enough for people to adjust their habits to them, probably they can be fairly well enforced. In the meantime public discussion is forming the opinions on which they will stand or fall.

On the other hand, the law is an educator in itself. When once established by the will of any considerable part of the people, it is the expression of an ideal, a program of procedure; and since all people look to it for guidance, it influences them to reach a uniform conclusion of right and wrong. A good example of this educative process of the law was found in the prohibition laws of Iowa and Kansas. Because of certain political circumstances, these laws were passed before a majority of the people really desired them. To keep this statute in force, therefore, it was necessary for temperance workers to be constantly in the field, educating the public against the evils of drink and emphasizing the necessity of restrictive measures. But the fact that the public had, by legislative enactment, committed itself to the prohibitive measure was of great value to the temperance workers in their educative work. In spite of all efforts to the contrary, however, in those communities where the majority did not desire the enforcement of this law, it was violated to some extent. And even in those communities where it was enforced, the constant vigilance of right-thinking people was necessary. Either before or after its enactment, therefore, there must be public discussion of a measure in order to get a majority of the people to assent intelligently to its enforcement.

Specific Training for Social Life. — Thus the state that is to be perpetuated through self-government must see to it that its citizens are well educated; and since a clumsy mode of procedure might destroy the best efforts of popular government, something more than a general intelligence is necessary. Beginning in the

grammar grades and continuing with increased emphasis through the high school and the university, special training should be given in all the subjects that pertain to social order and social control. It is not the place here to state specifically what subjects should be taught and what methods should be used to bring about the desired end. Yet it may be said that everything that leads to an acquaintance with the political and industrial history of the nation, with its social and economic conditions, with its forms of government, its constitutional and common law, and, indeed, with its social relations, should be taught in its public schools.

Yet while the educating process should begin with the children and continue with the youth of the country, the work is not finished with the training of these. And although discussion of public questions and some little dissemination of information is secured through the press and the platform, these agencies are really inadequate to meet the growing need. A realization of this inadequacy has recently led to the fruitful suggestion that the present public forum, furnished by newspapers, books, periodicals, public lectures, and addresses, be supplemented by neighborhood gatherings of adults in the community building, whether the schoolhouse, church, or other building, for the discussion of questions of common interest.[1] The National Community Center Association is promoting such public forums. In thousands of school buildings in cities all over this country such groups are meeting frequently for the discussion of public questions. The idea, moreover, has been taken up by churches, some student organizations in colleges and universities, and by private civic organizations. Cooper Union in New York City, an early forerunner of the present movement, is still functioning.

The plan of a forum for the frank discussion of public questions is certainly most significant and most worthy of an honest endeavor to promote the intelligence and social efficiency of that ninety odd per cent of our people who never get beyond the grammar grades of our schools.

The educational method must be our main reliance in cultivating a changed attitude to meet new situations, in laying the basis

[1] Ward, E. J., *The Social Center*, New York, 1913.

for new customary controls, in forming the emotional basis for cultural patterns adjusted to new situations. Slavery was embedded in our mores for thousands of years. Agitation, propaganda, education — based to be sure upon changed economic and social conditions — brought about an attitude hostile to its perpetuation. The depressed condition of women has been stamped with the approval of custom, tradition, and law since the dawn of history. The educational method has brought about a new set of customs, traditions, and laws. Monarchy was a universal governmental pattern until the Thirteen Colonies established the American Republic. It was the fruitage of the discussion by political philosophers in western Europe for a hundred years before. Let these few illustrations suffice. The set of social tradition, of patterns of organization, of social attitudes, of ideals in social relations can be modified by the educational method. In modern democracies that method, while a slow one, is our ultimate hope.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Show why education, custom, tradition, religion, social suggestion, and all such methods soon displace force in the government of a people.
2. Why is it more essential that the United States, for example, secure intelligence among her population than, let us say, Russia of the Czars?
3. Why cannot self-government long remain unintelligent?
4. If education is for the purpose of securing an intelligent citizenship, what purpose is subserved by education in the classics? Industrial education?

5. State the arguments in favor of thorough preliminary discussion of a measure before it is enacted into law. Against such a procedure.

6. What arguments can be advanced in favor of putting the law on the statute books at the earliest possible date? Against such a method?

7. Cite examples of legislation enacted without much preliminary discussion.

8. Read, in *Municipal Affairs*, Vol. III, pp. 462 seq., and in *The World's Work*, Vol. V, pp. 3339 seq., the account of Dr. Leipziger's work in the public schools of New York City. Estimate the value of such work in a democracy.

9. Enumerate the recent efforts to educate citizens in the United States.

10. What special efforts regarding immigrants?

11. Why do not more citizens vote at elections?

12. What are the advantages of the primary system? What are its defects?

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE IDEAL OF JUSTICE

The Nature of Justice. — Civil justice, through authority expressed in public opinion or law, defines and secures the rights of the individual and imposes upon him obligations to society. Its purpose is to give a fair opportunity to every man in the group. It attempts to determine what belongs to him and what he owes to other individuals and to the community. When a government has established justice, there is nothing important left for it to do which the individual cannot better do for himself. "Justice," says Madison, "is the end of government; it is the end of civil society." [1] Not equality, not fraternity, for perhaps these cannot be secured by government, but justice is the end for which organized government is established. Nor is this idea of justice based upon any natural right or law, but upon the judgment of society. Its psychological basis may be found in that sense of fairness which arises in the mind of an individual when he is brought in contact with others; but its final declaration is a social judgment. Since, then, it is an artificial, socially determined right, it may vary with the conditions of social order or individual environment.

So-called natural justice is the attempt on the part of an individual to secure his self-determined rights without the interposition of a third party. Existing only in an anarchistic condition where might makes right it is the animal struggle for survival, the application of biological law to human endeavor. A survival of natural justice may be observed in the family feud, and in a larger way, in the selfish and arbitrary struggles for power which nations enter into at the expense of others. And expressions of natural justice are the arbitrary meas-

[1] *The Federalist*, II, p. 241.

ures of trusts and monopolies when they are uncurbed by social regulation.

The Arbiter of Justice. — Civil justice implies at least two contending parties, or opposing principles, and a third party that decides between them. Since, in all social order, there must be this authority to decide right and privilege, the government takes it upon itself to represent the third party and establish justice between contending individuals or factions. Just as in the ancient régime the king could say, *L'état, c'est moi,* so in democracy, that summation of the ideals and will of the people, the government, can say *Le roi, c'est moi.*

In the evolution of the state, the governing power may take many forms; but civil justice develops along with the state rather than in accordance with the form of government. The horde shows few signs of civil justice; but wherever there is self-constituted leadership, there is need for some sort of social justice. For that matter, the self-constituted leader maintains his position in part by means of his service as arbiter in disputes. In fact, whether the leadership be self-imposed, established by custom, or based on heredity or the choice of the people, the leader has always, directly or indirectly, been a judge between differing individuals or clashing factions of the group. Wherever government exists, however, the leader is but its executor; back of the government is the supreme will of the sovereign community. If that sovereign happens to be a small group, as is sometimes the case just after a conquest, then the king represents the oligarchy. If, however, the sovereignty rests with all the people, then he represents democracy. Kings, rulers, and officers may be its agents, and constitutions, laws, and government its mode of expression; but the organized social will of the group is the court of last resort, the final arbiter of justice. Justice cannot, after all, rise higher than its source. Thus, although the character of the organs of justice will determine its effectiveness, the knowledge of relationships, the conception of right and wrong, and the standards of right conduct held by a community will determine the quality of justice.

The Relation of the Individual to the Mass. — In all forms of government the individual bears a certain relation to the social

group at large. This relationship varies in proportion, on the one hand, to the degree to which social pressure has developed, and to the passion for individual liberty, on the other. The extreme example of the subjection of the individual to the mass is found in socialism, which requires a complete subordination of each to the many. Plato's *Republic* gives us a vivid picture of this sort of government. And, indeed, the practical government of ancient Greece shows the absorption, to a considerable extent, of the individual by the government, the subjection of the individual to society. The despotisms of western Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries exerted tremendous pressure upon the individual. It was in the reaction against that pressure that the ideals of individual freedom arose. The despotisms were the result of the attempt to unify a people in the face of rapidly changing social conditions. The Tudors and Stuarts of England and the Bourbons of France had the task of welding into a unified whole the chaotic mass of their respective peoples. The pressures they imposed to accomplish that purpose stifled individual initiative. Modern democracy has somewhat the same problem. Rapid changes characterize modern civilization. Somehow new adjustments must be made. They can be made in either of two ways. Modern democracy by majorities may impose arbitrary pressures as heavy and as stifling as ancient despotisms upon minorities and upon individuals. Many tendencies in modern democracies manifest the ancient disposition to use the heavy hand of power. On the other hand, civilization to-day has at hand many methods which despotism was denied, such as the schools, the press, and other means of rapid and widespread communication. Free speech and a free press together with untrammeled investigation and liberty of teaching can bring to pass social solidarity and yet allow liberty to the individual never before possible.

The extreme of individualism is exhibited in the political theory of the survival of the fittest. When carried too far by unscrupulous people, this political individualism leads to a constantly recurring despotism. When, however, it seeks the highest good of the majority, when it bends its energies to the improvement of

society, it will be regulated by a political coöperation which involves the development of individual powers and capacities. And as the group becomes increasingly homogeneous in feelings and thoughts, the restraints on the liberty of the individual are lessened; for with uniformity of mental and social characteristics, sympathy increases between individuals and hostility decreases. Thus is the individual really governed without severe oppression.

Ideal Democracy. — When reduced to its ultimate analysis, the declaration that men are created free and equal, with certain inalienable rights, indicates nothing more than the right of men to make the laws that are to govern them and the right to choose the officers that are to rule over them; and do the rulers assume, for a time, the rôle of sovereignty, they are, after all, but acting as servants of the people. In our search for the ultimate authority, therefore, we must not carry too far that idea of natural right which received its initial impulse from the French philosophers. For it is only by means of coöperation of his fellows, who are impressed with the same idea, that the individual determines his right to govern; hence, both the right to govern and the right to freedom of individual action come from the judgment of society. In other words, the individual of to-day may do just what society grants him the privilege of doing and no more — that is, whatever he, with the coöperation of his fellows shall determine to be right and just and for the general welfare. The right to govern, therefore, is determined by the capacity for self-government; and the real freedom comes from the right established by coöperative association. The only natural right of the individual is the biological right to existence manifested in the law of survival; it is not biological fact, however, but social fitness that determines his right to share in the government. If, then, there is any natural right to government, it is a natural social right rather than a natural individual right. Man is born under existing laws and social institutions which, as an individual, he cannot overthrow; he is heir to conditions which are the fruit of a thousand generations of men. These conditions may be wrong, but they have been established by combined social action, active or passive; and the only manner in which he can influence or change these ideals, rules,

and customs of society is through combined social action, and whatever society determines to be right or just limits the area of individual liberty.

The Rational Choice of the People. — The social will of the people seeks, then, to establish justice among the individuals who compose the body politic. And when the social mind, after determining what is just and right among the people, carries out this social judgment, government has done its ultimate service to society. Although not the popular idea of equality, this plan for social coöperation nevertheless insists that each individual shall have the opportunity, so far as is compatible with social justice, to develop his individual capacity and exercise his individual powers. But if laws are needed to secure political freedom and civil justice, they are also needed to secure industrial freedom and economic justice. For in the face of changes rapidly occurring in any society just as free competition in political affairs, unlimited by social regulation, leads to anarchy, the outcome of which is a species of despotism, so, too, freedom of competition in the new industrial life, when unlimited by social justice, leads to industrial anarchy, whose final outcome is industrial despotism.

Of course, the ideals of justice held by a community will vary from time to time, in accordance with changing circumstances. For example, social justice looked with favor on the ideal of *laissez-faire* before great corporations had so far developed as to imperil the liberty of non-incorporated individuals. Now, however, governmental interference in the interests of justice between corporations and individuals has become necessary. Again, there was a time when society believed that justice in education was done when "the little red schoolhouse," built at public expense, gave the merest elements of an education to those who chose to come. But now social justice is satisfied with nothing less than compulsory attendance, up to a certain age, at a school where not only the three R's are taught, but where the pupil is trained in the sciences and in certain practical subjects as well. It is beginning to be perceived that, in the interests of social justice, a vocational training must be provided for each; that the youth must be taught which vocations hold out the best prospects of

success; and that the adult should be provided a chance to redeem his lost educational opportunities.

In the narrower sense the courts are the social institutions of justice. Originating as adjuncts of the king, or clergy, they were class institutions, just as was the Council out of which in many states grew the legislative assembly.

As a flood of new laws were required to meet a new situation incident to vast changes in a given society such as Norman England or Israel of the eighth century B.C. so courts had to be developed to interpret and administer the laws. Through the history of every nation may be traced the development of the courts. Step by step they have become the agencies of justice for all the people. Increasingly as democracy was established courts have become concerned with justice as between man and man and between the individual and social group, no matter what the differences in social position, wealth, culture, or office. That ideal has not yet been realized completely. Consequently the courts have received abundant criticism. Wealth has an advantage often in legal contests. Since trials often are a battle of wits between opposing lawyers, justice is defeated frequently by brains. Delays allow rascals to escape their just deserts. Technicalities provide the means whereby some deserving punishment go free to further plot against their fellows. Influence and political corruption frequently turn the scales against the innocent. The bar is conservative by reason of training and age; hence changes are slow both in procedure and organization. Britain, whence we derived our judicial institutions, has far outstripped us in the reform of courts and legal procedure. An aroused public conscience is demanding that these anachronisms in our machinery of justice be abolished. Enlightened and socially minded lawyers are discussing the indictments brought against the courts. Let us hope that the Temple of Justice will soon be cleansed, so that equality before the Law will no longer be a vain dream. Reginald Heber Smith, investigator for the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, in *Justice and the Poor* has thrown much light upon a great weakness in our judicial system, and pointed the way at least toward remedies. Evidently, more attention must be

paid to the lower courts in the United States if we expect justice to triumph there, and consequently in the higher courts. A simplified procedure, based on fact and substance rather than on technicality of the law, with courts presided over by men of fine character and excellent judgment, are among the essentials for the promotion of justice in the lower courts. Finally, such justice should be made available for the poor free of charge.

Thus in the struggle between conflicting cultures and clashing interests due to changing conditions of such a nature as to lead to maladjustments grew up both the ideals of justice and machinery to secure justice. With every profound change in any given society the old arrangements, the customary sanctions, and the patterns of conduct adapted to a stable society are inadequate to meet the situation and must be changed and supplemented by new arrangements. Ideals of justice spring partly out of the memory of arrangements which satisfied the needs of the individual under the old conditions, and partly out of the attempt to secure adjustments which will satisfy individual and group needs in changed conditions. Then the ideals of justice are turned about and used as guides to inspire men to readjust relationships so as to realize the ideals. Thus, men are controlled by what we call the ideals of justice.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. In what sense is a vigilance committee in a frontier settlement an instrument of justice? The social will of what part of the community does it represent?

2. Show how modern social legislation — juvenile court laws, probation laws, pure food laws, and legislation for the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors, "dope," patent medicines, etc. — are attempts to secure social justice.

3. In what sense is the "personal liberty" argument, as applied to liquor legislation, inconsistent with justice?

4. When the manager of a great corporation says that he will "run his own business," why is his attitude antisocial?

5. What light is thrown upon the relation between justice and forceful methods of social control by the fact that isolated and homogeneous settlements of poeple often have no officers of civil justice, such as constables, justices of the peace, etc.? What light is thrown upon the more unseen restraints?

6. Make a list of the various methods by which justice between man and man is secured in a certain hamlet, village, or neighborhood which you know.

7. Show how the school playground prepares children and youth for social justice.

8. What effect upon the development of social justice would a social center have — a common meeting place for the discussion of questions?

9. Outline the work of a court of small claims, Smith, *Justice and the Poor*, Chap. VIII.

10. Review a lawyer's analysis of the defects of the courts. *Ibid.*, Chaps. I–VII.

CHAPTER XXIX

SOCIAL INEQUALITIES

The Social Classification of Individuals. — The provision for securing for all both equal rights and equal social opportunities does not eliminate the possibility of social inequalities; for the status of an individual in society is, to a certain extent, measured by his individual ability and the application of that ability in an effort to improve himself. Thus, while in democratic society there may be a general tendency to make of individuals a homogeneous mass and destroy the graded orders of ethnic grouping, there yet exists sufficient variety among individuals to bring about inequalities in capacity and social position. There is a movement of society, but there is more than one "level of social motion"; consequently society is left in strata, and people are grouped about the centers of their own activity. We see laborers in the machine shop brought together by their particular industry; we find those of the teaching profession in another group; and we discover bankers in a third. The character of the work done influences the social grouping and, to a certain extent, determines the social status of an individual. And not only is there a division into groups; but within the group there is a secondary classification based on ability or position. A great factory, for instance, will have managers, overseers, clerks, operators, and helpers. Thus, while there is no determined assumption of superiority, these natural industrial groups form the centers of social grouping.

Inequalities Arising from Individual Characteristics.[1] — Wherever the word "equality" is used in reference to individuals of a community, it refers to freedom in the choice of opportunities,

[1] For a category of social inequalities, see Kelley, *Government or Human Evolution*, pp. 337–338. See Yoakum and Yerkes, *Army Mental Tests*, Chaps. II and V, for facts as to mental inequalities.

the chance for a man to use his capacities either in the coöperative or the competitive market; but it has no reference to the equalizing of powers or conditions, nor to the insurance of results. All the world is a market; and in it men make the best possible exchange of their personal powers or services for services of another sort. Now this trading capacity, if we may so call it, may be superior physical strength, intellectual power, moral character, religious nature, or personal attractiveness. And it stands to reason that the individual with a pleasing personality can easily obtain an industrial or social position which the one of forbidding personality can acquire only by proving his natural handicap to be outweighed by other and stronger forces, such as will power and intellectual acumen.

Some of these inequalities of powers arise from natural sources. For example, people who are born with some physical defect are handicapped when they compete with those who, having strong physiques, possess greater trading capacity. And just as the man who is endowed with superior brain power may, if he use it to advantage, outstrip another of meaner intellectual capacity, so, too, will a man naturally possessed of high moral qualities have less to overcome and more to work with than one born with a strain of moral obliquity in his nature. Finally, there are the qualities of determination and perseverance, which none of those other capacities can compete against; for an individual who has each one of these prime qualities in excess may yet be outstripped by one who has power to organize his resources, and the force of will to apply his powers. Thus the individual who has a strong physical, intellectual, and moral nature, together with a pleasing personality, has the opportunity to acquire a superior position with comparative ease.[2]

More important than these differences between people of fairly high ability is the wide range of capacity between the highly endowed and the feebleminded and psychopathic individuals. While society may open the doors of opportunity to the latter as

[2] Whether there are natural inequalities between races it is problematical in the present state of knowledge. However, see Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1920, pp. 60–66.

widely as to the capable, the native inequality of these various classes of the population is so great that no social arrangements thus far devised can put those of low intelligence and warped intellect on an equality with the talented. Such inequality of native endowment is of the greatest significance for society. It creates the problems with which a civilized people must ever struggle. If the number of those of low capacity in a population is enormous and the number of the talented is small, no great progress in society can occur. A wise social policy is to give the people of a low grade of intelligence the widest possible opportunity to develop their poor capacities to the greatest possible usefulness. Nevertheless equality of opportunity will not reduce the native inequality. It may, however, lessen the degree of inequality of usefulness between those of low and of high talent.[3]

Inequalities Arising from the Natural Conditions. — Many a tribe or ethnic group has, by settling on sterile soil, condemned itself to perpetual poverty. And not only has it lived a dull, unprogressive life, but it has sometimes become extinct because of the pressure of physical environment. Next in importance to infertility of soil are climate influences, for they tend to destroy the health of individuals, to limit their labor power, to reduce their general vitality. These climatic conditions may arise out of poor drainage, excessive heat or excessive moisture, great variations in temperature, or generally unhealthful conditions. For instance, climatic conditions in the Tropics will not permit of a high degree of civilization in that region. As another illustration, the writers have in mind a group of people who settled on a river bottom in a Western state. In the period of melting snows, this river, after plunging furiously down the mountain side, spread out into sloughs and bayous full of stagnant water, excellent breeding grounds for mosquitoes. And because the malaria carried by these mosquitoes kept the people sick for a large part of the year, their power to labor was curtailed at the same time that their expenses mounted. After they had mortgaged their farms to perpetuate life, they were finally obliged to leave the lowlands and flee into the foothills, where a healthful climate permitted them to live.

[3] Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1921, pp. 325–332.

Then there are the parasite enemies of plants, which must necessarily be enemies to man as well. The codling-moth, the boll-weevil, the phylloxera or chinch-bug, and the army worm sometimes make such ravages on vegetation as to destroy all the economic products of a community and reduce the people to poverty. Such a calamity may, by giving them unequal chances with others, determine their economic and social position in the world.

Or bacteria, the greatest enemies of human life, may, through disease, destroy a man's chances for physical, intellectual, or social supremacy. Nearly 750,000 preventable deaths occur annually in the United States alone. It is estimated that $460,000,000 is the annual cost of illness and death in the families of our American working men, or $960,000,000 a year, if to the first sum are added loss of wages through sickness and death. The sad part of the matter is that at least $500,000,000 of this expense is unnecessary. Hookworm in our Southern states decreases the annual earning capacity by $50,000,000; and every year tuberculosis, by throwing thousands out of work, drops them from the race for self-support and advancement in economic and social welfare.[4]

Only, therefore, as science and economic organization are brought to bear upon these enemies of humanity will the inequalities of life be reduced. A short time ago the yellow fever germ was found in a minute animal parasite carried by a species of mosquito. The diphtheria germ has been isolated; and it is now destroyed by means of the injection of a serum into the veins of the sufferer. Then, too, the fight to aid man in his battle with the natural enemies of his plants and animals becomes, each succeeding year, more energetic, more certain of success. Nor is this all. Science is gradually discovering the causes and preventives for diseases due to bad climatic conditions. And as a result, great natural resources, hitherto unavailable, are now being devoted to the advancement of civilization.

[4] Fisher, "Report on National Vitality," *The Report of the National Conservation Commission*, Vol. III, pp. 620 seq. Stiles, "Economic Aspects of Hookworm Disease in the United States," *Transactions of the 15th Congress of Hygiene and Demography*, 1913, Vol. III, p. 757.

Inequalities Arising from Accident. — Many people lose their normal position in the social and economic scale through earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, droughts, railway wrecks, fires, and the common accidents of industrial life. These accidents naturally have a vast influence over the lives of their victims; for they often render people unfit to struggle along in the rank and file of humanity. Some, of course, have an inherent power of sudden recovery from misfortune, are enabled to regain their former position; but there are others who go down in the struggle. For example, a certain family owned a piece of land along the Kansas River, which for years had yielded them a handsome income. But there came a flood which destroyed their growing crops, washed away large portions of the farms, and ruined or depreciated others. After the flood had subsided, they moved back into their home and began, with earnest efforts, to till remaining portions of the soil and restore their lost fortunes. Unfortunately, however, typhoid fever so prostrated the entire family that they were soon thrown upon the care of the public. Thus, within six months, a well-to-do family group had been reduced to poverty by accident. Nor is such an experience an unusual one. Accident, health, life, industrial insurance, and old age insurance schemes promise to do much, however, to alleviate such misfortunes as these; for when the economic results of these disasters are spread over the entire community, equality of economic opportunity will, to a certain degree, at least, be secured. So, too, are the inequalities due to natural conditions reduced by thrift agencies, such as savings banks, — both private and governmental, — safe investment companies for the man of small means.

Inequalities Arising from Social Environment. — Besides the natural forces which render unequal the struggle for life and wealth, there is a certain social pressure which arises from artificial conditions. There are, in the first place, the great inequalities of wealth which we meet at every turn of life and which, though somewhat dependent upon individual characteristics and the workings of natural forces, are, after all, largely due to social conditions.[5] If, for instance, a few people have absorbed the wealth of the

[5] Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1921, Chap. VIII.

community and used it arbitrarily then all the others have an unequal chance with them in the struggle for independence. The Federal Trade Commission in 1923 published a statement concerning the distribution of wealth in the United States based upon a study of the estates of decedents in 24 countries. It showed that 1 per cent of the decedents owned more than 90 per cent of the wealth represented. Ninety per cent of the estates amounted to less than $5000 each, while 80 per cent of the decedents left estates valued at less than $500. Taking only those estates which were actually probated and throwing out all those which were only estimated by the Commission we can say that the richest 2 per cent owned slightly more than 50 per cent of the wealth left by the decedents, while the poorest 65 per cent owned slightly less than 10 per cent of the wealth of the entire group.[6] This same study by the Federal Trade Commission found that, while there is a general impression at the present time that wealth is being concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, in 1912 large estates of $100,000 or more made up 52.6 per cent of the total value of all estates probated, while in 1923 such estates comprised only 45.9 per cent of the total.[7] Whether concentration of wealth in few hands is a good thing or not may be subject to dispute. Certainly much depends on how that wealth is used by the few. It is also certain that it is desirable that the many should have opportunity to accumulate savings against a rainy day and old age.

Even more important is the inequality of incomes in the United States. While the average per capita income of people in the United States is twice as great as that in Great Britain, four times that in France, four and one-half times that in Germany, and six and one-half times that in Italy, the distribution of this income is very uneven. A study by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1918 showed that the most prosperous 1 per cent of the income receivers of the country received nearly 14 per cent of the total, that the most prosperous 5 per cent received nearly 26 per cent, the most prosperous 10 per cent got nearly 35 per cent

[6] Nystrom, *The Economic Principles of Consumption*, New York, 1929, pp. 152, 153.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

and the most affluent 20 per cent got about 47 per cent of the total income. The same study showed that of the persons gainfully employed in that year 86 per cent received incomes of less than $2000 per year, and 94 per cent less than $3000 a year.[8]

In the distribution of both wealth and income there is great inequality. Whether this inequality measures difference in native ability or difference in economic and educational opportunities, we do not know. Possibly both.

Industrial conditions may also have much to do with the success of some and the failure of others. Where there is great prosperity in a community, it is easier for people to succeed than where there is great trade depression or where there are bad conditions generally. But as these business conditions are constantly shifting, it happens that even men of foresight and shrewdness are frequently ruined by unexpected industrial changes. On the other hand, there are men who, associating in business with men of industrial power, have the good fortune to enter industrial enterprises which succeed on account of the favorable shifting of social conditions. And finally there is always that struggling and unlucky majority — men who cannot successfully compete with the more fortunate few.

There is, indeed, an incompleteness of business organization which leaves a large number of people outside of the general opportunities for business success. Some of the difficulty arises from uncoördinated individual effort in the modern business life; but this defect is rapidly being displaced by the organization of men in groups for the purposes of production and distribution. And should business ever become completely organized on a cooperative basis, opportunities would be more nearly equalized, and wealth would, to a certain extent, be redistributed.

Nor is inequality of power much less in evidence in the political world than elsewhere in society; for, although it has been the boast of the United States that the American people have equal opportunities for political and civil power, we know that even here there are not only unequal capacities, but unequal opportunities

[8] Nystrom, *The Economic Principles of Consumption*, New York, 1929, pp. 175, 176.

as well. Liberty of action may, to a certain extent, have been secured; but political equality has not been an essential outcome of this liberty of action. Money and prestige can still secure place and power, can still blind the eyes of Justice. And although efforts are being made to secure the social equality of every man, both at the ballot box and in the courts, the wisdom of man has not yet been equal to the task. The corrupt practices acts, it is true, are the attempts of various states to correct the inequalities of the ballot box; but up to the present, our systems of court procedure have not been so perfected that the rich and powerful secure as summary justice as do the poor and politically friendless.[9] After all, law alone cannot force men to recognize the social rights of others. Such recognition must be acquired by the slow process of political and social development, the growth of a sense of social justice, and a passion for the general welfare.

But not only are there inequalities of wealth and industrial conditions; even religious belief may be the cause of certain inequalities. A man, for example, of a strong religious nature may owe his prominence to what he has accomplished in his church; or in his struggle for success, he may be supported by some powerful religious organization. He has, in either case, an advantage over the man who has influence neither in a church nor in a religious society.

And finally, although here in the United States we have assumed that every child has the chance to choose his own vocation in life, such is not the case. Because of the complexity of our social life, the passing of our empire of free land, the increasing economic and social stratification of our people, and the lack of intelligent guidance of our children and youth, many a man is as much "born to" a low plane in our modern economic and social life as was the serf of medieval Europe to serfdom on some particular estate. The chief occupation must of necessity be modified by environment. The public mind, by the creation of social conditions, sets the limitations for individual choice. No less powerful, on the other hand, in the regulation of social position, are the inequalities

[9] Smith, *Justice and the Poor*, The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Bulletin No. 13, New York, 1919.

arising from family distinction. A man who, for example, is related to the best families of a community has a greater opportunity to succeed than the man who is related to its worst families. To the term "best family" we do not, of course, give the arbitrary, and artificial, meaning accorded to it by polite society; the term "best families" is used by us in contradistinction to "worst families." Indeed, it only too often happens that a man who, under ordinary circumstances, would succeed admirably, fails to gain a position of usefulness and power because of the weakness or wickedness of members of his own family.

The Modification of Inequality. — Education, as it is conducted by the various states in the Union, represents perhaps the greatest single agency for the reduction of the inequalities of social life. The fact that the great mass of the people are associated in the same schools and given the same education, suggests that a leveling force is constantly being applied to the various social inequalities. It must be remembered, however, that the strong in mind and body still have the opportunity to outdistance their weaker competitors; for those with will and brain power can, by availing themselves of the opportunities of higher education, gain power and influence over their fellows. And while we ought not to wish to diminish such inequality in capacity, we ought to try to educate our people to a sense of social responsibility for their superior natural endowment. For we have passed from that old idea of education, — the elevation of one class above another, or to give the popular conception, the preparation of a man for an idle life. We now look at education as a means for elevating society at large and for creating the power to do a larger amount of work in a shorter time, to do it better, and to make it count in the welfare of society.

Thus we have seen that there is an insurmountable diversity in individual lives which leads from inequality of opportunity to inequality of power. This diversity we have, indeed, no desire to destroy. It should, however, be the aim of society to provide for the development of each separate power and capacity by removing or modifying social inequalities so far as science and legislation can. For example, the inequalities of life could be greatly

reduced by a positive program for better sanitation; the removal of causes of disease; protection against accident; the destruction of dangerous microbes, bacteria, and predatory animals; the curbing of the activities of predatory men and corporations; and provisions for proper recreation. Moreover, the removal or modification of artificial inequalities might, in a measure, be obtained by better instruction concerning the rights, duties, and privileges of individuals and by the establishment of laws regulating civil service, universal suffrage, and equality in the use of public highways, buildings, and conveyances. Great care should be exercised to give equality before the law and in the making of the law. Such instruction and such privileges, together with freedom in the choice of position and service and the opportunity for universal education, would, indeed, reduce social inequalities to a minimum and make social control rather less necessary than it is now.

Furthermore, the laws governing taxation in some countries are aimed at correction of some of the present inequalities. The theory is that, not only should each man pay taxes according to the amount of property he owns, but through progressive income and progressive inheritance taxes (by "progressive" is meant that the tax becomes increasingly heavy the greater the amount on which the tax is levied) an equalization of wealth and income should be brought about. Our anti-trust laws and laws limiting legal monopolies in some countries aim to provide more equal distribution of wealth and income.

The ideal condition would be the gradual displacement of the weak and degenerate stock by a strong and able one, such adjustment of wealth and income that each would have opportunity according to his ability, and such provision for the development of the individual according to his ability and aptitude as will make him most happy and useful to society. Individual differences we shall always have, and should desire to have. Individual differences give us variation from which the best adapted to the situation may be selected. But equality of opportunity to develop to the utmost individual ability is imperative for the welfare of society.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Take a social unit, such as a village, a country township, or a city, and make a classification showing the inequalities characteristic of the individuals therein.

2. Give an illustration of how social inequality is brought about by natural ability; by environment; by social circumstances into which one may be born.

3. Show how the extension of the franchise in England made for political equality; how the invention of street cars and the production of such things as the cheap sewing machine, the postal savings bank, and the building and loan association, iron out the economic and social inequalities between classes.

4. What effect has such a device as the joint stock company had upon social inequality?

5. Show how popular education works for equality; how it produces inequality.

6. Why is it not desirable from the standpoint of the social welfare to have a dead level of human equality?

7. Is it socially desirable to have equality of natural capacity? Of economic opportunity? Of educational privileges?

8. What bearing has the fight against disease had on the problem of human equality? The agitation for industrial education? For compulsory school laws? For workmen's compensation laws? For employers' liability acts? For pensions for widows with children? For juvenile courts? For scientific relief of the poor?

9. To what extent are individuals born unequal?

10. Are acquired characters inherited?

11. What are the causes of race differences?

CHAPTER XXX

ESTIMATION OF PROGRESS

Change versus Progress. — Inasmuch as civilization is made up of many complex elements, it is difficult to get a standard for the measure of progress. A thousand changes may be taking place in society, the final results of which are so difficult to estimate that it is uncertain whether they are progressive or non-progressive.

Observation and historical retrospect at once convince us that change is not always progress. Just as, according to the accepted doctrine of evolution, there is not only development but also regression, so in society, there is a working downward as well as upward. And before we may finally determine whether society is progressing, we must consider the aims of society and we must determine the standards by which progress is measured. The question of aims we considered in a previous chapter; the matter of standards is still to be discussed.

The Criteria of Progress. — Various standards by which to judge whether change has meant progress or not have been set up. It is not possible to review all these suggestions. A few can be noticed and evaluated.

Is growth of population a sign of progress? If this is the case, then China and India, with such dense populations and consequently so severe a struggle for existence that a failure of crops or a similar event results in the starvation of millions, are the most progressive peoples in the world. No. Mere increase of population is not an indication of progress. Quality as well as numbers enters into the problem. Pressure of population together with diseases and famines may weed out the physically weaker, but the struggle to survive leads to emphasis upon mere animal needs and pushes below the horizon the higher aspects of personality.

Is increase of wealth a measure of progress? Not necessarily, for the total wealth of country may be great, and yet be so concentrated in a few hands that the mass of the people may be poverty-stricken. Wealth to be a condition of progress must be so distributed that each individual is able to secure the greatest possible use of it and enjoy the blessings it brings. Just what that measure of distribution is cannot be stated precisely with our present knowledge.

Is control over nature a criterion of social progress? That depends to some extent on whether all the people share in the benefits, or whether the increased productivity of labor is monopolized by a few, while the many reap but few of the rewards.

In other words, whether increase of population, growth of wealth, and mastery of natural forces mean progress depends on the extent to which each individual is freer, has greater opportunity for self-development, for expression of his powers, for the development of his personality in the enjoyment of the accumulated achievements of society and for the largest possible service to his fellows.

A recent writer has summarized the many suggestions of the criteria of progress in these words: "By grouping these several concrete tests we reach a number of well marked indices of progress, industrial, educational, humanitarian, institutional. Or, expressing these ideas in somewhat less highly generalized form, we find a higher level of material wants and means of satisfying them; and expansion of the numbers of men, their energies and their contacts; greater emphasis upon intellectual values; wider participation in all material and intellectual gains; therefore, wider concepts of truth, greater liberty, greater order, and finally greater solidarity; for we are freest when love and intelligence constrain us to identify ourselves with our fellows." [1]

In slightly different terms we may say that *the criteria of progress are* (1) closer integration of society, (2) differentiation of social structure and function, (3) closer articulation of parts, (4) better conditions of life for each succeeding generation, (5) improvement of race or stock, (6) equalization of opportunity, (7) increased

[1] Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, New York, 1918, pp. 118, 119. See Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 356–360; *Studies in the Theory of Human Society*, p. 110.

service of wealth in the interests of all, (8) social direction of society in the interests of the individual, and (9) control over the forces of nature.

Integration of Society. — If society develops progressively, it becomes more and more closely integrated; the individual assimilates the ideals, *mores,* and purposes of the group. He feels himself a part of the nation. In our own day, for example, people of many different racial types, assembled under one government and one national life, tend to become one in thought and sentiment. If society is rapidly changing its standards, customs, and ideals, if large numbers of foreigners with different customs, ideals, and standards are coming in, if economic or social classes are forming rapidly with a developed class consciousness leading to class conflict, the process of integration is more difficult. On the other hand, if there is developed increased harmony of thought and feeling, this process of integration brings about more rapid and more effective social action. When it comes to social action, indeed, each of the ethnic groups of the world now has a much greater solidity than when men were born under status rather than under law; for although classes develop in a dynamic society, they are based not so much on status as upon ability and occupation, and it is easier for a man to go from one class to another.

Differentiation of Society in Structure and Function. — Since society began to develop from the protoplasmic or homogeneous state represented by the horde, there has been a continuous differentiation into activities and structures; for society grows, not only by the enlargement and solidification of the population, but in the organization of the mass into functional groups, each performing a service in the interest of a larger life. In government, for example, there was first a concentration of all powers in one individual; but gradually there was a differentiation into senates, assemblies, courts of justice, military organizations, and ecclesiastical orders. And this differentiation still goes on; new ministries, new commissions, and boards, and other new organs of government are created whenever they are needed. The governmental agencies are also supplemented by voluntarily organized groups. Society gains immensely in power and

social effectiveness by this growth, which is one of the signs of progress. Nor is this method of development confined to matters of government; for, in the economic world, we find each new industry demanding a new group of trained people to carry it on, each new invention demanding a new division of specifically trained labor, and each newly recognized social need calling forth organized effort to meet it.

Closer Articulation of Parts. — Not only do the old organs of government become more perfectly developed, but by change and practice they are made to fit into one another like the parts of finely adjusted machinery. Thus we observe that society grows in efficiency by increasing its number of functions and organs, by perfecting these organs, and by fitting these into a social mechanism which more adequately serves felt needs.

Has Each Succeeding Generation Better Life Conditions? — Another method of estimating progress is to observe whether the present generation has better life conditions than the preceding — that is, greater resources, better methods of service, and in a given time, with a given amount of energy, larger results. For, if we are to believe the theory of Weismann that permanent characteristics may be transmitted from generation to generation by biological inheritance, and that acquired individual characteristics are not so transmitted, the hope of civilization depends upon giving each successive generation better living conditions and greater opportunities, and making certain that the social heritage of civilization is, without loss, transmitted by social inheritance. That is, if there is an accumulation of energy, materials, and the fruits of civilization, if there is to be progress, better methods of using social achievements must be developed. The real service of education is measured by its success in aiding a people to accomplish these objects; the real progress of society is determined by conditions such as these. And judged by this standard the world is certainly ahead of its achievements of a hundred years ago.

The Improvement of Race or Stock. — Through the accumulation of wealth, through invention and scientific discovery, man is protected from disease, his physical welfare is increased, and

his life is prolonged for service. But does the racial stock gradually grow better or worse as disease is eliminated and controlled? To lower the death rate of a community by even two per cent is immediately to increase its labor power, both by creating a healthier state of society and by prolonging the life of the individual. But may not such conservation of life mean also the perpetuation of those unfit to propagate their kind? Not necessarily in the long run; for the *scientific* care of the weak develops not weakness, but strength. Society has, it is true, many evil effects of degeneracy to overcome; but better food, better habits of life, greater protection from disease, and segregation of defectives develop a better racial stock. With the growth of science and our knowledge of the principles of heredity, we must take care against the possible weakening of the race through the saving of those who, under harsher conditions, would not live to perpetuate their kind. Thus will human selection, guided by science, come to the support of natural selection, turning the survival of the *fittest* into the elevation and perpetuation of the *best*.

The Equalization of Political Opportunities. — The changes in political methods and the development of government have brought about a democratic society in which theoretically the individuals all bear the same relation to the whole body politic. It is only natural that, in a government by the people, each individual should have a right not only to participate in choosing legislators to make the laws, and officers to execute them, but even the opportunity to win such political distinction as his merits or ability permit. Sometimes, it is true, a few, gaining the ascendancy by machinations, intrigue, and corruption, may deprive people of their political liberty and their political opportunities. If there is to be progress, these inequalities must be smoothed out. Although wealth and prestige still play a considerable part in securing political preferment, there is a growing measure of freedom, an equalization of individual opportunity in political life. However, it is a question whether in our cities we have really advanced. Yet, in spite of the fact that the political boss still flourishes in our cities, his power, dependent in these days on the imperfect assimilation of our foreign population, is part of an out-

grown political system resting upon an unintegrated medley of peoples of differing cultural backgrounds which we hope is doomed to pass away. The old class-rule, by means of which a few assumed and maintained a monopoly of government, still is entrenched.

The Equalization of Industrial Opportunities. — The feudal system gave every man a place; it permitted him to change neither from one place to another, nor, as a rule, from one class to another. Now there is no doubt that the class system of Europe, with its opportunities for one class and not for another, was detrimental to the freedom and mobility of labor. However, it made for social stability. These barriers of humanity, however, have been gradually broken down, and each individual has an ever increasing opportunity to choose his own industrial life. Yet, it is beginning to be a question whether modern corporate industry, with its strict classification of workers on the basis of an almost microscopic division of labor, has not set a current running in the opposite direction. Up to recent times, the large amount of free lands in America has insured the greatest freedom of choice in occupation. If an individual was not satisfied with his calling or his salary, he could obtain a farm for the asking and begin a new industrial life. On the other hand, the accumulation of wealth and the organization of industry during recent years would seem, in a measure, to preclude the universal opportunity of individuals to rise. The increasing concentration of wealth and income in few hands is a serious menace to equal industrial opportunity. Yet, in another way, the accumulation of wealth and the organization of industry have, by developing the resources of nature, multiplied the opportunities of all members of the industrial group; for while one individual may be limited by the power of organization or the initiative of wealth, he has, as a matter of fact, a thousand choices of occupation where formerly he had but a few. Inasmuch as the industrial life demands skill and ability of widely different kinds, it provides for the greatest efficiency and happiness of all by giving to each the chance to do that work for which, both by nature and training, he is best fitted. It has, however, made many workers only cogs in a machine.

Increased Service of Wealth in Behalf of Humanity. — More and more the surplus wealth of a community is devoted, either by direct gift of the possessor or through enlightened methods of taxation and public expenditure, to the advancement of the people. Through individual management, wealth increases the conveniences of life; and by the establishment of schools, churches, libraries, gymnasiums, parks, and recreation grounds, all the members of society are given the opportunity for improvement. The telephone, telegraph, radio, means of rapid transportation, and all forms and conveniences of travel show what wealth can do to advance the interests of mankind. The machinery used in manufactures, mining, and agriculture enables people to accomplish more and to accomplish it more easily than was possible in the days of hand work. Power equivalent to that of eighteen slaves is said to be available to-day, if equally distributed, for every person in our population. Wealth, in fact, if properly distributed, brings increased leisure for mental, moral, and social improvement. And the progress of society is clearly indicated by the service of wealth in the development of better houses, a better grade of clothing, a more adequate food supply, rational means of spending leisure time, and, in fact, all the conveniences and pleasures of life. Those nations which have not accumulated wealth, therefore, have no material basis of progress; there is no opportunity for them to advance, because they have nothing with which to work. It is by the accumulation of wealth, and through the well-directed use of it, that political and social progress is made possible. More and more do men who have accumulated large fortunes realize that they are but the trustees of the surplus wealth created by a community; and increasingly is the effort being made to have this wealth bear its proper share in the public expenditures for the common welfare and in the general advancement of humanity. It is still a question, however, whether it is properly distributed.

Progress by Adaptation of the Forces of Nature to Man. — Another definite measure of progress is the gradual mastery of nature by man. As among animals, so, too, in the lower human societies, the organism lived and developed by adjusting itself

to nature; but the development of civilized man is marked by his increasing ability to bend nature to his wishes and make it serve his needs. Indeed, many of the milestones in the progress of humanity are at points where man touches and uses the forces of nature for his own benefit, be it a new food discovered, or a new use of one of the elements of nature, like electricity, steam, or radium. By the application of scientific activity to industrial life, man is able to increase the amount accomplished without increasing his effort; for a growing intelligence and an increasing variety of wants so whet man's ambitions that the tendency is toward more work, rather than less, and work that shows an increase in power. Thus there is a tremendous addition to the product of labor. When steam power is brought into practical use, when electricity begins to be applied to everyday things, when the producer and consumer are brought close together by cheap transportation, and whenever the discovery of a new scientific principle in medicine or chemistry points the way toward the preservation of health and the prolongation of life, society advances with enormous strides. In every instance we have nothing more than the bending of nature to the service of man; and just to the extent to which man has mastered nature and turned it to his use, a nation may be said to be civilized.

Social Direction of Society in the Interests of the Individual. — Another criterion of progress is the comparative welfare of the individual. Society exists only that it may advance the welfare of all its component members, so far as the welfare of each individual is consistent with that of every other. To secure this general welfare, society sets bounds to the activities of the individuals who trespass upon the rights of the defenseless. For example, it protects women and children against soulless corporations and ruthless men; it protects the weak against the strong, in the interest of what is, in the long run, the greatest measure of welfare for each.

For this purpose society must continually readjust its machinery to meet new conditions and to offset and cure new maladjustments brought about by calculating and antisocial men. The whole process is a conscious direction of social development

by those who have at heart the welfare of society. The activities of those, therefore, who look upon the social machinery as a means whereby to further their own selfish interests must be controlled by society as a whole. The completeness with which this artificial adjustment is made is the final test of social progress. Civilized society is a highly artificial affair; so delicate are its relationships that the machinery easily gets out of order. Thus it is the duty of the social engineer to find satisfactory methods for keeping the machinery going — a task none too easy; for, since precedents are few or lacking entirely, much of this effort must necessarily be in the nature of an experiment. The real statesman, therefore, as well as the sociologist, can never lose sight of this social purpose; and all suggestions for social reform are made with reference to their probable usefulness in securing this adjustment.

But all of these social inventions are for the sole purpose of developing social personality; for the individual is the unit for which society exists. Society must never lose sight of the fact that all its machinery exists to help men to become happy and fruitful personalities. *We may define this ideal social personality* as one characterized by high vitality, a well-developed mentality, a generously endowed moral nature, and a social nature capable, on the one hand, of "cheerful and efficient participation in the normal comradeship and coöperation of society," and, on the other, of "sympathetic and positively helpful" altruisms.[2] Or, to put the matter in terms of the psychology of social development, the purpose of society is to aid in the development of those institutions and ideals which will allow the individual to "particularize," to use Baldwin's term, on the basis of his social experiences, and thus produce innovations which society may "generalize" and make available for the whole group.[3]

Judged by this test, is society progressing? There can be no doubt that, in democratic societies, at least, the individual has now more freedom of self-expression, and society more rapid and complete command of the contributions of the individual, than

[2] Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 259.
[3] Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 539–542.

ever before. The give-and-take between individuals, the influence, on the one hand, of genius upon the less highly endowed portion of society, and the psychical and social interactions which make up what we call the social mind, on the other, naturally bring about these results. And with the growth of free institutions, the coming of a more perfect education, the gradual discontinuance of war, a growth of international conciliation of disputes between nations, and the regulation of class conflicts the individual is more than ever at liberty to give rein to his genius, and society more able than ever before to direct all its powerful agencies towards a more perfect socialization of the individual.

It is, of course, true that, in a highly dynamic state, society may sometimes seem to show retrogression rather than progress. It must not be forgotten, however, that, in the midst of rapidly changing conditions, it is not always possible to measure the degree of success attending any particular piece of social legislation or any specific device intended to lessen maladjustment. He who walks a steamer's deck must not judge his progress by his relation to the sea gull flying in the air, but by some landmark, by the stars, by the complicated system of navigation in use by the navigator. After all, and in spite of war, poverty, and crime, in spite of the ruthless oppression of the weak by the strong, does not society, in the most civilized countries to-day, more truly answer to the test of progress than ever before? One has but to project himself back into Roman or Grecian society, in the days of their highest development, and compare the lot of the ordinary man of those days with his chances in ours, to grasp the real significance of our present state of society.

Recent Changes. — The discoveries in chemistry, medicine, and biology of recent years have added much to the rapid changes in economic and social life. The tremendous industrial activity based upon these discoveries and inventions has brought about a super-organization of human societies. The extended use of electricity, the practical application of radium, and the discovery of helium gas have started new lines of transportation and communication. All these tendencies have quickened the activity of men in association and are producing tremendous results through

the stimulation of productive industry. The amount of progress of the race is difficult to determine on account of these rapid changes. No doubt, we have more comforts added to life and, to a certain extent, these are more widely distributed among the population. The study of the results of education has brought about changes in its direction and method, so that people are more specifically prepared for life. It is doubtful, however, whether there is any increase in human happiness, because material prosperity and economic activity are not the only means of producing happiness. Certainly there is less contentment among people now than previously and it is difficult to determine how much happiness is engendered by increased activity. It is evident that the opportunities for enjoyment have increased, but happiness must be determined somewhat upon the extent to which these opportunities may be utilized.

Regarding human conduct, it appears that our ideals of government, of laws, of religion, of social order, are higher than in other periods of progress in the United States, but these ideals have brought to the surface a certain disregard for law and order and a certain carelessness concerning the standards of conduct among certain classes of people.

The development of preventive medicine, of health and sanitation are providing means for the preservation of the race and the improvement of its working power. In spite of the political corruption and the maladministration of government which we see everywhere, there is a higher standard of political life and more efficiency in administration than hitherto. In observing this, it must be understood that higher ideals frequently bring to the surface many evils which were formerly passed by unnoticed. Also, rapid changes in social and industrial life have changed the attitude of the younger generation. They are bolder, freer, more open-minded and independent than the preceding generation. Many people who are inclined to identify tradition and conventionality with morality are alarmed at the present attitude of youth, but upon the whole, it must be maintained that they have utilized the results of modern education in such a way as to be in advance of previous generations. The number of

criminals among young men has come about by abnormal social pressure caused by unusual disturbances of a great war, but we should not be unduly alarmed at this. War and its after effects have added another stream of influences which have for the time disturbed our more or less stable equilibrium. New adjustments must be made. Whether they can be made soon enough to restore stability depends on whether that adjustment can be made rapidly enough to prevent disaster. We cannot stand another war right away. It is possible that some new invention or the adoption of some new theory might greatly add to our discomfort. What we need is time in which to catch up with the rapid changes which have recently occurred in our mores, in our attitudes towards social values, towards certain of our institutions. What might happen if the family is further disintegrated, if our scale of social values is disturbed seriously before new values can become established, no one knows. Our problem just now may be to catch up in our social arrangements with the stupendous changes in our material civilization.

READING ASSIGNMENTS

Baldwin, J. Mark. *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Chap. XIV.
Blackmar, F. W. *History of Human Society*, Chaps. I, III, XXXIX.
Bury, J. M. *History of the Idea of Progress.*
Giddings, F. H. *Study in the Theories of Human Society*, Chap. XIV.
Park and Burgess. *Introduction to the Science of Society*, pp. 953–1003.
Ward, Lester F. *Psychic Factors in Civilization*, Chap. XXXIV.

OTHER REFERENCES

Carver, I. N. *Sociology and Social Progress.*
Ely, R. T. *Studies in the Evolution of Human Society.*
Keller, A. G. *Societal Evolution*, p. 22.
Mallock, W. H. *Aristocracy and Evolution.*
Robinson, James H. *The New History.*
Sullivan, Mark. *The Turning of the Century; America Comes of Age.*

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Show that evolution of society does not necessarily mean progress.
2. After reading the foregoing chapter and the assignments in Giddings, make a list of the things which would serve as a test of progress.

3. Analyze some small community or group of people with which you are quite familiar; compare its achievements now with those of, say, ten years ago. On the basis of this comparison, decide whether it is a progressive or a retrogressive community.

4. Show that, while material betterment may mean progress for the community, it does not necessarily signify progress.

5. Outline a situation in which increase of culture might mean retrogression rather than progress.

6. Why may increase of such parts of the social structure as boards and commissions signify social progress? Under what circumstances would such increase mean the opposite?

7. If acquired characteristics are not inherited, explain how there can be better physical types of men and women. Show what is meant by "our social heritage." How are the social achievements transmitted from one generation to the next?

8. What evidence can you give that political opportunity is as great to-day as it was a generation ago or even greater?

9. Is there any evidence that there is greater educational opportunity to-day than there was a generation ago?

10. Is there any evidence that there is greater social application of wealth to-day than there was fifty years ago?

11. What bearing have antitrust laws, railroad regulation, and regulation of corporations upon the social use of wealth and upon industrial opportunity for the people?

12. Compare the statement in the text, that progress is measured by the mastery of man over nature, with Keller's statement on p. 22 of his *Societal Evolution.*

PART FIVE

SOCIAL PATHOLOGY

CHAPTER XXXI

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGY

Since society is made up of individuals bound together in social relationships, social pathology refers to the maladjustments in social relationships. The phrase is based on the analogy of bodily maladjustment of function in the organs. The term, unless carefully guarded, leads into the errors of the "organic" conception of society. If carefully guarded, however, the term "social pathology" may be used to denote the social conditions which result (1) from failure of individuals so to adjust themselves to social life that they function as independent, self-supporting members of society, who contribute their fair share to its stability and progressive development, and (2) from the lack of adjustment of social structure, including organized ways of doing things and institutions, to the development of social personality.

Pathological conditions in society may result from (1) natural lack of ability in individuals to keep pace with the changing ideals and institutions of society, or (2) from the failure of society to keep pace in its functional machinery with the changing conditions in the world in which it lives. Individuals may have inherited a nervous organization suited to easier and simpler conditions of social life. For example, the imbecile may be able to function very well in a rural community where every one knows him and understands how to use the limited abilities he possesses, while he may utterly fail in a city with its more complex relationships and graver social responsibilities. The weak or crippled individual may be able to support himself, establish normal social relationships and discharge fairly well his responsibilities in a simple society where mutual aid and human sympathy prevail, while in a group in which success depends upon meeting more exacting competitive condi-

tions he fails. On the other hand, society may have made great advances in, let us say, its economic organization, while its political machinery may be adjusted to a simpler economic organization and therefore it fails to provide justice between man and man. Or, society may have developed an economic structure requiring higher capacities in the successful individual worker and business man, but has not provided the social machinery to give the relatively less capable individuals a chance to contribute what may be reasonably expected of them. For example, in the United States corporations have grown up and in increasing numbers have taken over control of natural resources and methods of production and distribution of their products. They form monopolies and control prices. The natural tendency for prices to drop when inventions and organization reduce the cost of production is interfered with. Consequently consumers may pay more than they should for the product and many are reduced to poverty. The laws have not yet developed a method of meeting this difficulty; the normal distribution of wealth and income is interfered with. A pathological social condition results. Class feeling arises, sympathy for one's fellows in the struggle of life is clogged. There is no machinery whereby those who suffer may be helped without destroying their ambition and self-respect. Government is no longer respected and suspicion instead of confidence grows. Or, the development of social life becomes more complex and the educational system which should aid in preparing children and youth for life does not keep pace with the new demands on youth. Again, a pathological social situation develops. Individuals fail to cope successfully with life. They cannot make a decent living; they do not play their part in politics; they are unable to function in the improvement of methods of adjusting our social and economic difficulties.

Or, again, with changing social conditions there is not an equal change in social ideals. Free competition is destroyed by monopoly, but the old ideal of *laissez-faire* remains the dominant economic philosophy, an education in the "three R's" remains the educational ideal, the religious ideal of saving your own soul for the hereafter continues to control, and ethical ideals remain

individualistic rather than social. Yet again, pathological social conditions are produced.

Social normality is the condition obtaining in a society in which the social arrangements are such that each individual has the opportunity to make the most of his natural abilities in the interest of the welfare of the whole group, and that a sufficient number of socially adapted personalities are to be found to provide group stability and devise such changes in the social structure as will adapt social organizations and ideals to the conditions amid which the group lives. Society is composed of many interdependent parts, each with its particular function. It is easy to see, therefore, that, if one of these component units in any way fails in its normal function, thus forcing extra burdens upon other portions of society, such society is abnormal. In such a condition of affairs, however, the whole structure is not necessarily defective, but only those parts which fail to perform their legitimate or normal functions. When, on the other hand, men have learned to live together in harmony and so to coöperate that, in the exercise of his own peculiar powers, each has all the freedom consistent with the same degree of liberty on the part of every other individual, society may be said to be, not only normal, but well-nigh perfect.

Means of subsistence should be assured by fairly close connection with the soil and the resources of nature in general. There should, on the one hand, be coöperation of all individuals in the production and distribution of wealth, no group of individuals being relieved from the privilege and responsibility of performing its share of the service; and on the other, the wealth created should be sufficient to afford leisure for other than industrial pursuits. Furthermore, not only should each individual feel secure in person and property, but there should be universal opportunity for the most socially useful intellectual development, as well as means for promoting and perpetuating a high degree of morality. A normal society, in addition, is characterized by the absence of poverty, pauperism, vice, and crime, and the decrease of such defective classes as fail to respond to the demands of social life.

Characteristics of Social Pathology. — Social pathology may treat of a general defect which spreads throughout the entire social

structure; but more frequently the term refers to social maladjustments due to a particular class of people within a social group or to a defective function of government.

There are, in the first place, the unbalanced conditions of wealth and poverty. An excess of wealth may render some individuals useless to the community, just as its lack renders others dependent. These two groups, therefore, each failing to perform its normal service to society, become social parasites. Poverty, with all the conditions which it imposes, is a form of social disease; for, stunted in body and mind as are the hopelessly poor, they can receive but small return for their meager services. The prevention of poverty, on the one hand, and on the other, the utilization of wasted effort, have long been problems for the reformer and social philosopher. In the case of the idle rich the opportunity for service is, of course, more apparent than in that of the inefficient poor; yet both groups are inefficient in social coöperation because of a failure rightly to understand and use opportunities, or because of social maladjustment which permits idleness to the rich and forbids employment or permits parasitism to the poor.

Pauperism. — Following closely upon poverty is pauperism, which is a social disease having its source in the individual affected by his inherited incapacity and by the social conditions about him.[1] Pauperism, when it seizes the social body, is like a parasite receiving its sustenance from the animal on which it lives and returning no service for its life. Normal society, while attempting to check the growth of pauperism, has learned to treat the pauper as a socially inadequate personality. His spirit must be socially renewed. But pauperism is even worse than it appears; for, because of the various diseases, defects, and evils which it engenders and supports, it tends to weaken society by destroying not only its productive, but its moral force, and is, in reality, one of the worst forms of social pathology. Pretending to want to be respectable members of society, but at heart unwilling to pay the price, paupers may well be designated as pseudo-social.

[1] Legally any one dependent for his keep upon others than his natural supporters is a pauper. The term is here used as designating the willing pauper. See Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1921, pp. 20–22.

Crime. — Crime is another serious phase of social pathology; for, of all defects in society, it is the most directly antisocial. Openly attacking the fundamental idea in social life — coöperation in the interests of the whole group — the criminal becomes the deliberate enemy of social order; for he attempts to take without giving service in return, to destroy the individual with whom he should coöperate, or at least to live from the products of his toil. Not only does crime fall heavily upon its victims, whose property and means of service are destroyed, but since it costs much to provide the machinery for the prevention and punishment of crime, the burden is also heavy on society as a whole. And although it is true that the tendency in recent years has been to cause criminals under punishment to engage in productive labor, they are still, to a large degree, non-coöperative, and they never quite pay to society the cost of their care.

Sexual Vice. — Sexual vice produces social maladjustment chiefly through its effects upon the family and upon health. It develops out of the conflict between natural urges in the organism and the conditions imposed by social control. Man's sexual passions are geared to conditions in which procreation had to proceed at maximum capacity in order to keep up the population because of the enormous death rate due to inadequate nutrition, destructive enemies composed of savage beasts, hostile men, and disease. Now with the coming of comparative peace, the relative increase of mankind as compared with savage beasts, with man's command over the powers of nature, and with man's increasing conquest of disease, man's procreative powers are greater than needed. Further, with the development of education, and the placing of responsibility upon the individual to support his own family, the possibility of marriage is somewhat delayed beyond the time when the sexual passions are at their maximum. Moreover, at just that time, adolescence, the youth has not yet learned to adjust his habits to the emergency of the newly developed sexual drive. The result is that he satisfies those urges in socially unsanctioned relations, forms habits which linger long after adolescence, contracts venereal diseases, and in many ways imperils the welfare of the family and spreads disease. Vice is the result of the con-

flict between the biological urges and the social mores. Pathological conditions result.

Defectives. — The large number of defectives, such as imbeciles, the deaf, dumb, blind, and insane, must be considered from the social standpoint, because their existence concerns society at large. Not only are they dependent upon society for their support, but in a large measure, society is responsible for the increase of these classes. The defects result in social maladjustments and their prevention becomes a social necessity. In fact, many of the most grievous problems of social improvement have to do with these classes of defectives. In another chapter, the treatment of some of them will be handled more in detail.

The Pathology of the Family. — As has been stated before, the family is, both historically and structurally, the primary social group. Its fundamental purpose is to provide a place where the offspring may be reared under favorable conditions. However, it performs several other social functions, such as the biological, the economic, and the educational. A pathological condition of society arises when the family relations are such that it does not function properly as an economic, educational, and social agency.[2]

Perhaps the first requirement for a normal household is that the parents be in good mental and physical health. Lack of health in one or both parents often leads to pathological conditions, not only in the children, but in the home relations. Similar results arise from those who, by moral nature and temperament, are "unequally yoked," for incompatibility is as fatal as bodily or mental disease. There is, indeed, no other phase of social life in which maladjustments have such lasting consequences, and are so difficult to overcome or prevent.

Divorce, because of the division it creates in families, indicates a pathological condition. Nor is it easy to see how it can be improved without improving the conditions which are antecedent to and attendant upon the marriage relation. The highest and best form of matrimony is, of course, a coöperative companionship. In a spirit of love, sympathy, and helpfulness man and

[2] See *ante*, Chapter XI.

woman agree to live together for life; and in this spirit they build a hallowed place, called home, for the rearing and culture of children. But there are many baser motives in matrimony. Some men, for example, marry to gratify passion; some, desiring a good housekeeper or servant, secure a wife much as they might a horse; some, in their advanced years demand a nurse; and some marry for money. On the other hand, many women marry merely for the sake of gaining a home or support, regardless of what the man may be or of their attitude toward him; some marry because it is considered unfashionable or unfortunate to remain single; and still others marry against their will because of the pressure of relatives. Finally, there are many who, dazzled by the glamour of romantic love, enter the bonds of matrimony hastily and lightly, only to repent of their folly when it is too late for any assistance but that to be gained from loose divorce laws.

Again, inadequate support of the family, inadequate shelter, an insufficient amount of wholesome food, improper sanitation, and bad family discipline lead to pathological conditions. Where the moral status is not high and the socialization is not perfect, the evil tendency of the home is so great as to be overcome with great difficulty. It is, in fact, almost impossible to train children for the discipline of the larger social life when they have been corrupted by their home influences, or when the family has failed to function as the chief agency in the development of social adjustment for the child.

Pathology of the State. — Turning our attention to the state as it exists in a federal republic like the United States, we note the lack of adjustment of governmental machinery to the conditions of social life. If the purpose of our government is, as stated in the Constitution, to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, . . . promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," it is not unfair to say that in so far as the government does not see that these ends are approximated, it is defective and what may be called pathological social conditions obtain. Many of the defects of government are due, of course, to an imperfect socialization; liberty is at best an expensive thing, and a government by the

people an unwieldy government difficult to establish and difficult to maintain. There is no science of legislation, not even a well-learned art. Only a few states have adopted the plan of a legislative reference library, with a department devoted to drafting bills by a comparative study of legislative experience. The authority to make the laws is delegated, for the most part, to an inexperienced body; and before the members of one legislature have fairly learned how to provide for the needs of the people, they are turned out to make room for others. As a result our statute books are covered with obsolete laws — laws that have been of little or no benefit to the public, as well as some that are a positive injury. And when, in addition to the other difficulties, are added the evils of political corruption and the machinations of the demagogue, the imperfections and misrule are sufficient to warrant us in complaining of decided maladjustment in politics and government.

Pathology of Education. — Again, our educational systems, forgetting to adapt means to ends, frequently fail to develop good citizens. Much of our training in the schoolroom is imperfect, unbalanced, and on account of its evil social results, decidedly pathological. Moreover, there are many positive defects, such as bad methods of instruction, an incompetent teaching force, a poorly coördinated system, and curricula that fail to produce socialized citizens. Recent studies among unadjusted children show how often the school has not only failed to correct the perverse attitudes conditioned by home and neighborhood, but has through lack of understanding created patterns of conduct decidedly antisocial.[3]

The education provided by some literature is also pathological. From all the various books which are published and placed at the disposal of the public, it chooses those which interest and amuse. And since much of our cheap literature is positively bad; since in its character of communication of knowledge it sets forth falsehood for truth and wrong ideals of life; and since,

[3] See *Three Problem Children*, Publication No. 2, Joint Committee on Methods of Preventing Delinquency; Sayles and Nudd, *The Problem Child in School*, Joint Committee on Methods of Preventing Delinquency, New York, 1925.

by arousing unsocial desires, it causes people to deceive themselves, its perusal leads to degeneration. The pipe line may be perfect, but it may carry germs of disease.

The newspaper, because of like imperfections, often produces pathological states of mind. Pretending to be a leader of thought and a teacher of men, it frequently sells its services, becomes commercial, and publishes that which pleases its patrons, regardless of the truth or the evil effects on a community. The newspaper has, therefore, become to a large extent a purely commercial affair, which seeks to supply the demands of the news market; and some of the viler sort go to the length of depending upon a species of blackmailing, through which they receive advertising material as a sort of "hush money." Hence, while we concede the great service and great usefulness possible to the newspaper, we have to acknowledge that it has unguessed possibilities of evil.

Many newspapers publish sensational material which gives incorrect impressions and wastes time with long explanations about unimportant events; and some color news to suit their purposes. It is really difficult to point out a remedy for these conditions; for, since the present feverish state of society demands lively news, a dull paper will not be read. The attempt of Charles H. Sheldon to remodel the modern newspaper on a Christian basis was a failure. It had many good features, such as the reduction of descriptions of crime to a bare statement of fact, and the elimination of spurious advertising material; yet, as a newspaper, it did not satisfy the public. A modern newspaper must, to succeed, be bright, racy, and "newsy"; if it fail to be interesting, few will want it. After all, the proprietor of a paper furnishes the kind of wares that are salable in the market; and nothing but a thoroughly socialized public opinion can regulate the educational influence of the newspaper.

Other Areas of Social Pathology. — Much social maladjustment may be seen in other areas of social life. Consider how much maladjustment occurs in economic life. Industrial activity is followed by periods of depression throwing great numbers out of employment, and often resulting in bankruptcy for business concerns. A few accumulate great fortunes while great masses

live in poverty. Machines are introduced into factories and take the place of thousands of men. Changes of fashion, such as short skirts, lessen the demand for dress goods, and affect the price of the raw product. Rayon takes the place of cotton in stockings and seriously affects the cotton raisers. These and many other rapid changes disrupt stable business conditions with consequent disturbance of social relations. Health conditions change. A new disease, like the flu, rages and upsets the established equilibrium in economic and social adjustments. A combination in manufacturing or in retail businesses may result in destroying small local factories, dispersing the labor force and in scattering the families of those engaged in these activities. Chain stores drive the small grocers to the wall. Chain stores supplant individually owned stores, often drive their owners into bankruptcy, disperse the clerks, force people into new occupations, and change the habits of whole classes. Such are only a few of the maladjustments which occur in a rapidly changing society in economic matters. Pathological conditions result.

Again, the passage of new laws often disturbs conditions to which people have worked out some kind of adjustments. The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act forced railways to change the conduct of their business in many ways. The adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment and the passage of the Volstead Act for the enforcement of prohibition disturbed the habits of large numbers of people, destroyed a business of considerable importance financially, forced numbers of people engaged in the manufacture and sale of liquor to seek other occupations, and perhaps resulted in increasing the amount of money which people could spend on house furnishings, automobiles, victrolas, radios, dress, and food, and diverted money into savings accounts and investments. Some maladjustments occurred in consequence of the changes made necessary by the law. The passage of child-labor laws, of compulsory school attendance laws, of laws regulating the hours of labor of women and children, laws regulating sanitary conditions of factories, and laws providing for workmen's compensation are other illustrations.

The complications which changes in the population bring about,

changes whether of quality or sudden increase or decrease of numbers, produce pathological conditions. The great numbers of immigrants coming into this country from 1870 until about 1920, with the exception of the War years, disturbed a number of times the social and economic equilibrium. The quantity of the population must be considered along with the sudden changes in industrial conditions. When industry and trade are lively, and no great alterations in the industrial system are occurring, increasing population does less harm than in times of industrial slack. If, however, the newcomers are illiterate, especially if they are of such a nervous organization as is not adapted to meet the strain of the new conditions here, then our asylums for the insane fill up, the relative proportion of our mental defectives increases, and pauperism grows.

These various social maladjustments by no means exhaust the list that might be made of what constitutes pathological conditions in our social structure. Since it would be impossible to discuss all the various forms, three have been selected for discussion within the limits of this treatise — namely, poverty, crime, and degeneracy. These will serve to give concrete illustration of the nature of the problems with which society must deal in her efforts to secure a more perfect adjustment of her machinery for producing the social individual; and they will serve to indicate some of the methods which experience has shown may be used in securing that adjustment.

READING ASSIGNMENTS

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OTHER REFERENCES

Bogardus, E. S. *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, Chaps. XVII, XVIII.
Henderson, C. R. *Modern Methods of Charity.*
Reuter, E. B. *The Mulatto in the United States.*

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Define biologically a normal individual.

2. Criticize the following definition of a normal member of society, or a socius: A member of a social group who functions in his social relationships so as to forward the social aims of the group.

3. Would a normal member of a society of savages necessarily be a normal member of a civilized society? Why?

4. Give reasons why a society in the Middle Ages might be considered normal, and one with the same ideals, organization, and methods might be abnormal in this century.

5. Apply your conclusion to the criticism of a society organized on a military basis to-day. Apply it to one organized on the basis of the doctrine of *laissez-faire*.

6. Since brigandage was once an honorable occupation, why is it called crime to-day?

7. Why is pauperism considered an indication of social pathology?

8. Vice was once such a normal condition that it was attached to the temples of the gods; why is it looked upon to-day as antisocial?

9. What light does the position of this chapter thrown upon the contention that crime is an atavism, *i.e.*, that it is a sign of reversion to an earlier type of conduct?

10. A man once had as many wives as he could afford to support; why is it that now the polygamous family is looked upon as abnormal?

11. Why is it that the recent war was looked upon by the conscience of our country as dangerous to the welfare of the world, when, until recently, war was the usual thing between nations?

12. What are the recent pathological conditions of the family?

CHAPTER XXXII

POVERTY: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES

The Extent of Poverty. — Specific data as an aid to imagination bring about an appreciation of a problem far better than do general statements.

Disregarding the various estimates of poverty and considering only figures obtained by careful surveys by private investigators or public officials, we find an astonishing amount of poverty. Mr. Charles Booth in a study made in the latter part of the last century found that nearly a third of London's people were either already in distress or sinking into want. In 1901 Mr. Rowntree studied conditions in York, one of England's smaller cities. He found there 43.4 per cent of the wage-earning population, or 27.84 per cent of the whole population were poverty stricken. Booth's and Rowntree's figures are remarkably close. Mr. Bowley, a celebrated British statistician, and Mr. Burnett-Hurst in 1912 and 1913, made careful studies in four smaller cities of Great Britain. On the basis of these studies they ventured to make an estimate of the percentage of the industrial working-class population in poverty. Their estimate is "over 13 per cent." [1] That was the condition before the War. Recent figures show a worse condition.

In the United States we have more estimates and fewer careful studies. However, we have a few figures indicating the precarious conditions of millions of our people. The Federal Trade Commission in 1923 studied the estates of 43,512 decedents probated in 24 counties in the United States. During that year 259,908

[1] Space will not permit the inclusion of the figures, but they are readily accessible in such intensive studies as Booth's *Life and Labor of the People of London*, and Rowntree's *Poverty*, and in an extensive report, a Blue Book by the British Government, entitled *Public Health and Social Conditions and the Separate Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress* by Wakefield, Chandler Lansbury, and Mrs. Sidney Webb, 1909. For fuller discussion see Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1921, Chap. IV.

persons died in those counties, of whom 184,958 were persons 21 years of age or over. Thus 141,446 left estates so small that they were not probated. It was estimated that these unprobated estates averaged $258. They comprised 76 per cent of the entire number of decedents. Of these decedents 1 per cent owned more than 90 per cent of the total wealth. Eighty per cent of these decedents left estates valued at less than $500, while more than 90 per cent left estates of less than $5000 in value.[2] It is clear from these facts that the great proportion of these people had no great surplus piled up for a " rainy day."

Consider also the incomes of our people. In 1918 the National Bureau of Economic Research estimated that 1 per cent of the people received 14 per cent of the income of the country leaving the other 99 per cent with only 86 per cent. Or that one-fifth of the people received nearly half (47 per cent) of the total income of the country. Eighty-six per cent of the persons gainfully employed in that year received incomes of less than $2000. In 1924 less than 10 per cent of the more than 7,000,000 persons making Federal income tax returns reported incomes of $5000 or more. It is probable, therefore, that about 94 per cent of the persons gainfully employed in this country have incomes of less than $3000 a year.[3] Irving Fisher has estimated that 65 per cent of the people in the United States average less than $2300 per family. While these figures do not indicate the exact amount of poverty, they do suggest that there is a very large proportion of our people who have very little surplus above their necessities. Every indication points to a degree of poverty which is a menace to social progress, if not to social stability. How can we dream of a society in which there will be " domestic tranquillity," the " blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity," healthy individuals, educated children, socialized men, and women interested in the progressive development of our social organization, proud of our country and its institutions, when so large a minority of our people are faced by the stark realities of poverty? [4]

[2] Nystrom, *Economic Principles of Consumption*, New York, 1929, p. 152.
[3] Nystrom, *op. cit.*, p. 180.
[4] King, *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*, New York, 1918, p. 80.

Immediate and Remote Causes of Poverty. — The causes of poverty are not easily discovered for the reason that they may extend over a long period of time in their operations and may arise from many sources. Indeed, such is the case as regards all sociological phenomena. There may be immediate causes which are easily discernible; but there are always other deep-seated causes, that, through a chain of events, reach back to remote or primary forces. Nevertheless, by statistical determination and case counting, we can obtain sufficient data to classify most of the primary causes of poverty.

Characteristics of the Individual. — First, there are characteristics of the individual which, arising from hereditary influences, always indicate weakness of some sort, although the extent of hereditary influence in inducing poverty has not been fully determined. Recent studies, however, throw a very interesting, though somewhat uncertain, light upon the relation between poverty and both physical and mental degeneracy. For example, Goddard, in his study of the Kallikak Family, showed that a considerable number of the descendants of the feeble minded Martin Kallikak, Jr., were also shiftless and more or less dependent on others for support; and on the basis of some study of the question, Goddard estimates that 50 per cent of the inmates of almshouses are feeble-minded.[5] While this is the estimate of one who, because he deals constantly with one particular defect, may be somewhat biased, Miss Kite's *The Pineys,* Dugdale's older study of *The Jukes,* McCulloch's *The Tribe of Ishmael,* Blackmar's *The Smoky Pilgrims,* Danielson and Davenport's *The Hill Folk,* and Gesell's *The Village of a Thousand Souls* are reports of other investigations which supply indications that degeneracy is a potent cause of poverty.

One would be safe in asserting that at least 25 per cent of the almshouse paupers, 10 per cent of the paupers aided in their homes from public funds, and 5 per cent of those helped by private charitable organizations are mentally defective.[6] That is for pauperism. What about poverty?

[5] Goddard, *Feeble-mindedness, Its Causes and Consequences,* 1914, p. 17.

[6] See for further details Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency,* New York, 1926, pp. 71–73.

Enough studies have now been made to indicate that about 2 per cent of the population of the country are mentally defective, 2 per cent insane, and 2 per cent epileptic, or a total of 6 per cent who are mentally incapable of efficiently supporting themselves.

It must not, however, be understood that poverty is a defect which can be inherited. The suggestion is that poverty may be a result of some hereditary defect like feeble mindedness, insanity, or some other inheritable trait of a degenerate character, but there are certain influences of environment which, at the present stage of social science, seem very much stronger than those of heredity, so far as inducing poverty is concerned. What is the relative importance of the two factors it is impossible to state at this time except in very general terms. A broken-down nervous system, certain diseases like syphilis, and such characteristics of individuals as are inheritable, cause failure in the struggle for existence and certainly are not to be overlooked in search for the causes of poverty.

Moreover, there are other less striking and less definitely determined defects of nervous organization which lessen one's capacity to get along in the world. Only a beginning has been made by the bio-chemists in ascertaining how the functioning of the ductless glands affects the personality and the economic and social efficiency of people. Once we explained their incapacity by saying that they were "lazy." They were, but the important question is, Why? It has now been determined that there are a number of causes of laziness. The functioning of the glands of internal secretion is one of these causes. There are others. People may be economic failures because of experiences in their history which generate in them what may be called the "failure complex." They have never succeeded at anything they have undertaken from playground and school to factory or business. It is probable that underlying such a social experience may be a constitutional make-up of a sort which makes it difficult for them to succeed, but under different circumstances they might succeed.[7] Such are the con-

[7] For such a case see Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1926, p. 130, "The Seldons Family."

ditions born in the person which condition his success or failure in the economic and social struggle.

There is no way as yet known to science by which people who are born deficient in vitality may have this defect remedied. Negative eugenics has been proposed as a method by which the birth of abnormal individuals may in the future be prevented by keeping such living individuals from having offspring. This end could be gained either by an operation to render impotent their generative organs, by life segregation, or by some manner of inducing them to refrain voluntarily from parenthood. Positive eugenics, on the other hand, endeavors, by the promotion of selective mating, to secure a new generation produced by parents who answer to the tests of such vigor and mental alertness as are desirable in social beings, and thus swamping the defectives. These suggestions are interesting; and negative eugenics, as applied to the manifestly abnormal classes, deserves serious consideration. It is doubtful, however, whether we know as yet enough concerning heredity to warrant our going further with selective mating than the education of people to the importance of clean, strong parenthood.[8]

Disease. — Sickness is the greatest single, immediate cause of poverty. Devine says that 75 per cent of all poverty is immediately due to disease[9] — not 25 per cent as is usually supposed. And investigations carried on in Buffalo, Boston, New York, and other large cities show that sickness is the prime reason why people must apply for relief. Thus, while we still need to know the social conditions causing sickness, it is of value to know the extent of this proximate cause. Fisher has estimated that from sickness alone each individual loses an average of 13 days a year. There are sick constantly in the United States 3,000,000 people. Fisher estimates that preventable sickness in the United States costs annually one billion dollars.[10] However independent a family may hitherto have been, if sickness leaves the wage earners unable to work for their daily bread, to say nothing of being unable to

[8] For outline of causes of poverty see Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1921, Chaps. IV–VIII.

[9] *Misery and Its Causes*, p. 54.

[10] Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1921, pp. 396–399.

pay for medicines, doctors, and nurses, the family may perhaps never recover from its calamity. And not only may disease leave the bread earners unfitted for work for many months or years, but by causing death, it may leave a dependent family helpless. Perpetual poverty accompanies such unfortunate conditions.

Many things can be done, however, to diminish the importance of this grave cause of poverty. The conditions, for example, which produce undervitalization, such as bad housing and unsanitary conditions about a city or a rural home, can be changed; and by means of education, the conditions under which people work may be improved. There should be wise factory laws and fair hours, a minimum wage law in the unorganized industries, and carefully devised laws regulating the employment of women and children. Moreover, there should be dissemination of information concerning the causes of disease, protection against diseases by proper vaccination and quarantine regulations, and early attention to the first signs of disease and the prompt removal of the causes. There should be many safeguards and measures such as these.

Lack of Judgment. — Many people, though well-meaning and industrious, fail to exercise a wise economy in applying their earnings to the purchase of food, clothing, and implements of general use. And since they are but poor managers of their own affairs, they are unable to cope with the difficulties that beset them in the world about them. There is nothing truer in the world of poverty than the sentiment, long ago expressed, that "Poor men have poor ways." On the other hand, there are many who, for a time, have felt the grinding heel of poverty, and by means of courage or skill in management, have risen to a position of independence. Wise in choice, thrifty in management, and careful in the use of articles in their possession, they are possessed of characteristics which go far towards the maintenance of their independence and the gradual increase of their wealth even on comparatively small incomes. In contrast are those, who, with opportunities for advancement, either fail to seize them, or in attempting to take advantage of them, find themselves unable to manage; for, no matter how many good things come their

way, their poor methods will counteract all their efforts to rise. People who have had much to do in attempting to relieve the poor have found it impossible to help individuals of this class without furnishing some method of supplementing this lack of poor judgment. To such an extent is money squandered, are opportunities neglected, and the wrong choice made, that all attempts toward independent existence are neutralized.

Lack of poor business judgment may be due to innate characteristics or to poor education or to a combination of these two factors. Suggestions for the correction of the first have already been made. The second is to be cured by greater provision for training the individual.

The introduction into the schools of compulsory home economics will do much for the cure of this evil. To-day the wives are the spenders of the incomes; and up to the present wise training has been lacking. Often too busy in their school years to study household management at home, and deprived of any such training in the schools, our housekeepers are often wasteful in their household management. And even if they have had some experience at home, how often has that home training included proper instruction in buying?

Safe and sound investments for small investors would, of course, help in the solution of the problem. The Postal Savings Bank provides opportunities for the investment of savings, as do the enterprises of many banking institutions and certain building and loan associations. Such encouragement given to the man working for small wages does much to promote thrift. But these agencies for saving need to be increased in number and improved in the strength of their appeal to the poor; and to supplement them, there is need of an educational campaign and the creation of a social ideal and social customs which will check the present tendency towards wasteful expenditure and will tend to promote saving. Indeed, the place to begin is at the top, among the upper classes of society; for we are a nation of wasteful spenders.

Drink, Drugs, and Vice. — People addicted to drink, drugs, or vice are not lacking in formidable enemies to thrift and independence. These unhealthful appetites are usually cultivated,

although the hereditary influence sometimes appears in a system so weakened that the body and mind are susceptible to all evil influences. While the influence of intoxicating liquors has been entirely overestimated as an actual cause of poverty, it is nevertheless a factor in wasting the income and in destroying an individual's earning power. Liquor, as a beverage, is always a waster, and often a destroyer, of mental, moral, and physical capacity; it interferes, in the long run, with industrial efficiency and is increasingly a cause for discharge from employment. Even our short experience with prohibition, though as yet laxly enforced, shows that it has meant an increase of well-being, in a great many poor families.[11]

Alcohol in excess attacks the seat of the will power in a peculiar way; for it destroys moral courage, a quality highly essential to success. Narcotics in excess are also very productive of poverty. The use of morphine, opium, cocaine, and similar drugs, taken for the purpose of drowning trouble or relieving pain, quite frequently leads to poverty and a long train of attendant evils.[12]

The recently adopted amendment to the Federal Constitution in the United States represents an attempt to outlaw liquor as an intoxicating beverage. It is too early to be able to say positively what are the effects on poverty. If public opinion upholds the amendment and the attempts to enforce the law defining an intoxicating drink as one with a very low alcoholic content, there is little doubt that much money will be saved by people who would otherwise waste too much on drink. But even more important are educational measures for teaching people the facts as to the effects of alcohol and narcotics — not, of course, the pseudo-science now taught in most of our schools, but the results of careful scientific investigations. Along with these measures must go the removal of the causes of drink, both physical and social. Unstable neurotic conditions in men and women often induce a craving for drink, just as do bad nutrition, overwork, and worry.

[11] *The Survey*, Vol. XLV (Nov. 6, 1920), pp. 183–226; "Massachusetts under Prohibition," *Literary Digest*, Oct. 29, 1922.

[12] See Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, Chap. XXIV.

In order to remove the causes, therefore, attention must be paid to the conditions under which people live and work. Again, people drink for social reasons; for alcohol and narcotics promote genial flow of sociability. But the substitution of other means of social stimulation, as furnished by recreation and social centers, will, it is believed, do much toward displacing the demand for artificial stimulation now furnished by alcohol and other drugs.

A depraved sex appetite is no less conducive to poverty than the love of rum. Still as true as in the days of the Hebrew Sage are the words, "For on account of a harlot a man is brought to a piece of bread." [13] The recent report of the Vice Commission of Chicago estimates that 5,540,700 visits to prostitutes are made annually by men in Chicago alone, and at a total estimated expenditure, on the part of these men, of $15,699,449. It may be noted in passing, however, that these millions of visits are made by an estimated 200,000 of Chicago's men.[14] From these figures some idea may be gained of the enormous waste in money alone which is imposed upon this class of men by uncontrolled sex appetite. And of course, these enormous figures take no account of the expense involved in dealing with diseases arising from vice, of loss of earning capacity, of the suffering and death that falls to the lot of innocent wives and children, as well as to the guilty husbands and fathers.

What part uncontrolled sex impulses, exercised in normal relations, may play in reducing physical efficiency, we have no means of knowing until physicians make public the knowledge they are able to obtain in their practice. Nor do we know how great are the inroads of private vice upon growing children. In both these ways, doubtless, unfettered natural impulse lays a heavy tax upon the physical and mental efficiency of the race, because what is controlled in the animal by instinct is supposed to be controlled in man by reason; and the sanctions of reason are less powerful and more uncertain in their operations than are those of instinct.

Defective Personality. — Many people have a great deal to overcome on account of a something called personality, which

[13] Prov. 6 : 26.

[14] *The Social Evil in Chicago*, pp. 106–115.

depends not merely upon physical structure or mental attitude, nor entirely upon clothing or personal habits, but is a combination of all these in making one man an agreeable personality and another the opposite. To a certain extent, of course, a personality may be cultivated or improved; but in a large measure it depends upon hereditary characteristics and early training. However, he who is afflicted with a disagreeable one can, to a certain degree, be taught to have a pleasant address and a neat appearance; and he may possess a genuineness and sincerity which will make up for the lack of many other things. Yet the fact remains that one man will apply for a position and be turned away, while another will easily succeed in obtaining it; and there may be no other reason than that the second has a pleasing personality, and the first has not. But it sometimes happens that, after a man with unprepossessing personal appearance is once employed, his really pleasing character comes to the front and overcomes first impressions. But such is not always the case. When it becomes necessary to reduce the force of laborers, although skill may seem to be the first consideration, it frequently occurs that the disturbing, disagreeable person is the first to go. The quarrelsome, unsocial individual, by creating a perpetual disturbance, interferes with the smooth running of the establishment and is, therefore, not wanted; the one who survives to-day is the one who has a strong, socially coöperative nature, who can work uncomplainingly with others and for others.[15]

Shiftlessness and Idleness. — Once these terms used to explain why some people did not get along well in the world. It is now recognized that they do not explain; they are merely descriptive of social conduct. Shiftlessness and idleness are results of conditioning factors. Such factors are inborn characteristics, disease, and life-experiences. Many mental defectives are sluggish physically as well as mentally. Their parents were so before them. In some cases it has been found that they have a poorly balanced endochrine system of glands. In other cases it is not known just what it is that makes them shiftless and idle. Sometimes these characteristics are inherited, but often they are the

[15] See Devine, *Principles of Relief*, p. 155.

result of disease. The shiftless, indolent "poor white trash" of the South were once looked upon as inherently lazy; but recent investigations have shown that two millions of people in this country are suffering from hookworm, and as a consequence of decreased efficiency, are causing an economic loss of at least $50,000,000 a year.[16] Again, in other sections, malaria has so depleted the vitality of the inhabitants that they have the reputation of being lazy. The shiftless man does his work poorly and half-heartedly; and he avoids, or at least delays, any excessive labor, wasting his time because of his inertness. He leaves the windowpanes out and thus increases the expense of fuel; he leaves the vegetables unprotected in the garden, so that the frost comes and destroys them. The furniture deteriorates for the lack of care; and, in fact, everything is lost because of this lack of economy and thrift. Individuals of this sort cannot help being poor so long as such habits control them.

There is no cure known for the person who is inherently lazy and shiftless. If he is such by reason of disease, because he lives in bad conditions, or because he has become discouraged, something can be done to help. A thoroughgoing fight against the disease which saps his vitality will repay the effort; the removal of a family from bad sanitary and housing conditions will sometimes supply the incentive to stir them to industrious habits; and their removal to a community where their bad habits will not be popular will sometimes stir their sluggish spirits to action.

Poor Household Management. — Many people have been rendered poor through the use of poor food; many may attribute their failure through life to under-nourishment or malnutrition, especially in childhood, but often also in later life. It has been discovered that both children and adults must have properly balanced diets, the former that they may develop properly, the latter that they may resist disease and have the energy to carry on properly the work of life. Recent discoveries in the chemistry of foods have shown that there must be the proper proportions of protein, fats, carbohydrates, starches, cellulose, mineral salts,

[16] Stiles, "Economic Aspects of Hookworm Disease in the United States," *Transactions of the 15th Congress of Hygiene and Demography*, 1913, Vol. III, p. 757.

and fruit acids. Until recently it was not known that there were certain things which they have called vitamins which are absolutely essential for proper growth in children and for good health in adults. It has been found also that certain foods subjected to the violet ray are rich in the vitamin which prevents rickets. Without question the proper management of the food has something to do both directly and indirectly with poverty. While one might think that the chief problem is to get food of any kind, it is not too much to say that many people are headed towards poverty by improper diet, since the food has much to do with certain kinds of sickness, which in turn lead to poverty.

Furthermore, ignorance of the most effective management of the household in many cases has meant the economic ruination of a family. There is an old adage which says that, "Some women can throw more out of the window with a teaspoon than a man can bring in through the door with a scoop shovel." Good training in household management whether got in the home or in the schools will prevent poverty from this cause. One must not forget, however, that the best household management within the house will fail if the man of the house does not do his part in the management of the finances. How little we do to-day to train the girls for that important function! How much less do we do for the men!

The Disregard of Family Ties. — Disregard of family ties has contributed directly and indirectly to poverty. Many people have become poor through broken families. Frequently the father deserts the wife and children, leaving them in a helpless condition, or less frequently the mother deserts the father and children. Recent studies have shown that from 7 to 13 per cent of the cases of need met by charity organization societies are deserted wives.[17] Sometimes by separation through divorce the children are scattered and rendered homeless and helpless. Moreover, it sometimes happens that the bickerings of husband

[17] Brandt, *Five Hundred and Seventy-Four Deserters and Their Families*, New York, 1905, p. 10. Colcord, "Desertion and Non-Support in Family Case Work," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1918, p. 101. Colcord, *Broken Homes*, New York, 1919; Pear, "The Joint Operation of Family Helping Agencies in Boston," *The Family*, Oct. 1925, p. 166.

and wife render home a place of wretchedness. Such conditions represent a dissipation of individual and social forces and render all concerned less efficient as bread earners, and lead to social maladjustments out of which grows poverty. Nor must it be forgotten that the home is the original economic unit. It is the center whence radiates into the lives of the coming generation economic ideals and methods, which, if the home is broken up or is not what it should be, are learned much less thoroughly elsewhere. A good system of family desertion laws will help solve the problem of poverty due to desertion, but the other cannot be reached without giving much more attention by society to the art and science of homemaking from every point of view which affects the economic efficiency of the workers and of the managers of business and those who preside in the homes of the country. Schools of domestic economy will do much for the women, but they will not touch seriously the side of the problem pertaining to the men, and for neither the women nor the men will they give that intimate touch of emotion which makes the ways learned in childhood hold with viselike grip. The home must also be preserved for the inculcation of the virtues of industry, perseverance, and adaptability to circumstances and those moral and spiritual qualities which have no small part in the making of efficient economic and social personalities.

Influences of the Physical Environment. — A good many causes of poverty are wrapped up in bad physical or natural conditions. Among these may be enumerated the inadequate natural resources, such as the poor soil, lack of water, or other means of support. With the growth of means of easy and cheap transportation and the development of the habit of migration, this cause of poverty can be partly remedied. The migrations from the crowded and often infertile regions of Europe to America, Australia, and South America are illustrations of one way in which the difficulty can be met.

Again, there are bad climatic conditions which affect the health, strength, and prosperity of individuals. Sometimes these conditions may not be overcome. Often, however, the wit of man combined with capital can change such conditions. Climate, as

it affects crops, is manageable by adaptation of kind of crop to the climate. Once it was thought impossible to raise corn in Minnesota and Wisconsin. By the production of new varieties a corn has been found which can be raised successfully in those northern states. Then there are plant and animal parasites which frequently destroy the means of wealth production and leave the people impoverished thereby. So wonderful has been the advance of science, however, that there is hope now that every plant inimical to man's prosperity will either be so changed that he can make use of it, or that it will be exterminated. The success of agricultural experts during the past quarter of a century has been so great that the task appears by no means to be hopeless. Every year now sees some new process invented to check the ravages of pests which attack the farmer's fields and destroy his crops. Again, natural forces, such as floods, earthquakes, storms, and drought, give individuals such severe reverses as to destroy their independence. Defective drainage, also, leaving swamps that produce disease, may impoverish a whole community through sickness and frequent death.

Many of these causes are dependent more or less upon the judgment of individuals in presuming to reside where nature will not give them sufficient support or where she destroys them through her violence. Yet, on the whole, many of them can be remedied by society. Accidents caused by natural forces are now being lessened by the campaign of "Safety First," by the invention and adoption of safety devices, and when they do occur the loss involved is distributed over society by various kinds of insurance against accident. Some of these adverse natural conditions can be controlled by the wit of man; others cannot as yet. Storms, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions are quite beyond his control. Droughts, fires, floods, and pestilence are partly subject to man's will. Irrigation may solve in some places the problem of drought. Fires may be prevented in most cases. Floods by engineering works may be controlled. Pestilence of various sorts may be limited in their scope, and some of them prevented. Preventive medicine in certain parts of the world has almost eliminated such former scourges as smallpox, yellow fever, and typhoid. Only

in the backward and overpopulated countries do these natural factors play a very important part at present in causing poverty.

Influence of Social Environments. — Poverty may be developed through social conditions. The crowding of the poor into large tenement houses where there is insufficient light and air breeds and intensifies poverty. The evil influence of improper housing cannot be overcome by ordinary charity to the individual, for it has been found that if bad home surroundings cannot be changed, it is idle to hope for any permanent improvement in the inmates. Evil associations which thrive in crowded slums beget idleness, shiftlessness, and evil habits, and induce the conditions favorable to poverty. The defective sanitation usually found in such overpopulated districts adds to the general evil effect. Overcrowding breaks down the ordinary decencies of life, demoralizes the family life, induces vice, undermines the health, and destroys hope. When the overcrowding becomes as great as in some of the great cities, like London and New York, land values go up, and the type of house changes from the small, inexpensive cottage to the large, costly tenement. Consequently the man of small means finds it impossible to own his own home. In all of Greater New York City in 1910 only 11.7 per cent of the homes were owned by those who occupied them, while in the borough of Manhattan only 2.9 per cent were owned by the occupants.[18] He lacks that fine incentive to save in order to pay for a home — a tangible thing appealing to some of the most fundamental feelings. Much is being done in recent years to build good homes and tenements for the people. Rapid transit systems with cheap fares, allowing people to live at a distance from the crowded centers of business and manufacture, and the location of manufacturing plants away from the crowded centers of population yet near enough to enable them to command a sufficient supply of labor and to secure the requisite shipping facilities will do much to prevent the overcrowding now so frequent in our great cities. The large tenements were built to enable men to rent cheap dwelling places and yet get an adequate return upon their investments. They have failed, however, in that they provide barracks instead of homes.

[18] *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, 1910, Vol. I, p. 1313.

Even more important in producing poverty are the evil associations provided for children and adults. Not only do "evil communications corrupt good manners," but they sow the seeds of inefficiency by promoting bad habits and false ideals. The most debasing influence of the saloon was perhaps not the alcoholic liquors sold there, but the conversation, the contact with loafers, criminals, and degenerates who found there their refuge. Combine such associations with the influence of alcohol and you have a potent engine for the debasement of manhood, for the promotion of false ideals of home and family life, and for the production of industrial inefficiency. Any other place where men and boys congregate under bad leadership is equally productive of the destruction of high standards of life affecting economic independence.

Almost as bad is the lack of measures and methods for the fruitful, constructive employment of people's leisure time in recreation of an uplifting nature. Must men and children be worn down towards inefficiency and poverty even in their pleasures? Yet, until recently there was no thought given to the establishment of agencies for rendering men more efficient through their recreation.

The playground provisions of some of our large cities are doing something to take away the curse of depraving influences from people's leisure time. In 1923 there were 680 cities which reported community recreational leadership. 11,079 play leaders were employed. Expenditures for playground maintenance amounted to $13,948,054.[19] Much yet remains to be done, however. Along with their further development both in extent and in provision for the adults, there must go repressive or regulative measures for bad dance halls, amusement parks, vicious theaters, and moving picture shows. Along with these measures must go the development of the social centers, and other positive measures to provide variety and satisfaction in leisure-time activity.

Defective Government. — Legislation in favor of one individual or class may be to the detriment of other individuals or classes

[19] *National Conference on Outdoor Recreations*, 68th Congress, Senate Document No. 151, pp. 197, 198.

and may lead indirectly to poverty. In many instances we find defects in the judicial machinery. Even when there is no corruption or undue influence in the courts, the court costs are so high as to be prohibitive. Poor people cannot sue for their rights; they cannot afford to hire skilled lawyers in their defense.[20] Again, improper and unjust penalties sometimes are imposed which in themselves are detrimental to the individual. Legislation and its interpretation by the courts may be a very efficient means for the advancement of the material interests of society, by removing conditions which lead to poverty, and by developing conditions of industry and thrift. It may also in a measure shape the economic development of a nation and influence the wealth-creating power of individuals or groups.

Whatever else better legislation may secure, it will provide less for special interests and more for the interests of all the people. It will, indeed, not overlook the material development of society, but it will see that in that development the interests of the public are not forgotten or bartered away forever for a song. On the other hand, it will not forget that "man does not live by bread alone"; it will keep constantly in mind those large interests which we include sometimes under the general term "the social welfare" — education, recreation, and "the pursuit of happiness."

Moreover, waste in government bears heavily upon the poor. Millions have been squandered in the United States by "pork barrel" legislation. Rivers have been dredged at great expense on which there is no commerce. Expensive buildings have been built to gratify the local pride of some city and to help the legislator with his constituents. What about the free seeds sent out by Congressmen each year to their people? Who pays the bill? Where does the money come from for subsidies in the form of tariff taxes upon goods in general use but which do not need protection? From every consumer of those goods. Our Federal Pensions are not diminishing in cost in spite of the fact that the veterans of the Civil War are becoming fewer and fewer. It is remarkable how many young widows these veterans leave to be

[20] See Smith, *Justice and the Poor*, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Bul. No. 13, New York, 1919.

supported by a pension. All this waste comes out of the taxpayers. By our loose methods of administering public poor relief we are wasting money by spending it in a way that does not set the recipients upon their feet, but rather pauperizes them. Instead of setting our misdemeanants at work at which they can support at least themselves, we throw them into jails and there feed and house them while they are "laying out" their fine or sentence, all the while perhaps supporting their families from the taxes. Militarism so far as it is not absolutely necessary for the defense of the nation has weighed heavily upon the United States, although more heavily upon some other nations. During the thirty years from 1879 to 1909, 71.5 per cent of the national revenues were devoted to expenditures for war and defense.[21] In 1921 73 per cent went for the expenses of past wars and for national defense.[22] The fumbling methods of government in handling paupers, defectives, insane, and criminals constitute a waste which bears heavily upon the poorer members of society. In 1910 the Massachusetts Commission on the Cost of Living reported that crime, pauperism, insanity, and their collateral incidents cost that state $19,000,000, and that three-fourths of it was wasted. In the United States in 1919 the cities alone with populations of 30,000 or over spent according to a Census Report $55,086,145 for charities, hospitals, and corrections, and another $80,917,027 for police departments.[23] All this cost is borne by the taxpayer.

Misdirected and Inadequate Education. — Education to be of the greatest service should have reference to the conditions of life of those to be educated and their prospective future. All education should aim, among other things, to train the individual for self-support. It is not intended here to suggest that all education be made up entirely of the so-called vocational subjects and simply prepare for the commercial and industrial life, but the industrial element should be made universal in all education, for the first business of a good citizen is to be a producer and thereby a bread earner. Until recently a boy could not get an education

[21] Massachusetts *Report of the Commission on the Cost of Living*, Boston, 1910, p. 199.

[22] Pratt, "The Cost of Government," *Better Times*, June 9, 1924, pp. 12, 13.

[23] *Financial Statistics of Cities, 1919*, Bureau of the Census, p. 204.

in a trade at public expense unless he committed a crime and was sent to the industrial school or the reformatory. While the sociologist would be the last to exalt the making of a living over the making of a life, he believes that the making of a decent living for himself and family is the *sine qua non* of making a life which is worthy of the name. Happily, a beginning towards supplying this lack in our school system has been made. Much, however, remains to be done to make education do its full share in the prevention of poverty.

Furthermore, how many of our paupers are such because they have some physical defect which might have been corrected had it been discovered in time! Recent studies have shown that some children who fail in school are suffering from poor eyes, poor nutrition due to bad teeth, deafness due to adenoids and enlarged tonsils, and other physical defects easily corrected. Other investigations indicate that there are more of the retarded and dull pupils who are mentally defective than we ever suspected. While these cannot have the defect removed, they can be discovered, and special educational treatment given them in special classes, or in special institutions, and they can be segregated so as not to entail their defect upon the next generation. Medical inspection in the schools, though only quite recently introduced in the United States, in contrast with its long establishment in some of the countries of Europe, has spread widely and is doing much to teach us some of the causes of the failure of the schools to prepare pupils for life.[24] Tragic in its significance is the fact brought out by some recent studies of the occupations chosen by pupils who left school at the end of the compulsory school age to earn a living. Large numbers were found in "blind alley occupations" — messenger, bell boy, cash girl, clerk, and common laborer — in which they were earning their maximum at twenty years of age. From that time they slowly gravitated down toward dependency. Vocational guidance in the schools, based upon a close study both of the youth's aptitudes and upon the prospects in the various trades and vocations, has been proposed to correct this defect of our educational sys-

[24] Gulick and Ayres, *Medical Inspection of Schools*, Chap. XII.

tem. Certainly every youth, ignorant often of his own capacities and generally quite unacquainted with the comparative opportunities offered by the various vocations, has the right to expect some one in this great society of which he is a part, to give him counsel on these vital questions. He has a right to know something of the nature and promise of different occupations for his own sake. Society owes it to herself to give him that guidance. In many places it is being done with considerable show of success.[25] Coupled with this defect is the frequency of inadequate education. Children are allowed to be out of school, either at work or in idleness, when they should be preparing more thoroughly for the work of life. Many of these pupils could have accomplished much more and become industrially independent, had longer training been given them. Stricter compulsory education laws, courses better adapted to their needs, and continuation schools, will do something to aid in correcting these defects of the educational system.[26]

Bad Industrial and Economic Conditions. — Frequently a community has such bad industrial conditions that they are conducive to the wealth of a few and the poverty of many. When the control of the sources of wealth falls into the hands of comparatively few people, there are indications that a certain number of individuals will fail to have sufficient income for their support. Moreover, there are various changes that occur through the shifting of economic society, either through what might be called natural or arbitrary social causes, which induce conditions of poverty. Among these might be named the variations in the value of money; trade depressions, like those of 1870, 1893, 1907, and 1921; changes in trade and industry, brought about by improved machinery, such as occurred in England following the Industrial Revolution; the shifting of industry caused by invention and discovery, an example of the former being supplied by the displacement of hand-weavers by machines after the invention of the power loom, and

[25] Bloomfield, *Vocational Guidance.*

[26] Miles, H. E., *Industrial Education*, No. 3, Bulletin of the Wisconsin State Board of Industrial Education.

Reber, Louis E., *Industrial and Continuation Schools*, No. 5, Bulletin of the Wisconsin State Board of Industrial Education.

of the latter by the impoverishment of the New England farmers upon the opening up of the rich farming lands of the Mississippi Valley; excessive or ill-managed taxation, as in the pre-Revolutionary days in France; the undue power of class over class, well illustrated by the supremacy of the aristocracy in Russia, and of the "coal barons" in the United States; and the immobility of labor, much more noticeable in former times than now and in a country like Russia than in the United States. Enforced idleness of wage earners is a potent cause of poverty and the most difficult of all to overcome. The second most important cause of dependency as shown by charity cases is unemployment. In Boston for 1923–1924 it caused 23.6 per cent of the cases which came to the agencies.[27] All of these have, at various times and in different degrees, influenced the social population, causing it to degenerate.

Each of these conditions in varying degrees is amenable to correction. Variations in the value of money are not under absolute control, especially over long periods of time. If a new discovery of a basic metal like gold is made or if through war or some similar catastrophe an enormous waste of capital occurs, the value of money is bound to vary. With every increase in the amount of gold available the influence of new discoveries of the metal is diminished unless the demand for gold increases equally with the new supply discovered. On the other hand, any monetary device which makes gold less necessary as a base, unless the base is thereby made less stable, would tend to make less likely fluctuations in its value due to this cause. The abolition of war by arbitration and international conciliation would remove a very important agency of waste, and would therefore make the value of gold more stable.

Commercial crises, economists tell us, are the result sometimes of an over-extended credit, often of an unsound money system, sometimes of an interruption of the ordinary channels of trade by war, or the fear of war. Anything which disturbs the ordinary course of national or international commerce when industrial conditions are strained helps to precipitate a panic. Measures,

[27] See Gillin, *op. cit.*, pp. 73, 76, 124, and Chap. VIII.

therefore, which prevent frequent and profound changes of commercial policy within a nation, and between nations, make less likely the crises which ruin people and press most heavily upon the poor. If the time ever comes when war and the fear of it no longer paralyze business and turn the laborers in shop and on farm into destroyers of life and property, one of the important causes of poverty will be removed.

There seems no way at present to obviate entirely the often terrible cost of progress incident to the introduction of new machinery and methods, which often means the displacement of workers by a machine and their consequent poverty because they find themselves unable to adapt themselves to a new occupation. A more general education in youth, thus making the individual more adjustable to changed conditions, has been suggested as a measure that would help solve the problem. The present tendency, however, is towards making the worker merely a cog in a machine and therefore the less able to adjust himself to a new situation. Sometimes the workers have organized and resisted the introduction of labor-saving machinery, but that means greater cost of the article to the consumer.

A like situation exists relative to the hardships involved for some in inventions and discovery. Unless society is willing to sacrifice all progress inventions cannot be repressed. These must go on, for they mean ultimately better conditions for the greater number. This kind of poverty is a cost of progress which society must pay. Society can prevent, however, the burden falling entirely upon a single class. By means of a system of pensions and social insurance the cost could be spread out over the whole social group.

By ironing out fluctuations in trade and industry, as suggested above, much of the enforced idleness of laborers would cease. A practical system of employment bureaus would take care of others. A system of insurance against unemployment along lines similar to the systems existing in Germany and England, would help to distribute the burden over society more equitably.

Thus, by such measures society is struggling with these socially caused maladjustments which involve the poverty of many.

Unwise Philanthropy. — One of the greatest causes of pauperism is unwise philanthropy, for it induces people who are poor to become dependent. As is stated in the next chapter, wise charity seeks to teach people to help themselves and to develop independence and thrift through material and spiritual aid. Much that is called charity is nothing more than almsgiving. An indulgence in a maudlin sentiment which destroys the spirit of independence and undermines self-help is antisocial. Scientific charity will relieve distress and teach people to help themselves by making it impossible to become habitually dependent upon others. It will make every effort to prevent pauperism. It aims to take such measures as will enable people to remain independent, or, if dependent upon others for a time, to make that period as short as possible. Real charity does not try to relieve of their responsibility those upon whom the burden of support naturally falls. It endeavors to help the natural supporters, however, to carry their burdens as easily as possible. Modern charity believes that whenever possible relatives rather than the state should support dependents, but it will do all it can to help those relatives to secure work by which they may do the task with honor and independence. It helps people to help themselves. This it does with material relief when that will serve best, but always with skilled counsel. Giving to a beggar on the street probably will confirm him in dependency; he will learn that a living may be obtained more easily that way than by labor. Giving to a family without knowing their circumstances may determine a career of pauperism for them. Investigation, careful records to enable others to whom such a family appeals to know their history and what is being done for them by others, and efforts at securing them an opportunity to earn an honest living are absolutely essential in our complex civilization in our great cities where few people know their neighbors, would we give helpfully. Service as well as immediate material help is imperative. The world has been slow to recognize these principles, but at the present an increasing number of people are becoming aware of their existence and believe in their possibilities.[28]

[28] See Devine, *Principles of Relief*, pp. 185–266.

To remedy the evils growing out of unwise philanthropy principles of scientific charity, — principles, while not final, because they are developing, which are based upon the experience of those who have dealt most extensively with these problems, — have been adopted. They have been most thoroughly worked out by what is called organized charities and certain German municipal experiments in dealing with poverty to be described in the next chapter. These principles to succeed must be applied both by private and public relief officials and receive the enthusiastic moral support of every private organization which gives relief and of every philanthropic individual. They must be worked into our public relief system, which for the most part to-day in America is actually medieval in its methods, — no investigation, scarcely any records worthy of the name, and little coöperation with the private agencies which are trying to introduce constructive methods. Some of the experiments of foreign cities might well be tried here with certain modifications. The vagrant and those unwilling to work must be made to work. Combined with these measures must go the preventive social devices described in the preceding sections. We have only just begun to attack the problem of poverty. To some it seems hopeless, but to those who are in the closest touch with this grave problem and who know most about the failures of our best methods, but who also know that these modern methods have never had a fair chance, there is nothing but promise. It is they who talk of "the cure of poverty."

Summary. — As the causes of poverty are numerous and varied in nature so attempts to prevent it must come from many sources. To sum up the matter, we may conclude that among other things are improvements in industrial conditions through the process of social evolution and governmental influence, such as steadiness of employment at a fair remuneration, stability of industrial and financial conditions, justice in taxation, government, and legislation. Again, improvement in modes of living, such as better housing, good home surroundings, improved sanitation, better care of the personal health, and profitable recreation and amusement. The change in personal characteristics through

education by developing thrift, energy, prudence, sound judgment, and the power to labor, is a means of the prevention of poverty. So likewise, the change in personal habits, the disuse of liquor and narcotics, and the abolition of selfishness and the promotion of love in the home, with purity of life, all tend to develop the character of man and to remove him from a possible state of dependence. As sickness is one of the chief causes of poverty the removal of disease through science and legislation are important measures of prevention. Add to the foregoing, scientific charity, which helps persons at the right time and in the right way, and poverty will gradually grow less as the years pass.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Make an estimate of the extent of poverty in your own community. (If a small place you can get the information by going to the town and county relief officers and from common report as to who has received help.)

2. Make a list of the evil social consequences of poverty among families of which you know, *e.g.*, how many boys never had a chance at a proper education, how many girls "went wrong" because of poverty, etc.

3. Classify the poor families with which you are acquainted in your community under as many of the heads in the chapter as you think are necessary to account for their poverty.

4. What is your community doing to remedy or prevent poverty? (Make a definite list of the things.)

5. What is your community not doing that it might do to cure and prevent poverty?

6. Suggest any other methods of meeting the poverty problem than those mentioned in the text.

7. What was the nature and extent of Flood Relief in the Mississippi Valley in 1927 and of the Florida Hurricane in 1928?

8. What are the methods of Red Cross relief?

9. Should the government establish pawn shops, public dance halls, and pool halls?

10. Who is responsible for the existence of the bootlegger?

CHAPTER XXXIII

CHARITIES AND CHARITY ORGANIZATION

The Philosophy of Charity. — The common meaning of charity is the giving of alms to the poor or the help of the sick. What is popularly known as charity in modern times is called alms in the Scripture and in other ancient writings. What is called charity in the Scripture is merely love or a wide human sympathy. It may apply in its widest sense to all classes of people, whatever their condition, to whom sympathy and aid may be given. The modern use of the term charity has come to mean assistance of those in need of help by methods which have developed in the course of the attempt to help the needy without pauperizing them. Organized charity is a term which originated in reaction against the more or less indiscriminate individual and church charity of the Middle Ages. Organized charity arose in quite modern times, in fact, just about the beginning of the sixteenth century, in the effort of a few communities, such as Bruges, Belgium, Leisnig, Saxony, Rouen, France, and Ypres, Belgium, to unify the assistance to the poor in those communities in the interest of more effective administration of the rather chaotic charity of the day.[1] More than a century later a more effective organization of the charities within a municipality was set up in Hamburg, Germany, to be described later. The organization of private charities for more socially desirable results came into being in London about 1867. As one result of the experience of the years since, it has become quite clear that charity to be effective must be an organized rather than an individual affair, and that certain methods must be employed if the recipients are to be really helped rather than demoralized.

[1] Salter, *Some Early Tracts on Poor Relief*, London, 1926.

Society seeks to protect itself by caring for the weak in order to prevent social disease and degeneration. The normal healthy social structure is made stronger by warding off pauperism, by preventing insanity, epilepsy, imbecility, blindness, and deafness, as well as by caring for the afflicted. Certain philosophers, Herbert Spencer among the number, have advocated the development of the strong by making them stronger and neglecting to care for the weak and decrepit. They hold strictly to the doctrine of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Hence, properly to enforce this principle of natural evolution, the efforts of humanity should be devoted to the improvement of the best of the stock, rather than to an attempt to uplift the defective, out of which nothing strong and normal can come. They go so far as to say that if the weak and diseased members of society were all left to perish, the strong would then perpetuate the race, and thus gradually the weak would be replaced by the strong. This is a good evolutionary principle in the absence of a conscious agency to supplement nature's selection. Nature's chief method of securing a more perfect adjustment to existing conditions, so far as modern science has come to definite conclusions, is by the elimination of the ill-adapted. As soon, however, as Intelligence appears upon the scene nature's slow methods are supplemented by conscious adaptation to natural conditions. Nature by eliminating the hairless animals produced after millenniums long-haired animals to withstand the glacial cold. It is man, however, since the domestication of animals, who by the introduction of intelligence into the breeding process has, to put it from the standpoint of results rather than of method, bred the legs off and put hams on the hog, developed the race horse on the one hand and the draft horse on the other, brought forth the spineless cactus, produced the numberless varieties of various kinds of fruits and cereals. It is still done by elimination in part, but elimination has been supplemented and hastened by conscious selective breeding instead of by nature's tardy processes. What man has actually done to secure these results so speedily is to select those varieties for breeding which show the qualities he wishes and to prevent the propagation

of the undesirable kinds. The slow and wasteful method of nature, therefore, should not be allowed to work out its results in humanity without some restrictions. Society is so closely organized and the relations of its members so intimate that the strong to protect themselves must be mindful of the weak. As well may the head say that it cares not if the hand is diseased so long as body, heart, and head remain, for indeed the disease may spread until head, heart, and body are involved. Hence, if for no other reason than its own protection, society must care for the weak and the defective. Also, because if society practiced utter selfishness, it would lose interest in humanity, and altruism, and even sympathy would decline and the human race be weakened on account of the loss of its best social qualities. Charity, then, when properly administered, may protect and help the weak, prevent the spread of weakness, and make the strong stronger by unselfish activity.

Universality of Charity among Nations. — Charity or almsgiving is a very ancient practice, common to all nations after a more or less permanent social life was established. The Hindu, Egyptian, Persian, Hebrew, and Chinese philosophers have all uttered lofty and humane sentiments in regard to the consideration of the poor, and means of relief are recognized in many of their laws. In Athens a " poor tax " was regularly levied and collected. Aristotle advocated the relief of the poor, not by a tax but by a more permanent method of distributing the land in small parcels among the needy, that they might become self-supporting. While most savage tribes care little for the poor or for the aged, the Aztecs of Mexico and the Incas of Peru made provision for these classes. The former taught that the poor should be helped and the latter provided homes for the care of orphans. The Jewish synagogue was a center for the distribution of alms and the Hebrew commonwealth had wise provisions for the care of the poor. As the synagogue at first was the meeting place of the Christians it continued to be a center for the distribution of alms, and its successor, the church, followed its example. It is noteworthy that one of the earliest officers to be appointed in the primitive Christian organizations was the

"deacon" whose chief duty was to look after the poor in the church.[2]

Many of the problems that confront us to-day in regard to the administration of the charities troubled the ancient nations, although it must be admitted that, with all of the fine precepts of philosophers, real charity was sadly wanting, in most instances, when it came to the practice of genuine help to the needy. The sayings of the wise in charity as well as in religion were far different from the doings of the people. And in the ancient nations, as in many modern, the practices of government and social order were such as to create the conditions of poverty more rapidly than they could be relieved, even under the best administration.

The main defect of the ancient methods of charity was that the chief motive to almsgiving was personal interest. Through superstitious fear, men were urged to give, that they might thereby enjoy the favor of the gods. "He that giveth to the poor lendeth to the Lord," are the words of the Hebrew Sage. This sentiment was repeated a thousand times in the writings of the Fathers of the Christian Church. In fact, it remained the chief motive down to very recent times and has not lost its power even to-day. Or, the motive was political expediency. The politicians of ancient Rome gave alms and those of modern New York give to the poor for the same motive. Or, people give out of sympathy but without insight. Their impulses are good, but their methods produce more pauperism than they cure. The motive being egoistic did not create a rational desire to help the poor, and led the people to careless and indiscriminating giving, thereby creating paupers and beggars. The poverty-stricken wretch of ancient society excited the pity of benevolently disposed people, but through the teachings of the Church he became "God's pauper," and giving to him opened to the giver the doorway to Heaven. Temporary relief was usually the extent of the aid given, and no systematic efforts were made to help the needy to help themselves. Hence, no organization was attempted. To give alms was to throw a piece of money to a beggar with the hope

[2] Harnack, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christenthums*, translated as *The Expansion of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 194.

that he would soon be out of sight and out of mind. While this was one of the chief characteristics of ancient almsgiving, it has not entirely departed from modern charity. Many seem to give to relieve their consciences or to get rid of the importunate solicitor, with the vague hope that the person may be benefited. And by some giving in the abstract is still considered a means of grace.

Alms among the Romans. — As the Roman system was widespread at the time of the appearance of Christianity, it is necessary to refer briefly to the condition of affairs especially subsequent to the foundation of the Empire. The history of the destruction of the small landholder of Italy, through the numerous foreign wars which killed off many, taxed to death others, and by bringing in cheap grain from conquered countries drove out of the country still others, resulting finally during the latter days of the Empire in a few rich men owning the land, while the mass of the population were either poor peasants or slaves in the country or flocked to the cities to live miserable lives, is too familiar to need repetition. As the rich class possessed all the wealth and controlled agriculture, commerce, and industry, the poor came to expect alms or support from the former. As the rich and noble maintained their power through political position, the latter paid for support with their votes. The mob finally became large and dangerous and difficult to manage; yet he who sought power in Rome must reckon with its demands, for there was no middle class to maintain the equipoise of social and political life. All labor had been degraded by the introduction of slavery until it was considered ignoble to engage in any pursuit except politics and the proprietorship of a landed estate. There was no other alternative than that one class should be supported by the other, and, hence, the poorer class expected gifts from the rich and powerful.

After the establishment of the Empire these conditions became greatly exaggerated. At the time of Augustus, it is estimated that 580,000 persons received relief in the city of Rome. The custom of the emperors, when elevated to the throne, to give large gifts to the people, became general among all those who held political position.

When it became known throughout the Empire that gifts of

corn and wine were scattered freely, many flocked to the city to be fed. While pauperism was not general through the provinces, Rome became overburdened with people seeking alms.

To allow the poor to live, attempts were made to regulate the price of corn, and Caius Gracchus succeeded in making the price of a Roman bushel five *asses*, or less than the cost of production. This, of course, caused a falling off in the production and shipment of corn, and as a consequence corn was distributed gratis to the populace. Then followed a careless or indiscriminate distribution of corn, and later of oil and wine as well, which increased from year to year and reign to reign. To give some estimate of the extent of these gifts by politicians, demagogues, and public officials a few general statements will suffice. In 73 B.C. it is estimated that gifts amounting to $438,500 in value were distributed; in 46 B.C. it had increased to $3,375,000; in the time of Augustus Cæsar 320,000 men received aid or grants of corn, and the number increased from this on. The annual distribution from Nero's time to the end of Severus's reign rose to a value of $1,500,000. This was, of course, done by the officials representing the state. But this amount was greatly augmented by office seekers and demagogues who could keep their places at the public crib only by dividing the spoils with the mob. It is estimated that Nero, during his reign, disposed of food, etc., valued at $96,500,000 to the people and that Hadrian gave food, etc., valued at about $165 per capita to the people of Rome. It is difficult to ascertain the exact amounts, but even though these estimates are only approximate they give us some notion of the enormous expenditure. But this could not be called charity in its best sense, but rather a systematic method of developing pauperism. It established the right of the needy citizen to demand and receive help from the state. The Romans did something to provide protection to all people who resided within their territory, and especially those who were Roman citizens, but there was really little sympathy for people who were in distress. Even in ancient Rome the exposure of infants who were deformed was advocated, and it was considered better that the aged should die and not prove a burden to the community.

Philanthropy was by no means unknown, however, among the Greeks and Romans. We must not permit Uhlhorn's prejudiced position in his thorough but unfair work, *Christian Charity in the Ancient Church*, to blind our eyes to the fact that the people among whom Christianity entered as a "gospel of love and charity," as Harnack calls it, had cared for the poor from sympathy for them before charity was polluted by political motives. Human sympathy is not limited to Christianized peoples; it lies at the basis of all societies in every age, as we have seen. It was the mainspring of charity in Greece and Rome before it gave way to the passion for political domination in the period of the disintegration of the early, efficient social bonds. Doubtless the contrast between the charity of the Greek and Roman cities of that day and that to be seen among the early Christians aflame with the passion of a new brotherhood and with a heightened sense of membership in a new and heavenly society was striking enough. The charity of the Christian Church, however, was fine enough not to need the factitious splendor of a false contrast.[3]

Charity of the Christian Church. — The early Christian associations had for one of their cardinal points the care of the poor of their own membership. The teaching that all men were brethren made it necessary that brotherly love should abound. The Church found itself diametrically opposed to the Roman doctrine and system which it found in existence when it entered the Roman Empire.

With a widely extended sympathy for all humanity the Church began its work of permanent help to the poor, the suffering, and the downtrodden. Against the calculating political nature of the Roman politicians, it set forth the warm heart-love of fellow men. Upon the downfall of the Roman Empire the Church soon absorbed all of the charitable work of the time.

With the passing of time, however, and the Church's succession to the place of power occupied hitherto by the Empire, the ethical motive was contaminated by the selfish motive of thus securing the favor of Heaven for the giver of alms, and thus forging

[3] Harnack, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christenthums*, translated as *The Expansion of Christianity*, Vol. I, Chap. III.

one more chain with which to bind men to the Church. Instead of the old political motive of the Roman statesmen, the Church substituted the commercial motive of securing by almsgiving a treasury of grace. The foundations of such a doctrine are to be found, in truth, as early as the writings known as the *Shepherd of Hermas* and the *Second Epistle of Clement.* Cyprian, the bishop of Carthage, wrote that alms are the means by which we wash off any stains contracted subsequent to the cleansing of baptism.[4] Christianity in her conflict with barbarism attempted to bring all men within her fold by appealing to motives already familiar to them, and did not scorn to appeal to such motives in order to secure gifts for the poor.

This was a kind of giving which existed for the benefit of the giver alone. According to theory, all gifts to the poor were gifts to God, and those who furnished the gifts received their reward in Heaven. Therefore, giving became a means of direct salvation to Christians, a part of their religion. This is a vicious principle, for when carried far enough it makes religions irreligious and charity uncharitable. When it comes to turning over lands and estates to be given to the poor, for the sole benefit of the giver, it results in a system of selfishness. Nor is that all, for it leads to corruption of the society which obtains funds on the pretense of insuring the salvation of souls in return for the loan.

Yet, it must be added, the Church cared not only for members of its own little societies but also for those with whom it came in contact, especially after the establishment of monasteries. These it established throughout its realm, and they became asylums for the poor and oppressed. It built hospitals and prepared homes for the care of the poor, and preached to the whole world the lesson of charity and brotherly kindness, with a new earnestness born of the most powerful sanctions.

Results of the Charity of the Church. — The power which the Church obtained through the decline of the Roman Empire came to her in part legitimately through well-rendered service. In part, the service rendered was for the selfish purpose of securing adherents. Consequently with that power came the respon-

[4] *De opere et eleemosyniis* i, quoted by Harnack, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 191.

sibility of caring for all of the subjects within reach of the Church's authority. The result was a burden too great to be easily borne.

On account of the indiscriminate giving on the part of the Church, which believed in treating all people alike, thousands took advantage of it and grew up in indolence and became veritable paupers, willing to draw a large part of their living from public sources. So during the Middle Ages and at the beginning of the modern period, the results of the lavish hand of the Church began to appear in the thousands of all classes of every description who clung to ecclesiastical and lay associations and institutions for their own support. No one could censure the Church for indiscriminate giving, if he granted the premises upon which almsgiving was based. Moreover, there was no careful consideration of the effects of this indiscriminate charity. The need was great. There was no strongly organized government, and the Church was practically the only existing agency of help. When one considers the dense ignorance still prevailing concerning the true principles of charitable relief, he is prepared to deal leniently with the one institution of the Middle Ages which was attempting in any organized way to meet the needs of men.

Charity of the State. — When society became thoroughly feudalized, each person had his place and his support, such as it was, and there was little need of almsgiving. On the decay of this system of government the number of poor increased enormously and the burdens of the Church became so heavy as not to be borne without the assistance of the state. Gradually the nascent nations of Europe began to adopt measures of relief. Various continental cities made the first experiments. First to do so on a large scale was England.

At first laws were passed for the regulation of labor with the object of keeping the laborer in the state of servitude which the feudal system had created. Among these laws passed during the fourteenth and fiftecnth centuries was one whose object was to repress vagrancy. (12 Richard II.) When Henry VIII dissolved the monasteries, vagrancy increased and laws were enacted intended to diminish it. Subsequently vagrancy laws were made more severe (Ed. VI) and provision was made to raise

funds for the poor by appointing collectors in each parish. The Church was still the dispenser of charity. It was not until Elizabeth's reign, however, that the state took a vigorous interest in charity and that the power of administering it was shifted from the ecclesiastical to the civil authorities. A series of laws was passed which finally culminated in the statute of 1601 (43 Elizabeth), known as the foundation of the English Poor Law. Laws followed, from time to time, which modified and improved this act until a complete state system of poor relief was established. These laws in many respects were salutary but their unwise administration had a tendency to increase pauperism and consequently enlarge the expenditures for its relief. In the care of the poor the state had reached the conclusion that all of the needy poor should receive help and as nearly all laborers were needy the conclusion was inevitable that they should receive aid. Expenditures increased, until in 1783 the amount for poor relief was, according to Fowle,[5] £2,004,238; in 1803 it had increased to £4,267,965, and in 1818 it reached its high tide in the sum of £7,870,801, the population at this time being only 11,000,000.[6]

In 1834 the Poor Law was revised and the administration was reformed. Subsequent acts have continued to modify and improve it. The nation still suffers from the evils of a previous short-sighted policy. Although it possesses the most elaborate state poor relief system in existence, no nation has greater burdens to bear from pauperism.

Hamburg-Elberfeld System. — In striking contrast with the comparative failure especially of out-relief in England is an experiment first tried in a German city. About 1765 there arose in Hamburg a new method of dealing with paupers and poverty-stricken people. During the middle of the eighteenth century and toward its close the number of helpless and wretched people had increased greatly throughout Europe. A movement for the assistance of these people arose. A general wave of benevolence and charity spread over Europe. While it caused

[5] *The Poor Law*, p. 73.

[6] For a more detailed account see Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1926, pp. 147–189.

the relief of the helpless, it was so lacking in intelligence and system as to be a detriment rather than a help to society. Hamburg was a rich city, having been engaged in trade with the East and West for many years. It was cosmopolitan in nature and attracted many to the city, either for work or for a living without work. The streets were lined with beggars, thousands of people receiving help from all sources. Finally, a society was organized in Hamburg among the citizens, whose chief aim was to promote a better system of government. To this society a certain Professor Büsch presented a novel plan for the care of the poor, which was finally put into operation. He organized a central bureau, and divided the city into districts, appointing an overseer in each district. The helpless were taught to help themselves, work being supplied where they could not find it; people were forbidden to give alms at the door; an industrial school was provided for the children; hospitals for the sick; and in fact a general system was established for the care of every one according to his needs and deserts. It worked a complete revolution in Hamburg. It drove out the paupers or put them to work. It relieved the distress of children and educated them to industry and self-support. It cared for the sick, and repressed begging on the streets. The transformation was quite complete. Thirteen successful years were followed by a decline for a time.[7] The system was revived, however, and the idea spread to Elberfeld, a small German town, which applied the system with some modifications in 1852 so that the Elberfeld system, so well known among charitable workers, was in reality the original Hamburg system slightly improved.

A summary of the Elberfeld system here may be of service. The city was divided into sections. Within the confines of each section were included about 300 people, but with not more than four paupers in any one section. Over each of these sections was placed an almoner, as he was called. The almoner was the official with whom each needy person came into first-hand contact. To him the needy of that section made application for help. He then inquired carefully into all the circumstances of the case. If convinced that the family needed relief he gave it

[7] For details and causes see Henderson, *Modern Methods of Charity*, pp. 9–12.

himself. However, he had to keep in close touch with the family by a visit at least once in two weeks. He gave relief according to a minimum standard set down by law. Any income the family might have was deducted from this minimum so as to make sure that it was not getting more than enough to supply the bare necessities of life. The almoner not only supplied relief, but also was supposed to keep a general oversight over his district and act as adviser to any whose circumstances indicated the possibility of falling into dependence. He helped secure employment for the unemployed, medical help for the sick, and offered advice to the improvident and dissipated, or in case of the incorrigible, reported them for prosecution. He loaned sewing machines and tools belonging to the municipality to those who might thus be kept from want. These almoners were appointed for three years and service was compulsory, on pain of loss of the franchise from three to six years and an increased rate of taxation. The best citizens were thus secured for this work. They served for a long term of years, being reappointed again and again, society thus securing experienced men. For example, among 600 almoners recently appointed one had served 49 years, 19 over 30 years, 81 over 20 years, and 268 over 10 years. The office was considered such an honor that it was frequently sought by the best citizens, being considered the first step on the ladder to political office in the municipality. These almoners were usually unpaid, although in some places where the system is in use, some of the officers are paid.

Fourteen of these sections were organized into a district over which was an overseer whose business it was to preside at the fortnightly meetings of the almoners, where the reports of all these almoners were considered and a minute book prepared for the Central Committee of nine which was over the whole system in the city. This committee met fortnightly but on the night following the meeting of the district meetings. Indoor relief also was controlled by this Central Committee, the overseers and almoners having no connection with that. In many places both men and women served as almoners. These almoners were chosen from all classes of the population, not from the upper

class alone. In every city where the system is in existence a large army of men and women of at least average intelligence are interested in the problem of poverty, not after dilettante fashion, but by first-hand acquaintance. Efficient service is secured because it is personal and intimate. With no more than four cases to look after it is possible to show true neighborliness. Constructive philanthropy is possible not only because the system supplies personal treatment for those who already have fallen into poverty, but because it makes the almoner an instrument of prevention. He is a father to the fatherless, an adviser to the foolish, and serves as the connecting link between the inefficient individual and society which so often is only a lifeless abstraction or a heartless automaton to the poor.

The value of the system, however, is indicated in these figures: In spite of the fact that the population of Elberfeld increased from fifty thousand in 1852 to one hundred sixty-two thousand in 1904, the number of those receiving either temporary or permanent help increased from 4000 to only 7689 or a decrease from 8 per cent of the population to 4.7 per cent. The cost of relief per capita of population in 1852 was 89 cents; in 1904 it was 88 cents including expense of supporting the almshouse, orphanage, and kindred institutions.

It may be added incidentally that the system as administered in most of the cities of Europe at present has some defects. The almoners, although not trained for the work, make their own investigations. It is quite likely that it is not done as well as the trained worker would do it. They give relief themselves, — a practice which organized charity on the basis of long experience elsewhere condemns. The Elberfeld system will not work even in Germany without the aid of carefully devised poor laws. As Mr. Almy has remarked, however, these defects are not inherent in the system, and could easily be remedied. Certainly the result in lessened poverty justifies the hope that its essential features may, perhaps in modified form, be introduced into this country.[8]

[8] *New Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, p. 438. Almy, "The Use of Volunteers by Public Aid Officials," in *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1904, pp. 113–134.

That the Elberfeld system is not adapted without some change to cities of all sizes and conditions is shown by the experience of Hamburg. As the relief system was originally organized at Hamburg there were a number of defects which account for its failure. The number of cases looked after by one almoner was from twenty to as many as eighty; the duty of the almoner was consequently limited to receiving applications for relief and more or less careless granting of aid at first without frequent enough reinvestigation; and the records and materials bearing upon the cases and their administration were not collected in one central office. In 1892 a reorganization was begun. An expert was employed to assist in the reorganization of the system. As a result of this reorganization requirements were adopted making the visitors more independent of the central office than before, and making the districts not only independent but also giving them such rights as the nomination of superintendents of districts and of new helpers, and considerable power to vote aid. Hamburg dropped the small district system of the Elberfeld plan because it had been found in Hamburg that with its rapidly shifting population some districts would soon come to have no needy and others would have many. Hence, the new Hamburg system also did away with committing a given needy person to one almoner. A district is laid out with a superintendent at its head. He selects his helpers in number according to the need of the district. He receives the applications for aid. He assigns the cases to the person who he thinks will best fit that particular case. That case may be left in the hands of this person or after some trial it may be given to another better fitted to deal with it. This plan also enables him to give to the man of leisure more cases than he gives to the busy man, and to adapt the helpers to the particular case in hand. This system differs also from the Elberfeld system in granting relief for a longer period. In the Elberfeld system relief is granted for only two weeks. In the new Hamburg system the dependents are divided into classes, one of these containing the aged and the sick and such others as are in a condition not likely to change soon may be granted an allowance for six months, all others for not more than

a month, until the next session of the council. The new Hamburg system has another feature not found in the Elberfeld system, a body composed of the superintendents of the districts and called a *Kreis*, or circuit. These constitute an appeal board to hear appeals from the districts, to discuss matters of concern to all the districts in their circuit, and to consider and care for cases which need institutional care. The chairmen of these circuits are members of the central board. The central board has much the same duties as the Central Committee of the Elberfeld system. It is the court of final appeal, conducts investigations into conditions in the city bearing upon poverty, makes general rules and regulations under which the various poor officers operate, and decides the larger and more general policies. It has as its clerical agency a business management. Through this central agency all applications for relief must pass.

The system has worked remarkably well in Hamburg and has been adopted with success in a number of the larger cities of Germany.[9]

The Indiana System. — While space will not permit a full description of the system of poor relief which has done so much to make Indiana a leader in the administration of poor relief, especially out-door relief, in the United States, a brief outline will serve the purpose, perhaps, of indicating what can be done with a carefully devised plan of administration based upon the old discredited system of county and township relief.

The jail, poorhouse, county hospital, and children's home are the institutions under the control of the county authorities in Indiana. In addition to the board of county commissioners who in most states have sole charge of these county institutions, the legislature in 1899 provided for the appointment by the circuit court judge of six persons to act as a board of county charities. The appointment is mandatory on petition of fifteen reputable citizens of the county. They are required to visit each of the charitable and correctional institutions in the county receiving public monies, and to report their findings to the county com-

[9] For this summary we are indebted to the splendid outline of the system given by Professor Henderson in his *Modern Methods of Charity*.

missioners at least quarterly and to the circuit judge annually. Copies of their reports are to be furnished the newspapers and the Board of State Charities. As a result of these provisions and the excellent supervision given the poorhouses by the Board of State Charities, the poorhouses of that State have been made more nearly into what they should be, — homes for the aged and respectable poor, instead of dumping grounds for the refuse of humanity. The following table tells its own story on this point:

	1891	1909
Inmates under 16 years of age	13.3%	1.2%
Inmates 16 and under 60	52.7	47.8
Inmates 60 and over	34.0	51.0

The Indiana plan of managing township charities has been even more striking because out-door relief is included. Under the old system of unsupervised relief the township trustees in 1895 were spending annually $630,168.79 without any record being kept to show who were helped and for what reason. In that year a law was enacted at the suggestion of the Board of State Charities which revolutionized matters. The trustees as overseers of the poor were required by that law to file with the respective boards of county commissioners reports which must contain certain information concerning every family and person aided, a duplicate of which report was to be sent to the Board of State Charities. That provided supervision not only by the county commissioners, but also by a state body. Two years later a law was passed requiring the trustees to levy a tax against the township to cover the cost of poor relief granted to persons in that township. This supplied the other element lacking in the previous law, that of putting upon the people where the poor lived the burden of their relief instead of paying the cost out of the general funds of the county. Each trustee was now responsible directly to his constituents for whatever expenditure was made. Two years later a law applying the principles of organized charity to the relief of the poor was passed and put the final element needed into the laws governing out-door relief for a whole state. Thus are provided supervision by a state board, local financial responsibility, and the application of the principles of scientific charity to

the relief system of a state. This system also affords an opportunity to the State Board to study the whole problem of poverty in that state and get at the real causes of poverty.

The results of this system are shown by the fact that while in 1897 one out of every thirty-one of the inhabitants of the state was receiving public relief, ten years later only one out of seventy-one was receiving such relief, although the amount given each person had risen from $4.72 to $5.13. In 1897 there were thirty-eight counties in the state in which one out of every thirty or less inhabitants was receiving aid, while ten years later there was not a county where so many of the inhabitants were being aided at public expense. Furthermore, the expense of public relief had fallen from $388,343.67 in 1897 to $279,967.31 in 1907;[10] thus fewer persons were receiving relief, but those who were receiving it were getting more adequate relief. This example of a state which by a few very simple changes in her public relief system made it really efficient shows what can be done if brains and perseverance are applied to the problem here in the United States.

The Rise of the Charity Organization Movement. — The reform of public charities after the methods of the Hamburg-Elberfeld, often modified in some respects to meet local conditions, was extended to many of the principal cities of Europe. Paris, Vienna, and Berlin inaugurated systems of charity organization, which had for their purpose the systematic helping of the poor, and the repression of pauperism. The influence of all this work for the reformation of public out-door relief was felt everywhere, its results were made known and began to show results in private relief work. This influence began to tell on the ideals prevailing in non-public relief associations both on the Continent and in England about the middle of the nineteenth century. About this time the charities of London were very imperfect and inadequate. A large number of societies existed having no particular coördination or coöperation. They were relief societies pure and simple. However, in 1869, the Charity Organization Society of London was formed. It had for its purposes the harmonious

[10] *The Development of Public Charities and Correction in the State of Indiana, 1792–1910*, 1910, Board of State Charities, Indianapolis, pp. 118–127.

coöperation with each other and with the poor law authorities, of the various charitable agencies in the district, the checking of the evil of overlapping relief, the repression of mendicity, the furnishing of help to the needy, and the repression and prevention of pauperism by thorough investigation and by means of self-help.

Charity Organization in the United States. — It was not until the year 1877 that the Buffalo Society of Charity Organization was established, and it was the forerunner of all such movements in American cities. It was based upon that modified form of Hamburg-Elberfeld system which has been adopted in London and elsewhere. Its principles, as announced, were to reduce vagrancy and pauperism and ascertain their true causes; to prevent indiscriminate and duplicate giving; to secure the community from imposture; to see that all deserving cases of destitution were relieved; to make employment the basis of relief; to elevate the home life, health, and habits of the poor; and to prevent children from growing up as paupers.

The means employed to bring about these results were coöperation of charitable agencies; thorough investigation of all applicants and all conditions of poverty; a careful registration of all those asking for help; and giving the kind of help that suited the exact need of each individual. The society also advocated the study of poverty and pauperism in order to better understand the causes. In this way they hoped to improve the condition of the poor and to reduce almsgiving to a system of scientific charity.

The Indorsement of Charities. — The organization of societies giving relief into an association whereby overlapping of relief could be eliminated and coöperation between the various relief agencies secured aimed to cure one kind of ills besetting the philanthropic impulse. There is another sort of malady, however, which that movement did not touch. There may be three or there may be a thousand relief agencies associated in an associated charities' organization. The associated charities, except in a few instances, has not been in a position to say that another relief agency is not needed and therefore may not enter the field and appeal to the public for support. As a consequence of the multiplication of relief agencies in response to the great growth of the

desire to relieve the suffering to be seen in the midst of our plenty, and in response to the opportunity provided by the philanthropic sentiment to thus graft upon the public, there has been an enormous development of institutions and organizations appealing to the public for support. So great has this tendency become, and in some places so numerous the organizations appealing for support, that it is impossible for the busy business man to discriminate between the claims of the various organizations appealing to him for help. With a willingness to help any real need and a desire to spend his money only where it will do the most good and not contribute to the development of institutions which are unnecessary, he has been tossed about in his mind as to what he should do. The commercial organizations of the larger cities finally took hold of the problem and decided that they would look into the various organizations to which the business men were asked to contribute and have a special force organized in their office to investigate each organization. Each member of the commercial body was then invited to coöperate with the commercial organization in this work by placing in his place of business a card stating that those in that business house or office were members of the board of commerce, or whatever the body was called, and that they would contribute to no organization which did not have the indorsement of that organization. At the same time that this was done publicity was given to the fact that a special committee to investigate the claims of philanthropic institutions had been organized, and the various charitable organizations were asked to submit to the commercial body information on certain points which would show their methods of financial management, the field they covered, and a number of other matters bearing upon the usefulness of the organization in the community. In this way these organizations were carefully examined by the commercial body and the contributing public had the advantage of whatever skill that body commanded in investigating the merits of the various philanthropic organizations. This method was intended to catch the useless organizations and the impostors. It also served to prevent the organization of societies which would duplicate the work of others already in existence. In Cleve-

land, where the movement originated, the commercial organization at first coöperated with the philanthropic societies in an endeavor to gather the money necessary to carry on the work of these societies which were indorsed, and divided it among them on the basis of what they spent the year previous, or some such basis as might seem equitable to the board.

The results of charities' indorsement were fully up to expectations in cutting down the number of institutions receiving their support from the public. It also gave an impetus to the movement to have institutions carry on their work with more care for the financial methods employed, and for the results obtained. They knew that they would be judged by results and that if these results did not commend themselves to the investigating committee, their support would be cut off by the refusal of this body to indorse their work. The campaign for funds in the Cleveland plan was centered in a week and each giver knew that when he had given once he would not be asked for gifts by other organizations. The result was a great increase in the amount given by each man and therefore a greater amount to be used by the institutions approved.

This system of indorsement did not receive the unanimous approval, however, of social workers and students of the question. The fear was expressed that the investigating committee might not be intelligent enough to judge correctly of the real merits of an organization. They were usually business men, it was claimed, who were not familiar with the needs of the people along philanthropic lines and therefore were likely to think that an organization was unnecessary when it was really needed. There was also a fear expressed by some that this system would mean the control of charities by big business. The debate was not yet settled before charities endorsement gave way to the "community chest." In New York City, where there was a strong charity organization society, that organization did this investigating and indorsing. This plan in most places where the associated charities' movement was less well established in the confidence of the people did not work so well, inasmuch as the various relief societies objected to investigation and indorsement by an association which was sup-

posed to coördinate the various relief agencies in the task of succoring the needy of the community.[11]

Out of this movement grew the more recent "federation," "central council," "community fund," or "community chest" movements. These movements are supplanting the indorsement work of the commercial bodies. Their respective functions are becoming more clearly differentiated, although in some places the "council" performs the functions of a "federation," or "chest," and in other places the "federation," or "chest," serves also as a "council of social agencies."

The central councils of social agencies are, in the words of Mr. McLean, "delegate bodies representing the social agencies of the city, these agencies still maintaining independence of action in all fields and being bound together by coöperative rather than contractual relationships."[12] Some councils recently organized have functioned as standard-making agencies for the various social organizations. In order to establish such standards they have in some places surveyed the needs of the city and asked whether the various agencies covered the needs of the city. Overlapping by different agencies is brought to light by such study, gaps are discovered in social work, coöperation between the various agencies is promoted, steps are taken to cover these gaps by existing organizations or by organizing others to fill the need, united action in educating the community to its needs and how to meet them is promoted, and a systematic plan for the welfare of the whole community is developed by the social agencies themselves. This plan obviates the difficulties found in having a body of business men who are not so familiar with social work as the organizations themselves, determine what agencies are doing good work and set up standards.

The federation of social agencies grew out of the difficulties experienced in Cleveland when the Chamber of Commerce tried to carry through the scheme of indorsement and a united appeal

[11] Baldwin, "Committee Report of the Relation of Commercial Organizations to Social Welfare," *Proceedings, National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1913, p. 73. Williams, "A Chamber of Commerce Militant," *ibid.*, p. 84. Stewart, "Charities Indorsement in Retrospect and Prospect," *ibid.*, p. 100.

[12] "Central Councils and Community Planning," *The Survey*, June 2, 1917, pp. 217–219.

for funds. The chief emphasis in the federation was raising money for the agencies. However, no money-raising organization can ignore the question of standards, overlapping, and gaps, if it is to do a good job. Hence, it was felt that with the business men should be associated representatives of the agencies and of the public. In Cleveland this federation took over the indorsement work of the Chamber of Commerce, the drive for funds, and acted also as a standard-making body. Thus, it combined the functions of a central council of social agencies with those of a money-raising body. In the course of time the term "community chest," or "community fund," has come into more general use. In some places these organizations perform the functions of a central council of social agencies to plan the social work of the community, and also the money-raising money-allotting functions of the "chest" or "fund." In others the two functions are exercised by separate bodies.

These movements have resulted in much progress in the conduct of social work. More money for social work has been raised than under the previous method of allowing each agency to make its own appeal, overlapping and gaps are discovered and corrected, higher standards of work have been established, and coöperation between the various agencies, and between the agencies and the public has been increased.[13]

Public Welfare Departments. — There is a tendency to centralize all public organizations concerned with social welfare under the direction of a single county officer called the County Superintendent of Public Welfare. The States of North Carolina and Missouri recently established a law providing for such a county officer. Some other states have passed similar laws. The main

[13] For details and the debate on the subject see: Williams, "Cleveland's Group Plan," *The Survey*, Feb. 1, 1913; "Some Questions about Charity Federation," *ibid.*, June 17, 1916; "Putting Coöperation on the Map," *ibid.*, Dec. 25, 1915; "Three Years of Charity Federation," *ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1916; Norton, "City Planning in Social Work," *ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1916; Norton, "The Progress of Financial Federation," *Proceedings, National Conference of Social Work*, 1917, pp. 503–507; Johnson, "Ideals of Financial Federation," *ibid.*, pp. 507–510; Devine, "Joint Finance," *The Survey*, Jan. 14, 1922; "Councils of Social Agencies," *ibid.*, Jan. 21, Feb. 4; Douglas, "Statistics of Giving," *ibid.*, Oct. 15, 1921; Persons, *Central Financing of Social Agencies*, Columbus, Ohio, 1922; Kingsley, "The Co-ordination of Agencies' Activities," *Proceedings, National Conference of Social Work*, 1922, p. 415.

purpose of such a law was to coördinate and weld into one system with one set of records all county agencies working for the poor, the criminal, the defective, and the delinquent. This gives opportunity for the correlation of county social welfare with the various state departments and state institutions in the supervision of delinquents, paupers, defectives, and the sick. The law also contemplates a bureau of research in connection with the office, where investigations of living conditions may be carried on as well as the study of all projects and organizations for social welfare. This movement, however, has not fulfilled the hopes of its sponsors. While the organization of such departments has occurred in numerous instances, the private social organizations have grown much too rapidly and are too much needed for work which the public welfare department is not equipped to do to be swallowed up by the public departments. It is still felt by social workers and by informed citizens that much pioneering in social work must yet be done by the private agencies which the public department cannot do in the present state of public opinion. However, the private agencies are handing over to the public departments those functions which the public departments are prepared to handle efficiently. There is developing a closer relationship, however, between public and private social agencies.

Principles of Scientific Relief. — Out of the confusion of indiscriminate giving and haphazard methods of administering charities, which have sometimes tended to increase rather than to decrease dependency, there have evolved a few fundamental principles of charity based on scientific methods. Among them the following may be enumerated: (1) the helpless must be taught to help themselves; (2) the work test should be applied to all persons to the extent of their working power; (3) indiscriminate giving is dangerous and should be prohibited; (4) every gift should be for the purpose of permanently helping the recipients; (5) relief, when given, should be adequate but should be carefully supervised; (6) the rehabilitation of the dependent family — nothing less — should be one of the ultimate aims of scientific charity; (7) the other ultimate aim should be the prevention of poverty; (8) case-work methods must be employed if charity is to be con-

structive rather than demoralizing.[14] Thus, scientific charity is a study of how to relieve, how to rehabilitate the dependent, and how to prevent poverty and pauperism.

Gradually it has dawned upon the communities that the most difficult thing to do is to help others without at the same time doing an injury. Promiscuous giving is no longer considered a virtue. To be generous and careless may lead to more trouble than to be penurious. One should not repress generosity, but the duty does not end with the giving, it extends to the insurance of good results from the gift. Scientific charity seeks not to relieve the public from the burdens of the poor, but seeks to lay increased responsibility by doing more for the poor and doing it in a better way. It is easy to give without skillful case work, but it is a very difficult matter to make the gift only a part of a socially constructive program, which often requires infinite patience and unusual skill. "The gift without the giver is bare." The last half century in American charities has brought about a general reform in methods of dealing with the poor and the helpless. Much, however, still remains to be done. The public must be educated to a sense of the importance of the principles which experience has suggested. Workers both salaried and volunteer must be trained. The principles wrought out in the experience of private philanthropy must be introduced into public relief in the United States; in only one state, Indiana, has that been done to any appreciable extent. However, in a growing number of cities and counties such methods are being employed.

READING ASSIGNMENTS

Fowle. *The Poor Law.*
Gillin, J. L. *Poverty and Dependency.*
Henderson, C. R. *Modern Methods of Charity,* Chap. I.
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Warner, Amos G. *American Charities* (Revised Ed.) Chaps. XII–XV.

OTHER REFERENCES

Harnack, A. *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christenthums.* Translated as, *The Expansion of Christianity,* Vol. I, Chap. III.
Richmond, M. E. *Social Diagnosis; What Is Social Case Work?*
Ulhorn, Gerhard. *Charity in the Christian Church.*

[14] See Richmond, *What Is Social Case Work?* New York, 1922.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. State arguments for and against Mr. Spencer's contention that by charity we do an injury to society by saving alive the weaker people.
2. List the motives which lead people to give to the poor to-day.
3. Show the similarity of motives between the alms distributed by political bosses, say the Tammany leaders on the East Side of New York, and the motives of the politicians of Ancient Rome in giving "corn and games" to the populace.
4. In the light of what happened in Rome when the wealth was concentrated in few hands and the bulk of the people had little chance at independence, what would you say would be good social policy with respect to the problems of poverty in this country with its universal suffrage, by which votes may be exchanged for a living?
5. Are large sums spent on the poor necessarily good evidence of proper care of the poor? Why? Are small amounts? Why?
6. In what respects was the charity of the church of the Middle Ages a good thing? Wherein was it open to criticism?
7. Compare the charity of the churches to-day and public charity in their results.
8. Compare the aims of public charity as administered to-day in the United States and the charity administered by a Society for Organizing Charity, or an Associated Charities.
9. Outline the plan of public relief provided for in the laws of your state.
10. Criticize these laws and suggest changes for the better.
11. What is the advantage of the Community Chest?
12. Outline the services of the visiting nurse; of the school nurse.
13. How do clinics for children contribute to social welfare?

CHAPTER XXXIV

CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND PREVENTION

Nature of Crime. — From the legal point of view crime is an offense against the law of the land. Sociologically it may be defined as an act which is *believed* to be socially harmful by a group which has the power to enforce its beliefs.[1] It varies in character and degree on account of the act itself and also on account of the law. A mild offense against the law is called a misdemeanor. A serious offense is called a felony. The only difference between a felony and a misdemeanor is in the gravity of the offense, and, since the estimate of the seriousness of an act varies from place to place, these are not the same in different communities. In early society, when natural justice prevailed and each man settled his own difficulties with his fellows, crime in a legal sense was unknown. Cruelty, savagery, and bestiality existed, but the fine distinctions civilized society makes between acts, such as immoral acts, injurious acts now called torts, and criminals acts, were the results of a long process of social development. Many acts now not considered criminal were punished as such in early society. Sometimes harmful acts were looked upon as affecting only the injured persons or his kindred. But now every criminal act is considered an offense against society. In a sociological sense a serious offense against society may be a social crime, even though the law has not been passed defining such act as criminal.

The Extent and Cost of Crime. — In the United States it is impossible to obtain more than a mere guess at the extent of crime. The United States Census supplies some figures which are suggestive, although they do not measure the amount of criminality in the country. As between states a comparison is unfair because the various states do not have the same laws.

[1] Gillin, *Criminology and Penology*, New York, 1926, p. 13.

There is the same difficulty when one tries to compare different countries with respect to criminality. With these limitations, however, some statistics of crime in different countries will be suggestive of the extent of this social malady.

We have no measure of crime in the United States except the institutional population on a given date in the census year, and the commitments to institutions during the census year. On January 1, 1923, there were in the various penal and correctional institutions in the United States a total population of 109,619 under sentence besides those in military and naval prisons and in insane asylums. The fluctuations of the number under sentence per 100,000 population varied as follows: 1880, 98.7; 1890, 106.7; 1904, 99.0; 1910, 107.9; 1923, 94.6. In 1923 it is estimated by the Census that there was a total of 357,493 commitments as compared with a total of 479,787 in 1910, or a decrease of 25.5 per cent. The decrease of the prison population during the same decade was even greater, from 521.7 per 100,000 population to 325.1 in 1923, or 37.7 per cent. Between 1910 and 1923 there was an increase of 275.2 per cent in the commitments to Federal prisons, due to the enactment of the Federal narcotic and prohibition laws during that decade, of 15.6 per cent in the state prisons, of 67 per cent to the reformatories, due to the tendency to provide for reformatory institutions. There was a decrease for that decade of 35.9 per cent in commitments to county jails, workhouses, etc. and of 18.7 per cent in commitments to municipal jails and workhouses.[2]

In both 1910 and 1923 the leading offense was drunkenness, although the percentage of total commitments for this offense fell from 35.6 per cent for 1910 to 25.6 per cent for 1923. The percentage for disorderly conduct also fell during the same decade from 19.1 per cent to 14.9 per cent of the total commitments. There was an increase of commitments for homicides from 1 per cent to 1.1 per cent. There were also increases for rape, burglary, forgery, and robbery, the increase for robbery being especially large. The increase for violating drug laws during the decade was 2066.7 per cent and for violating liquor laws 326.2 per cent

[2] *Prisoners, 1923*, Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1926, pp. 7–23.

due to the enactment of these two laws during that period. The commitments of men as compared with females rose during the decade from 8.6 men for one woman to 11. On the basis of their proportion of the population of the country negroes are committed about twice as frequently as whites, and 3.2 times as many as the native whites, while foreign born whites constituted 1.3 times as many in proportion to their percentage of the population as the native whites, considering only adults over 18 years of age both in the commitments and in the population of the country. The age group 21–24 still constitutes the most criminal age group. The only exception to that as between the native white, negroes, and foreign born is that for the latter the age of highest criminal incidence is 35–44.[3]

Moreover, certain figures available indicate that the United States has an unenviable record as to murder when compared with England. It has been stated that the murder rate in the United States is 50 times that of Great Britain. Chicago in 1916 had 36 times the number of murders in proportion to population as London, while New York City the same year had only 10 less than England and Wales. All the prisoners in Canada about 1923 are said to have numbered only as many as those in one state prison in the United States.[4]

While the situation in Europe is better in many ways than in this country, yet even there the authorities are deeply concerned over the situation. Aschaffenburg, in his scholarly and temperate work, after giving many tables of figures comparing crime in Germany at different times, says, "Hence, the conclusion is unavoidable that brutality, recklessness, and licentiousness are spreading more and more in the growing generation." [5] Recidivism in that country in increasing as everywhere else. He says, "Of the 98,411 persons, who at the time of their conviction, in the years 1894 to 1896, had already served five or more sentences, 72.7 per cent recidivated in the course of the five years following their last conviction." [6]

[3] *Prisoners, 1923*, Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1926, pp. 24–76.
[4] See Gillin, *Criminology and Penology*, New York, 1926, p. 25.
[5] *Crime and Its Repression*, p. 218.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

This gloomy picture is not relieved by a consideration of the expense involved in this fact of criminality. It has been estimated that crime costs $2,500,000 a day in this country. Spalding estimated that in 1910 in Massachusetts the struggle against criminals took 10 per cent of the taxes raised in that state. In 1920 in Wisconsin almost 6 per cent of all taxes were used for that purpose. It seems that we spend more of our public monies on the repression of criminals than on any other single public function except roads and schools. These enormous figures take no account of the property destroyed, the time, life, and labor lost and the private expense involved in running down criminals, to say nothing of the expense of locks, burglar alarms, and other devices to prevent criminality.

The situation is similar in Germany. Aschaffenburg reports that in 1909 in Germany there were 248,648 thefts, frauds, and embezzlements, and adds, "Unfortunately we have no idea, even approximately, how great the average damage was in each case, but there can be no doubt that national prosperity sustained a tremendous injury through these crimes against property." Taking as a measure his findings as to the time loss sustained by those who were gravely injured by assault in Worms, 7.3 days for each act, he estimates that for such crimes alone in Germany there was a loss of time amounting to 2308.8 years in that single year in Germany from that crime alone.[7]

The Relative Weight of Different Classes of Crime. — About 1920 in England 8 per cent of the offenses were against the person, 18.5 per cent against property, and 73.5 per cent other offenses. In 1923 in the United States the commitments to institutions were for crimes very much in the same relative proportions. Crimes against property accounted for 16.8 per cent of the commitments, crimes against the person including sex offenses, 8.5 per cent. The rest were divided between those against the government, .7 per cent; against public health and safety, 9.8 per cent; against sobriety and good order, 48.2 per cent; against public policy, 12.5 per cent; against children and prisoner's family, 1.4 per cent; and unclassified and unknown, 2.9 per cent.[8]

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 225, 226.
[8] *Prisoners*, 1923, Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1926, pp. 28, 29.

Is Crime Increasing? — It is very difficult to be certain whether crime is increasing or decreasing. Since the World War in this country a great furore has been raised concerning the increase of crime. This has been chiefly newspaper talk and there are but few adequate statistics which throw light upon the question. Commitments to institutions in the United States showed a drop from 521.7 per 100,000 of population in 1910 to 325.1 in 1923. Probably this decrease is due to the extension of probation and installment payment of fines. The Census report showed that commitments in 1923 had increased over those for 1910, 326.2 per cent for violation of liquor laws, 2066.7 per cent for violating drug laws, 68.2 per cent for forgery, 16.1 per cent for homicide, 83.3 per cent for robbery, 10 per cent for nonsupport or neglect of family, 33.3 per cent for rape and 67.3 per cent for violating city ordinances. It showed that commitments had decreased for the same period for the following crimes: drunkenness 55.3 per cent, disorderly conduct 51.5 per cent, vagrancy 52.8 per cent, larceny 42.3 per cent, assault 53.1 per cent, burglary 11.4 per cent, carrying concealed weapons, 27.1 per cent, fraud 55.7 per cent, malicious mischief and trespassing 68.8 per cent, fornication and prostitution 28.8 per cent, and gambling 50.7 per cent. All these figures are based on numbers per 100,000 of population. Yet, from these figures, interesting as they are, it is hard to say whether judged by commitments crime increased or decreased during those 13 years. All we can say is that some serious crimes increased, while some decreased. The two outstanding increases were for violating liquor laws and violating drug laws, both new laws enacted in that period. Miss Abbott has shown that the statistics in Chicago are so inadequate that no clear tendency can be made out.[9] Mr. Fosdick, comparing the first quarter of each year from 1917 to 1920, and these results with the first quarter of 1921, believes that there has been a slight decrease in the crimes of robbery and assaults to rob, burglary and larceny, and murder, while there has been an increase of the number of automobiles driven away.[10]

[9] Abbott, "Recent Statistics Relating to Crime in Chicago," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. XIII, November, 1922, pp. 322, 334, 335, and 345.

[10] Fosdick, *Criminal Justice in Cleveland*, Cleveland, Ohio, 1922, p. 4.

We get used to crimes with which we are familiar. Their commission does not make an impression upon our imagination. However, new crimes impress us to such an extent that we feel there must be an increase of crime. Furthermore, the newspapers, in seeking for the new and the sensational, convey to the reader the impression that there is a great increase in crime. However, if one looks back over newspaper discussion and comment in other periods, he will find that ever so often there has been a "crime wave." So far as one can tell from the figures, it has been largely psychological.

Repeaters in Crime.[11] — One of the purposes of criminal justice and of the punishment of the criminal is to prevent a man who has once been convicted of crime from repeating his act. We call our institutions "correctional" institutions. How well do they "correct"? Let us see.

In Massachusetts in 1921 of all prisoners sent to the various institutions, 51.3 per cent were repeaters, while in 1922, 55.1 per cent were repeaters. In Wisconsin in 1920, of the inmates of the State Prison, 45 per cent, and of the Milwaukee House of Correction, 53.5 had been convicted of crime before. About the same time in West Virginia State Prison 51 per cent, and in the Georgia State Prison 42 per cent were "repeating the course." In Detroit about the year 1920, of 1800 unselected misdemeanants, 55.4 had had previous contact with the police or court. These figures represent an enormous failure. Practically half of these men have been in difficulty before. What a comment upon our methods of treating the criminal! When our universities send home every year from 2 to 8 per cent of the students enrolled because they have "flunked out," sometimes a great cry is raised against the failure of our school system. What if the high schools and the universities flunked half of their students? And yet that is what these figures of recidivism really mean. Half of the criminals in our correctional institutions have "flunked the course" once or more.

[11] From this point on through this chapter the material is adapted from Gillin's chapter in Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, *Social Problems*, New York, 1928, Chap. XXV.

Every study of recidivism shows that repetition of crime increases as the average mentality lowers. That has been found in a study of repeaters at Joliet, and by Goring in his study of English convicts, at Parkhurst Prison.[12] What this means is that we send to our correctional institutions the failures of our schools and of our communities, and expect them to do what the schools and the playgrounds, the homes, and the probation officials have failed to do. Naturally into our prisons will gravitate those who have failed to respond to every other influence to make them good citizens. No criticism should therefore lie against the people in correctional institutions for failures of these cases. On the other hand, however, these institutions should not be compelled by law to let them out when they well know that they will fail again; yet in most of our states the criminal law provides for the ultimate termination of the sentence in most cases at a very definite period, whether the man has reformed or not. This is a great mistake, and accounts for a part of the repetition of criminality among the inmates of our institutions. Back they come again and again in spite of the fact that there is no hope of another term doing them any good. These are custodial cases who ought to be kept indefinitely within an institution.

In summary, then, the situation may be expressed as follows. (1) In 1923 and 1924 in normal schools and teachers' colleges there were enrolled 273,107; in colleges, universities, and professional schools 726,124; in all higher institutions of learning a total of 999,231. In 1923 there were committed to penal and correctional institutions of the United States 357,493. That is, over a third as many were committed to these institutions as were in all the institutions of higher learning. (2) We spend more on our struggle with criminals than on any other things except education and good roads. Hence, it must be one of our major social problems. (3) We do not know whether crime is increasing or decreasing, except such serious crimes as homicide which seems to be on the increase. (4) Approximately 50 per cent of those in our penal and correctional institutions are " repeating the course."

[12] Ordah, "A Study of Fifty-Three Male Convicts," *Journal of Delinquency*, Vol. I, March, 1916, p. 13; Goring, *The English Convict*, London, 1913, p. 271.

Factors in the Making of the Criminal and the Delinquent. — The conduct of every man, including the criminal, is the result, in general terms, of two sets of factors. (1) The native characteristics of the individual handed down to him by heredity from his ancestors, and (2) the various external influences which play upon him during the period of his development. In order to make more precise the analysis of the factors producing the criminal, we may divide these two general classes into the following sections: (1) physical environment; (2) physical and mental characteristics of the individual; (3) hereditary characteristics, thus giving special emphasis to the physical and mental characteristics which are inherited in contrast with those which are developed on the basis of heredity through the influence of the environment; (4) economic factors; (5) social factors.

The Physical Factors: the Physical Environment. — Early in the scientific study of crime and the criminal it was noticed that crimes vary with geography, the climate, the seasons, and the weather. Lombroso believed that he had discovered that in crimes against the person the minimum number occurred in the level parts of France, a slightly greater portion in the parts that were hilly, and the maximum number in the mountainous districts. On the other hand, his statistics seem to indicate that rape was more common in the level country than in the mountains and hills. Furthermore, he found that the districts of Italy most subject to malaria showed the maximium number of crimes against property. On the other hand, those parts of France and Italy where goiter prevailed, resulting in cretinism, had less than the average number of homicides, thefts, and sexual offenses.

Moreover, it was observed by certain students that countries with a warm climate have a higher rate of criminality against the person, while those in cool climates have a comparatively high rate of crimes against property. Again crimes vary with the seasons. In winter crimes against property prevail, while in summer the peak is reached in the crimes against the person. This variation of various kinds of crimes according to the seasons led to Lacassagne's so-called "criminal calendar." According to this calendar infanticide holds first place in the months of Janu-

ary, February, March, and April; homicide and assaults in July; patricides in January and October; rapes upon children in May, July, and August, with the minimum in December; rapes on adults reached their maximum in June and the minimum in November; while crimes against property seemed to reach the maximum in December and January.

As the result of the discussions which have grown out of these statistical findings it is now generally agreed that the effects of these physical factors are indirect rather than direct; *i.e.*, it is not that cold induces sluggishness, which lessens crime against the person but that the crimes against the person in cold regions and in the cold season are fewer because human contacts are less numerous during those periods and in those countries. Furthermore, crime against property increases in the cold climate and in the cold seasons because of the greater economic distress.

More recently some attention has been given to the relationship of the changes in the weather to criminality. Mr. Dexter studied the matter somewhat carefully and found that the number of arrests varied quite regularly with the temperature in any given place. He found that as the barometer fell the number of arrests rose. He thinks that this air pressure affects directly the nervous condition of people. He found that assaults vary inversely with the degree of humidity. He explains this on the basis of the depressing effect of a high degree of moisture in the atmosphere. He discovered that on the days when the winds are mild, that is, between 150 and 200 miles per day, there is a high pugnacity rate. During the days of calm and days of high winds, the number of arrests were less. He found that cloudy days showed the fewest number of personal encounters which attracted the attention of police. Very much more careful investigations will have to be made, however, before these conclusions can be accepted at their face value. Here, too, it is probable that the weather affects conduct, on the whole, indirectly rather than directly. In general, then, we may hold, tentatively, that the physical environment affects man's conduct largely through its influence on his ways of getting a living, the form of occupation which these climates make possible, the unemployment and therefore the pressure of

need due to seasonal occupations, and through the ease or difficulty with which a living is obtained, due to the richness or poverty of the natural resources and the ease with which the resources may be exploited.[13]

Physical and Mental Characteristics of the Individual. — Man in his physical and mental makeup is very much more complicated than any other animal. He has a depth and breadth of emotional expression impossible to the lower animals. His intellect enables him to discriminate, weigh, and decide a course of conduct in a very much more complex environment than the lower animals. Consequently, in order to explain his criminality we must examine his physical, emotional, and intellectual nature in order to see the part it plays in the problem. His conduct is less instinctively determined, his emotions are subject to control by his intellect, and hence find expression in much more devious and complicated ways. What then are the chief physical and mental factors which seem to have unusual weight in the production of delinquents? Let us look first at the physical characteristics of the individual. Society's requirements in its present organization require certain physical equipment in order that the individual may make a living and adapt himself to the economic and social standards which in the course of human civilization have been set up. His physical organism must function in certain specific ways in order to meet these requirements. For example, he must have fairly good health, he must be physically well formed and capable of certain economic activities, his physical appearance within certain limits must make him acceptable to a certain degree to those by whom he is surrounded in order to get along well economically and personally. If he is of a weak physique, certain occupations will be closed to him as a means of livelihood. Goring found that criminals of violence were burly and strong, while thieves were puny and weak. Studies in England and in this country have shown that the criminal population in our institutions as a whole average almost two inches shorter than the freshmen in some of our American universities and several inches shorter

[13] For a more thorough discussion of the factors of the physical environment see J. L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology*, New York, 1926, Chap. V.

than the members of the Royal Society in England. Moreover, if an individual has suffered disablement either by disease or accident it may be impossible for him to hold a job, or he may hold one with inadequate wage. Due to these physical disabilities economic pressure may cause him to become a thief. Goring's studies showed that thieves and burglars, who constituted 90 per cent of the criminals in Parkhurst Prison, England, and the incendiaries were the smallest and lightest of the various criminal classes.[14] On the other hand, studies by Doctor Healy among juvenile delinquents in Chicago showed that 13 per cent had some abnormality of development as one of the probable causes of delinquency. From 50 to 64 per cent of the 2000 juvenile recidivists in Chicago, and from 72 to 73 per cent of the females among them, were over-developed physically.[15] In these juveniles physical overdevelopment, especially among the girls, seems to result in sexual maturity before judgment and self-control have developed equally and therefore leads to sex delinquency.

Moreover, recent studies of the influence of the indocrine gland, or the ductless glands, seem to promise light upon the relationship of the functioning of these glands to crime. Research, however, has not gone far enough yet to make certain that the lack of the proper functioning of these glands always leads to criminality.

The chief mental defects and characteristics which seem to have a bearing upon the criminal are epilepsy, insanity, and certain emotional disturbances which seem partly the result of inherent tendencies and partly the result of the individual's reaction to his life's experiences.

Mental defect for a time received unusual emphasis as characteristic of delinquents and criminals. The figures, however, vary with the examiner and with different parts of the world. Goring, in his study of 948 convicts, found that the highest percentage of mental defects appeared among those guilty of setting fire to stacks (52.9 per cent), with decreasing percentages for arson

[14] Goring, *The English Convict: A Statistical Study*, London, 1913, pp. 196, 197. See also Sleyster, "The Physical Basis of Crime as Observed by a Prison Physician," *Physical Bases of Crime, A Symposium*, Eastern, Pa. 1914, pp. 115, 116.

[15] Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, Boston, 1915, pp. 135, 136, and Book II, Chap. IV.

(16.7 per cent), rape on the child (15.8 per cent), robbery and violence (15.6 per cent), unnatural sexual offenses (14.3 per cent), blackmail (14.3 per cent), and burglary (10 per cent). Among those guilty of counterfeiting, it was practically negligible (3.3 per cent). In the United States figures vary from prison to prison, one of the most conservative findings being that of Dr. Anderson in the correctional and penal institutions of Wisconsin. In that state only 12 per cent of the inmates of the State Prison were feeble-minded, while in 17 county jails 16 per cent were clearly mentally defective, 8.8 per cent of the boys in industrial schools, 10 per cent of the inmates of the Milwaukee House of Correction, and 10.5 per cent of the inmates of the Girls' Industrial School. Studies in some other states have found even larger percentages mentally defective. Since only about two per thousand of the population are feeble-minded it is easy to see either that feeble-mindedness has been a potent factor in making the criminal or else that the criminals studied have been caught because of their condition. Certain other studies, however, especially those by Murchison, have thrown doubt upon the difference in mental capacity of prisoners and the general population. Furthermore, it should be noticed that experience indicates that the feeble-minded person who is not properly supervised, is not capable of ordering his conduct in accordance with the standards of society, and therefore is more likely, under the influence of individuals of antisocial proclivities, to become delinquent than the ordinary person.

Epilepsy, while not such an important factor in crime as Lombroso thought, yet because of the social neglect which we visit upon epileptics, seems to furnish an unusually large number of criminals and delinquents. Dr. Healy in his study of 1000 young repeaters in Chicago, found 7 per cent epileptic.

The insanities, of which there have now been recognized about thirty odd varieties, are decisively important in the production of delinquents. Sometimes insanity leads to quarrelsomeness and the starting of lawsuits. The paranoiac who has delusions of persecution, easily comes to feel that he is unjustly treated, therefore may become a fraudulent person, or even a criminal.

Among these insanities *dementia praecox* has come to be recognized as one of the most important in connection with delinquency. The literature of criminality is full of cases of insane offenders.

The development of psychiatry has shown that there are various emotional disturbances which result from the unhappy life experiences of the young. While we have no definite statistics on the number of cases in a given criminal population who have been started on their career of delinquency by reason of these emotional disturbances, recent studies have shown that a great many of the young delinquents are suffering from mental conflicts which have resulted from unpleasant experiences in their lives. These emotional upsets may result from severe repression at home, lack of appreciation by schoolmates, a shock from premature sexual experiences, or from the conflicts which may arise between natural curiosity and normal impulses on the one hand, and the standards of conduct set up by society. Recent studies, both in juvenile courts and in schools, have shown that many problem children are suffering from such emotional experiences. Some case studies of adult criminals also indicate that such disturbances in their early life was one of the disposing causes to a criminal career.[16]

Heredity and Crime. — One often hears that a certain person is a hereditary criminal. Can crime be inherited? Crime is a social manifestation in conduct, while heredity is a biological matter. Crime cannot be inherited in any scientific sense of the term. What can be inherited, however, are certain physical and mental characteristics, which under the right environment may result in crime. Early sexual maturity may be inherited resulting in a lag between the mental and the emotional nature, resulting in laziness, in nervous instability, and in mental defects. Nervous instability and mental deficiency may also be inherited. Healy, in his study of 1000 juvenile delinquent repeaters in Chicago, of whom 668 provided adequate family histories, found epilepsy or some grade of mental defects in 245 of the families,

[16] Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, Boston, 1915, Book II, Chap. X; Sayles and Nudd, *The Problem Child in School*, New York, 1925; *Three Problem Children*, New York, 1924; Glueck, *Mental Disorders and the Criminal Law*, Boston, 1925, pp. 287, 315, 317–318; Van Waters, *Youth in Conflict*, New York, 1925; Hoag and Williams, *Crime, Abnormal Minds, and the Law*, Indianapolis, 1923, Chap. XIII; *Judge Baker Case Studies*, Series I.

while 152 cases showed criminal individuals in the ancestry. In 61 per cent of 823 cases he found distinct defects in the family.[17]

Economic Factors. — Crimes against property increase with economic depression and unemployment. Such crimes also seem to vary even in times of prosperity with rapid changes in the industrial organization. Do men steal because they are hungry? Do girls enter a life of prostitution because of need? Yes and no. Some men steal because they are hungry or because their families are in need. Some girls enter a life of prostitution or pursue a course of conduct which may lead in that direction by reason of necessity. On the other hand, some people in the very deepest need do not commit crimes, and some girls pressed by necessity almost beyond endurance do not sacrifice their virtue. It is clear, therefore, that economic factors act indirectly rather than directly in most cases. Combined with a certain type of individual character, need becomes a circumstance which results in antisocial conduct. Unemployment and economic distress to some individuals bring a strain which it is impossible for them to bear. We can say, therefore, that the economic factors provide the environment under which certain natures give way and break over the standards set by society. Furthermore, certain trades show themselves to be extra-hazardous in their moral results. Street trades are especially dangerous for children and youth. Night work in factories provides an environment which is a menace to the morals of girls and young women. Working boys furnish a delinquency rate from two to ten times as high as those who are not working. Messenger service seems to be especially hazardous. Waitresses in hotels and restaurants, on the one hand, are living on the smallest wages, perhaps rooming in some cheerless room, denied ordinary recreation, and on the other are subject to the solicitations of conscienceless men. A recent study showed that 62 per cent of the waitresses in hotels and restaurants were without normal homes. Statistics also show that there is a very close correlation between crime and child labor. In 1914 during the time of high unemployment burglary increased 30 per cent over the rate for 1912. Vagrancy increased 51 per cent, robbery 64 per cent, and

[17] Healy, *op. cit.*, Boston, 1915, pp. 153–157.

mendicancy 105 per cent. Divorce and suicide rates likewise went up. In 1920 of the men in the Wisconsin State Prison, 42.5 per cent had never been regularly employed, but were drifters. On the whole, therefore, we can say that the economic factors serve to break down the resistance of the weak individual.

Social Factors. — The experiences through which one goes in life affect one's conduct. Like economics they form the medium in which personalities develop. If the social surroundings are of such a nature as to bring out those inherent qualities of the individual which are adapted to social conformities and to inhibit those characteristics which lead to antisocial conduct, the individual will probably develop conduct in accordance with the standards of society. For conduct is the outcome of two sets of conditions: (1) the inherent characteristics of the individual himself; (2) stimulated to expression or repressed by the circumstances in which he lives. In civilized societies there are a number of social conditions inimical to the development of a social personality. These social factors in a broad general way may be classified as follows: (1) the factors connected with the home; (2) the playground; (3) the school; (4) community influences; (5) customs and beliefs current in a given society; (6) antisocial companions; (7) class hatreds; (8) religion; (9) the courts and prisons; (10) the fundamental elements in a given civilization.

The *home* is the fundamental social institution. It has enormous possibilities of influencing the development of the personality of children. Consider for example the home of the immigrant in this country. Many times the immigrant's family settles in a large city. The parents have to adjust themselves to strange conditions both economically and socially. All ties have been broken, but these people have brought with them standards and traditions quite different from those of the country to which they have come. Often they are peasants who are now thrust into industry. Frequently the father and mother are compelled to be away from home, leaving the children to their own devices. The children, while subject to the old country traditions and standards, become Americanized more rapidly than the parents and find a conflict between the standards set up by the new society in which

they are growing up and those of their parents. Frequently also the home is poverty stricken and the children are denied many things which other children about them have. Healy and Bronner from a study of their cases in Chicago show that one-fourth of the juvenile delinquents were from homes so poor that poverty was a factor. Moreover the broken home is decidedly dangerous for juveniles. In two thousand cases studied in Chicago nearly a third of the juvenile delinquents had one or more parents dead. From 21 to 30 per cent had parents separated, while from 48 to 55 per cent of the children had both parents living at home. In many of these latter cases, however, they might as well have been orphans because of the bad conditions which prevailed in these homes. The number of immoral homes is strikingly large in the case of juvenile delinquents. The fundamental importance of a good home in the prevention of delinquency is well recognized. Frequently a bad home is to be found where there are present drunken, immoral, epileptic, insane, or feebleminded parents. In Chicago in 1903–1904, out of 584 boys who appeared in the courts, 107 had habitual drunkenness in their families. Of 157 girls in the Illinois State Training School, 31 were daughters of drunken fathers; at least 10 had drunken mothers; 27 had vicious fathers; 16 had vicious, immoral, or criminal mothers; and 12 were from families in which other members than the parents were vicious or criminal. Healy and Bronner found from 20 to 28 per cent of the homes from which these children had come were cursed with alcoholism, immorality, or crime.[18]

Many of these homes in the slums of the cities are so crowded that decency is impossible. Consequently the child from his earliest years becomes habituated to scenes from which he should be protected. Breckinridge and Abbott in Chicago, studying 584 delinquent boys and 157 delinquent girls, found that 47 per cent of the boys were from families with six or more children, and 21 per cent were from families with eight or more children. Among the girls 34 per cent were from families with six or more children, and 13 per cent from families with eight or more.

[18] Healy and Bronner, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXII, July, 1916, pp. 50, 51.

Furthermore, even where the families are not broken, lack of parental management is to be seen in many cases of delinquents. Healy and Bronner found extreme lack of parental care ranged from 23 per cent of the cases in the first series to 46 per cent in the second. Extreme parental neglect was found by them in 16 per cent of the second series of 1000 while only 5 per cent of the homes were very good.

The lack of *wholesome recreation* in a great city is one of the most potent causes of juvenile delinquency. Mr. Thurston found in his study in Cleveland that over 50 per cent of his delinquents spent their leisure time in desultory unguided pursuits. In my study of 160 wholesome citizens I found that only .7 of 1 per cent spent their leisure time in such pursuits. No community can afford to neglect playground facilities with proper guidance for its children.

The relationship of *education* to crime has often been studied. Very few college graduates are found in our prisons and reformatories. Whether this means that education results in a course of conduct which does not end in prison, or only that those who are able to graduate from educational institutions do not get caught we are not sure. The larger proportion, however, of our prisoners are quite uneducated persons. It is probable that lack of education has a selective effect upon the economic career. The ignorant man usually has greater difficulty in making a living. He must take less well paid employment. The range of his employment is narrow. He is less likely to have the varied use of his leisure time and therefore may easily drift into bad companionship. However, the type of crime varies with the degree of education. Crimes of violence are most frequently committed by the uneducated, while crimes of skill like embezzlement and forgery are the crimes of the educated.

Furthermore, children who are not well adapted to the school system are likely to become truant and to wind up in the juvenile court, frequently the first step toward a criminal career. Evidently our schools are not yet perfectly adjusted to all the children who come to them. Built for the average child too frequently the schools give little or no attention to the abnormal child. Too

frequently children are allowed to drop school for lack of interest, go to work at the first opportunity, and as we have seen, working children are under special hazard. Consequently in fairness it may be said that the school must shoulder the responsibility for some delinquents. Some schools at the present time are endeavoring to obviate this difficulty not only by adapting the curriculum to the needs of the child but by putting in visiting teachers whose business it is to adjust the social conditions in the home or neighborhood to the child. Increasingly the school must recognize that it is its business to develop the social personality. Mere formal education will not always accomplish that.

The influences in *the community* have a great deal to do with the development of conduct. Children and adolescents are subject to the attitudes and opinions of the community. How often when a delinquent is brought into court the story is told of how he had a good family, came from good stock, and yet had gone astray because of factors operating in the community. Consider the difficulty which well-intentioned parents have in stemming the influence upon their children of these factors. Saloons, dance halls, vicious resorts, and the uncontrolled life of the gang in the alleys, back yards, railroad yards, and docks often can undo much of the good work done in the family. These conditions together with the difficulties already noted, which face the immigrant family, helps to account for the undue incidence of juvenile delinquency among the children of the foreign-born.

Moreover, consider the influence of *customs and beliefs* which are at variance with the customs, beliefs, traditions, standards, and ideals held by those in authority in any given society. Reflect upon the situation of a foreign-born family coming with a set of social traditions and customs from another country, yet subjected to the standards, beliefs, ideals, and traditions which have grown up in America. The difficulties of the foreign-born and their children with prohibition illustrates this principle. It is also illustrated by the difference in the sex morals of an immigrant from an eastern or southeastern European country, with those of America. It may also be illustrated by the changes which are going on with respect to sex morals and other phases of social con-

duct in our day as contrasted with the standards of a generation ago. The drinking habit of many people is a fertile source of delinquency and crime. Various studies show that of the serious crimes of violence from 33 per cent to as high as 67.4 per cent are due to drunkenness.

Moreover, many beliefs become current among certain classes and groups of society which are at variance with the established standards of conduct. Confirmed criminals are usually cynical and bitter. They see no reason why they should be punished for acts which are similar to other acts within the law. Open assault on a rich man seems less ignoble than the cautious combinations of fraud sometimes practiced by respectable citizens. The criminal is subject to the public opinion of his own class rather than that of the general society of which he is a member. In such cases conflict arises between group standards and the larger group standards.

In the rapidly changing society of the present day classes, both social and economic, inevitably arise. Consequently *class hatreds* are likely to develop unless adjustments between these classes are very carefully regulated. In every period of social and industrial unrest, of political or economic oppression such class hatreds are bound to develop. Out of these hatreds develop beliefs and standards of action which frequently lead to violation of law. Industrial strikes, race conflicts between negroes and whites in some of our great cities and between Orientals and whites on the west coast are illustrations of how easily these class conflicts lead to crime. In Europe even the different religious groups sometimes come into conflict. Witness the anti-Semitic " pogroms " in certain European countries. In the industrial struggle of this country we see the class hatreds develop in our communist groups and the I. W. W.'s, to say nothing of the class strife which grows up in ordinary industrial strikes.

Religion is another social factor which has been considered in connection with crime. One would suppose that a religion which has for its doctrine the love of one's fellowmen would prevent clashes, and make for peace and good conduct. Curiously enough, however, even Christianity has not always been characterized

by such results. Wars have been fought over religious questions. Prison statistics show that religion does not always have the effect of curbing the antisocial propensities of men. A study made by Aschaffenburg in Germany has shown that in certain countries of Europe Catholics have a higher criminal rate than Protestants, both of them than Jews, and these three religions higher than those of people professing no religion whatsoever. It ought to be pointed out, however, that a careful study of these facts shows that it is probably the difference of economic status rather than their religion which accounts for this curious situation. If religion is chiefly of a ceremonial nature rather than of a social character it should not be expected that it would have very much influence upon conduct. The only religion which seems to have any bearing upon the problem of crime is a socialized religion, *i.e.*, a religion devoted to social ends and purposes.

The *courts*, which are the instruments of justice set up by the state to protect the citizens and to bring the offenders to justice, sometimes are indirectly responsible for criminality. Consider the effect upon the man brought before a court charged with an offense, who is poor and cannot hire a lawyer, but has to take whatever lawyer the court sees fit to appoint for him. Whether he is correct in his conclusion or not, is he not likely to believe when he sees rich men defended by very capable lawyers escape, that justice is not even-handed? Furthermore, the delays that are to be found in many of our courts in bringing the accused to trial allow many a rascal to go unpunished. Witnesses die or are got out of the way, so when the case comes to trial, the offender must be dismissed. One who cannot get bail must lie in jail in contact with hardened criminals, which is especially bad for a young offender. Moreover, consider the numerous technicalities on which skillful lawyers may cheat justice in the case of influential criminals, in contrast with the speedy hearing and the swift punishment meted out to the poor and uninfluential. The effect of all these things upon the minds of men who feel that they have been discriminated against may be easily imagined.

In many of our states our *prisons* are conceived to be institutions for the reformation of the criminal. Yet as an actual fact

we know that the results in many cases of incarceration in our penal institutions is to turn the man out worse than when he enters. Often he comes out embittered because of his experiences in the prison. Furthermore the prison frequently serves as the place of contact between first offenders and the hardened offenders. Frequently they are schools of crime.[19]

Civilization itself may account for some of our criminality. In our civilization our social, industrial, and political relationships are growing ever more complex. They are most complex in our great cities. Such a civilization requires a much nicer adjustment on the part of the individual than a simpler society. Consider then the individual who by nature perhaps is defective or unbalanced, and the influence of this complex civilization upon his conduct. Unless civilization throws about him its protecting arms and guides him in circumstances in which he is unable to direct his own conduct, he becomes the victim of our culture. Again reflect upon the man who has been brought up in the simple relationships of the country, has formed habits of living there, has adjusted himself to the simple conditions of the countryside, who finds himself in middle or late life endeavoring to live in a city. Frequently he fails to make the proper adjustment. If he is by nature limited in capacity his difficulty is doubly great. However, in such a civilization the conditions are rapidly changing, old standards are being dissolved while new customs and codes have not yet had time to establish themselves. The number of laws, therefore, is increased in order to bring into some sort of conformity the individuals making up the large aggregates of people, thus providing increased opportunity for the violation of law.

When one considers all these conditions surrounding every one of us from childhood to old age, while we recognize that a considerable number of our population is somewhat defective in brains, large numbers are lacking in any expensive education, that we are so organized that there are great gulfs between the opportunities for different groups; when we remember how our economic life puts stresses upon us which require good capacities to meet

[19] See Lowrie, *My Life in Prison*, New York, 1912.

these stresses successfully and how little we do to train people to adjust themselves to these complex conditions it is remarkable that no more become criminals. The real miracle is that so many of our people do not get into serious difficulty with the law. Let us now turn to consider some of the methods which society has devised to deal with the delinquent and to prevent maladjustment.

Methods of Dealing with the Delinquent and the Criminal. — Many of our present methods, we must remember, are heritages from the past. They are old machinery to meet new situations. Consequently many of them are quite inadequate.

The Police. — The officers of the peace are the first ones to deal with the criminal. Their chief functions are to preserve the peace, to arrest and bring to trial offenders. We must remember that the police is a new profession. Formerly they were watchmen who gave only a part of their time without pay or at a very small remuneration to guard the peace of the community. The police as a body of men giving their whole time to the preservation of the peace orginated only a hundred years ago, to be exact, in 1829, in London. In very few countries of the world are these men trained as a physician or a lawyer is trained. The policeman is often appointed even without any sort of civil service examination. He gets his job by his friendship with some politician or by being a friend of a friend of one. If he is a sheriff he is elected by popular vote, if a town constable he may be appointed by the mayor or elected by the city council or the town board. In the simple conditions of the early days of this country such officials were perhaps adequate for the situation. But with the growth of our large cities and the increasing number of professional criminals the policeman must be of a much higher type. He must be trained for very difficult duties and he should be selected with the greatest care. His standing in the esteem of the community is shown by the fact that he is the butt of all kinds of jokes and the favorite theme for the cartoonist.

A new day, however, is dawning for the profession of policemen. In a number of cities police schools are now in operation. An increasing number of our cities require a civil service examination

in the selection of these men. Truly there is much yet to do before our police force will be any kind of an adequate means of catching criminals and of preventing crime. They are notoriously incapable of handling juveniles.

The Courts. — After a man is arrested he is either placed in jail to await trial or is let out on bond. In due time he comes before the court for his trial. He pleads either guilty or not guilty; if the latter he stands trial for the charge against him. As our courts are organized at present, the trial is a legal battle between the prosecutor and the defender. The judge is umpire in the game. These courts operate under statutes enacted by the legislature. These statutes provide what kind of sentences may be given by the judge according to the kind of crime he has committed. The jury hears the evidence and in a few states the members of the jury are judges of the law as well as of the facts of the case. In case the man is acquitted the whole matter is ended; but if convicted, the law provides for appeals on the part of his attorney to the higher court on the theory that every chance should be given to the man to prove himself to be innocent. However, in the course of time so many technicalities in regard to the rules of evidence have been developed, that it is very difficult to convict a man accused of crime who is able to hire good lawyers. A recent study in St. Louis County, Missouri, for example, shows the difficulty which the court experienced in convicting men charged with crime. Out of 443 for whom warrants were issued, 163 were finally sentenced, but because of probation, appeal, and other dispositions, only 100 were finally sent to prison. Out of the 163, if the pleas of guilty by 137 are deducted, only 26 persons were sent to prison. That is, out of 443 charged with a felony in the two-year period from October 1, 1922, to October 1, 1924, in St. Louis County, only 26 were punished.[20]

In Cleveland in 1919 the mortality of felony cases in the Common Pleas court was very much greater than that in the St. Louis court. Of 3236 felony cases in that court, only 9.5 per cent were convicted of felony, although 13.38 per cent pled guilty of the offense charged, and 17 per cent more, who had pled not guilty,

[20] *The Missouri Crime Survey*, New York, 1926, pp. 154, 155.

finally changed the plea to guilty of offense as charged. Thus a trifle under 40 per cent were either convicted or pled guilty, while over 60 per cent were disposed of in another manner, $5\frac{1}{3}$ per cent being dismissed on a *nolle prosequi*.[21]

Could we study the number of appeals and the disposition of the cases on appeal, and could we look into the minds of those who escaped punishment, as well as those who were punished, we should have a more adequate picture of the failure of the courts in the administration of criminal justice. Perhaps then we should be prepared to appreciate ex-President Taft's statement that the administration of criminal justice in the United States is a disgrace. Here and there states are changing their criminal procedure in the direction of swifter and more certain justice. Some courts are making use of clinics in order to study the individual who is on trial. At Sing Sing, New York, a great laboratory is being started to determine how to classify the convicts and how they shall be treated in order to fit the treatment more perfectly to the needs of each individual. Ten years ago I suggested and recently the suggestion has been recommended to the legislature of one of our states that the criminal law should be changed so that the function of the court would be confined strictly to determining the guilt or innocence of the person accused, that if he were found guilty then his treatment should be committed to a special board, whose business it is after careful study of the criminal himself, to ascertain what treatment should be given him. Perhaps some day some such system will displace our present medieval theory that a legislature can know better than a board of experts what treatment to give the man found guilty of a given crime. In Boston, Chicago, and many other of our large cities, juvenile courts have the services of psychologists and psychiatrists to aid them in determining what to do with the juveniles who come before these courts. Some of our states, Wisconsin, for example, among many others, provide psychiatric service to the penal and correctional institutions of the state in order to advise the parole board as to whether the man should be discharged as

[21] *Criminal Justice in Cleveland*, Cleveland Foundation, Cleveland, Ohio, 1922, p. 95.

well as to understand what kind of a trade should be taught him in the institution. Step by step science is being introduced into the determination of the nature of the offenders in order that the institutions provided by society for his treatment may better perform their duties.

Probation is another device to mitigate the maladjustment of criminal justice to the needs of the individual. We stubbornly hold to the old theory that the lawmakers should say just what treatment should be handed out to each individual who contravenes a certain law, assuming that there is some divine gift in a lawgiver that enables him to set down in a law beforehand just what kind of treatment will probably protect society and reform the delinquent. That theory, however, has worked so badly that we have invented a device known as probation, by which the judge is empowered to use his discretion as to whether he will send the convicted man to an institution or whether, in view of all the circumstances of this man's nature and the conditions surrounding the commission of the crime, the judge might not better suspend sentence and put the man in charge of some one who will give him careful supervision. This is a modification of the old penal theory of punishment. If probation is carefully used and applied only to those who give promise of doing well at liberty under supervision, and if those under whom the judge places those convicted of crime are properly qualified persons, the device is a beneficial one. Many a man by probation has been saved the stigma of a prison sentence, has been put to work, his family supported, and he has learned his lesson.

Juvenile Reformatories. — Juvenile reformatories were devised to remove from prison juvenile offenders. They are now usually called industrial schools. The ideals back of them are entirely commendable. They are an American invention going back to about 1820. However, the history of these institutions is not reassuring. Too often they are simply juvenile prisons. Frequently they are in charge of men and women without special qualifications for their difficult tasks. In a study made by Doctor Miriam Van Waters a number of years ago of some 28 girls' industrial schools in this country, only six were found doing constructive

work. In all of these six cases they were manned by people who understood children and youth. So conducted they are valuable institutions, because there are some children who do need, for a time at least, an institution in which they may be trained for good citizenship. Unless those in charge of these institutions are trained men and women who understand how to manage young people and how to bring a new viewpoint on life into their minds, how to awaken idealism, and how to get these young folks to form habits of conduct in accordance with the standards of society, they are useless.

Adult Reformatories were started in this country with the establishment of the Elmira Reformatory for men in New York in 1876. This was an experiment in an attempt to apply reformatory methods to young men. It was limited to first offenders who had committed only certain types of crime. Those who had received life sentences were not eligible. In this institution trade schools were established to teach these boys, and elementary schools were provided for those who were illiterate or near-illiterate. At one time thirty odd trades were taught, military drill and physical exercise, medical service, religious services were provided, and certain classes of citizenship and ethics were held to bring before these young men new ideals, to establish new habits, and prepare them for a useful life when they went out. This institution was copied in a large number of our states and also in Europe. However, with a few notable exceptions in this country they have turned out to be merely young men's prisons. The difficulty here, as in the case of the industrial schools, has been the character of those who have been placed in charge of them.

Another device to adjust treatment to the individual offender is the *indeterminate sentence*. As actually practiced the term is a misnomer. In none of our states is it absolutely indeterminate, but is limited by statutes to the length of time for which the offender would have been sentenced had he been sentenced under the determinate sentence law. Therefore, it is a limited indeterminate sentence, that is, limited to the penalty set down in the law for that particular offense. However, in its actual administration in most states under this sentence men are retained in

prison longer than under a definite sentence. Therefore, even this limited indeterminate sentence means some social advance. What is needed is that the sentence should be absolutely indeterminate in the sense that the sentence should depend not upon the limitations of the statutes, but upon the judgment of those who know the man best and are qualified to determine when he is fit to go back into society with the prospect of good conduct.

Closely connected with the indeterminate sentence is *parole.* This is another method of individualizing the treatment of offenders. Probation we use for men before they are sent to prison in order to save them from a prison sentence. Parole is the term we use by which we let men out on trial after they have been in the institution. In actual practice the man is under the supervision of parole officials. Here again we have a system that in its purposes is entirely commendable. However, too frequently the parole officials have been inefficient men without special training for their tasks. Frequently they have not understood how to handle the men under their supervision; they are often overloaded and therefore have too infrequent contact with those paroled. The device, however, has great possibilities and with well-trained parole officials not too heavily burdened with great numbers of parolees, the system has great promise. No one knows how large a percentage of those paroled have done well. Originally the estimates were as high as 85 per cent. More careful study has shown that the percentage is very much lower. If, however, even 50 per cent or even a third of the men discharged on parole do well the system has justified itself.

Our highest penal and correctional institution is *the prison.* To this institution are committed those convicted of the more serious crimes and those who, because of their age, are not eligible to the reformatory. Its history has been a sad one, and only from the standpoint of the protection of society can it be partially justified. Usually it is run under the strictest discipline, the rule of silence between the prisoners usually prevails, it is officered most frequently by men who have no special qualifications for the task either by nature or training. Society demands that its chief function shall be to keep the men safely within its walls and, so

far as their work does not interfere with free workmen, kept busy. Then, if in addition it can turn out some of these men reformed, society is fairly well satisfied. However, from the standpoint of turning out good citizens, it has been a colossal failure. Here, again, the personnel in charge of the prisoners is the most serious difficulty. The guards, hired for less than a ditch digger can earn, are for the most part uninspiring, repressive automatons. Once we get the conception that the function of a prison is the same as that of a university, namely, to turn people out into society to meet its complex demands, we shall pay better salaries to the men whom we put in charge of the prisoners and we shall require higher qualifications.

In all these penal and correctional institutions there are in general two classes of inmates. There are those who ought to be subject to custodial care as long as they live. These are made up of the insane, feebleminded, epileptic, criminals, and certain psychopaths who under the knowledge we now have we can see no way ever to discharge them into society without danger. The other class is a large group of young men who have made mistakes and have decided to reform. These men ought to be let out into society as soon as they are fit to return. At the present time too frequently they are kept in prison until they are ruined for life.

Education in Our Prisons. — We have briefly noticed that the institutions for the young delinquents are called industrial schools, and that the fundamental idea of the reformatory was by means of trade-schools and schools of elementary branches to prepare men to go out into society again. Since, however, most of the men even in our prisons go out, and since the great majority of them are poorly educated, should not even our prisons be conducted as educational institutions? Fortunately, that concept of the function of the prisons is gradually growing. In a number of our American prisons classes are held for those that are illiterate, or have not got beyond a certain grade of elementary schools. In addition, in a few of our prisons opportunity is given to the men to pursue courses of higher learning or trade courses to prepare them for some form of occupation outside. California and Wisconsin are two striking representatives of this new venture. Out

of 1200 men in the Wisconsin state prison, 200 are taking University Extension courses, paid for out of their own meager earnings. California has extended the system of prison education more widely than any other state. Not only does it permit the inmates of its prison at San Quentin to take extension courses from the university, but it conducts its own school in the higher branches of learning.

Not only does education in the prisons help to prepare the men for their after-careers outside, but is a very great benefit in relieving the tedium of their spare time and aids very materially in the matter of discipline.

As we look back carefully over the whole history of the treatment of the criminals we see that society has here made one of its most dismal failures. It fails in its trial of the offender; it fails in his detention before trial; that failure is repeated too often when he is sent to an institution which is not properly equipped to re-orient him for life on the outside. Too often we fail to equip this institution properly; we put in charge of it inadequately prepared individuals; we fail to apply the various sciences which deal with the management of human beings. Often we put the wrong person on probation, and do not put others on probation who would profit by it. Our parole methods often are brought into contempt by giving the prisoners improper supervision or by letting out the wrong person. We fail when we allow the legislature to decide beforehand just what treatment a man shall receive for a given crime, and therefore we must release them whether they are fit to go back into society or not. We fail when we treat them only with repression in prison and not by modern educational methods. We fail when we keep them idle instead of allowing them to work at some useful trade.

Furthermore, when we are dealing with prisoners in institutions, of course we are commencing at the wrong end. We are making prisoners faster than we can reform them. Hence the growth in the prison population of most of our states. We are not applying the old adage that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

"If our study of the matter has shown that the lack of play-

grounds makes for criminality, if slums produce as their results offenders against society, if we learn that the school is failing to set the feet of young people upon the right path, if our study shows that even the church is failing in the great task of directing young people into the paths of social righteousness, if our economic system is such that it sometimes provides the occasion that drives men into crime, and if our political system is such that it promotes criminality rather than prevents it, our study indicates the points at which the attack on the problem of crime should be made. Steadily year by year as we obtain better knowledge, we must apply this knowledge which we have in psychology, in sociology, in education, in religion, in politics, in economics to adjusting the conditions of life to the capacities of each person so as to enable him to function in the very best possible way according to his natural capacity.

"From the doctrine of heredity we should learn that there are certain people born into the world who are unable to function under the present organization of our social life. Eugenics suggests that certain of these people should be selected for non-propagation. If we applied as much good sense and science to the production of our human population as we do to our animals we should solve this aspect of the problem in a very short time. The feeble-minded, certain classes of the insane, epileptics, the mentally abnormal, and other defectives challenge our attention to this problem of racial stock. Some people are less capable of adapting themselves to the social requirements of life than others. Either we must eliminate those incapable of making adjustments, or we should throw about them the protecting arms of society, that is, adjust society's requirements to them rather than to make demands upon them which they are incapable of fulfilling." [22]

READING ASSIGNMENTS

Burt, Cyril. *The Young Delinquent.*
Gillin, J. L. *Criminology and Penology.*
Henderson, C. R. *Penal and Reformatory Institutions.*
Robinson, L. N. *Penology in the United States.*

[22] Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, *Social Problems*, New York, 1920, p. 444.

OTHER REFERENCES

Ellis, Havelock. *The Criminal.*
Ferri, Enrico. *Criminal Sociology*, pp. 1–143; 200–265.
Wines, F. H. *Punishment and Reformation*, pp. 122–229. Reports of Crime Commissions of New York, Illinois, Missouri, etc.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. State the difference between crime in the legal sense and crime in the sociological sense.
2. Attempt to ascertain the cost of crime in your county.
3. Pick out a half dozen cases of crime in your community and ascertain the causes operating in each case.
4. In the light of the discussion in the text carefully analyze the laws of your state for dealing with murder and criticize them, pointing out the admirable characteristics and the defects.
5. What plans has your state for the reformation of criminals?
6. Make an outline of a system of laws governing the punishment of the crime of homicide inspired by the aim to reform those that are probably subject to reformatory influences and to protect society from those who are hopeless. Give your reasons for each measure proposed in this scheme.
7. Has there been a crime wave in the United States since the World War?
8. Is crime increasing or changing its nature and method?
9. In what ways has the automobile increased crime and vice?
10. Explain the "racket" and methods of "racketeering."
11. In accordance with the present trend of civilization should we not naturally expect a great increase in crime?

CHAPTER XXXV

SOCIAL DEGENERATION

Nature of Social Degeneration. — Nordau once wrote a large book on degeneration built upon the studies of his acknowledged master, Lombroso. His thesis is that the nervous diseases that curse society to-day, the literary and artistic monstrosities which appear ever and again, and the moral and religious crazes which arise from time to time are symptoms of degeneracy.[1] To him these social phenomena constituted social degeneration.

Morel, Feré, Talbot, Lange, and a host of geneticists and eugenists, have written extensively upon degeneracy in the individual. Only indirectly do these studies bear upon the question of social degeneration.

Ward in his *Pure Sociology* touches the question of race degeneration. He treats it from the analogical point of view, drawing the parallel between the extinction of the highly specialized forms of animal and plant life, like the dinosaurs and the giant sequoias, respectively, and races and nations, citing as examples the conquest of Troy by Greece, the yielding to Spain in the fifteenth century of the torch of civilization borne by Italy up to that time. To Ward, "race and national degeneration are nothing more than this pushing out of the vigorous branches or sympodes at the expense of the parent trunks." He makes the term degeneration synonymous with decadence.[2]

We know what biological degeneracy is. It is the degeneracy of the individual in one or more of a number of ways. Genetically it may be described as a variation from the type in the direction of less complexity of physical organization, with the result that the organism is illy adapted to meet the conditions of life. In the para-

[1] Nordau, *Degeneration*, New York, 1895.

[2] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 77, 78, 227–229.

site it is adaptation of the organism in order that the creature may the more easily adjust itself to the struggle for existence in accordance with the law of parsimony, or least effort, and a consequent simplification of structure. It is doubtful whether the plants and animals which have succeeded the old, highly specialized forms are degenerations from the latter. Rather they seem to be cases of arrested development of unspecialized forms better adapted to the conditions of existence under a suddenly and greatly changed environment. So the races and peoples which occupy highlands or those which are found in out-of-the-way places like the interior of Africa or of Australia are probably cases of arrested development rather than degenerate races. If social degeneration is to be interpreted in this way, then examples are to be found in the decadent Roman Empire, the Italian city-states in the days of their decadence, and in the Spain of a generation ago.

Social degeneration is the breaking up of the coördination existing between the various social elements, — individuals and the subgroups which coöperate in the social process, — by the growth of so many antisocial elements that social unity is destroyed. This may result from the relative increase of insane, mentally defective, and psychotic individuals in the population, or the breakdown of ideals, sanctions, and customs necessary to effective coöperation in social life among the individuals who make up society. Therefore, individual degeneracy has a direct bearing upon social degeneration through the composition of society, for degenerate individuals are either unsocial or antisocial and are unable to coöperate in the aims and purposes of society. On the other hand, social degeneration results from changes in society which throw unusual strains upon individuals. Inventions and discoveries which displace wage earners bring about unemployment, consequent poverty with its train of worry, sickness, crime, suicide, drunkenness, "dope," insanity, vagrancy, prostitution, and loss of ambition and hope. The individual incapable of readjusting himself to the new conditions succumbs to circumstances and vicariously pays the "cost of progress." The more strenuous the economic and social life, the greater is the strain upon the individual, and the larger is the number of those

who break in health, in morals, in ideals, and in social usefulness. The family standards are lowered, morals decay, interest in the state and public welfare declines, willingness to work with others for the welfare of all is destroyed, class spirit is engendered, and social idealism and social coöperation sicken and die. Both public and private agencies for social adjustment are unable to cope with the increasing problems both because of the increased burden and also because of the decreasing number of people in the population who have the welfare of the whole society at heart. The rich seek materialistic ends, acting upon the theory of "after us the deluge," while the poor lose ambition and hope to the extent that they think they have no stake in society.[3]

Social degeneration, then, arises from a relative growth of the number of individuals who fail to perform their part in coöperative social activity. This causes a breakdown in the social mechanism through disintegrating social control. A few of the factors in social degeneracy deserve attention in the brief discussion it is possible to give the subject here.

Intemperance. — Wherever intemperance of any kind exists social degeneration certainly and physical degeneration probably will result. The parent who is given over to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors may not beget drunkards, but he probably will hand down to his children the enfeebled germ plasm which made him a drunkard, still further weakened by his excesses, and thus he may be the cause of the development of epilepsy, or imbecility, in his offspring. Continue this to a sufficient degree and society finally becomes extinct. On the other hand, the sober, industrious, temperate people, the stock being untainted with degeneracy, not only give forth the ideas which are the motors of development and normal progress, but perpetuate a stock which increases in vigor and is able to seize and use the opportunities for advancement. Under this law temperate people eventually possess the material wealth of the community, control the social forces, and discover the truth, essential to social advance. Hence, it is not merely the sapping of the physical vitality of the race that constitutes the principal effect of intemperance; it is the

[3] Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1900, pp. 347–356.

destruction of normal coöperative relationships. Intemperance is against all normal progress and therefore involves decay.

There is no doubt that intemperance is often the result of degeneracy in the individual. The enfeebled intellect has no restraining power. It drifts as a ship without a rudder. The feebleminded, the epileptic, and the insane, as well as the neuropath in general, often find in alcohol a substitute for the emotional satisfaction furnished normal beings in other ways — a crutch for their unstable nerves. Dr. Branthwaite studied 2277 inebriates as to their mental condition and found 16.1 per cent insane, 62.6 per cent imbeciles, degenerates, and epileptics in a marked degree, defective but to a less degree manifesting defectiveness in eccentricity, silliness, dullness, senility, or periodical fits of ungovernable temper, while but 37.4 per cent were of average mental capacity. He estimated that at least 62 per cent of these cases were inebriate by reason of their mental condition.[4] Of the 774 men committed to the Iowa State Institution for Inebriates in 1906–1908 the parents of 13 were defectives and of 94 were diseased. The fathers of 26 and the mothers of 21 were tuberculous and the mothers of 11 and the fathers of 12 had heart disease. One or both of the parents of 427 of them were intemperate in the use of liquor. In the two years 1910–1912 the figures are even more striking. Of 665 inmates of that institution 8 had defective fathers or mothers, 116 diseased fathers or mothers, while 250 had fathers or mothers who were intemperate. The parents of only 88 were known to be non-users of liquor.[5]

On the other hand, we are uncertain how great is the influence of liquor in producing inheritable degeneracy. In an investigation made for the American Medico-Psychological Association published in 1903, 5145 insane persons were investigated. Thirty per cent were total abstainers, while the insanity of twenty-four per cent was considered due directly to the influence of liquor. Dr. Billings in commenting upon these and other figures of like nature said, " In any case where there is a tendency to psychic or

[4] Quoted by Warner, *American Charities*, Rev. Ed., 1908, pp. 79, 80.
[5] *Second Biennial Report of the State Hospital for Inebriates, Knoxville, Iowa*, 1908, p. 14; *ibid.*, 1912, p. 21.

nervous instability or abnormal action either inherited or acquired, the excessive use of alcohol may act as the exciting cause like a torch to inflammable material, but the same result may be produced with any excess creating a strain on the nervous system." [6] Professor Hodge of Clark University conducted some experiments upon cocker spaniel puppies, 1896–1898, to determine the effect of alcohol upon them. He carefully controlled the experiments so that they would be as nearly free from error as possible. He came to the following conclusions:

(1) On the side of general intelligence the alcoholic dogs were in no wise inferior to their mates.

(2) The alcoholic dogs manifested extreme timidity when the others showed no signs of it. Commenting upon this characteristic Dr. Hodge said, "Fear is commonly recognized as a characteristic feature in alcoholic insanity, and delirium tremens is the most terrible fear-psychosis known."

(3) The reproductive capacity of the non-alcoholic dogs was much greater, and the viability of the progeny of the non-alcoholic dogs was 90.2 per cent, while of the puppies of the alcoholic dogs it was 17.4 per cent.[7]

The author, while admitting that the experiments were too few to serve as a basis for very definite general conclusions, says, "Possibly the most important of our results relates to the vigor and normality of offspring."

These experiments were with dogs, not with human beings. An investigation by Demme, however, throws some light upon the human problem of degeneracy and alcohol. Demme found that in the progeny of 10 alcoholic families, 17 per cent were normal, the rest suffering either from physical deformities, idiocy, epilepsy, or early death, while in the 10 non-alcoholic families, 88.5 per cent were normal. Twenty-five out of 51 children in the former families and only 3 out of 61 in the latter were non-viable.

Degeneracy of other sorts is closely connected with intemperance. Thus, Koren estimated 37 per cent of the pauperism

[6] Billings, *Physiological Aspects of the Liquor Problem*, Vol. I, p. 341 sq.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 371–375.

in this country due directly or indirectly to drink.[8] Devine says more than 16 per cent of pauperism is due directly to drink.[9] Koren found intemperance the principal cause of crime in over 21 per cent of 13,402 convicts investigated.[10] Dugdale found that 45 per cent of 176 habitual criminals were from intemperate familics, and 42 per cent were habitual drunkards.[11] Sullivan estimates that 60 per cent of homicidal offenses in England and a slightly smaller percentage of crimes of lust are caused by alcohol.[12]

The very close relation of alcoholism and degeneracy has often been remarked. Some writers think that their influence is reciprocal. Sometimes alcoholism is the result and at others the cause of degeneracy.[13]

Goddard has recently reported on the most careful and extensive study yet made of feeblemindedness. He sums up an analysis of his inquiry as to the relation of alcohol to feeblemindedness thus, "It looks evident that alcohol almost doubles the number of feebleminded children in a family. But are we sure that alcohol is a cause and not merely a symptom?" He points out that while "the percentages are very high for the feebleminded children of alcoholic parents and at first glance it appears that alcohol has greatly increased the number of feebleminded, yet the argument is not complete." In these investigations he properly points out they were dealing only with feebleminded children of alcoholics. To make the case complete, the normal children of alcoholic parents in otherwise normal families should be investigated. On the basis of his study he concludes that alcohol instead of being a cause of feeblemindedness, so far as his studies show, is simply a symptom of degeneracy, that it occurs for the most part "in families whcre there is some form of neurotic taint, especially feeblemindedness." So far as the evidence goes on the influence of alcohol in producing physical degeneracy the findings are negative. All we can say is that the evidence is not conclusive that

[8] Koren, *Economic Aspects of the Liquor Problem*, p. 120.

[9] Devine, *Misery and Its Causes*, p. 211. Cf. Lindsay's 15 per cent plus in *Proceedings, National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1899, pp. 369 *et seq.*

[10] Koren, *Economic Aspects of thc Liquor Problem*, p. 120.

[11] *The Jukes*, p. 187.

[12] Sullivan, *Alcoholism*, pp. 164–169.

[13] See Sullivan, *ibid.*, p. 182, for remarks on this point.

the intemperate use of alcohol by drunken parents directly affects the germ plasm in such a way as to produce that form of degeneracy which we call feeblemindedness.[14] These studies are of interest chiefly in showing how closely linked are various forms of social degeneracy.

This conclusion leaves untouched the problem of whether alcohol in any way either directly or indirectly affects man's relations to his fellows so that he becomes pseudo- or antisocial. Doubtless there are many cases where drink has induced pauperism. The wages or savings have been spent for drink. The family has come to want. Indirectly, doubtless, by inducing irregular habits of industry, inefficiency in industry and business, drink has contributed to dependency. The associations connected with the saloon have frequently been the means whereby the sturdy independence of the worker has been undermined and his descent to social parasitism has been started.

The same is true with respect to alcohol's relation to criminality. Some crimes are incited by drink. Alcohol seems to paralyze the higher inhibitory brain centers and thereby favors the formation of habits clearly antisocial in their results. It seems to incite brutal and lustful passions at the same time that it perverts the judgment. Socially it seems to stimulate fellowship, for drinking is closely connected with the love of companionship. Nevertheless, really it makes for lawlessness and the breaking up of society into antagonistic groups, by its close alliance often, especially in temperance countries, with criminal groups. Alcohol is ever indissolubly linked up with antisocial and vicious activities. Without a doubt, from the standpoint of social degeneration, drunkenness bears a heavy share of responsibility.[15]

Immorality. — Leading to sexual excesses, immorality saps the physical, intellectual, and vital strength of a community, thus dissipating the energy which ought to be used in social action. As society develops by the enlargement of activities on one hand and the accurate adjustment of its organs or parts on the other,

[14] Goddard, *Feeblemindedness: Its Causes and Consequences*, 1914, pp. 490–492.
[15] Aschaffenburg, *Crime and Its Repression*, Boston, 1913, pp. 69–88.

immoral influences destroy normal functions and lead to social decay.

Immorality, while often it is bound up in a tangled skein with intemperance, is at least as fruitful a source of degeneracy as intemperance in the use of alcohol. This stands out in such degenerate families as those of the Jukes, the Rooneys, the Ishmaels, and the Zeros. Whether they are intemperate or not, they are usually immoral. They may not be criminals, but they are immoral. The most hideous thing about the awful stories of these families is the frightful depths to which they descend in their sexual relations.

Immorality, considered as indiscriminate sexual relationships, operates to produce degeneracy through the spread of disease. Goddard found out of 40 children in what he calls the Hereditary Group of feebleminded, from 10 matings where the parents were syphilitic, 42.4 per cent were feebleminded, 4.9 per cent normal, 27.7 per cent died in infancy, and 10 per cent were miscarriages. In this group, however, there was feeblemindedness in the parents. The terrific proportion of these children who died in infancy or miscarried — nearly two-fifths — as compared with an average of 12.9 per cent of all classes of feebleminded is significant.[16] No conclusive study of the relation of syphilis to epilepsy has yet been made. It is suspected, however, that they are closely connected. Recent studies in the Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute show that nearly a fifth of the male inmates of the Wisconsin Hospital for the Insane are insane because of syphilis. Goddard does not believe that syphilis is a potent cause of feeblemindedness, although he admits his cases do not prove that it is not.

Moreover, the share of sexual vice in producing human misery is appalling. To say nothing of the cost of treating those afflicted with the so-called social diseases and the loss of time and decrease of physical and mental efficiency by the victims of these diseases, consider the unhappiness, domestic discord, and ruined homes incident to vice. The most important cause of divorce after desertion, which is a symptom rather than a cause and

[16] Aschaffenburg, *Crime and Its Repression*, Boston, 1913, pp. 494, 495; 518, 521.

probably is usually preceded by unfaithfulness, is marital infidelity.[17] There immorality strikes at the very foundation of social life. The family relations are broken up. The most important center for the development of helpful social relations — the home — is destroyed. Children are thrown into new relationships and forced to new adjustments often with disaster to them. Instead of promoting social coördination and that social control which makes for cohesion and social progress, there arises disorder through disregard of social bonds. Pauperism, crime, and vice flourish as the result. Society comes to lack that close-knit coördination and orderly functioning which is necessary to social progress.[18]

Hereditary Influences. — The influence of heredity on individual life has not yet been fully determined. The studies already made indicate that through physical heredity one generation influences the next to a great extent. Disease is probably not transmitted from parent to offspring by heredity but the characteristics of physical structure conducive to the development of the disease are probably handed down from generation to generation through the germ plasm. It may be that certain poisons may so affect the somatoplasm and the germ plasm of the parent, that the germ plasm has less resistance to that poison, such as alcohol, for example, in a future generation. The consensus of opinion among biologists and pathologists to-day is that disease germs as such cannot be transmitted through the germ plasm from parent to child.[19] Recent studies have supplied some evidence to show that feeblemindedness is probably inherited according to the Mendelian law.[20] If so, then the presence of that defect in the stock tends to social degeneration, for the feebleminded are unable to perform their social duties and thus the social group is injured and progress is by so much impeded. It is also true that many old families like the Edwards, or the Dwights, show the perpetuation of a strong, vigorous stock, mentally and physically, and also manifest a tendency to social adaptation and influence.

[17] *Census Bulletin, No. 96: On Marriage and Divorce*, 1908, p. 13.
[18] Warner, *American Charities*, Rev. Ed., 1908, pp. 81–90.
[19] Walter, *Genetics*, 1914, Revised 1922, pp. 92–94.
[20] Goddard, *Feeblemindedness: Its Causes and Consequences*, 1914, Chap. VIII.

Examples, however, like that of the Jukes family,[21] the Smoky Pilgrims, or the Tribe of Ishmael, show how disease, vice, and crime may be transmitted socially from generation to generation, for the transmission of social characteristics comes through early contact, training, and environment. If a family group is criminal and vicious their children are liable to be the same through early association. Certain it is that not only families, but whole communities, become weakened and degenerate, growing worse from generation to generation — an evolution downward so to speak — by reason of a bad social heritage of customs, ideals, traditions, etc., which are socially disintegrating. It thus sometimes happens that a hardy stock or race gradually declines, degenerates, and even becomes extinct on account of the failure to receive and use accumulated social achievements. To such as these Lowell refers in his "Interview with Miles Standish":

> "They talk about their Pilgrim blood,
> Their birthright high and holy!
> A mountain stream that ends in mud
> Methinks is melancholy."

However, just to the extent that we ward off disease and develop a higher degree of physical and mental life, to that extent will social life be improved, for a high type of social life comes essentially from the association of high-grade normal individuals.

While the two kinds of inheritance — inheritance through the physical transmission of characteristics by means of the germ plasm, and the transmission from one generation to another by social means of communication, example, ideals, of the mental and social possessions — must be kept clearly separated in our thought, yet both work together in the process of evolution and of degeneration. Poor physique, poor mentality biologically transmitted, bear very directly upon the kind of social product in the way of ideals, customs, traditions governing men's relations

[21] These are studies in social degeneration: *The Jukes*, by Dugdale, *The Smoky Pilgrims*, by Blackmar, and *The Tribe of Ishmael*, by McCullock, *The Hill Folk*, by Davenport and Danielson, *The Nam Family*, by Davenport and Estabrook, *The Kallikak Family*, by Goddard, *Dwellers in the Vale of Siddem*, by Rogers and Merrill.

with each other which a group will furnish and use. The feeble-minded, the insane, the epileptic, and the neuropathic do not make good members of society, but on the contrary contribute to its stock elements which are unable to associate together in any helpful and constructive way. They add to the social burden which society must bear — a very costly burden upon the labor and thought of the social. Moreover, they contribute directly to the pauper and criminal classes which set up ideals and generate customs and habits which eat like a canker into the very vitals of society.

On the other hand, there is an increasing amount of evidence that social conditions have a great deal to do with the production of physical and mental weakness, and upon social maladjustments. We know that bad housing conditions, poverty, bad habits and customs, unsanitary factories and dwellings, and social neglect of certain poisons break down the physical efficiency of people, destroy ideals of proper home life, cut the root of ambition and of hope, divide society into suspicious and warring classes, put a strain upon the minds of some which ends in insanity and makes impossible the realization of ideals of cleanliness and health.[22] Whether these conditions affect the germ plasm by which some forms of degeneracy like feeblemindedness are transmitted we do not know, but this defect and bad social conditions are so often found together. These conditions reduce the physical efficiency of people both physically and mentally, and lead to social degeneration. It is probable that bad social conditions act as a selective agent on individual degeneracy.

Eugenics. — Two separate groups of scientists are still contending over the question of which has the greater influence, heredity or environment, in the development of human society. No doubt, the extremists in each group are wrong in their assumptions because these two lines of development correlate and they are absolutely necessary to each other. The disagreement has led to investigations which have clarified the subject and have shown conclusively the importance of each in human evolution. It is clear that hereditary traits descend from generation

[22] See Warner, *American Charities*, Rev. Ed., 1908, pp. 66–90, and Chap. IV.

to generation through the germ plasm, having a separate group of cells from the body cells of the individual, and that these traits develop in response to both internal and external or environmental stimuli. Biologically, these two groups of stimuli are in action from the very beginning of the individual in the germ cell and the environmental stimuli increase in activity and influence through the development of the individual. The biological processes admit a wide differentiation in the selection of traits, while the variety of environmental stimuli have tremendous influence in the development of these traits. The environmental influences are both physical and psychical. In the development of personality the social environment has the greater influence. The significance of eugenics in social development is found in the recognition of the inequality of traits and the adaptation of environment and education to their proper development. This brings into play the leadership of the best that nature has given, but calls up as well through adaptation, training, and education all of the hereditary traits of individuals and puts them into service. This is not for the purpose of establishing a dominant class but of developing the truest of all democracies, founded on inequality of merit and service, rather than on an assumed equality, which does not exist. The study of eugenics helps us to so direct social activity that better racial characters may be developed and utilized.

Social Degeneration. — When discussing the influence of individual degeneracy in producing social degeneration it was suggested that anything that breaks down the workings of the social organism or renders ineffective the social machinery leads directly to degeneration. We have very many causes that work to destroy normal social action. They may do nothing more than retard progress in general, though they may so seriously affect organs as eventually to destroy the whole group. An example is furnished by the effect of accidents on the adjustment of social relations in industrial life through dangerous occupations. The explosion in a mine may kill a hundred people and thus destroy the earning capacity of a hundred families. These families may resort to various expedients for support, but there can never be the independent, normal, social life that existed before. Homes

are broken, individuals die through want or excessive toil, others become sick and hopeless, and some go down to vice or crime. Society may push on through normal agencies and overcome the evil effects arising from such accidents, but the social maladjustment thus engendered must be overcome or society will perish. A hundred cases similar to this, like the influence of disease from social groupings, unsanitary surroundings, improper employment of men, women, and children, enforced idleness through the shifting of industrial life, and conditions which produce a high death rate, all have a decided effect in producing social degeneration. If all such defects should be massed at a given time, and also if vital causes should arise through lack of the food supply, a community must grow weaker and weaker until there is no social feeling, thought, or will power, no social coöperation. The same effect is produced if the sum total of social maladjustment, though scattered over long periods of time, has a cumulative effect, so impoverishing the normally social individuals with the burden of taxation necessary to support the defective and delinquent, or of so burdening them with social duties made heavy because some refuse or are unable to bear them, that the effective coördination of individuals and groups is broken down.

Maladjustment of Groups. — There are survivals of the wolfish disposition in men. This disposition manifests itself more in the attempt of the individual to associate on his own terms with his fellows rather than in refusal to associate. The predatory instinct is evinced to a high degree in many members of society. It is a survival into modern society of the barbaric " passion for domination," as Mallock has called it. They lack the wide social interest which considers the welfare of all the people in the group. They form groups within society. Such social degeneration is exemplified by the societies of beggars, criminals, and predatory exploiters of the people who mask under the guise of legality in their financial operations. They are social within their own little group; they are anti-social when the whole society of which they are naturally a part is considered. Or, they may develop class feeling and standards which are at variance with the welfare of the larger social unit. So often those who have climbed up the ladder of

business, political, or professional success try to kick down the ladder up which they themselves came. They seek their own selfish interests rather than the larger interests of the whole society of which they are members and for the survival of which they ought to feel responsibility. On the other hand, those who have not been successful lose interest in the concerns of the larger group. They see those in high places "looking out for number one"; like the Northern tribes of Israel they cry, "What portion have we in David? neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse: to your tents, O Israel: now see to thine own house, David." These latter in our day make up the Ishmaelites of society. Both classes help to destroy that integration of feeling, pride, idealism, and purpose, that coöperative spirit in working out maladjustments in the social machinery upon which a progressive society depends. Social degeneration results. Thus, there are individuals who fail to perform their social part in a community, either through weakness, selfishness, or viciousness. These flock together into groups of like natures having similar interests and prejudices. As groups of antisocial or pseudo-social individuals they destroy social solidarity and destroy social adjustment. Wherever a large number of individuals fail in this respect society is rendered degenerate.

Social Types. — Each social group has its own type which determines its degree of progress or degeneration. The ideal of any social group is ever above that which is actually achieved. Through the momentum of social forces this ideal gradually changes and consequently the social type varies from one period to another. Whenever the agencies which are at work to maintain the social standards or to improve the environment cease to act, the social life disintegrates and the achievements of generations disappear. This may occur by the loss of the proper ideal or the failure to put forth sufficient will power to approximate the ideal. Luxury, idleness, or shiftlessness destroys the thinking and working forces of society and causes it to lose its acquired characteristics.

Separate groups have widely different views of the right and wrong of social action and put in practice far different social

usages. The ideals of the Bantu negroes, the Thlinkits, the Ainu, and the Sioux are very different and their social types vary, and yet how widely different is any one of these from the social ideal and practice of the civilized American. Degeneration is a breakdown of not only the social ideals of the group, but of the typical social relationships already achieved. What would be social degeneration for a highly civilized people might represent advancement of a tribe of Sioux Indians.

The Survival of Society. — The hope of society consists in making the social relationships ever more complex and more closely coördinated. But in order to accomplish this it is necessary to bring each succeeding generation into ever increasing control of the accumulated products of civilization. In the organization of society the fit must be given ample opportunity to demonstrate their strength and the unfit must be gradually eliminated. But the elimination of the unfit is a social process and refers not so much to individuals as to characteristics. It is therefore essential that the strong should protect the weak and give them an opportunity to overcome their weakness. While protecting the weak, nevertheless, society must take measures to make certain that their weakness is not transmitted from generation to generation. In the case of defectives, for example, who transmit their defect by reproduction, they must be segregated or be so treated otherwise that they cannot produce their kind. The criminals must be put apart where their bad example and influence cannot contaminate others. The whole community must therefore be trained in industry, sanitation, domestic habits, and social life in order to perpetuate its normal growth. Vice and crime must be suppressed, poverty relieved, and pauperism prevented. More than this, all must be given the advantages of an education which will fit them for an honest, independent individual life and prepare them for their social duties. Wealth must increase to keep up with growing needs, but it must not be concentrated in too few hands. Education must improve, but must be extended and adapted to social needs. Society thus has the power, through the selection of ideals and types and the ordering of social activities, to perpetuate itself. The strong must give

opportunities of improvement to the weak and teach the weak to use them to their best advantage. This must be done constantly because there is no such thing as an automatic society running from generation to generation. The nearest approach to a social *continuum* corresponding to the germ plasm in the body consists of the traditions, customs, and ideals of a society. They, however, seem to be very much more easily affected both for ill and for good than the biological bearer of physical characteristics, the germ plasm. All efforts for the improvement of society must be as perpetual as the taking of food for the nourishment of the body. Society's work is never finished because society itself is never completed. The hopeful part of it is that while it is virtually established that acquired physical characteristics cannot be transmitted by heredity, acquired social qualities, ideals, traditions, and customs are the major part of our social heritage.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Criticize the definition of social degeneration given in the text by formulating a better and giving reasons for the points of difference.
2. Distinguish between social degeneration and individual degeneracy.
3. Pick out one case of degeneracy in an individual and trace its history, seeking to find out the causes, its heritability, and some of its social consequences, like drunkenness, illegitimacy, disease, etc.
4. Show how, even if intemperance cannot be inherited, the use of alcohol to excess produces social degeneration.
5. State the objections to sterilization of degenerate persons.

6. Give the arguments in favor of that method of treating degenerates.

7. What other methods can be suggested to adequately deal with the problem of such a degeneracy as feeblemindedness, if, as recently stated by the Vineland, New Jersey, authorities, there are thirty thousand such in New York, eighteen thousand in Pennsylvania, fourteen thousand in Massachusetts, over nine thousand in Michigan, and eight thousand (estimated) in New Jersey?

8. Why should not degenerates be kept in poorhouses?

9. Why should they not be left at large in the families of the country?

10. Suggest a plan by which marriage laws might be made to prevent the spread of degeneracy.

11. What is a moron? What is the danger of having him at large in society?

12. Is it possible to improve the human stock by birth control?

13. How may human waste be eliminated by community control?

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITABLE AND CORRECTIONAL AFFAIRS

Necessity of Care. — The foregoing chapter makes clear how necessary it is that the strong and normal should care for the weak and the abnormal. But to do this in such a way as to increase the strength and sanity of society requires great skill. If it were merely an individual matter, the unfit would probably be weeded out by natural selection in the struggle for existence. But in society it is impossible to permit natural selection to do its work in the old brutal fashion and at the same time preserve our sentiments of pity for the weak — sentiments produced in the course of hundreds of generations. It is impossible for the same reason to apply a stern method of social selection which would eliminate the socially unfit. It is neither possible nor desirable to behead people who are unfit for coöperative life, or even to commit them to a painless lethal chamber. Hence, all that society can do is to see that the unfit do not procreate and endeavor to make people fit for social life. There is less objection to measures which would insure the dying out of a degenerate stock like the feeble-minded or the insane, although voices are raised against even such suggestions. In doing this, great care must be taken that the weak and the vicious are not perpetuated, and also that they do not become a burden to the strong whose vitality might thereby be sapped.

The reformation of the reformable is highly desirable. So costly is it to raise a human being that society can ill afford to destroy one of whom there is any hope. We find it difficult, however, to train even normal people into good social usage. It is far more difficult to train the abnormal. Greater care is needed, therefore, to train those who are educable and care-

fully to segregate and care for those who are not, for the sake of society as a whole. Because of the lack of scientific care in the treatment of the weak and the vicious, crime, insanity, epilepsy, pauperism, and degeneracy are increased. Administration of the laws governing the care of the incapable is the crux of the matter.

Methods of Administration. — Charitable and correctional institutions may be classified in two general divisions, namely, private and public. The care of the poor was for a long time left to private charitable agencies. Gradually, however, it has come to be recognized as a part of the duties of the state. In other words, society is conscious that all its members should be responsible for the care of the few weaker ones. So also in the early history of society crime was a personal matter and individuals were allowed to punish those who wronged them, or, in case of death, the relatives of the deceased were bound to pursue the murderer and destroy him. Gradually, however, it became the duty of the state to punish criminals. To-day the hand of the individual is restrained by law from punishing those who wrong him. On the other hand, he has the right to demand that the state protect him and his property and punish all offenders. In like manner gradually it is coming to be seen that both relief and correction, not in alleviation and repression alone, but also in the doing of constructive remedial work as well as providing preventive agencies, must come under the management of public authorities as fast as private agencies by experiment point the way in which it may best be done. There is need of the private agency, but to assert that it is impossible for public relief agencies to command the men, means, and methods necessary to do the needed work is a counsel of despair which democracy is not ready to accept. Each type of work has its peculiar advantages and drawbacks. Each has its field of work. Each must supplement the work of the other.

So far as charity is concerned, private administration has the advantage of sympathy, enthusiasm, and independent action, but it lacks unity and comprehensiveness. Public charities, on the other hand, have the advantage of greater funds, complete supervision within a given territory, and are always open to

public inspection. Their dangers are failure to get full return for the money expended and the interference of politicians in work which can be well done only by experts. Public charities, being supported by taxation, have a more stable income than most private charities which are dependent upon the contributions of individuals. Nevertheless, there is frequently more humanity in the private charity than in the public, which is liable to become a cold, formal machine of administration. Private charity can attempt more experiments than public. Its constituency is smaller, more compact, probably more intelligent as to needs and methods to meet those needs. It can respond more quickly to an emergency. Public charity is less scientific, more wasteful, and less efficient. These shortcomings, however, are not inherent, but are incidental to the lack of an enlightened public opinion. What is needed is more public interest in the care of the poor, and a general appreciation of the relation of poverty to social welfare. Does any one doubt that if the general public were as well informed as to the ideals and methods of proper relief of the needy as the small body of constituents of the private organization, the public could do it as well as the private organization? The probabilities are that it would do the job much better.

Methods of Public Administration. — There are various methods of public administration of charities and correction which have risen largely under different conditions. The states have, therefore, different laws and varying methods of procedure. Some states have a separate board for each institution, leaving the oversight to the legislature, which usually commits it to a special committee to visit the institution and report. A state board of charities, with supervisory powers, each institution having a local board, is also quite common. In a few states, such as Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, has been established a state board of control which manages all the charitable and penal institutions. In these cases there usually is no supervising body aside from the board of control. In Kansas a board of control has been replaced by a board of administration in charge of all charitable, penal, corrective, and higher state educational institutions.

While the state board of control concentrates administration in the hands of one board, it is in danger of devoting itself too much to business affairs and of neglecting the study of causes, the standardization of methods, the introduction of new methods based upon careful study of experiments in other states, and lacks the independent judgment as to how administration might be made better afforded by a board of state charities purely advisory in its capacity. On the other hand, the state board of charities that visits, inspects, and has advisory powers only, is usually more progressive in the determination of the best systems of conducting charitable institutions and in the scientific care of the unfortunate, and enlists the interest of a larger number of people in these problems in that each institution is managed by a local board of trustees. In the latter case often the penal institutions are conducted by a separate management. However, the state board of control as instituted in Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota for a time grew in favor in the West.

More recently in many parts of the United States another method of organization has been developing. The state department of welfare has met with great favor. Instead of numerous boards and commissions through which the state government functions the tendency has appeared to organize all the functions of the government into a small number of departments. The welfare department is given charge of all the activities relating to the care of the incapable and antisocial. In some states, like Massachusetts, which had a number of commissions dealing with these various classes, the functions of the commissions become the functions of divisions or bureaus, subordinate to the department. The same tendency appears in boards of control and in boards of state charities. The different activities are functionalized through subordinate organizations.[1]

In some states there is a state board or commission on lunacy, which has special supervision over all the insane, epileptics, and weak-minded. There is supposed to be some advantage in having a special board for a specific institution or group of institutions.

[1] See for detailed exposition of the various methods of organization Odum and Willard, *Systems of Public Welfare*, Chapel Hill, 1925.

It is claimed that it gives an opportunity for members of the board to become proficient in a given line. Moreover, it is claimed that when a single board attempts to manage all the charitable and penal institutions of a large state, while its administration may be perfect, it is in danger of failing to understand all the institutions under its control, and therefore the best methods of caring for the wards of the state are not obtained. On the other hand, it is held that when a board is provided for such institution, the members usually do not give all their time to the work and therefore the management of the institution falls naturally into the hands of the paid superintendents, as the experience of Iowa has shown.[2] There is the further difficulty that each institution endeavors to obtain from the legislature more than its just share of the state's money without regard to the needs of the other institutions of similar character. The legislature has neither the time nor experience necessary to judge between these claims. A state board of some kind is needed to study the whole situation, make recommendations to the legislature, and thus secure an orderly and symmetrical development of the state's charitable and correctional institutions in accordance with the just needs of each institution. It has been suggested that the penal institutions of a state should constitute one group; the charitable institutions, such as care for orphans, insane, epileptics, and imbeciles, another group under a separate supervision. Schools for the blind and the deaf and dumb should be placed under the department of public instruction. In this way the state would not be burdened with the multiplicity of boards, and the work would be subdivided so as to produce the best results. Where the population of the state is large and the number of charitable and correctional institutions grows, some such division of labor is best. On the other hand, in a state with but few institutions a paid board of members devoting all their time to the institutions or a state board of supervision with a skilled, paid secretary seems to be best.[3]

[2] See Gillin, *A History of Poor Relief Legislation in Iowa*, 1914, Chap. XVII.

[3] For a detailed discussion of these plans see Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, New York, 1921, Chap. XVI.

Segregation of Wards of the State into Separate Institutions. — The first important thing in dealing with dependents and delinquents is a careful segregation of these in different institutions. There should be a penitentiary for the hardened criminals, reformatories, one for young men and another for young women, for younger criminals susceptible to reform, and industrial schools for incorrigible boys and girls. Great care should be exercised in sending each individual to the proper institution. While this general plan is being carried out in the United States, there is much neglect in specific instances of the proper classification. Often insane are kept in county poorhouses or sent to prison, and epileptics are found in insane asylums and institutions for the feebleminded. Sometimes this is due to lack of adequate provision for one or more of these classes. Often it is due to failure to apply scientific tests to determine to which class a person belongs. The epileptics, the insane, the feebleminded, and the habitual drunkards should be treated in separate institutions. The modern almshouse or county poor farm often has no classification whatever. There we find the pauper, the victim of misfortune, the imbecile, the insane, the epileptic, the criminal, and sometimes those afflicted with chronic diseases. By careful classification each one could be helped in accordance with his specific needs, and much time and money saved. From the standpoint of the social welfare the placing of young offenders with old criminals in the jail or penitentiary is utterly inexcusable. Next to it is the collection of broken parcels of humanity in the county almshouse. The mingling of the insane and epileptics in the same institution is a palpable error. The first principle of good administration is classification. Each individual must be treated according to his characteristics as well as his needs. Men cannot be reformed in phalanxes, much less in a heterogeneous mass.

The Classification of Inmates. — Classification should extend further. The inmates of each institution should be classified according to sex, age, health, temperament, habits, etc. Good or evil may arise from association in any of these institutions. Only those should be thrown together who are mutually helpful, or at least those who are not mutually harmful. As man is a

social being, it is useless to ignore the helpfulness of proper association. Human beings of the unfortunate classes, or those of a vicious character may be made to help each other, if the proper classification and the right method be used. For example, it has been found that in many cases feebleminded women take great pleasure in caring for the young children in the institution. So a careful study of the different people in a poorhouse often will enable the authorities to put people together who are congenial in their tastes and habits. Mrs. Coolidge reports that the matron of the San Francisco almshouse for women contrived to solve the problem of bad snorers by ingeniously putting them with deaf persons.[4]

The Merit System among Employees and Officials. — Appointment of officers and attendants should be made with the greatest of care as to the fitness of the applicant. The using of positions in the charitable and penal institutions as rewards for political workers is extremely pernicious. Men who have served their party must have a place, or they have friends who must have positions as rewards for such service. The world is full of "hungry incapacity" seeking an office, and many appointees to public service are "mere pegs to hang an office on." Men on boards with appointive power are besieged by this class, and it requires great skill, patience, and courage to secure the right person for the right place.

Civil service has its advantages as a means of securing efficient servants of the people. Civil service, however, is not an automatic process by which capable officials are secured; it is only a method which may be useful if great care be exercised. The merit system should have much flexibility, and if the appointing power is intelligent and conscientious and brave enough to resist political pressure, it is usually better than the hard and fast rules of a formal civil service system. Since these qualities are often lacking in the high officials, civil service has been found a defense — perhaps a rather poor one — to prevent the institutions from being delivered over to the tender mercies of the politicians. In actual practice the heads of the institutions and of the boards

[4] Warner, *American Charities*, Rev. Ed., p. 217 n.

are usually appointed, while the subordinates are chosen from the civil service lists.

But it is preposterous to make sweeping changes in officials and attendants every two years as the party in power changes, as has been done in some instances. Economy, efficiency, and humanity indicate that it is wisdom to find the best officials that can be had anywhere for the positions, and to keep them as long as they are the best. After all, it depends upon the character of the men in the business, whether a high degree of success is possible or not.

The public administration of charities is of great importance to the welfare of society in general. For if the dependent, delinquent, and defective classes are not well cared for, either within institutions or without, there is a tendency to increase the number of the defective and criminal classes. This makes society more abnormal and adds to its burdens. The enormous sums spent for the care of the weak and the vicious cannot be justified unless social adjustment is enhanced. The socially constructive point of view must dominate all charitable and penal affairs, or we but add to the misery and degradation by our efforts to care for the helpless. It would be better to let Nature take her course in weeding out the unfit than through improper methods and defective administration to increase and perpetuate a stock of degenerates.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What would be the effect upon normal society if the number of dependents were multiplied fourfold?

2. Why is it not cheaper to allow the poor to get along as they may and relief to be given as any one wishes to have it done rather than to have supervision?

3. Outline the method of supervision practiced in your state by public authorities with reference to the public charities and the correctional institutions. With reference to the private charities.

4. Outline clearly the scheme of the state board of supervision, or, as it is commonly called, a board of state charities. Of a board of control. What is the essential difference between the two plans?

5. Give arguments in favor of each of the two systems.

6. What arguments can be advanced in favor of the supervision of private charities by public authorities? Against it?

7. What classification is possible in your state of the defective, dependent, and delinquent classes? State the reasons why they should be cared for in separate institutions.

8. What classification of inmates is practiced in your insane asylums? In the jails of your state? In the poorhouses of your county?

9. State the reasons in favor of careful classification in inmates of institutions.

10. What are the defects of the parole system?

11. What are the defects of Juvenile Courts?

12. What improvements should be made in the judicial system?

13. How does politics prevent scientific administration?

CHAPTER XXXVII

SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

We have finished our survey. We have examined the nature of social life; we have seen how the individual and his group interact; we have noticed that man does not live in a social vacuum, but in relationships with other individuals, and that his conduct is conditioned by the group to which he belongs. We have tried to define sociology, noticing its scope and its relationship to other social sciences. Then, in brief outline, we endeavored to understand how society grew up, how its institutions developed, how the land it occupies conditions its activities, how social organization evolved; we have traced the organization and life of the family, and the influences which have modified it from time to time. We studied the phases in the development of the state and the functions which it performed as a method of organizing human endeavor. We have examined property in its origin and development and the effects that it has had upon social organization. We have seen how ethics grew up out of the conditions under which men had to live; our religion likewise sprang out of the social conditions of mankind. We have noticed how both ethics and religion have developed in response to the enlarging mental horizon of mankind and his social experience.

Then we took up the matter of the question as to how the social organization molds the individual into conformity with its standards and its codes. On the other hand, we examined how the individual modifies the social organization. We pointed out that a part of this process of social control and socialization was more or less unconscious adaptation to the circumstances of life, and how a part of it is to be explained on the basis of consciously formed ideals. We examined the different methods of social control, the part played by the conscious aims of society, the ideals pre-

sented in social organization, the method of force and the educational method, the growth of the ideal of justice and its influence upon social control. It was pointed out that in spite of all of this unifying process of the social organization over the individual, that social inequalities persist partly by reason of men's natural inequalities and partly by reason of social expediency. We endeavored to understand what is meant by progress and to estimate its development.

Finally, we studied the maladjustments which come about in social life due to the varieties of individuals and the changes which come about in mankind's development. This we described as social pathology. We have seen that society has endeavored to correct certain of these maladjustments more or less by the rule of thumb and pointed out how society has learned certain lessons from its past experience. We come now to consider finally the question as to how far man may consciously direct the course of human development.

How Social Evolution Has Occurred Hitherto. — Our survey of the development of human society has shown us that even up to the present time social evolution has occurred largely by accident through the working out of consequences unforeseen. Fifty years ago Lester F. Ward pointed out that for much the longer part of human history social evolution developed spontaneously, or without conscious direction. It came about by the working together of the urges inherent in human beings, conditioned and modified by the surrounding circumstances. He pointed out also, however, that with increasing knowledge of the nature of man and of the world in which he lived, that conscious direction of social development took the place of spontaneous evolution. Up until rather recently, however, this process was largely by the blind trial and error method. For a thousand years, at least, and perhaps longer, man has been experimenting in the conscious adjustment of himself to his circumstances. Since he had no precedents except those which had grown up during the period of unconscious social evolution, he could only try new ventures by what he thought might affect the purposes which he had in mind. This is what we mean by the method of trial and error. But when new circum-

stances arose that brought about maladjustment in the arrangement then existing, some one in the group proposed an alteration. That method has been pursued not only through savagery and barbarism but for the most of the period of civilization. Hence when we look at the ancient civilizations of Babylonia and Egypt, or even of Greece and Rome, we see that the changes to effect adjustment to the new circumstances were simply modifications of the old customary arrangement supplemented by what someone thought would make the adjustment more perfect. The earliest glimpse which we get at these conscious arrangements is that provided by the Code of Hammurabi, of about 2300 B.C. Without question these laws are merely the codification with some changes in the old customary arrangements which had existed from time immemorial. Likewise, the Twelve Tables of Rome represent conscious modification of old methods of securing adjustment between the individual and the group, and between groups on account of new conditions which society faced. It is true that in those early times the new conditions and the resulting maladjustments were due to the invention of new technique for getting a living with the consequent increase of population, and the warlike contacts between groups of people, conquest of one group by another, and hence the necessity for new arrangements which earlier conditions had not forced to the front.

It is possible that these changes seem to us less violent than those which have occurred in more recent times because we do not know as much about them. It may be, however, that the changes were not so great as in more recent time, and therefore the modification of pre-existing social arrangement did not need to be so radical. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that so far as our knowledge goes, the last hundred years seem to us to be most characterized by swift and violent changes of any period in the history of mankind, and that the number of maladjustments have increased enormously during that period over any other period of human society.

So far as we can see ancient man's methods of managing his social arrangements by blind trial and error did not result so badly. Recently, however, since changes have been so sudden and so

rapid, the old arrangements for the adjustment of man to his social circumstances, and the old forms of organization have become in many respects sadly out of date. When one compares the history of the last hundred years with what we know about mankind before that time, modern changes seem to be very sweeping in comparison with those characteristic of ancient times. In a broad general way these very fundamental changes have come about in three fields which concern mankind. Almost a century and a half ago changes began in England in the economic life which were so fundamental and disturbing that we have called them by the name "The Industrial Revolution." The whole method of producing goods by the introduction of machinery driven by other than human power wrought fundamental changes in man's method of making a living. The consequences of that revolution are to be seen in all human relationships. Not only did it alter man's economic life; it brought maladjustments in the family relationship; it affected religion; it destroyed the old customary relationships between superior and inferior; it broke down old customs and traditions by which man had lived for thousands of years; it well nigh destroyed the old sense of neighborliness; it gave a rude shock to the old methods of mutual help to those in need. It swept society into widely separated classes, and destroyed the old bonds by which feudal classes were bound together. It loosened the ties of responsibility which age-long practice had built up and made out of date whatever laws there were regulating the relationship of man to man and group to group. The old moral code suffered; helpless childhood became a problem because the old method of taking care of orphans no longer sufficed. Womankind and children were exploited in the interest of greed. Every social institution found itself out of joint with the situation.

Again, the old political order which had grown up on the basis of feudal organization was found to be inadequate to meet the new situation. Cities grew up in altogether new places and for industrial reasons. The mass of England's population, for example, changed from the East of England to the West where there was water-power and coal. Cities reached a size never before

experienced in the history of mankind. The laws which had grown up before the Industrial Revolution were found to be inadequate to meet the new situation. The agencies of government were not fitted to the new circumstances. With the family disrupted by the new industrial organization, it was no longer able to function as the school of the growing children, hence schools had to be built. The crowding of great numbers of people into close contact in an industrial city brought about new problems of sanitation and health, for which, neither in custom nor in law was there adequate control. The regulation of public order, largely cared for hitherto on the basis of customary regulation, had to be supplemented by organized police forces and the prison system. Housing became a difficult matter. The regulation of streets and alleys became a new problem. International commerce had to be taken in hand and regulated. Factory laws were necessary to prevent evils of the exploitation of the laboring classes. Safety and sanitary codes had to be built. A thousand and one new relationships, which could not wait for the growth of customary regulation, which is always slow, had to be made; hence, the growth of political machinery and legal regulation, the consequent increase of courts and their modification to meet the new circumstances went on apace.

In the third place, the most rapid change in the widening of the intellectual horizon has occurred consequent upon the growth of science. The beginning of this widening interest of man and his world in Western civilization goes back to the Renaissance in the fifteenth century. With a discovery of a new world the old conceptions of the nature of the world in which we live were destroyed. The invention of the telescope brought within the scope of our knowledge vast worlds which before had been merely sparkling stars. The Copernican and the Newtonian discoveries rocked to their foundation the old mental concepts with which man had lived for thousands of years. Since that time the process has gone steadily on. With the growth of the natural sciences, especially botany, zoölogy, prehistoric archæology and biology, especially under Darwin and his colleagues, a whole new conceptual system was necessary. The Darwinian theories of the development

of animal species, and of the descent of man, and the consequent Spencerian philosophy rudely shocked the whole mental framework. So to speak, man woke up one morning to find all the mental furniture of his house disarranged. This chair which from time immemorial had been in a certain spot to which he had grown accustomed was found to be upside down. The table was overturned, the dishes were on the floor, the cupboard had been ransacked, the stove had been knocked over, and the whole place was in the utmost state of disarray. No wonder mankind under those circumstances felt very uncomfortable. Philosophy, affected by these changes in natural science, likewise had to change its whole method. Consequently, the last 75 years has been a period of mental disquietude such as the world has never seen before. These changes in men's concepts, the discoveries made by anthropology as to great numbers of people who were not accustomed to live as we had been accustomed, their different codes of morals, their varying systems of religion, their different ceremonies of etiquette, came to us with a shock. Moral codes were upset; the old sanctions of conscience were weakened and in many cases destroyed. Religion has been going through a period of conflict and readjustment, the end of which has not yet appeared. In short, in the last seventy-five or a hundred years mankind has been going through so many and such varied changes, such maladjustments have come about in consequence thereof in the social relationships, that sometimes it appears that we are face to face with disaster.

These great and fundamental changes have developed situations in our social relationships and in our social organization which constitute challenges to thinking men and women to make adjustments in the interest of individual and social welfare. We have no longer a concensus of public opinion based on custom and tradition. On the contrary, we have a division of public opinion — one part of the people controlled by such customs and traditions looking back to the good old times and believing if we could only go back to the ways in which our fathers regulated things, the old customs, the old beliefs, the old theories, that all would be well. On the other hand, an increasing part of the population,

subjected to the new flood of ideas, the new philosophy, the new science, believe that adjustment cannot be made on the basis of customs and traditions which were suited to a different situation. They believe that the old customary and traditional regulation of life at the best are useless and at the worst are obstructive. Whatever may be the truth with respect to these two points of view, the fact remains that there is no unified public opinion as there was, let us say, in the Middle Ages, when all men everywhere accepted a certain point of view, held certain beliefs no matter how poorly they practised them and endeavored to conform to certain standards with more or less success. Under the circumstances, therefore, it seems necessary to build a new public opinion based on knowledge of the present situation. All parties agree that there are maladjustments. The only point on which they differ is as to the way in which these maladjustments may be cured. All agree that human relationships are out of joint. The question is, how shall they be readjusted? The readjustment, if we may learn anything from the past, must be consciously effected. Furthermore, it must be effected within the limits set by the natural capacities of man, and in accordance with the fundamental processes according to which human beings coöperate.[1]

Even the biologist is optimistic in this regard. Says Conklin:

"The short and narrow view of human society and history is often discouraging and at times it seems desperate, but the long view is more hopeful. The human race has a surprising amount of resiliency and adaptability, it has passed through many terrible crises, many experiments have proved colossal failures, many nations and civilizations have gone down in the wreckage of time and yet the race survives and society moves forward. Our cherished institutions and social organizations may be only temporary but the records of social evolution show that the world moves forward and justifies the faith that mankind will ultimately reach the goal of a really rational organization of human society." [2]

Obstacles to the Conscious Direction of Social Development. — There are certain obstacles to the conscious change of the direction of human development, which it would be simply preposterous to undervaluate. Consider a few of these obstacles:

[1] Conklin, *The Direction of Human Evolution*, New York, 1923, p. 72.
[2] Conklin, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

(1) We must never forget that man works within certain limits; he is limited by his very nature. While instincts form a very much less part in his machinery of conduct than environment, which is not the case in animals, nevertheless in his nature he has certain definite limitations which we must always keep in mind. This marvelous characteristic of man, his intellect, makes it possible for him to vary his environment and to adjust himself to the environment as no other animal. Nevertheless, that intellect is limited in its power. One has only to remember what was discovered in the mental examinations of the drafted men in the Great War to recognize that as a whole the population of the United States has a rather low mental level. Probably it is as great as that of any other people, but if so, then we must say that the mental level of the human race as a whole is rather low.[3] Those tests show that the native ability of the bulk of our population, if these mental tests properly represent the population, was about that of a thirteen-year-old child. Moreover, we must remember that through unnumbered ages of man's history he needed the mental development adapted to a very much simpler situation than confronts him at the present time. There are limits to his possibilities which we must not forget.

(2) Consider also the immense aggregates of population which must be leavened with needed information and new attitudes before we can establish patterns of conduct adjusted to the new circumstances of life. Never in the history of the world has there been so many people living upon its face as at the present time. The exploitation of nature has made this possible, new sources of food supply are available at the present time which enables the earth to support the population as never before possible in its history. Contrast the immensity of the task, therefore, of bringing to a united mind the 120,000,000 living at the present time within the confines of the United States as compared with the small numbers resident here when Columbus discovered America. True, we have means of intercommunication at the present time which were then unknown. These we shall discuss later. The very immensity of the aggregates of population, however, is one

[3] See Yoakum and Yerkes, *Army Mental Tests*, New York, 1920.

of the problems which must be faced when we talk about the conscious direction of social adjustment. Every individual in these immense aggregates in the various countries throughout the world must be brought to look at a problem in very much the same way before that problem can be solved. New attitudes must be created, the basis must be laid for new patterns of conduct, new methods of coöperation, new adjustments to a given social situation. In our day we have seen how difficult is the process of getting a hundred twenty million of people in this country to agree upon such a pressing problem as the abolition of war, or a half-way step such as the League of Nations. Multiply that 120,000,000 sufficiently to account for the billions of individuals which people the world, many of them in a very much lower state of economic and intellectual development than our own, and you have some conception of the magnitude of this obstacle.

(3) Furthermore, we must not forget that there is an immense hangover of respect for tradition and custom from a former age. The prestige of the old cannot be suddenly destroyed. In how many minds hangs the theory that what was good enough for our fathers is good enough for us! This attitude impedes change and prevents readjustment. Changes have already come in these various lines, to which tradition and custom have not been able to offer sufficient obstacles to prevent them. In industry, commerce, and all affairs where change has meant profit, most people in the Western World are quite willing to accept changes. Our material civilization is based upon them. We are unable often, however, to see the connection between these changes and the social mores and our traditional attitude in many other fields. Where the results of science have increased our material convenience and comfort, we accept science. Large portions of our population have also accepted the results of science in their general view of the world. Nevertheless, in many spheres of human relationship, the traditional and customary still survive. Without question this is an obstacle to adopting the policy of conscious direction of social reconstruction.

(4) Another obstacle which must be overcome if we would consciously direct social development is the cleavage of society into

classes following special interests or moved by class prejudices. Ever since commercialism entered the field formerly occupied predominantly by the agricultural and pastoral economy, society has been somewhat divided into classes. With conquest you always have classes for a time. In the course of centuries, however, the relationship between these classes has been adjusted and both sides accepted the situation. As for example, the relationship between the lords and the vassals in feudal Europe during the Middle Ages. The cleavage to-day, however, is not on the old basis. It rests now upon that of industrial function and property. Each of these classes finds its own interest opposed to the interest of the other classes. The working classes, for example, are class conscious. On the other hand, property owners, capitalists and managers of capitalistic property, feel that their interests are opposed to the interests of the laboring classes seeking for higher wages and better working conditions. This cleavage is perhaps not permanent, and may be reduced in the course of time, nevertheless at the present it is an obstacle which must be overcome before we can have a united public opinion and a reconciliation of clashing interests.

(5) The commercialization of the agencies for the diffusion of information and for the formation of new attitudes is another obstacle in the way of conscious direction of social development. In another connection we have spoken of the press as a post-graduate institution. However, there is another aspect to the newspaper. As conducted at present it is a commercial organization. It is conducted for profit. The stockholders in the corporation publishing the paper expect dividends. Consequently it must be conducted in such a manner as will enable it to sell its products. News is colored, editorial policy is shaped, and the method of presentation on the page is determined by commercial standards. Consequently, a good deal of change will have to come over the press before its utmost potentialities for the diffusion of information and the formation of a public mind upon the conscious direction of social development can be assured. This situation, again, presents an obstacle which must be seriously considered.

(6) The intrenchment of the vested interests in the *status quo* is another obstacle to conscious, free direction of social arrangement. The politicians are interested in a situation which allows them to proceed to serve their particular interests without disturbance. Most of them are not in politics for their health or for the general welfare. They have either selfish or party interests to consider. Again, there are vested interests of religion which resist any change in present social arrangements. Any of you can ascertain what would happen, if you will take the trouble to go into a community of a thousand people with twelve churches and suggest that it is over-churched, and consequently, half of these churches should close their doors and unite with the other churches for the advancement of religion. You might show them how much less it would cost, how much better clergy they could secure, how much larger Sunday schools they might have, how the church buildings and all the activities of each church might be stimulated by such a change. In most cases you would meet enormous resistance from the adherents of the churches who feared they might be closed up, and have to unite with the others. That is what we mean by vested interests in the *status quo*. Some ministers might oppose it because they would have to change their location. Some old people would oppose it because they had always been Baptists, let us say, and would have to become Presbyterian, or vice versa. Others would oppose it because they have a sentimental interest connected with the particular building and the group of people with whom they have been worshipping. Furthermore, industry and commerce have vested interests in the present social order which would lead them to resist, and does lead them to resist, any changes in the direction of readjustment in the interest of the welfare of the whole. There is never a session of Congress at which a tariff bill is up that this is not apparent. The specific problem before each of the groups represented in the lobby at Washington is not what is for the welfare of the country, but what is for the welfare of my particular industry. They resist changes which they think are inimical to the welfare of their industry with every artifice known to resourceful men. Then there is the conservatism of the aged and other groups toward change.

Certain changes seem to threaten age and group prestige. These classes feel that they have a vested interest in the prestige, and therefore resist any change which threatens it.

(7) Still another obstacle to the re-shaping of social organization in the interest of more perfect adjustment of social relationships is the survival of class and group prejudices. These prejudices constitute patterns or stereotypes which have enormous influence over one's conduct and attitude. Illustrative of one of these prejudices is the resistance which was met by the doctrine of liberty, equality, and fraternity following the French Revolution, on the part of the privileged classes. It took a revolution in France to reduce these prejudices on the part of the privileged classes; even after 150 years of Republican government in France, much of that old class spirit still survives in certain parts. Likewise, the moneyed group in this country is likely to think of itself as a superior class, and to look down upon the common laborer. Sometimes the educated classes look upon themselves as a kind of aristocracy whose privileges are threatened by certain changes. The attitude of many people toward the Negro and the immigrant is determined by the survival of these prejudices. Therefore any change which threatens these prejudices is bound to suffer resistance.

All of these obstacles must be faced by those who dream of the time when society will consciously, in the clear light of ascertained facts, direct its own development. These obstacles must not be minimized, but on the other hand, they should not be exaggerated.

Hopeful Possibilities of Conscious Direction of Social Development. — In spite of the obstacles that lie across the path of social direction of society's future, there are a number of elements in the situation which indicates that increasingly conscious direction of social evolution is possible.

(1) The very breakdown of certain parts of the old social order wrecks the rigidity of what Bagehot has called "the cake of custom," and makes the whole situation fluid, ready to be directed into new channels. This breakdown of the old order is to be seen in family relationships, in the business world, in the realm of morals,

in the rapid changes in government, and in international relations. As we have already seen, the old patriarchal family is pretty well broken. The family as the center of the economic system has been seriously shaken. As the center of the educational system the family has had to yield after a certain age to the school, and is playing less and less part in the education of childhood and youth. A method of doing business hardly gets settled before changes come in that make readjustment necessary. The individual ownership of business, and the partnership, both have had to give way to the corporate organization. Swiftly new forms of corporations have been devised. One is hardly well established before another one comes in. First this large organization of business entered the manufacturing field. Now through the chain store it is going into the retail field. Where it will end is not our concern at this moment. The point is that the business world is in a state of flux. The same is true of morals. The old moral sanctions have been seriously damaged. They are disintegrating. Customs and religious taboos alike in large sections of the population, whether for good or for ill, have lost their power to govern the conduct of men and women. Morals are ready for direction in new channels if some one will provide the necessary sanctions and get them established. Too often morals have been considered as based on some theory of absolute right inherent in the nature of the universe. Perhaps we shall some day see that morals are based upon the question as to the effect of various forms of conduct upon social welfare. The same breakdown is to be seen in government and in international relations. When the United States of America broke with the old traditional form of government and set up a republic, an enormous shock was given to the long-established order in the governmental field. Gradually democracy became an ideal which from the time of the establishment of the Constitution down to the present has been ever more generously interpreted to the inclusion of more and more people. Vast changes which have been taking place in government, both from the standpoint of the nation, the state, the municipality, and the county, show that in the 150 years of our national existence, government itself has been in a state of flux. It is so

to-day. Never before have our institutions been subjected to such serious criticism. The old town-meeting has given place to representative democracy. The city manager has displaced the city council. State politics are undergoing rapid change. Even the two-party theory of government is seriously threatened. In international relations the results of the World War has seriously disturbed the former situation. The theory of the balance of power has seemed to be sadly lacking in those elements that make for the welfare of humanity. So throughout the entire social order we find ourselves at a crisis. The hopeful part of it is that it has shaken us out of our satisfaction and complacency with the established order and revealed clearly that new arrangements must be made. Such a situation, disturbing as it may be, is hopeful for the policy of consciously directing the readjustment now necessary.

(2) Another hopeful condition in the situation is that at the present time we have methods of arriving at facts in any given situation never before available to mankind. At the present time our historians and our scientists have enabled us to know more about the nature of the world and its past history than any generation of men that have ever lived upon its face. Historical methods of research have destroyed forever the old fanciful and imaginative history. The new history, with its carefully guarded method, endeavors to present from the records of the times an impartial picture of the situation. Science, especially the natural sciences, have taught the social sciences the fundamental methodology of getting at truth. The social sciences have begun to develop the technique and have attained such advancement at the present time and such acceptance of the results that we can have facts to guide us in planning the future of society, if we will take the trouble. There are still people, of course, in goodly numbers, who believe in the magic of words and who are wishful rather than scientific thinkers. Nevertheless, the present methods of scientific research are at hand, well understood, and easily manageable. Practically any problem could be examined by scientific methods to-day if society were ready to take the trouble and spend the money to do so. Take the chaos with respect to the work of

prohibition. It is simply a matter of ascertaining the facts. It ought not to be a matter of politics, but of a wide-spread investigation, not of hearsay, but of actual conditions on which the government could determine its policy with reference to the control of the liquor problem. The same is true with reference to practically every other problem before the American people at the present time. The tariff ought not to be settled on the basis of hearings and debates. That method results in nothing but darkening counsel with words without wisdom. The actual workings of the tariff can be ascertained by a patient gathering and consideration of facts. The same way with the problem of immigration. Heated argument gets us nowhere, either on one side or the other. What we need are the facts of the situation. We can get them if we will.

(3) The growing respect which is accorded to science, its methods and its results, is another hopeful element in the situation. Science is a word to conjure with at the present time. It has advertising value. The economic value of that word shows that however grossly it may be misinterpreted sometimes, it has acceptance in the public mind. Its methods are not as well understood as they should be. Sometimes its results are considered as miraculous when people do not understand how they are secured. One sits in his own drawing room and hears the human voice from across the Atlantic. Great concerts come to him over the radio. This respect for science, embryonic as it is, is a hopeful sign. When a deeper understanding of the methods of science, and a more profound appreciation of its careful and impartial search for truth comes about, the conscious direction of social development will become very much easier.

(4) Furthermore, we have an educational system, whatever may be its shortcomings, which provides a modicum of information about the world and society. The boy in grammar school to-day knows more about the world than the wisest man of one hundred years ago. That is due to our educational system. Furthermore, it is the system through which respect for science, some knowledge of its methods, and an appreciation of its results, can be more widely disseminated. Increasingly that attitude

has taken possession of our educators. That, again, is a hopeful element in the situation.

(5) The world has never seen such a complete system for the dissemination of information on a wide and rapid basis as at the present time. Not only the newspaper, but the telegraph, the telephone, the radio, have knit men together around the world as was never possible until to-day. It is well known that in the War of 1812 the Battle of New Orleans was fought after the treaty of peace had been signed in Paris, but before the word could be got across the Atlantic. To-day no important event occurs anywhere around the civilized world but what it is known within a very short time. While this system for the dissemination of information can be used for purposes of propaganda for selfish and antisocial interests, it is available for the building up of attitudes on the basis of sound information toward the rational direction of society's development.

(6) Happily, as a result of all these changes in the intellectual realm for the last 50 or 75 years there is a questioning of the old methods of arriving at a determination of policies based on custom and tradition. Sometimes we hear the complaint to-day that everything is being questioned. While this skepticism has made many men uncomfortable, without doubt a healthy skepticism with regard to our former attitudes and methods is wholesome. Parents sometimes complain to-day that the children question things which they took as settled matters. Of course they do. We ought to rejoice that they do. If we cannot give a reason for the hope that is within us, why should we hold it? Even St. Paul exhorts us to "prove all things, and to hold fast to that which is good."

At least these six elements in the situation indicate the possibility of the conscious direction of our future social development. Whether they are sufficient to enable us to break down the obstacles that stand in our pathway, whether we shall continue to drift along in our social evolution, or whether we shall finally arrive at the place where not on the basis of custom or tradition, not on the basis of prestige or selfish interest, but on the basis of what is best for society we determine our course only the future can tell.

There is no question of the goodwill of most people toward the welfare of society. There are very few people in any country who are not well-wishers of their country. Most people if you were to ask them anywhere in the world would admit that they cherish the ideal of the welfare of human society. They want to see things adjusted. Class, caste, and individual, all agree on the necessity of adjustment. Where they differ is on the methods to be used. This goodwill of the people is an asset of very considerable value. It needs, however, to be guided and informed. The new methods of research and the growing respect for science, let us hope, will help. The modern methods for the dissemination of information conceivably may be used either for the destruction of society or for its reconstruction. For which it will be used depends upon the vision of the leadership of society and upon their ability to get their vision shared by the great bulk of the people.

The vast changes which have taken place in the material and intellectual world in the last century cannot but have their repercussions upon our social structure and our ideals. They have shattered our old philosophy; they have wrecked our social institutions. Readjustments will inevitably come. Shall they come, as too frequently in the past, in a haphazard measure, or shall they come as the result of rational direction by an enlightened public conscience? As John Dewey has recently said, "It is no longer a physical wilderness with which we in this country are struggling. Our problems grow out of social conditions: they concern human relations rather than man's direct relationship to physical nature. . . . Only when we begin to use the vast resources of technology at our command as methods to achieve purposes that are avowedly social will there be an approach to a new individual, an individual as much related and unified as the present individual is divided and distracted. . . . Technology taken in its broadest sense offers an answer to the problem. It furnishes us with means that may be utilized in transforming the forces of our industrialized society into factors in producing individuals who are not only possessed of material goods, but also equipped with a high quality of desire and thought." [4]

[4] *The New Republic*, February 19, 1930, p. 16.

A new individualism, therefore, based upon a new sense of the relationship that ties one individual to another, social group to social group, and the recognition that our reconstructed society must rest upon rational knowledge, patiently ascertained by scientific methods and adjusted to the attitude of the new individual united to others of his kind, in a broader consciousness of oneness than ever before, are the elements in a social reconstruction whose destiny only the future can reveal.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is meant by the statement in the text that social evolution has for the most part been the result of the blind trial and error method? Illustrate.
2. Why cannot that method be relied on in the present situation?
3. Why is a consensus of public opinion necessary if we are to try consciously to direct the evolution of society?
4. What are the chief obstacles to conscious direction of social adjustment?
5. What are some of the elements in the present situation favorable to the conscious direction of social reconstruction?
6. Why can we say that the present breakdown in old methods of social control is favorable to the possibility of conscious social reconstruction?
7. Is the present questioning of old methods and institutions wholly bad? Why?
8. What are some of the agencies at hand to assist in social reconstruction?

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